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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the portrayals of the demonic, the Sitra Aḥra, the “Other Side,” in the 
Zohar and closely related texts.  Such portrayals form a key theme in the Zohar, a collection 
of 13
th
 century mystical, mythological, and homiletical texts, written in Spain.  In proposing 
new approaches to this theme, the thesis also advances new ways of understanding the 
work’s literary virtuosity and ontological innovativeness.      
 
At the rhetorical level, the thesis focuses on close readings, attending to the distinctive ways 
Zoharic texts employ “schemes” and “tropes” (Quintilian) in a manner that constructs and 
manages ambivalence about the divine/demonic relationship.  This methodology grows out 
of a rejection of past scholarly approaches, which tended to read such texts as reflective of 
large-scale cultural-historical phenomena, such as the putative divide between Gnosticism 
and Neoplatonism.  Such approaches bypass the distinctiveness of Zoharic writing, in which 
all precursor texts, be they scriptural, rabbinic, or theological, become transformed into 
elements of novel literary works.            
 
At the ontological level, the thesis rejects the unreflective notions of “catharsis” that have 
often guided past Zohar scholarship’s understandings of the relationship between the divine 
and the demonic.  The inadequacy of such notions appears particularly when Zoharic texts’ 
literary specificities are foregrounded.  Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, the thesis 
illuminates the phenomenon that Zoharic texts continually portray the recurrent emergence, 
collapse, and re-consolidation of divine subjects and structures as inextricably bound up 
with that of demonic subjects and structures.  The approach taken by the thesis highlights 
the centrality of “abjection” (Kristeva) for the emergence of differentiated subjects, human 
or divine.   
 
Reading the Zohar in this way facilitates a  comprehensive embrace of the distinctiveness of 
its textuality and an explication of its vision of the ways the differentiation of divine and 
human subjects from their “Others” is both indispensable and yet ultimately impossible. 
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     Technical Note 
 
This note contains some preliminary explanations about methods that might be helpful 
before beginning reading the thesis, but is only supplementary to the information contained 
in the bibliography.  Please see the bibliography for any information not contained here. 
 
I. Bibliography and Footnotes 
 
The bibliography contains the complete publication information for all sources.  For 
brevity’s sake, the footnotes contain only abbreviated information, easily amplified through 
reference to the bibliography.  Authored works are cited in the footnotes by the author’s last 
name, abbreviated title, and the relevant page numbers.   Other works are cited by an 
abbreviated title and page number.  The style in both footnotes and bibliography follows the 
Style Sheet issued by the UCL Department of Hebrew and Jewish Studies. 
 
II. Texts 
 
Zohar:  There are no standard critical editions of the Zohar, Ra’ya Mehemena, and Tikune 
Ha-Zohar.  I have generally employed the most widely-used editions, edited by Re’uven 
Margoliot (see bibliography for details).  I have occasionally selected variants that this text 
provides in parentheses, noting in the footnotes the basis for my choice – at times buttressed 
by reference to the Cremona or Mantua editions (see bibliography).  Moreover, I have 
occasionally adopted the textual variants offered by Daniel Matt in his Aramaic Texts (see 
bibliography), when the Margoliot text seems corrupted, and have so noted in the footnotes. 
 
Bible: I have used the standard Masoretic text for the original Hebrew and the King James 
Version (KJV) for the English translations (see bibliography for details).  Due to the 
importance of the specific names of God in the Zohar, I generally substitute transliterations 
of those names for the KJV’s translations.  Where I otherwise depart from the KJV, due to 
the way particular passages are understood by the Zohar, I so note in the footnotes. 
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III. Translations 
 
All translations from non-English works not marked by a footnote are my own.  When I 
have composed my own translations of the Zohar and Tikune Ha-Zohar, I have drawn on a 
wide variety of sources, including the Hebrew translations in Yehudah Ashlag’s Sulam and 
Daniel Frisch’s Matok Midevash, and, rarely, the Soncino translation, as well as 
commentaries such as Moshe Cordovero’s Or Yakar and others (see bibliography for details 
on all sources mentioned here).  I have also quoted extensively from the new translation by 
Daniel Matt (see bibliography for details), and have so noted in the footnotes.  Where I 
quote Matt’s translations but have modified them, I so note.   
  
IV. Transliterations 
 
I have used a simplified transliteration system, as follows: 
 
Consonants: 
 
א:  at the beginning of a word, designated by the appropriate vowel; if sounded in the middle 
of a word, preceded by a single closed quote (’) 
בּ:  b 
ב:  v 
ג: g 
ד: d 
ה: h (always added at the end of a word that ends with a ה, even if ה is silent) 
ו: v (if a consonant; otherwise designated by the appropriate vowel) 
ז: z 
ח: ḥ 
ט: t 
י:  y (if a consonant, otherwise designated by the appropriate vowel) 
כּ: k 
כ: kh 
ל: l 
מ: m 
נ: n 
ס: s 
ע: at the beginning of a word, designated by the appropriate vowel; if sounded in the middle 
of a word, preceded by a single closed quote (’)  
פּ: p 
פ: f 
צ: ts 
ק: k 
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ר: r 
שׁ: sh 
שׂ: s 
תּ, ת: t 
 
Vowels: 
 
Pataḥ and kamats: a 
Tsere, segol, and mobile shewa at the beginning of a word:  e 
ḥiriq: i 
ḥolem, kamats katan and ḥataf kamats: o 
shuruk and kubuts: u 
 
   
 
  
  
10 
 
Introduction 
 
A. The Demon, the Modern, and the Text 
 
In its Hekhalot sections, the Zohar describes a series of palaces through which prayers pass 
on their way upwards through the divine realm, and through which the soul ascends after 
death.
1
  These palaces also form progressively ascending stages in the human quest for 
divine secrets.  The Zohar declares that the first of these palaces, the site of the "beginning 
of the secret of faith," stands on the threshold between the realms of holiness and 
contamination – and thus provides a unique vantage point from which to perceive both the 
divine and the demonic realms.  
 
 אתוריש והיא יאהד ןיגבו ...אתונמיהמד אזרל אתוריש והיא יאהו ,אתונמיהמ וג אתוריש ,האמדק אלכיה
 ןיגרד לכד אתוריש והיאד ,אד אגרד וגמ אמחד ,עשוהב ה"והי רבד תלחת )ב א עשוה( ביתכ ,אתונמיהמד
 ,אליעל אקלסל ,ןיגרד לכד אפוס ,אד אתוריש וגמ אמח עשוהד ןיגבו .אתתל אתחנל ןיגרד לכד אפוסו
םינונז תשא יאה אלטנל ךירטצא2   
 
The first palace, the beginning within faith, and this is the beginning to the mystery 
of faith … and since this is the beginning of faith, it is written “The beginning of the 
word of YHVH by Hosea” (Hosea 1:2) – for he saw from within this level, which is 
the beginning of all the levels to ascend above, and the end of all levels to descend 
below.  And since Hosea saw from this beginning, the end of all levels, he had to 
take that "woman of whoredom" [ibid.].
3
  
                                                 
1
 I note at the outset that, for the sake of convenience, I will use the term “the Zohar” as shorthand for the 
collection of texts in the standard printed editions of the “Sefer ha-Zohar,” taking the Margoliot edition as my 
basis, but excluding the Ra’ya Mehemena sections,.  The Hekhalot sections are two inter-related compositions 
printed in Zohar Bereshit I, 38a-48b, and Pekude II, 244b-268b. As will become evident in this introduction, I 
am fully cognizant of the many critiques directed against the notion that the Zohar is a unitary book with a 
single author or even a unified group of authors.  For some prominent examples of such critiques, see Yehudah 
Liebes, ‘Ketsad Nitḥaber Sefer Ha-Zohar’, 1-87; Daniel Abrams, ‘The Invention of the Zohar as a Book’, 7-
142.  A more accurate, if somewhat clumsy label for the texts in the printed editions may be something like 
“the Zoharic literature” or, even more clumsily, “the texts written in the mid to late 13th century that came to be 
collected and printed together in the 16
th
 century and called the ‘Sefer Ha-Zohar.’”  Nonetheless, for reasons 
that should become clear in this Introduction, I think there are good reasons for reading the texts of “the 
Zoharic literature” together, even while rejecting any a priori assumptions about common authorship.    
2
 Zohar, II, 245a. 
3
 Unless otherwise stated, all translations are my own. 
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Like the prophet Hosea, figured here as the paradigmatic kabbalistic debutant, modern 
kabbalah studies may be viewed as having been situated, from their inception, in this liminal 
palace.  Gershom Scholem was fascinated from the outset by the importance of the "left 
side" for understanding kabbalah, a fascination that persisted throughout his life.  From his 
early research into the "Castillian Gnostics,"
4
 to his enduring passion for Sabbateanism in all 
its permutations, to his meticulous research into the genealogy of particular demonic 
personalities,
5
 Scholem implicitly positioned the field squarely within the "first palace."  Or, 
to put it another way, much of modern kabbalah studies may be viewed as having been 
always already inscribed in the Zohar's "first palace" text – a text that would thus have 
adumbrated the modern field's possibilities and limitations and prefigured its triumphs and 
dangers.    
 
A vantage point analogous to that of the "first palace" – a place from which one can perceive 
two opposed dimensions simultaneously – also deeply informs the Scholem tradition’s 
general characterizations of kabbalistic writing.  Scholem portrayed such writing as filled 
with tension between "inexhaustible symbolic images" and "speculative justification and 
conceptual interpretation" of those images.
6
   In Isaiah Tishby's pithy formulation, these two 
dimensions of kabbalistic writing are those of hagshamah [המשגה, loosely, 
"corporealization"] and hafshatah [ הטשפה, "abstraction"] – the former that of "visionary-
mythical images and narratives," the latter that of "speculative-philosophical concepts and 
reasoning."
7
  For Scholem, this tension, internal to kabbalistic texts, replayed a broader, 
historical tension between kabbalah as a whole and the anti-mythological Judaism he viewed 
as its historical rival.  Kabbalah, for Scholem, represented the "vengeance of myth against 
                                                 
4
  Scholem used the notion of the “Gnostics of Castille” as a way of describing a group that includes Yitsḥak 
Ha-Kohen, Moshe of Burgos, and Todros Abulafia.  See Scholem, Kabbalah, 55-56.  Some scholars have 
criticized Scholem’s notion that 12th and 13th century kabbalah can be understood as a Gnostic incursion into 
Judaism.  See, e.g., Idel, Kabbalah:  New Perspectives, 30-33.  Others have questioned the coherence and 
value of a general category of “Gnosticism” for describing a vast array of heterogeneous phenomena in late 
Antiquity.  See, e.g., King, What is Gnosticism?, passim; Williams, Rethinking ‘Gnosticism’:  An Argument for 
Dismantling a Dubious Category, passim.   I limit my use of Scholem’s “Castillian Gnostics” to:  1) providing 
a convenient label for the specific group of figures Scholem has in mind; and 2) providing an example of 
Scholem’s meta-historical conception, which recent scholarship has compelled us to critically examine.  
5
 See, e.g., Scholem, Shedim, Ruḥot u-Neshamot, 9-102.  
6
 Scholem, On the Kabbalah and its Symbolism, 96. 
7
 Tishby, Netive Emunah u-Minut, 23:    םייתוזח תולילעבו םירויצב המשגה לש םינפ- םיגשומב הטשפה לש םינפו םייתימ
םיינויע תונויגהבו- .םייפוסוליפ    
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its conquerors"
8
 – the latter term referring to the rationalistic Judaism that had supposedly 
crystallized in the centuries prior to kabbalah's emergence.  The "source of the countless 
inner contradictions" in kabbalistic symbols was the tension between their mythical content 
and the language of pre-kabbalistic normative Judaism which kabbalists continued to 
employ.
9
  From an even broader historical perspective, Scholem declared that it was the age-
old "tension" between "gnosis and Platonism" that was continually "repeated in the heart of 
Judaism" in the opposition between kabbalah and its opponents as well as within kabbalah 
itself
10
 – the term "gnosis" associated loosely with mythology and "Platonism" with the 
aspiration for harmonization with philosophical theology.    
 
This framework pervades the perspective of those writing within the Scholem tradition even 
at the level of detailed textual analysis, nowhere more so than in reading texts portraying the 
relationship between the divine and the demonic.  The notion that a kabbalistic text is a 
terrain of struggle between "gnosis and Platonism" – either as a reflection of the conflict 
between these vast historical movements or of a split within an individual author's 
subjectivity – deeply colors such analysts' treatment of particular symbols and passages and 
their explanation of textual paradoxes and contradictions.  At a methodological level, such 
an approach entails the construction of rival models of coherent concepts and/or images, 
followed by the interpretation of particular Zoharic passages as reflecting the dominance of 
one or the other of such models.     
 
Although the mythological dimension of kabbalah is by no means limited to the demonic, 
there is something mythological par excellence in texts that portray the demonic as a reality, 
rather than as an absence or a subjective projection – provided that we divest the term 
“myth” of all pejorative connotations.  Tishby declares that the relationship between the 
divine and the demonic is the "cornerstone in the conflict that opposes the mythological 
tendency and the theological imperative" in kabbalah.
11
  Scholem, for his part, quotes 
Hermann Cohen, whose rationalistic approach serves as the perfect foil for his own, for the 
                                                 
8
 Scholem, On the Kabbalah and its Symbolism, 99. 
9
 Ibid.   
10
 Ibid. 97.  See also Scholem, Kabbalah, 45. 
11
 Tishby, Torat Ha-Ra ve-ha-Kelipah be-Kabbalat Ha-Ari 47: .תיגולואיתה השירדהו תיתימה היטנה ןיב תקולחמה עלס   
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notion that "a power of evil exists only in myth."
12
  Transvaluing Cohen's intent, we could 
say, in the language of the Zohar, dayka! [אקייד] – precisely!    
 
Consequently, it is especially in relation to the demonic that the usefulness for textual 
analysis of Scholem's notion of "tensions" and "inner contradictions" between “gnosis and 
Platonism” must be re-examined.  To be sure, the kabbalah of the 13th century, like that of 
later periods, was undoubtedly marked by fundamental controversies.  Scholem, Yehudah 
Liebes, and others have highlighted the way that, at least in the early period of divergences 
between Catalonian and Castillian kabbalists, the question of the demonic was a key marker 
of difference.
13
  We find this phenomenon expressed in a pair of statements from the two 
circles to which kabbalistic thinking about the demonic owes its key formulations, the 
"Castillian Gnostics" and the "circle of the Zohar."
14
 These two texts, as Liebes has pointed 
out,
15
 contain very closely related language declaring that knowledge of the "left side" was 
that which gave its adepts their uniqueness and their superiority over others.   
 
The first of these texts is from the “Castillian Gnostic” Moshe of Burgos: 
 
יללכ רחא םלוע תואיצמ אוה רשא ילאמשה תוליצאה ירתס יניינעב , ומצע תוהמב דרפנ... םה םיטעמ
 תוליצאה רדס תואיצמ רקיע םיניבמו םיעדויה[תאזה... ]הזכ אלפומו רז תואיצמ ןינע יכ , גשומ וניא
 הנוילע הלבק דוס ילבמ...  ןימי ןוימדב אוה לאמשה הז ... גלפומ תואיצמ אוה לאמשה תואיצמ ןוימדו
רזו אלפנ ומצע ינפב...  16 
 
In the matters of the secrets of the left emanation, which is the existence of an 
other, comprehensive world, separate in its own essence.  … Few are those 
who know and understand the essence of the existence of the order of [this] 
emanation… For the matter of this strange and mysterious existence cannot 
be grasped without the secret of a superior tradition.  … This Left is in the 
                                                 
12
 Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, 36. 
13
 Liebes, Ha-Mashiaḥ shel Ha-Zohar, 35-38.    
14
 On the “circle of the Zohar” [רהזה גוח], see generally, Liebes, ‘Ketsad Nitḥaber Sefer Ha-Zohar’.       
15
 Liebes, Ha-Mashiaḥ, 36-37. 
16
 Moshe of Burgos, 'Sefer Amud Ha-Semali', 208 & 210. 
  
14 
 
likeness of the Right.  … And the likeness of the existence of the Left is an 
existence distinct in itself, wondrous and alien.  
 
Aside from the proclamation of the esotericism and the superiority of knowledge of the 
demonic (the "Left"), two other features of this excerpt broach crucial themes I will pursue 
in this thesis.  The first is that the relationship of the "left emanation" to its holy counterpart 
is simultaneously one of absolute difference and uncanny sameness:  the Left is both an 
"entire other world," and yet one "in the likeness of the right."  The second is that that "other 
world" is both "alien” and “wondrous," an excellent description of something compellingly 
fascinating and yet also frightening.  These two forms of ambivalence – the first an 
ontological characteristic of the demonic itself, the second a feature of the subjective 
experience of it – will be discussed at great length below.    
 
The parallel passage in the Zohar links this knowledge to the deepest secrets of creation. 
 
 אדבוע אזמרל ןיעדיד ןוניא ןיריעז לבא ,היב ןיעדיו היב ןאעל אירבח תישארבד אדבוע ,ןועמש יבר רמא
 לכד ןנינת אד לעו ,לודגה ןינתד אזרב תישארבדאדד יוריפנס לע אלא אלשלתשמ אל אמלע 17 
 
Rabbi Shim’on said, “The Companions study the Work of Creation and know 
something of it, but few are those who know how to evoke the Work of Creation 
through the mystery of the Great Dragon.  And concerning that [ve-al da], we have 
learned that the whole world unfolds only on the fins of that one [al …de-da]. 
 
The rhetoric of this excerpt may seem figurative, with the "Great Dragon" intended 
metaphorically.  In this vein, it would be an assertion, in conformity with the excerpt from 
Moshe of Burgos, that the most esoteric truths are only available to those with knowledge of 
the demonic.   Nonetheless, the excerpt also resounds with a more corporeal, more 
mythological meaning – the assertion of an inextricable link, as much ontological as 
epistemological, between the divine in its highest creative moment and the demon-ridden 
                                                 
17
 Zohar II, 34b.  A midrashic source of this statement may be found in Seder Rabah di-Bereshit in Bate 
Midrashot I, 28:  “And the entire world stands on the fin of  Leviathan” [ לש דחא ריפנס לע דמוע ולוכ םלועה לכו
 ןתיול ]. 
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depths, personified by the "Great Dragon."  While this reading sounds like a very heterodox, 
even proto-Sabbatean, conception, it is supported both by the context of the passage and by 
the midrashic sources upon which this excerpt is based.
18
  
 
With this close association between demonic depth and divine height, we come upon a 
remarkable affinity between the most esoteric dimensions of 13
th
 century kabbalah and key 
features of the cultural Modernist matrix out of which Scholem – and thus modern kabbalah 
studies – emerged.19   A central feature of the cultural Modernism of the early 20th century 
was the "primitivist" quest for the renewal of creativity through drawing on terrifying, yet 
fascinating forces – forces imagined as residing both in the exotic, mysterious and remote 
non-European world and in the exotic, mysterious, and remote depths of the unconscious.
20
  
This "primitivism" was always accompanied in Modernism by an emphasis on advanced 
virtuosity in specific artistic, cultural or intellectual media.  This double movement was 
captured by one cultural historian with the notion of a paradoxical "alliance of primitivism 
and abstraction"
21
 – a pair of opposite tendencies strikingly close to Tishby's hagshamah and 
hafshatah.  Scholem himself, like many of the key Modernist innovators of the early 20
th
 
century, combined an attraction to fascinating, yet terrifying, primal forces with rigorous 
disciplinary virtuosity.
22
  I believe that this unexpected homology between the characteristic 
                                                 
18
 In addition to the Seder Rabah di-Bereshit, see also Pirke Rabbi Eliezer, 23a-b (ch. 8):  “On the fifth day he 
caused the water to spawn Leviathan, the extending serpent, whose dwelling-place is the lower waters.  And 
between his two fins, the central bar of the earth stands” [  םימה ןמ ץירשה ישימחבןתיול  םימב ורודמ חירב שחנ
ןיבו םינותחתה ינש דמוע ץרא לש ןוכיתה חירבה ויריפנס  ]. 
19
 I am using “cultural Modernism” here in a relatively specific historical sense to refer to the wave of 
transformations of European high culture that swept across a wide range of domains approximately between 
the 1880s and the 1930s.  The nature, extent, chronology, and geography of the transformations in each domain 
differed widely, a complexity I need not discuss here.    
20
 The literature on Modernist primitivism is vast.  See, e.g., Middleton, 'The Rise of Primitivism and its 
Relevance to the Poetry of Expressionism and Dada', 185-203; Goldwater, Primitivism in Modern Art, passim.  
My own work has argued that Modernist primitivism was central to the post-World War I transformation of 
international law.  See, e.g., my 'Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of Reconstruction’, 351-380.  
Scholem's early advocacy of re-conceptualizing the Jews as "orientals" as part of a critique of European 
culture, was part of this general cultural movement.  See Lazier, 'Writing the Judenzarathustra: Gershom 
Scholem's Response to Modernity, 1913-1917’, 33-65.     
21
 Middleton, 'The Rise of Primitivism’, 194. 
22
 Mosse offers a description of Scholem that could be easily transposed to many of the key figures of cultural 
Modernism, particularly its avant-garde (especially if one substitutes the words "painter," "composer," or 
"architect" for "scholar" in the following passage): 
Scholem confessed that he had been attracted to anarchism even if it filled him with terror. … [H]e 
always walked a fine line between his fascination with the unconventional, even bizarre - the 
attraction for the spontaneous, uncertain dynamic (almost a Nietzschean life force) - and the need for 
self-discipline as a scholar. 
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double gestures of cultural Modernism and thirteenth century kabbalah suggests one route 
towards understanding the kabbalistic demonic, a route that can vindicate some of the 
central impulses of the Scholem tradition, while building on some of the central critiques of 
that tradition.   
 
For the purposes of a study of the demonic in the Zohar, three such critiques are particularly 
important. First, a number of scholars in the last three decades have undermined the 
historical narrative upon which Scholem's approach was based.  Moshe Idel, Charles 
Mopsik, and others have questioned whether one can speak of a "Gnostic" incursion into 
kabbalah in any historically meaningful sense, let alone the notion that kabbalah is a 
battleground between “Gnosticism” and Neoplatonism.23   Idel and Liebes have also 
undermined the notion of a historical rupture between a pre-kabbalistic non-mythological 
normative Judaism and a "revenge of myth" surging up in the 12
th
 and 13
th
 centuries.
24
   
 
Second, Liebes and those writing in his wake have questioned the notion of a single author 
for the main body of the Zohar, a position that had become axiomatic for Scholem.  Liebes 
projects a "circle of the Zohar," a group of authors who were all improvising on common 
themes and styles.
25
  The notion of a “circle of the Zohar,” whose membership and inter-
relationships remain subject to debate, has become a guiding assumption of many current 
scholars.
26
   
 
                                                                                                                                                      
Mosse, ‘Gerschom Scholem as a German Jew’, 129.  See also Wasserstrom, Religion after Religion, 129-131, 
for a brief contextualization of Scholem in his cultural milieu.  Wasserstrom notes the interest taken in 
Shabetai Tsevi by such figures as Georg Lukacs and Ernst Bloch.  For an example of the "Orientalist" 
assumptions that occasionally played a role in Scholem's philological analyses, see Scholem, 'Le-Ḥeker 
Kabbalat R. Yitsḥak ben Ya'akov Ha-Kohen’, 285.  Scholem argues for an Eastern source for the Sidre de-
Shimusha Raba, arguing that its demonic imagery shows an influence of the "imagination of the Arabs" that 
was "rich and fertile in matters relating to demons"  [ דקסעב םיברעה לש םנוימדאמ הרופו רישע עודיכ היה םידש י ].  For 
the Orientalist fascinations of German Jewish intellectuals during Scholem's youth, see Mendes-Flohr, 'Fin de 
Siècle Orientalism, the Ostjuden, and the Aesthetics of Jewish Self-Affirmation,' 77-132.  I thank Shaul Magid 
for this reference.   
23
 See, e.g., Idel, Kabbalah:  New Perspectives, 31-34, 156-157; Mopsik & Smilévitch, 'Observations sur 
l'oeuvre de Gershom Scholem', 6-31.  The latter essay also criticizes understanding  kabbalah as simply a 
Jewish application of Neoplatonism.   
24
 E.g., Idel, Kabbalah:  New Perspectives, 156. 
25
 See generally Liebes, ‘Ketsad Nitḥaber Sefer Ha-Zohar’.   
26
 See, e.g., Huss, Ke-Zohar Ha-Raki’a, 11-140.   
  
17 
 
Taken together, these first two critiques demand a dramatic rethinking of how to read the 
Zohar – particularly those passages marked by paradoxes, contradictions, or ambivalences, 
key characteristics of texts concerned with the demonic.   The attribution of divergences 
among and within passages of the Zohar to the relative dominance of one or the other of 
those putatively perennial historical or phenomenological rivals, “Gnosticism” and 
Neoplatonism, or to the outcome of the struggle between them within a single authorial 
“heart,” harbors a variety of dangers, including: overestimating the coherence of such vast 
and internally heterogeneous currents, understating the complex nature of "influence" in 
relation to a work like the Zohar, ignoring the often hypothetical nature of such influences, 
underplaying the distinctiveness of the Zoharic materials, and relying on a textually 
unjustified assumption of a single Zoharic author.  Finally, I note that certain aspects of 
these first two critiques cut in somewhat different directions.  Whereas the undermining of 
the "Gnosticism vs. Neoplatonism" thesis might suggest that we should look for even more 
coherence in the Zohar than did the Scholem tradition, the undermining of the "single 
author" thesis might lead us to simply attribute tensions among Zoharic passages to 
differences among multiple authors.   
 
A third critique, however, indicates interpretive possibilities beyond such conundra.  As 
initiated by Liebes and pursued by those writing in his wake, this critique argues that the 
Scholem/Tishby approach to the Zohar has given insufficient attention to its literary 
dimensions and overemphasized its "doctrine."
27
  Liebes particularly drew attention to the 
significance of such large-scale literary aspects as the "frame stories" in the Zohar, as well as 
to smaller-scale techniques such as exploitation of the polysemousness of key terms.
28
  
Attention to such polysemousness also allows Liebes to point to other rhetorical techniques 
such as irony.  For example, he discusses the Zohar's designation of the seven cosmic pillars, 
also identified with the seven lower sefirot, by the term hevel [לבה ] – a term that, in this 
context, carries the overt meaning of divine breath, the foundation of all existence, but also 
retains its antithetical value from Ecclesiastes of mortal "vanity."  
 
                                                 
27
 See Liebes’ critique of Tishby’s focus on the “doctrine of the Zohar” [רהזה תנשמ] in ‘Zohar ve-Eros’,  1-4.   
28
 See, e.g., his discussion of the word "אתועינצ" in Torat Ha-Yetsirah shel Sefer Yetsirah, 128-132. 
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This emphasis on the literary dimensions of the Zohar offers the promise of avoiding a 
number of the problems brought to light by the critiques of the Scholem tradition, even 
beyond that envisioned by Liebes.  The heterogeneity of elements deployed by Zoharic texts  
need not be attributed to their reflection of rival models but as a key feature of a complex 
literary technique – whose textual product should be read as something other than a means 
of conveying coherent models or even tensions between them.  Moreover, an innovative 
text's relation to the language of its authoritative predecessors need not be limited to either 
doctrinal rupture or fidelity, but often takes the form of more complex and fraught 
dynamics,  involving unpredictable mixtures of submission, rebellion, trepidation, 
tendentious misinterpretation, re-appropriation, and so on.
29
   
 
Finally, this emphasis on the literary techniques of the text may relativize the interpretive 
importance of the question of authorship.  Following Liebes’ notion of a “circle of the 
Zohar,” Melilah Hellner-Eshed suggests the analogy of a jazz ensemble, whose members 
produce individualized and contrasting riffs on common musical themes.
30
  A related 
paradigm would be the structuralist notion of a productive "combinatoire" – the generation 
of variants of myths through divergent combinations of certain basic elements or themes, 
yielding often conflicting narratives and even morals; from this perspective, a myth consists 
of all its variants, even when they appear on the surface to be incompatible.
31
   
 
Liebes himself devotes much of his crucial essay, ‘Ketsad Nitḥaber Sefer Ha-Zohar,’ to a 
comparative study of 13
th
 century texts with strong affinities to the Zohar.  He argues against 
the notion that they should be seen, stylistically, as imitations or plagiarisms of the Zohar, 
or, doctrinally, as adhering to or deviating from some supposedly authoritative Zoharic 
dogma.  Rather, they should be read as works by authors who were engaged in producing 
variations on a shared fund of themes and styles and experienced themselves as freely 
working on their "own material" as they transformed and improvised on this fund.
32
  Liebes 
                                                 
29
 I refer here to the complex relationships described by Harold Bloom.  See, e.g., The Anxiety of Influence, 
passim.   
30
 Hellner-Eshed, Ve-Nahar Yotse me-Eden:  Al Sefat Ha-Ḥavayah Ha-Mistit Ba-Zohar, 231 n. 81. 
31
 The classic description is in Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, 206-231.     
32
 For example, Liebes declares that Yehudah ben David He-Ḥasid felt free to produce variant versions of 
Zoharic texts, "doing with them as he would with his own" material [ולש ךותבכ השוע אוהשכ], even though he 
joined the circle at a relatively late stage, when Zoharic texts were already circulating.  Liebes, ‘Ketsad’, 73.   
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also makes analogous arguments about variations among parallel texts within the "body of 
the Zohar" [the Guf Ha-Zohar; רהזה ףוג] itself.33 
 
Nonetheless, I believe that the implications of the three critiques just evoked have not been 
fully thought through or implemented either alone or in relation to each other – particularly 
as they affect our reading of Zoharic passages on the demonic.  First, the call for attention to 
the literary dimensions of the text have focused on such aspects as narrative frame and 
structure, rather than on the functioning of rhetorical structure at a more detailed level – 
particularly at the level of phrases, sentences, and paragraphs (to which I refer in Chapter 
One as "constructional schemes") as well as the paradoxical employment of individual 
phenomenal images to evoke both divine and demonic entities (the distinctive Zoharic use of 
"tropes").  The Zohar uses both of these quite distinct sets of rhetorical techniques, 
separately and in tandem, to portray the relationship of the divine and the demonic.        
 
Moreover, Liebes himself generally does not carry through on his seemingly categorical 
rejection of a "doctrine of the Zohar,” and for good reason.  I note that he frames this 
rejection not simply as an assertion of a multiplicity of doctrines, but rather as a more far-
reaching claim that identifying such "doctrines" blinds one to the true nature of the Zohar.
34
   
For Liebes, the Zohar's essence is that of "eros," a term which he even views as the best 
translation for the word "Zohar" – and, he proclaims, "to define eros is to kill it."35   
 
I make two critical observations about Liebes’ general stance in relation to his particular 
analyses.  First, despite his rejection of the very notion of Zoharic "doctrine," Liebes' 
brilliant readings of Zoharic texts, both internally and in relation to other 13
th
 century texts, 
are replete with the identification of doctrines and their philological significance – in 
relation to, among other things, the question of authorship.
36
  This suggests that doctrinal 
analysis may be inevitable and that a deeper reflection upon the relationship between 
                                                 
33
 For example, Liebes argues that, at the time of the composition of the Idra Raba, which presents itself in part 
as a commentary on the Sifra di-Tseni’uta, the latter was still “a fluid text, susceptible to variations of versions 
and editing [תוכירעו םיחוסינ ייונישל ןותנו ליזנ טסקט]”.  Liebes, Torat Ha-Yetsirah, 139.  He also argues that the 
Sifra di-Tseni’uta shows the influence of the doctrine of the shemitot, a doctrine generally absent from the 
Zohar and explicitly rejected by Moshe de Leon.  Ibid., 136. 
34
 Liebes, Zohar ve-Eros, 1 & n. 107. 
35
 Ibid., 4. 
36
 This is true throughout ‘Ketsad Nitḥaber’. 
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doctrine and literary style needs to be undertaken.  Secondly, while highlighting the "erotic" 
nature of the Zohar is intended to assert that it transcends any fixed doctrine, the call for 
attention to the literary dimensions of the text stands at odds with this rather general and 
vague notion of a transcendent "eros.”  I argue, by contrast, that the texts produce the sense 
of their non-correspondence with any fixed doctrine through identifiable rhetorical 
techniques, on the level of both schemes and tropes; moreover, the doctrines themselves 
often function as literary elements deployed and juxtaposed for rhetorical effect.  Taken 
together, these two observations suggest both more attention to doctrine and more attention 
to rhetoric.    
 
In this study, therefore, I proceed along two major axes of analysis, the ontological doctrines 
about the relationships between the divine and the demonic and the rhetorical techniques 
used to portray them.  I will also highlight the complex, often unexpected, and at times 
indeterminate relationships between these axes.  In the course of so doing, moreover, I will 
be complicating our understanding of the well-known interweaving in kabbalah (and Jewish 
tradition more generally) between language and being.
37
 
 
Attention to the complex relationship of these two axes also guides the distinctive way I 
criticize the notion that one can read Zoharic texts as reflections of competing conceptual or 
phenomenal models.  In particular, I subject the writings of Tishby on the demonic to 
extensive critical examination.  Tishby frames his discussions of the demonic with the 
positing of competing metaphysical models, models that derive from the Scholem tradition's 
grand narrative of the tension between "gnosis and Platonism.”  However, rather than 
explaining  the inadequacy of this approach through Liebes’ notion of a general Zoharic 
transcendence of doctrine, I identify the key textual techniques employed by Zoharic texts in 
portraying the demonic, techniques that are ultimately responsible for the general impression 
of a doctrine-defying "eros."   I also show, however, that, though particular techniques may 
give the impression of being associated with distinct models of the demonic, these 
techniques may not be reduced to expressing such models.  Rather, while the rhetorical 
                                                 
37
 Cf. Wolfson, Language, Eros, Being, passim. 
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techniques often create expectations of particular ontological correlates, the texts just as 
often disappoint those expectations.     
 
The error of refusing to truly read a text, of viewing rhetorical structure as a mere vehicle 
for conceptual doctrine, is known to literary critics as the "heresy of paraphrase."
38
  
Paraphrase bypasses the pleasures of the text in favor of the abstractions it supposedly 
reflects.  In the Zohar, this error is portrayed in the parable of the "mountain-dweller."  This 
foolish character, ignorant of the refinements of the city, consumes wheat in its raw state, 
disdaining the pleasures of bread, cakes, and royal confectioneries – and absurdly imagines 
himself superior because he possesses the "essence" of all such luxuries.  The Zohar declares 
that only he who consumes all these luxuries – and by analogy only one who revels in the 
rich literary delights of the Zohar – can understand their essence, the “wheat” or kabbalistic 
doctrine.
39
 
 
Conversely, I also show that a number of Zoharic texts thematize the opposite danger, that 
of simply submitting to the expectations set up by rhetorical techniques.  Such texts suggest 
that the confusion between rhetorically created expectation and ontological truth may lead to 
the gravest kind of religious error.
40
  Taken together, these two dangers highlight the need 
for a subtle reflection on the relationship between rhetoric and doctrine in the context of a 
work that operates powerfully on both levels.    
 
Rather than simply reflecting one or another of competing models or even the tension 
between them, Zoharic texts strategically and overtly juxtapose elements from incompatible 
conceptual models and incongruous phenomenal images, using them as raw material for  
novel literary creations.  Such juxtapositions of seemingly incompatible elements occur even 
within short excerpts, indeed even within single images.  Rather than reductively reading the 
heterogeneity of textual elements as evidence of an underlying clash between coherent 
systems of concepts or images from which the disparate elements supposedly derive, I strive 
to read the resulting texts as something new and distinct.   
                                                 
38
 See Brooks, The Well-Wrought Urn, 192-201. 
39
 Zohar II, 176a-b. 
40
 See my discussion of Solomon's error in Chapter One, pp. 86-88. 
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In rhetorical terms, the Zoharic technique of the juxtaposition of heterogeneous elements 
might be called a form of catachresis – defined by Quintilian as an “abuse" of language, 
often consisting of unnaturally mixed or extended images.
41
  Such "abuse" is “necessary” in 
order to signify "whatever has no proper term.”42 Significantly for my suggestion of the 
uncanny convergence of cultural Modernism and 13
th
 century esotericism, catachreses may 
also be viewed as the most characteristic gestures of the 20
th
 century avant-garde,
43
 pithily 
summarized by Max Ernst in a formulation highly pertinent to analysis of the kabbalistic 
demonic: "the coupling of two realities that seem incapable of coupling on a plane that 
seems unsuited for them."
44
  The abundance of catachreses in the Zohar – particularly in 
relation to the demonic, some of whose key activities consist precisely of "unsuitable" and 
seemingly impossible "couplings" – demonstrates the necessity of beginning with close 
textual analysis rather than premature recourse to conceptual or phenomenal models.  Such 
models are incapable of capturing the paradoxical phenomena the Zohar wishes to evoke 
through its catachrestic techniques.   
 
Indeed, the service rendered by rhetorical analysis in drawing our attention to the 
widespread Zoharic use of catachresis also suggests its utility for the specification of other 
general terms used in Zohar scholarship.  For example, catachresis is a rhetorical technique 
that can help provide much-needed specification to Scholem's general definition of the 
mystical "symbol" as that which "makes another reality transparent which cannot appear in 
any other form."
45
 This familiar definition is strikingly similar to Quintilian's definition of 
the function of catachresis – though the latter, in its specificity, shows one way Scholem's 
general insight can actually be used in reading particular passages.     
 
Although catachresis may be found throughout the Zohar, its use is particularly suited to the 
realm of the demonic.  As Paul de Man points out, there is something disturbing intrinsic to 
                                                 
41
 See Preminger, ed., Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 104.  The quoted phrase is from 
Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 132.    
42
 Quintilian, Institutes, 132. 
43
 Such images, staples of Surrealism, were inspired by Lautréamont's notion of beauty as “the chance 
juxtaposition of an umbrella and a sewing machine on a dissection table." Maldoror and Poems, 217. 
44
  Ernst, ‘Au-delà de la peinture’, 256.   
45
 Scholem, Major Trends, 27. 
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this trope.  Catachreses, he writes, “are capable of inventing the most fantastic entities …. 
They can dismember the texture of reality and reassemble it in the most capricious of ways, 
pairing man with woman or human being with beast in the most unnatural shapes.” 46   
 
These two features of catachresis, “dismemberment” and “reassembling” will be key to 
much of what follows.   Particularly in Chapter Two, the baffling process by which the 
demonic begins as the inchoate "refuse" of the divine and then becomes a highly structured 
and autonomous realm ruled by mighty diabolical personages will be one of my central 
themes.   On the rhetorical level, adapting the work of Harold Bloom, I will refer to the 
images that embody these two features of catachresis as “tropes of limitation” and “tropes of 
representation.”47 Though I discuss these in great detail below, I would here like to mention, 
in connection with my discussion of catachresis, the “trope of representation” most 
important for my purposes, that of prosopopeia – a trope that personifies, or "gives a face" 
to something that normally lacks a "face." Prosopopeia is a particularly apt term for 
understanding kabbalistic thought, much of which is preoccupied precisely with, to use 
Lurianic terms, "tikun ha-partsufim," itself almost a literal translation of the term 
prosopopeia.  As De Man writes, “Something monstrous lurks in the most innocent of 
catachreses: when one speaks of the legs of the table or the face of the mountain, catachresis 
is already turning into prosopopeia, and one begins to perceive a world of potential ghosts 
and monsters.”48  Catachresis thus is particularly suited for portrayals of the demonic, 
especially those concerned with its crystallization, the process by which it is "given a face." 
 
With this approach to reading the Zohar, one can vindicate some of the crucial critiques of 
the Scholem tradition, while retaining what I believe to be some of its deepest wellsprings.
49
  
                                                 
46
 De Man, 'Epistemology of Metaphor', 21.    
47
 See, e.g., Bloom, A Map of Misreading, 88.  They have been explained by one scholar as follows:  tropes of 
limitation are "figures that undermine the poetical sufficiency of extant visions—literal or fictional- by 
exposing their referents to be more or less or other than they seem"; tropes of representation are "figures that 
replace extant visions with visions of new objects, whether parts of previously extant (but no longer literal) 
wholes, or wholes of previously extant (but no longer independent ) parts."  Faubion, Modern Greek Lessons: 
A Primer in Historical Constructivism, xxii.  In this thesis, the key example of tropes of limitation is irony, of 
tropes of representation, prosopopeia.    
48
 De Man, 'Epistemology of Metaphor', 21.     
49
 My position has something in common with Mopsik in 'A Propos d'une polémique récente concernant 
l'oeuvre de G. Scholem’, 13-25.  Mopsik argues that the persuasive critique of Scholem's thesis of a Gnostic 
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Zoharic texts on the Sitra Aḥra are indeed marked by tension between seemingly 
incompatible motifs – and yet we need not have recourse either to a grand historical 
narrative about competing traditions or to a subjective narrative about conflict within the 
breast of “the author."  The provocative and explosive tensions within the Zohar need not be 
seen as a reflection of competition between models but are immanent in the material itself, 
both on the rhetorical and ontological levels.  For example, the Zohar and much of 
kabbalistic literature generally are replete with portrayals of the ways the divine and 
demonic continually enter into dangerous and scandalous relationships with each other.  
Moreover, some of the most characteristic and profound dimensions of the kabbalistic 
tradition emerge from the bafflingly never definitively achieved drive to distinguish the 
divine and the demonic, generating endlessly proliferating discourses and ritual practices.   
This vast discursive and ritual production, generated by the explosive dynamics between 
"high" and "low," would have particularly appealed to the Modernist sensibility of a 
Scholem and must partly account for his fascination with Sabbateanism.  This thesis will be 
concerned, accordingly, with seeking out the rhetorical techniques and ontological doctrines 
through which the Zohar juxtaposes heterogeneous elements – abstract and concrete, 
sublime and base, majestic and repulsive.  In doing so, I embrace the Scholem tradition's 
fascination with such phenomena, even while adopting a critical stance in relation to its 
explanation of them.    
 
  
B. Demonic Ambivalence 
 
From the standpoint of the Zohar's "first palace" – that Janus-faced site which 
simultaneously looks both upwards and downwards, towards the highest heaven and the 
lowest hell – the divine and the demonic appear separated by the merest threshold, hardly 
sufficient for a static foothold, as the ventures of Hosea into the "Other Side" confirm.  
Unceasing, dangerous movement between the two realms, rather than their definitive and 
hermetic separation, is thus a central feature of Zoharic ontology.  Consequently, just as I 
seek to identify paradoxical techniques of rhetoric to understand the complex stylistics of 
                                                                                                                                                      
incursion only deepens the paradox that Scholem cherished:  the provocative relationship of halakhic Judaism 
to the latently antinomian mythology by which it has long been accompanied.  
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Zoharic discourses on the demonic, so I have sought out a paradoxical and dynamic 
ontological theory to understand their doctrine.   
 
At this doctrinal level, I will foreground the dynamics of ambivalence, in which the most 
radically other may prove to be the most intimate, the most denigrated fatefully linked to the 
most idealized, the most contaminated often mistaken for the most holy.  It is a central 
contention of this thesis that the dynamics of ambivalence, in a wide variety of 
permutations, can provide guidance through many of the mysteries of Zoharic texts on the 
relationship between the divine and the demonic.  Though I draw this term from 
psychoanalytic discourse, I use the notion of ambivalence to include not only the struggles 
of a subject (or proto-subject) with opposed tendencies, but also the “objective” duality (or 
proto-duality) of those tendencies themselves – or, more precisely, I show how the dynamics 
of ambivalence generate both subjects and objects.
50
  I will look at these dynamics from two 
distinct perspectives, splitting and abjection, the former the focus of Chapter One, the latter 
of Chapter Two.  Taken together, these analyses will, to be sure, elaborate a set of implicit 
Zoharic "doctrines" – but doctrines that bear within them an intrinsic paradoxicality highly 
productive for accounting for the texts’ baffling formulations and apparent contradictoriness.   
All three of these notions drawn from psychoanalysis – ambivalence, splitting, and abjection 
– concern the processes of the formation of subjectivity.  As such, however, they are well-
suited to explore the formation of those fundamental structures of kabbalistic ontology that 
are divine and demonic subjects.  I will return below to the question of the psychoanalytical 
provenance of my key analytical terms.   
 
The vicissitudes of the dynamics of ambivalence may be associated with a variety of 
rhetorical techniques.  In Chapter One, the focus will be on rhetorical parallelism; in Chapter 
                                                 
50
 Freud’s elaboration of the dynamics of ambivalence was always intimately related to his dualism, a key, 
persistent feature of his thought, though taking ever-changing forms.  Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
53; Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 292.  His late turn to mythological imagery, most overtly in his embrace of 
Empedocles’ opposition between “love and strife,” cannot be dissociated from the final version of his dualism, 
the conflict between “Eros and destructiveness.”  Freud, ‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’, 246.    In this 
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“forces” that precede or transcend the subject.  Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 293.  Almost involuntarily, 
against the “the radically demythologizing milieu and intent of Freud’s psychoanalysis,” he bequeaths us a 
vision of these forces as “silent, invisible Movers that take the place of the prior idols that psychoanalytic 
theory has dispatched,” forces that “cannot be demythologized.”  King, ‘Freud’s Empedocles: The Future of a 
Dualism’, 24.    
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Two, on the two-step process of “tropes of limitation” followed by “tropes of 
representation.”  I again caution, however, that associations between ontology and rhetoric 
can be as misleading as they are illuminating.  In the remainder of this Introduction, I will 
foreground the ontological level because introducing its key features requires a substantial 
discussion of non-Zoharic texts; by contrast, the rhetorical analysis can only be explained in 
conjunction with the readings of particular Zoharic texts that form the core of the subsequent 
chapters.   
 
1. Ontological Splitting and Rhetorical Parallelism 
 
Splitting, in psychoanalysis, consists of a set of techniques for the management of 
ambivalence.  The experience of acute ambivalence is that of an unbearable tension in which 
incompatible affects or valorizations are projected onto the same object and/or coexist 
within the same subject.  Splitting may take a wide variety of forms – projection and 
introjection, idealization and denial, as well as other ways of accomplishing the division 
between the “good” and the “bad.”51  Such mechanisms not only serve to protect the 
cherished object from negative valorizations but also serve to protect the integrity of the 
subject from intolerable contradictions.  Thus, on the one hand, the object is doubled into 
“good” and “bad” forms; on the other hand, the subject is split between its accepted facets, 
embraced as the true self, and its repressed facets, cast into that space of alterity, the 
unconscious.  Phenomena typical of splitting, most obviously, those of semantic and/or 
phenomenal doubling, may be taken as evidence of the formative processes whereby 
coherent subjects and objects, selves and others, come to be.  Or, to put it another way, 
coherent subjects and objects can be viewed as products of splitting.   
 
Ultimately, however, the techniques of splitting are fragile and must be continually re-
enacted.  The opposed poles of such splits, both internal and external, constantly threaten to 
flip into one another, producing a sense of unease, a scandalous indeterminacy, an 
“uncanny” resemblance of things which "should" stand in a relation of opposition.52  The 
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 Kristeva, Melanie Klein, 107. 
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 The classic text is Freud, 'The ‘Uncanny', 217-256.  The analysis of the literary, cultural, and 
psychoanalytical implications of "the double" is vast.  Freud drew on the work of Rank, The Double. A 
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precariousness of "splitting” and the consequent need for its continual re-enactment leads to 
a proliferation of increasingly menacing doubles.   
 
The pertinence of these phenomena to the demonic was already suggested by Freud, who 
proposes splitting as the psychological mechanism that generates the Devil.   Tellingly, for 
my purposes, he offers at least two distinct versions of this mechanism, one on the level of 
the object, the other of the subject.  The first concerns the splitting of the image of the father 
into "good" and "bad" versions, the other concerns the splitting of the self.
53
   In the first 
version, Freud argues that "God and the Devil were originally identical – were a single 
figure which was later split into two figures with opposite attributes."
54
  This single figure 
was modeled on, or, perhaps more accurately, was a daunting projection of, the human 
father.  The benefit gained by its splitting into two opposite personages was the management 
of the "ambivalence which governs the relation of the individual to his personal father."
55
  In 
the second version, by contrast, Freud attributes the origin of the Devil to a splitting of the 
ego, an attempt by the individual to safeguard the coherence of his self-image against its 
fragmentation by unruly desires:  "the devil is certainly nothing else than the personification 
of the repressed unconscious instinctual life."
56
  In this version, the Devil is a crystallization 
of elements that the subject finds incompatible with a coherent self and that become 
dissociated from, and antagonistic to, that self.  In rather more complex form, both of these 
versions will be important to this thesis.  I strongly emphasize, though, that I will adapt them 
for ontological, rather than merely psychological, portrayals – or, more precisely, if, as these 
Freudian passages can be read as hinting, both the object and the subject are products of 
splitting, the latter must be situated at a level that precedes them both.  Splitting may thus be 
viewed as, paradoxically, both constructing and managing ambivalence. 
  
A clear example of the dynamics of splitting, re-enacted with ever-increasing insistence 
through the history of kabbalah, is the phenomenon of the semantic and/or phenomenal 
                                                                                                                                                      
Psychoanalytic Study.  The theme, pervasive in both Western and non-Western cultures, was particularly 
prominent in European Romantic literature, from Dostoevsky to Maupassant.  Among the writers that have 
influenced my own understanding of this theme, beyond Freud, Klein, and Rank, are the anthropologist Claude 
Levi-Strauss and the philosophers Jacques Derrida and Sarah Kofman.   
53
 Rizzuto, 'Freud, God, the Devil and the Theory of Object Representation', 168. 
54
 Freud, 'A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis', 85. 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Freud, ‘Character and Anal Erotism’, 173.  See generally de Urtubey, Freud et le diable, passim.   
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mirroring between the divine and demonic realms, often associated with the verse-fragment 
translated by the KJV as "God also hath set the one over against the other” [ השע הז תמעל הז
םיהלאה] (Ecc. 7:14).  This association was appropriated and adapted for their own purposes 
by 13
th
 century kabbalists from a long tradition extending from the Talmud
57
 to the Sefer 
Yetsirah
58
 to the Sefer Ha-Bahir.
59
  A review of Zoharic texts yields a wide range of terms 
shared by the divine and demonic realms:  each has ten sefirot, seven palaces, and so on.
60
  
Indeed, a better Zoharic translation for the Ecclesiastes verse would be “‘this’ confronted 
with ‘this’ hath made the Elohim,” since this would retain the semantic repetition [הז...הז] 
key to this phenomenon whose distinguishing feature is the designation of radically opposed 
entities with identical, or nearly identical, terms.
61
  This insistence on antithetical 
homonymy, with its potential for confusion and indeterminacy, makes the radical distinction 
that must nonetheless be drawn between these adversarial realms both highly urgent and 
deeply problematic.  As I shall show, the consequent fears of misprision, of taking one realm 
for the other, which reach their apex in the Sabbatean controversies, already form a key 
theme in the Zohar and related 13
th
 century texts.
62
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 bḤagigah, 15a: 
הז תא םג ביתכד יאמ היל רמא הער תוברתל אציש רחאל ריאמ יבר תא רחא לאש תמועל  המ לכ ול רמא םיהלאה השע הז
 אלא ךכ רמא אל ךבר אביקע יבר ול רמא תורהנ ארב םימי ארב תועבג ארב םירה ארב ודגנכ ארב אוה ךורב שודקה ארבש
 םיקידצ ארבםנהיג ארב ןדע ןג ארב םיעשר ארב 
Aḥer, after he had taken the evil path, asked Rabbi Me’ir:  “what is the meaning of that which is 
written, ‘Also this confronted with this hath made the Elohim’?  He replied:  “For everything that the 
Holy One blessed be He created, he created a counterpart.  He created mountains, he created valleys; 
he created seas, he created rivers.”  Rabbi Akiva said to him:  “Not thus did your master speak.  
Rather, He created righteous people, he created wicked people; he created the Garden of Eden, He 
created Hell.” 
58
 Sefer Yetsirah Ha-Shalem, 145: 
םיהלאה ארב הז תמועל הז ץפח לכ םג ,ער תמועל בוט . 
Also, in relation to every object, “this confronted with this hath made the Elohim” – good confronted 
with evil. 
59
 Sefer Ha-Bahir, 7: 
א םג יאמו םיהלאה השע הז תמועל הז ת(ז תלהק 'די ,)ערב ומוקמ םשו והת ארבו םולשב ומוקמ םשו והב ארב 
And what is “Also this confronted with this hath made the Elohim” (Ecc. 7:14)?  He created Bohu and 
posited its place in peace; and he created Tohu and posited its place in evil. 
60
 See Cordovero, Pardes Rimonim, Pt. 2, 55a; Tishby, MZ, I, 288.    
61
 My translation also suggests that the second part of the clause “God hath made” should be Zoharically read 
as “hath made the Elohim,” with “the Elohim” as the object of the verb – for this would accord with the 
Zoharic notion that the divine name “Elohim,” associated with the side of judgment, the ultimate source of the 
demonic and even one name for it (in the expression “Elohim Aḥerim,” “Other Elohim”), may be a product of 
this division – a notion closer to the themes of Chapter Two. 
62
 On the dangers of cognitive and religious error due to homology between the divine and the demonic, see 
Cardoso, 'Al Shene ha-Meshiḥim di-Kedushah u-Shene Ha-Meshiḥim di-Kelipah', 288-289. 
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In the Sefer Amud Ha-Semali of Moshe of Burgos, the ominous side of the kabbalistic 
insistence on correspondences between the two realms is succinctly expressed in its 
discussion of the first of the ten demonic sefirot.   This text provides two opposed, yet 
punningly related, traditions concerning the name for this sefirah, which corresponds to 
Keter in the divine realm.  The first teaches that its name is Te’omi'el [לאימואת], the "twin 
God" or "twin of God" – teaching that it and the holy sefirah of Keter are “twins in rank" 
[ןתלעמב תוימואת].63  On the other hand, another tradition informs us that it is Tomi’el [לאימות] 
– which may be translated as "the termination (or death) of God."64 The text tells us that this 
second name signifies that it and Keter are "not equal in rank and do not match each other 
[ מב תווש ןניאתומיאתמ ןניאו ןתלע ]."65  If we put together these two statements about the 
relationship between the divine and the demonic, we would obtain the following paradoxical 
formulation:   "תומיאתמ ןניאש תוימואת תולעמ," the metaphysical "twins that do not match" or 
that are "unsuited" or "improper" for each other – which I have taken as my title.  
 
The precariousness of the distinction between the divine and the demonic is reflected in the 
oscillations in their relative power.  Some kabbalistic texts tell us that the demonic "twin" 
was created for holy purposes, above all to punish the wicked, and thus subordinated to the 
divine.
66
  However, this putative instrument of divine will comes to rebel against its 
subordination – a rebellion, seemingly both inevitable and inexplicable, that destabilizes the 
authority of the divine itself.  Often, this rebellion is expressed through the verse-fragments, 
"A slave who becomes king … and a  bondwoman who supplants her mistress" [  יכ דבע תחת
התריבג שרית יכ החפשו...ךולמי ] (Prov. 30:22-23).67   
 
The projection of a normatively inferior realm that rhetorically and/or phenomenally mirrors 
the holy realm, but that also menaces, destabilizes, and may even come to dominate it, 
strongly resembles the power dynamics of "mimicry" described by the literary theorist Homi 
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 See Moshe of Burgos, 'Sefer Amud Ha-Semali', 211. 
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 After the model of "רודה לכ םת דע", “until all the generation was consumed” (Numbers 32:13).   Cordovero 
also interprets the name in this sense.  Pardes, II, 55a.  In the Tikune Ha-Zohar, 108b, these names are used for 
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Bhabha, whose work is guided by psychoanalytic writing on ambivalence.  Bhabha 
elaborates this concept in portraying attempts by colonizers to recreate the colonized in their 
own cultural image. Bhabha argues that two characteristic limits become manifest in such 
projects.  First, in order for the condition of the colonized to serve as a continuing 
legitimation of the colonizer's power, a difference with the colonizer must always be 
maintained – i.e., the colonized must be set up to fail in its mimicry in order to justify its 
subordination.  Second, however, the colonized's mimic presence destabilizes the colonizer's 
own identity, parodying, and thereby undermining, its authority and integrity.  The very 
failure to completely assimilate the colonized that legitimizes the colonizer's power thus also 
reveals a limit in that power.  The troubling presence of the subordinated "double" thus 
comes to undermine the self-certainty, even the identity, of the "original."  Bhabha asserts 
that the colonial cultural project thereby often results in the simultaneous production of both 
"resemblance and menace."
68
 The colonized Other oscillates between "mimicry – a 
difference that is almost nothing but not quite" and "menace – a difference that is almost 
total but not quite."
69
   
 
Perhaps the clearest instance of the importance of these dynamics of mimicry to 
divine/demonic relations in the Zohar is the formulation that the demonic is to the divine "as 
a monkey is beside human beings" [אשנ ינב לצא אפוקד אנווגכ].70  This phrase may be used to 
suggest the subordination of the demonic and its failure to achieve full resemblance to the 
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 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 86.   
69
 Ibid., 91.   As I note above, many kabbalistic texts portray the demonic as originating in a force that was 
designed to serve holy ends but then became improperly independent and began to work against their true 
master.  See, e.g., Gikatilla, Sod Ha-Naḥash u-Mishpato, passim.  In a closely analogous vein, Bhabha quotes 
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paraphernalia and ceremonies of the imperial legislature, has dared to defy the mother country."  Location, 85.  
Cust may as well have been describing the parallelism established between the divine and the demonic, and the 
penchant of the latter for rejecting the notion that it should be subservient to the former.  He could, indeed, 
have used one of the kabbalists' favorite scriptural citations for this process:  ""a slave who becomes king 
…and a bondwoman who supplants her mistress” (Prov. 30:22-23).  
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 See, e.g., Zohar II, 148b, III, 189a.  The former passage identifies the holy female with the the letter "ה" and 
the unholy female with the letter "ק" – with the key difference between the two the elongation of the left leg, a 
fitting sign in kabbalistic imagery for its demonic nature, as well as an exemplification for the Bhabha phrase, 
"almost the same but not quite."  This formulation of the relationship between the divine and demonic as 
human to monkey is repeated by Cordovero in Pardes, II, 55a and 56b-c.  In the second of these passages, 
Cordovero explicitly emphasizes the parodic element of the monkey's mimicry.  The image is of Talmudic 
provenance, though it is there used to describe the relationship between higher and lower beings, rather than 
between the divine and the demonic.  bBava Batra 48a. 
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divine, but it also evokes the destabilizing power of parody.
71
  Indeed, often this mimicry 
comes even more menacingly close than Bhabha's "difference that is almost nothing."  I 
refer again to the widespread kabbalistic use of a single term to designate both divine and 
demonic entities.  The Zohar highlights the fact that such disturbing homonymy can even 
affect the highest divine names, such as El [לא].72   The 16th century kabbalist Moshe 
Corodovero discusses this phenomenon, shortly after citing the Zohar's "monkey" image, in 
a manner that suggests the "difference that is almost nothing" involved in demonic mimicry:   
"And it is no wonder that you find the name El in relation to the kelipot, for just as there is 
the name El on the holy side, so is there the El Aḥer [Other God].73 Although Cordovero 
assures us that this is "no wonder," the Zohar shows us that this homonymy can lead to the 
gravest form of religious error.  Thus, Balaam described himself as one who "heard the 
words of El" [לא ירמא עמוש] (Numbers 24:4), intentionally deceiving some into viewing him 
as a holy prophet, though he secretly intended to refer to the demonic "El."
74
   Semantic 
"resemblance," or even indistinguishability, becomes religious "menace" – the "difference 
that is almost total," or rather that should be total, "but not quite," a silent margin that can 
spell the difference between the highest and lowest.  Antithetical homonymy – a rhetorical 
analogue to ontological splitting thoroughly ubiquitous in kabbalistic discussions of the 
demonic – thus proves to be a fragile and dangerous technique of managing ambivalence, 
threatening at least the subjective distinguishability of the divine/demonic divide, and 
perhaps, as we shall see, even posing an ontological threat to that divide.   
 
I note three additional instances of this phenomenon which serve to highlight its generality.  
First, the Zohar uses the demonstrative pronoun "these" [הלא], the abstract signifier for the 
designation of proximate objects, to refer both to the demonic couple of Sama’el and Lilith 
and to the six sefirot that together compose the Holy One blessed be He, the Kudsha Berikh 
Hu – and, in some places, the seven sefirot that compose the Kudsha Berikh Hu and his 
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 See, e.g., Zohar Ḥadash 8c (Sitre Otiyot).  In this passage, the letter "ק" is compared to “a monkey which, 
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 רחא ל"א שי ןכ השודקה דצב לא םש שיש ומכ יכ תופילקה תומדב לא םש אצמנש המ המית ןיאו  
74
 Zohar III, 193b-194a. 
  
32 
 
consort, the Shekhinah.
75
  As Cordovero writes, "just as there are 'these' on the side of the 
kelipah, so there are 'these' on the side of holiness"
76
 – potentially introducing an element of 
lethal indeterminacy into any gesture of designation.  A second, equally telling, instance 
may be found in Sefer Amud Ha-Semali.  According to this text, the word "other" [רחא] – 
often the very signifier of the demonic in kabbalah – can refer either to the divine or the 
demonic, again depending on the context.
77
   A striking Zoharic example of this is the use in 
at least one place of the term "Sitra Aḥra,"  "the Other Side," one of the key terms for the 
demonic realm, to designate the holy realm.
78
  A third example, going to the heart of the 
distinction between the divine and the demonic, concerns the word "left."  As Cordovero 
tells us, "sometimes the Zohar calls the unholy the 'left side' and sometimes the holy – and 
one needs to distinguish according to the context."
79
  Thus, we find in 13
th
 century texts that 
the words for both the proximate [הלא] and the remote, the other [רחא], are doubled 
signifiers, rendering a gesture in either direction indeterminate in relation to the distinction 
between the divine and the demonic – an indeterminacy also found in the word that 
generally designates the demonic side ("left").  Such instances suggest that the danger of 
instability and indeterminacy posed by antithetical homonymy goes beyond even the 
challenge presented by parody.   
 
  2.   Abjection and Irony, Crystallization and Prosopopeia 
 
As I noted above, Chapter One is largely devoted to exploring the Zoharic construction and 
management of ambivalence through splitting and its evocation through schemes and  
tropes.  It also shows the ways such splitting is never definitive, indeed, is continually re-
enacted, and how the two opposed realms continually threaten to encroach upon each other 
or to be mistaken for one another.  At least in a pre-messianic time, ambivalence thus 
appears irreducible, as it is the very same mechanisms that construct it, seek to manage it, 
and destabilize it.     
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 Compare Zohar II, 236b (demonic interpretation) and Zohar I, 2a (divine interpretation). 
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  Pardes, II, 5c:  
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Even though it is a dynamic process, however, splitting is an insufficient frame for reading 
the Zoharic Sitra Aḥra.  Splitting and its associated rhetorical techniques are useful for 
reading Zoharic portrayals of the Sitra Aḥra as a mighty, antagonistic realm, a formidable 
rival to the divine realm to which it bears such a troubling resemblance.  Yet equally 
persistent Zoharic themes concern far more intimate relationships between the two realms.  I 
refer to portrayals of the genealogy, vitality, and nurturance of the demonic as deriving from 
the divine (or, especially in the case of its initial emergence, the proto-divine) – more 
precisely, from the (proto-)divine's waste products, filth, malignant growths, fallen desires, 
and so on.   
 
Passages that bring together these two cardinal notions – the highly organized structure of 
the mighty realm of the Sitra Aḥra, on the one hand, and its emergence from, and 
dependence on, the flimsy, inchoate, and diseased byproducts of the (proto-)divine, as well 
as its seductive relationship to the divine, on the other – feature the most provocative 
catachreses, the most baffling, flagrantly incoherent images.  Two examples, both of which 
will serve as frequent touchstones for my entire analysis, can serve to quickly evoke this 
technique.  The first is the Zohar's assertion that the ten sefirot of the Sitra Aḥra, the entire 
demonic realm, "cling to the zohama
80
 of the fingernail" [ארפוטד אמהוזב ןדיחא] of the 
Shekhinah.
81
  This portrayal is not merely theologically scandalous (which would not be 
surprising or unusual in the Zohar), but constitutes an evidently deliberate catachresis, a 
suturing together of utterly heterogeneous images – not to mention a rather precarious 
physical situation, if one takes its phenomenal evocation seriously.  How can that most 
flimsy and unstable basis, fingernail filth, support the mighty and highly organized demonic 
realm, an "entire other world"?
82
  A second example comes from the writing of Joseph of 
Hamadan, a contemporary, perhaps a member, of the circle of the Zohar, in a passage 
closely related to the Zoharic spirit.  This kabbalist portrays the demonic realm as nurtured 
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from the excretory orifice of the divine phallus.
83
  This very different image poses an even 
more theologically shocking notion, as well as an equally baffling image, again especially if 
one takes its phenomenal evocation seriously.  In both cases, the images defy the possibility 
of accounting for the stable grounding that a persistent, powerful, and highly structured 
demonic realm seems to require, and of providing for even a minimally theologically 
acceptable explanation of its relationship to the divine.   
 
Tishby's approach to explaining this paradox, that the Sitra Aḥra is at once an independent, 
adversarial realm and intimately related to the divine, serves only to heighten its baffling 
quality.  For Tishby, the dependence of the demonic on the divine, for example at a 
genealogical level, should be seen as an attempt to mitigate the dualism between them, 
particularly the stark dualism expressed in the portrayals of their relationship as 
homologous.
84
  This interpretation, however, misses the import of the relationships of 
dynamic intimacy between the two realms, and may even be seen as a form of psychological 
denial in the face of their enormity.   It fails to acknowledge the horror of such relationships 
– which may be described as monstrous births, perverse sexuality, and parasitical nurturance 
– and of the theological scandals they involve (scandals only magnified by the paltriness of 
the attempts to rationalize them).  Rather than a mitigating retreat from a sharply demarcated 
dualism, such dynamic relationships of intimacy between the two realms suggest a deeper, 
more primordial, and ultimately more disturbing link than splitting.   
 
Indeed, the ambivalence expressed through the various forms of splitting may even seem 
like a secondary phenomenon in comparison with this more intimate level.  At this deeper 
level, the Zohar discusses the baffling processes through which various kinds of inchoate 
refuse emerge from the divine, even from the highest levels of the divine, and subsequently 
crystallize into a highly structured and powerful demonic realm.  Such passages implicitly 
draw our attention to a level of intimacy between the divine and the demonic that precedes 
the emission of such refuse, a troubling and mysterious intimacy that can scarcely be named.  
Dynamic intimacy then persists after the crystallization of the demonic, in the relationships 
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of desire and nurturance.  This deeper level thus not only concerns a "temporally prior” 
process, but also the generation of ongoing desire and need.   
 
Tishby and other followers of Scholem discuss the emission of refuse from the divine 
through the notion of "catharsis.”85  There has, however, always been a good deal of 
imprecision in the way this notion has been used in academic kabbalah scholarship.  The 
Scholem tradition has tended to employ this notion in the form of an unreflective amalgam 
of a range of meanings bequeathed by the texts of Plato, Aristotle, Freud, and others – and 
the differences and ambiguities both intrinsic to those texts and accentuated by generations 
of divergent commentators.  While this is not the place to discuss that history in depth, the 
kinship between the range of meanings of catharsis in the Western tradition and a 
corresponding range in kabbalah scholarship compels a brief excursus on it. 
 
For my purposes here, some of the key meanings bequeathed by history include the Platonic 
literal or figurative detachment of the soul from the body,
86
 as well as the medical expulsion 
of toxicities from the body, and the perfection of the body through physical training.
87
  The 
latter two, in the Sophist, also have their analogues at the level of the soul – on the one hand, 
ridding the person of such vices as cowardice, intemperance, and injustice, and, on the other 
hand, the curing of ignorance through instruction.
88
  Aristotle, in turn, introduced the use of 
the term to refer to the effect produced by the theatrical representation of highly charged 
dramatic situations – a usage whose meaning gave rise to centuries of still-unresolved 
debate.  One commentator divides the various participants in this debate into those who see 
catharsis as more of a purgation, the expulsion of "undesirable or excessive emotion," and 
those who see it as more of a purification, in the sense of the positive transformation of 
potentially valuable emotions.
89
  These two broad categories may be roughly associated with 
the second and third meanings of catharsis in the Sophist cited above.  I note, however, that 
commentators have even debated whether Aristotle's notion of the rectification achieved 
through dramatic representation concerns the subjectivity of the audience or rather the 
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objective situation enacted on the stage
90
 -- or, alternatively, whether the term has both 
"internal and external" references,
91
 or even was chosen deliberately for its ambiguity, its 
capacity to bear a range of meanings.
92
  Finally, Freud's notion of catharsis builds on, while 
thoroughly transforming, a number of these positions:  it refers to the discharge of 
something painful to the subject, something that was once part of the subject but has become 
dissociated from it through repression.  This discharge occurs through a re-enactment – 
produced not on the stage as a public spectacle, but out of the interiority of the subject itself 
in the privacy of the analytical situation.
93
   
 
Each of these distinct notions of catharsis has a correlate in kabbalah scholarship, and, a bit 
more distantly, in the texts it has sought to interpret by their means.  Rather than go through 
those correlates in detail here, I note two key questions about the meaning of catharsis that 
emerge from this brief review.  First, does the appearance of the impurity and its 
rectification take place in a space which is primarily external to the subject, such as a literal 
or figurative stage, or is it a process that takes place primarily in the interior of the subject?  
One can associate the former position with an "instrumental" understanding of kabbalistic 
catharsis, the intentional production of harsh forces by God to punish evildoers, and the 
latter position with the notion that it is God who is struggling with an internal impurity – or 
even, the notion which I will develop below, that this struggle is a pre-condition for the 
constitution of a coherent divine subjectivity, a notion that may take us beyond the limits of 
the idea of catharsis.
94
  Second, if one adopts the latter position, is the impurity which 
constitutes the target of the catharsis an integral part of the subject, one which requires 
transformative "purification," or an alien body which needs to be destructively "purged"?   
One can associate the former of these positions with texts that envision integration of the 
Sitra Aḥra into the divine, the latter with texts that envision its ultimate destruction.    
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In relation to divine catharsis, it is not obvious which of the latter two alternatives is more 
theologically provocative – the notion that the divine is united with an alien element that 
needs to be purged or that there are elements of the divine itself which are defective and 
need to be perfected.  Moreover, whichever of these options is favored, it seems shocking 
that divine catharsis would be something that needs to be re-enacted repeatedly throughout 
cosmic history – indeed, that such repetitions would in a way constitute that history – rather 
than being achieved in one gesture.  In addition, all the meanings of catharsis cited above 
seem ill-equipped to account for the kabbalistic account of the ongoing relationship between 
the divine and the demonic – in which the impurities purged in the process of catharsis come 
to form a mighty realm, the match in power and structure of the subject that purges them, 
presenting ceaseless challenges, menaces, and temptations to that subject.  Finally, they shed 
light on the coexistence in kabbalah of seemingly incompatible views about the nature and 
fate of the Sitra Aḥra.  As Scholem notes, the antithetical notions that the fate of the Sitra 
Aḥra is to be annihilated and that it is to be integrated into the holy realm are both equally 
"plausible" within the kabbalistic tradition;
95
 such antithetical views may coexist within a 
single work or even a single passage.   
 
The upshot of this excursus on “catharsis” is that we need a perspective that could provide 
meaning to the following:  a) the presence of an element within the divine that needs to be 
"purged" or “purified” in any of the senses noted above; b) the need for repeated acts of 
purgation/purification; c) the crystallization of the expelled elements of inchoate refuse into 
a mighty and antagonistic other realm; and d) the heterogeneous portrayals of the fate of the 
demonic.  Just as it is necessary to reject an interpretation of the Zohar as simply reflecting 
competing “Gnostic” and Neoplatonic notions, so must one reject a reading which simply  
chooses among historically available notions of catharsis.  We must look, instead, for a 
distinctive Zoharic pattern that could respond to the desiderata I have just listed.   
 
My quest for such a perspective has led me to the work of Julia Kristeva, specifically to her 
portrayal of the emergence of bounded subjectivity as dependent on, and subsequent to, the 
"abjection" of inassimilable alterity.
96
  The insistent link in kabbalistic texts between the 
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constitution, perfection, and purgation of the divine, on the one hand, and the constitution, 
maintenance, and nurturance of the demonic from the refuse of the divine, on the other hand 
– as well as the persistent lethal threat and perverse temptation posed by the demonic to the 
divine – suggests that Kristeva's "abjection" can provide a guiding thread through the 
labyrinth of Zoharic portrayals of the demonic.   
 
The theory of abjection is a portrayal of the formation of subjectivity which highlights the 
latter’s belated and ultimately pyrrhic quality, its initiation at a stage in which subject and 
object are not differentiated, its dependence on the exclusion of an alterity from which it 
cannot definitively separate itself and yet which it can never definitively incorporate, and 
consequently the ways in which ambivalence towards this "abject" is irreducible.  It requires 
nearly impossible portrayals of the initiation of projects for separation before the very 
subject and object of the separation have come into being, as well as the perpetual renewal 
of such projects due to their pyrrhic quality – features that may often only be expressed in 
literary texts that stretch to their limits, or even defy, both grammar and semantics.  It thus 
has a certain intrinsic paradoxicality which can go a long way to illuminating many of the 
Zohar's baffling formulations and seeming contradictoriness without recourse to notions of a 
struggle between macro-historical movements or a single author's divided heart.  In short, 
though developed through psychoanalytic reflections on the formation of human 
subjectivity, it is remarkably suited for understanding the generation of the cosmic structures 
and the divine and demonic personages which are the Zohar's main ontological focus and for 
the stylistic virtuosities which are its rhetorical hallmark. 
 
Kristeva portrays the emergence of subjectivity out of a primordial space that precedes both 
the subject and its objects.  The literal referent of such an image would be the fused state of 
mother and child, but its strict description would avoid even such language as too dyadic – 
and might rather favor a formulation such as "the archaism of the pre-objectal 
relationship."
97
  Out of this primordial space, subjectivity begins to emerge by a process of 
violent separation between a proto-subject and its proto-object.  This proto-object is that 
from which the nascent subject must be separated as a prerequisite to a separate identity – a 
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process necessarily involving "the immemorial violence with which a body becomes 
separated from another body in order to be."
 98
  It comprises the subject's "earliest attempts 
to release the hold of the maternal entity even before existing outside of her …. a violent, 
clumsy breaking away, forever stalked by the risk of falling back under the sway of a power 
as sheltering as it is smothering."
99
  That from which the proto-subject separates itself, 
consequently, does not appear either as a neutral or fully constituted "object," and must be 
negatively charged in the extreme – for it represents the threat of the collapse of the fragile, 
nascent subject.  It appears, therefore, as inchoate stuff, repulsive miasma:  the "abject."  In 
sum:  the emergence of the subject with a bounded identity must be preceded by the 
"abjection" of inchoate desires and physical elements, expelled to the subject's borderline, 
even constituting that borderline.  These abjected elements originate within the "archaism" 
of the undifferentiated state preceding subject and object, but must be violently detached and 
repelled – "abjected" – in order for the subject to establish itself.   
 
The first proto-object confronted by the proto-subect is a source of terror, for it threatens the 
subject with disintegration, with collapse back into the state of undifferentiation from which 
it emerged.  The emergence of the subject is thus, for Kristeva, indissociable from the 
emergence of the terrifying abject – a terror augmented, rather than mitigated, by the latter's 
inchoate state and by the fact that the proto-subject and the abject have the same primordial 
source:    
 
I expel myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself through the same movement by 
means of which “I” purport to posit myself.… In this trajectory where "I" emerge, I 
give birth to myself in the violence of the sob, of vomit.
100
  
 
The abjected elements that are expelled "outside" the subject originate in a primordial 
undifferentiated space in which no "inside" or "outside" yet exists.  Given this primordial  
kinship, the subject can no more definitively separate itself from the abject than it can 
completely assimilate it.  The abject, therefore, persistently haunts the subject as a continual 
                                                 
98
 Ibid.  
99
 Ibid., 20. 
100
 Ibid., 11.   
  
40 
 
source of anxiety about its identity and integrity.   It also poses a persistent temptation for 
the subject, luring it to plunge into the abyss of non-meaning – a return to that primordial 
state "as sheltering as it is smothering."   
 
Experiences that evoke the abject, particularly those that put clearly defined boundaries into 
question, can severely shake the subject's sense of its own bounded identity.  Indeed, it is not 
only the "absence of cleanness/propriety [propreté] or health" as such that evokes this 
experience, but everything that "disturbs an identity, a system, an order."
101
   The experience 
of the terror of abjection that threatens to collapse the fragile boundaries of the subject can 
be evoked, at its most archaic, by rot, feces, refuse, all that physical stuff that has no 
boundaries and thereby threatens to erode the boundaries of the "propre" (a French word 
that can signify both cleanliness and the state of belonging to the self).  On the social level, 
it can be evoked by everything that "does not respect limits, places, rules. The in-between, 
the ambiguous, the hybrid. The traitor, the liar, the criminal with a good conscience, the 
rapist without shame, the killer who purports to save."
102
    
 
Horrifyingly, the inchoate elements which the subject must expel to its outer borders in 
order to achieve a bounded identity eventually crystallize and confront the subject as a 
definite and antagonistic object.  This monstrous object, secretly inhabited by the abject, 
poses a new and distinct threat to the subject’s identity.  Kristeva compares these two states 
of the abject – borderline and object – in this passage on the relationship between refuse and 
corpses:   
 
[R]efuse, like the corpse, indicates to me to what I must perpetually exclude in order 
to live. These body fluids, this defilement, this excrement are what life barely 
tolerates, and then only on pain of death.   I am there at the boundary of my status as 
a living being. My body detaches itself from this boundary in order to be a living 
being.  This refuse falls away in order for me to live …. If ordure signifies the other 
side of the boundary, where I am not, and which permits me to be, the corpse, the 
most repugnant refuse, is a boundary that has invaded everything. It is no longer I 
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who expel. "I" is expelled. The boundary has become an object. … That elsewhere 
that I imagine beyond this present … is now here, cast, abjected, into "my" world. 
Deprived of world, therefore, I pass out.
103
 
 
This transformation of the "borderline" into an "object" is as paradoxical as it is terrifying.  
That which begins as part of the undifferentiated archaic state becomes an inchoate abject 
that emerges to confront a proto-subject; then is pushed to the borderline of the subject in 
order that a bounded identity can be established; and, finally, becomes a powerful "Other" 
that poses a mortal threat to the subject.  The inchoate has become a lethal adversary – or, to 
use a Zoharic play on words:  the pesolet [תלוספ; refuse] has become a pesel [לספ; an idol, 
i.e., for the Zohar, a personified diabolical  adversary]. 
104
  
 
It is from this paradoxical standpoint that Kristeva locates all those cultural and religious 
attempts to codify, and defend against, the "abject" – codifications that take this 
transformation of the "borderline" into an "object" as the theme of elaborate discursive 
classifications and ritual practices, seeking thereby to conjure away its threatening quality.  
Kristeva offers the biblical laws about impurity, including both dietary prohibitions and 
impurities arising from sex and death, as a key example.  For Kristeva, "biblical impurity is 
a 'logification' of that which derogates from the symbolic order" – that is, the abject.   The 
aim of this "logification" is to prevent the abject from "actualizing itself as demonic evil."
105
   
 
Kristeva's portrayal of abjection also shows the ultimate impossibility of a completely 
successful "logification" of this kind.  The terror of abjection – as well as the temptation it 
poses – re-surfaces whenever the necessarily incomplete exclusion of the abject breaks 
through the fabric of its "logification" by the symbolic order.  The abject is that which is 
“rejected, yet from which one cannot separate oneself, that from which one cannot protect 
oneself as from an object … it beckons to us and ends by swallowing us up."106  It should be 
clear by now, therefore, why any definitive "catharsis" of the abject – in either the 
"perfection" or "purgation" sense – is as impossible as it is urgent.  On the contrary, "re-
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birth,” or any kind of internal or external creative work, can only be achieved "with and 
against abjection."
107
 
 
Indeed, the codifications of the abject are inhabited by the very forces they would conjure 
away and increasingly come to resemble them, becoming  cognitively and religiously 
menacing doubles:  "Defilement now comes to be that which damages symbolic univocality, 
that is, simulacra, ersatzes, doubles, idols"
108
 – again recalling the Zoharic pesolet/pesel pun 
cited above, as well as the antithetical homonyms that pervade kabbalistic designations of 
the relationship between the divine and the demonic.   Such doubles – crystallized out of that 
which has been abjected and has returned as a formidable adversary – are a precise 
instantiation of what Freud called the "uncanny":  "everything is unheimlich that ought to 
have remained secret and hidden but has come to light."
109
  From undifferentiation to 
abjection to the uncanny; from primordial unity to inchoate refuse to demonic doubling; 
from undifferentiated proximity to a borderline to menacing remoteness; from an intimacy 
that pre-exists identity, to a subject and its refuse, to a self and its enemy:  it is these 
paradoxical developments that make Kristeva's portrayal of abjection so productive for 
grappling with the kabbalistic demonic.  They also make it clear why all attempts at 
codifying and conjuring away the abject/demonic are fated to be pyrrhic quests, whether 
they aim at assimilation or destruction of its threatening alterity.    
  
Kristeva argues that the confrontation with abjection goes to the heart of religion and, 
indeed, “constitutes” its history, in a manner closely related to the history-constitutive role 
of the struggles of the divine with the Sitra Aḥra in the kabbalah: 
 
To each abjection, its sacred – Abjection accompanies all religious constructions, 
and it reappears at the moment of their collapse ….  We can distinguish a variety of 
structures of abjection, which in turn determine the types of the sacred…. The 
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diverse modes of the purification of the abject, the diverse catharses, constitute the 
history of religions ….110 
 
The weakening, or collapse, of traditional religious codifications of the abject results in its 
"reappearance" – leading in turn either to new codifications of the abject, or to more daring 
attempts to give it linguistic form as in, according to Kristeva, the avant-garde writing of the 
late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, a response to the weakening of inherited cultural codes.   
The upsurge of fascination with the demonic in emerging kabbalistic circles in the 12
th
 and 
13
th
 centuries could be viewed as, at least in part, a response to a weakening of such 
traditional codifications (perhaps partly under the impact of the philosophical critique of the 
tradition); the interest in this dimension of Jewish religious history by Scholem and others in 
the early 20
th
 century could, in turn, be viewed as part of the general Modernist fascination 
with the abject described by Kristeva. 
  
Kristeva's portrayal of subjectivity provides a powerful framework for reading the 
vicissitudes of the portrayal of the demonic in the Zohar and other 13
th
 century texts – in 
particular, the emergence of the demonic from the refuse of the (proto-)divine, an emergence 
that precedes the full constitution of divine structures and personages; the crystallization of 
this refuse into the mighty realm of the Sitra Aḥra; and the ongoing and dangerous 
relationships of desire, nurturance, and impersonation between the divine and the demonic.   
Moreover, if we accept Kristeva's portrayal, all constructions of subjectivity – including 
divine subjectivity – are precarious, due to the fact that they rest on the abjection of elements 
from which the subject both must and cannot fully separate itself.  The textual coexistence 
of the contradictory motifs of the assimilation and destruction of the demonic; the endlessly 
repeated efforts to achieve one or the other; and the impossibility of either achievement 
except in some messianic future are all illuminated through this framework.  The 
proliferation of discursive and ritual practices in kabbalah aimed at either assimilating or 
destroying the demonic can be apprehended as attempts at codification and domestication of 
the abject in the face of its ever-renewed resurfacing, bringing with it the most severe 
anxiety about the collapse or corruption of human and divine subjectivity.  The ambivalence 
                                                 
110
 Kristeva, Pouvoirs, 17.    
  
44 
 
about the demonic which is so abundantly expressed in kabbalistic texts, and the techniques 
of splitting aimed at managing it, may also be viewed as an outcome of the dynamics of 
abjection.  Just as there is no subject – human or divine – who can fully say, with Prospero, 
"this thing of darkness I acknowledge mine," so there is no subject who can fully separate 
itself from that "thing of darkness."  The abject/demonic is that which both is and is not a 
part of the (divine) subject, as well as both subordinate and not subordinate to it. 
 
Thus, in a passage that uncannily seems to echo certain kabbalistic texts, especially those 
that evoke the "slave who becomes king … and the bondwoman who supplants her 
mistress," Kristeva writes: 
 
Within abjection, there is one of those violent, obscure revolts of being against that 
which menaces it and which seems to come from an exorbitant outside or inside, cast 
aside from the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable.  It is there, so close, but 
inassimilable … Nonetheless, from its exile, the abject does not cease to defy its 
master.
111
   
 
The numerous variations in kabbalistic writings on the genealogy, nurturance, seductiveness, 
mimicry, and power of the demonic can be seen as attempts to wrestle with this irreducible, 
indeterminate, and bewilderingly ubiquitous threat that "emanates from an exorbitant 
outside or inside" – more precisely, from a not-yet-demarcated place, or even non-place, that 
precedes the distinction between inside and outside.  Kristeva's work also thereby sheds light 
on why the "emanation" (Kristeva's term here)/"atsilut" of the "abject"/"left side" was 
viewed by many kabbalists as the most profound secret.  Or, to use the Zohar's image, it 
illuminates why "few are those who know how to evoke the Work of Creation through the 
mystery of the Great Dragon," as well as why "the whole world," perhaps including divine 
subjectivity, "unfolds only” upon this dragon's “fins."112   
 
I caution, however, that, although Kristeva's portrayal of abjection will loom heavily in the 
background of my analysis, I will not simply make a mechanical application of it.  Indeed, 
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one of the appeals of Kristeva's portrayal is the way some of its aspects pose challenges to 
univocal narratives, explanations, or even normal grammatical structures, since it demands 
portrayal of actions and desires prior to the full formation of the subjects and objects that 
could be their agents or targets.  The proliferation of heterogeneous and incompatible 
portrayals of abjection is intrinsic to the theory itself.  This feature makes it productive both 
for understanding the Modernist avant-garde (Kristeva’s concern) and 13th century kabbalah 
(my concern). 
 
 C.  Overview of the Dissertation 
 
In this Introduction, I have suggested two different mechanisms underlying portrayals of  the 
demonic in the Zohar, those of splitting and abjection.  I associated the first with an effort to 
preserve the integrity of a constituted entity – such as "the father" or "the ego" in Freud or 
divine figures and structures in kabbalah – from the threat posed by the cohabitation of 
incompatible values and desires.  I associated the second with the primordial dynamics of 
identity-formation, in which the constitution of a bounded subject requires the dissociation 
of a primal state of undifferentiation – a dissociation necessarily violent and incomplete, 
leading to the formation of a proto-subject and an inchoate abject, and ultimately to a subject 
warding off an invasive abject at its borderline or confronting a powerfully threatening 
object in the form of a fully constituted adversary.   The literal referent of this process, for 
Kristeva, is that of the nascent subject's separation from the maternal body – though in this 
case, as in the first, the process precedes its referents and even constitutes them.   These two 
mechanisms correspond to what Kristeva calls the "double-faced sacred" [le sacré bi-
face].
113
  
 
The second of these portrayals, that of abjection, may be taken as the deeper of the two, 
since it explores the constitution of the subjects and objects whose splitting is the affair of 
the first portrayal.  Portrayals of abjection concern "secret and invisible" processes, depict 
the "uncertain spaces" of "unstable identity," and evoke the "simultaneously threatening and 
melding … archaic dyad," phenomena over which language has no hold without being 
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"interlaced with fear and repulsion."
114
  Nonetheless, the evocation of splitting in the Zohar 
coexists with the portrayals of the processes of abjection and may not be reduced to them.  
The Zohar lives within the ambivalences it evokes, rather than masterfully deploying them 
in the service of a doctrine, even a doctrine as paradoxical as abjection.  The textual 
complexity of passages focused on both sorts of processes forecloses a reduction of one to 
the other – just as it forecloses the reduction of the rhetorical dimension to its putative 
ontological referents.     
 
Each of the first two chapters of this thesis takes as its primary focus one of these two 
mechanisms, although there will, of necessity, be some overlap between them.  Chapter One 
primarily focuses on the construction and management of ambivalence in terms of 
ontological and rhetorical splitting between the divine and demonic.  Chapter Two focuses 
on the portrayal of ambivalence in terms of abjection, the relationships of genealogy, desire, 
and nurturance between the divine and demonic, relationships whose paradoxical and 
recurrent trajectories lead from the abjected refuse of the divine; to the crystallization of the 
demonic; to a fully structured adversarial realm.  At the rhetorical level, this process leads 
from "tropes of limitation" – such as irony, for example, the irony of the primordial divine 
plenitude emitting some form of inchoate refuse – to "tropes of representation" – whose 
fullest expression would be the crystallization of that inchoate refuse into a fully constituted 
structure, such as the ten demonic sefirot homologous to the divine sefirot, and, even more 
so, the personages of Lilith and Sama’el.  I caution again that the rhetorical techniques and 
substantive portrayals of the demonic overlap but do not neatly correspond – and at times, 
their non-correspondence is one of the ways a Zoharic text produces its effects.  
 
In Chapter Three, I turn to two polar consequences of the processes describes in the 
preceding chapters.  First, I turn to the portrayal  of a world thoroughly pervaded by the 
crystallization of a mighty demonic realm denominated by the same names as that of the 
divine realm.  The ultimate danger in such a world, our world, is that of the impersonation 
of the divine by the demonic.  This danger results from a method of combat between the two 
realms that I call “aggressive enclothing,” the capture of the divine by the demonic in such a 
way that one can no longer tell of particular entities to which realm they belong.  In this 
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reified world, a world of grotesque masquerade, beset by terrifying dangers of misprision 
and indeterminacy, meaning itself may come to seem always already captured by its 
opposite.  I then turn to the opposite danger implicit in the cosmic vision elaborated in the 
earlier chapters – the dissolution of meaning, a danger embodied in the abyss, the tehom.  In 
this section, I show how Zoharic texts on the tehom portray it as the ultimate danger to 
meaning, but also as the ultimate resource for new meaning:  a return to the primordial 
source, a return fraught with the possibility of catastrophe, can also show the way to 
unlocking reification and re-opening creativity.     
 
Finally, in the Conclusion, through bringing together some of the most radical suggestions 
about the relationship of the “improper twins” throughout the thesis, I suggest some 
consequences of Zoharic mythology for thinking about “Otherness” of all varieties.   
 
Two final notes.  First, a note of caution about my recourse to psychoanalytic terminology.  I 
emphasize that it is not my intention to directly engage the debate about the relationship of 
psychoanalysis, or psychology generally, to kabbalah, or religion generally.  Scholem's 
complex and vexed relationship to psychoanalysis has already been discussed by a variety of 
scholars.
115
  Nonetheless, I wish to use the concepts of ambivalence, splitting, and abjection 
heuristically, as a way of reading, organizing, and making sense of the heterogeneous 
portrayals of the demonic fundamental to the Zohar and much of kabbalistic literature.   
Moreover, although a demonstration of this point would go far beyond the scope of this 
thesis, I think that 20
th
 century psychoanalysis could be shown to be heir to the kinds of 
traditions of which 13
th
 century kabbalah is also a part (a notion that has nothing in common 
with fanciful notions of the "influence" of kabbalah on Freud).   Both terminologies, I would 
propose, contribute to reflecting on some of the deepest truths and may be used to illuminate 
each other.  
 
Finally, I note that I generally favor the term "Sitra Aḥra," the "Other Side," to designate the 
demonic.   Although the term "demonic" is often used in English-language scholarship, and 
although I will often also use this term, it raises a number of difficulties.  In particular, it can 
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cause a confusion between the metaphysical structures and the ruling personages of the evil 
realm, on the one hand, and the everyday "demons" [םידש, shedim] who have permeated the 
everyday life of the rabbinic and popular imagination since at least Talmudic times, on the 
other.  Though I will at times distinguish between "devils" for the former category and 
"demons" for the latter, the general use of the word "demonic" for Sitra Aḥra in the 
secondary literature makes this distinction impractical to follow consistently.  There are, 
moreover, more affirmative reasons for using the term Sitra Aḥra, due to its stressing both 
the "otherness" of the demonic, and its embodiment of the other "side" of a cosmos whose 
totality includes both divine and demonic.  This ambivalence is perhaps the major theme of 
this study.    
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Chapter One: 
Reading the Sitra Aḥra 
 
 
A.  Two Models of the Sitra Aḥra? Essence, Geography, Structure 
 
In Mishnat Ha-Zohar, Isaiah Tishby structures his overview of the Zohar's vast literature 
on the demonic by positing a tension within the work between a "dualistic tendency" and 
"restrictions on dualism."
1
   At the level of the history of ideas, Tishby links these two 
"tendencies" in the Zohar with, respectively, the "pessimistic" vision he attributes to 
Gnosticism and the "optimistic" vision he attributes to Neoplatonism.  At the hermeneutic 
level, Tishby uses this general dichotomy to interpret the relationship among Zoharic 
passages that present dramatically contrasting images of the Sitra Aḥra.  At the 
compositional level, Tishby asserts that the "internal contradictions" in the Zohar's 
portrayal of the Sitra Aḥra are a product of a "conceptual struggle":  on the one hand, 
“the clear tendency of the author to see evil as an independent power at war with 
divinity”; on the other hand, the “faithfulness to the teaching of Judaism” that 
“overpowered” him and caused him to “recoil from drawing extreme dualistic 
conclusions.”2   
 
Tishby deploys his general framework of two opposing "tendencies" as a way of 
organizing the Zohar's heterogeneous portrayals of the relationship of the Sitra Aḥra to 
the holy realm.    In the terms I broached in the Introduction, the difference between 
Tishby’s two “tendencies” turns on the sharpness with which the technique of “splitting” 
between the divine and the demonic is implemented.  In Tishby’s reading, the “dualistic” 
tendency works towards a greater implementation of the splitting technique; the tendency 
engaged in “restrictions on dualism” works to mitigate that implementation.      
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Tishby's discussion of the two “tendencies” in the Zohar’s portrayal of the relationship 
between the Sitra Aḥra and the holy realm may be divided along three key axes:  the 
geography of the Sitra Aḥra in relation to the holy realm, the structure of the Sitra Aḥra 
in comparison with the holy realm, and the essence of the Sitra Aḥra in contrast to that of 
the holy realm.  Though he does not use these terms, Tishby implicitly argues that the 
Zohar presents competing images of the Sitra Aḥra along each of these axes.    
 
The competing geographical images concern the site of the Sitra Aḥra, its location in 
relation to the holy realm.   According to one set of images, the demonic resides, in 
normal times, in absolute separation from the holy realm, in the "crevice of the great 
abyss" [אבר אמוהתד אבקונ, nukva di-tehoma raba].3 The denizens of this abyss can 
approach the holy realm only in times of the Sitra Aḥra's lamentable ascendancy, brought 
about particularly by human sin.  According to a second set of images, the Sitra Aḥra 
normally resides in the closest proximity to some aspect of the holy realm, often the 
Shekhinah.  It is only banished to remote regions when it violates its proper task in 
relation to the divine.  Tishby correlates these two geographical images of the Sitra Aḥra 
with two competing understandings of its essence: the remote Sitra Aḥra with the 
"dualistic tendency" in the Zohar, its more "pessimistic," "Gnostic" side, in which the 
Sitra Aḥra is absolutely opposed to the divine, and the proximate Sitra Aḥra with the 
more "optimistic," "Neoplatonic" vision, in which the Sitra Aḥra is only contingently 
opposed to the divine and may even come to serve as its ally. 
 
Tishby also correlates these competing notions of the geographical relationship between 
the divine and the demonic with competing structural images of the Sitra Aḥra.  One set 
of structural images of the Sitra Aḥra in the Zohar stresses the “complete parallelism"4 
between the holy and unholy realms, a structural relationship that I prefer to call 
"homology," for reasons I will explain below.  Tishby highlights a number of Zoharic 
homologies between the holy and unholy dimensions:  each side contains ten sefirot,
5
 
seven "breaths" [םילבה, corresponding to the seven lower sefirot], three "knots" [םירשק, 
                                                 
3
 Ibid., 300.  This phrase appears numerous times in the Zohar, e.g., II, 163b & 173b.    
4
 Ibid., 289 [המילש הלבקה[. 
5
 Zohar III, 70a. 
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corresponding, in the holy realm, to the left, right, and central columns of the sefirotic 
tree],
6
 seven palaces [תולכיה],7  a "king and priest" (associated, in the holy realm, with the 
sefirot of Binah and Ḥesed ), a male and a female personification (a partsuf, to use the 
Lurianic term), and so on.
8
  By contrast, a second kind of imagery is unconcerned with 
such correspondences.  Rather, taking seriously the phenomenal image implied in the 
word kelipot ("husks," "peels," or "shells"), the Sitra Aḥra is viewed in these passages as 
a series of layers wrapped around the holy dimension – a structure I call that of 
"concentricity."
9
   
 
Tishby strongly correlates the structural relationship of homology between the holy and 
unholy realm with specific alternatives along the other axes I have identified.  First, he 
argues that the geographical notion of the Sitra Aḥra as radically distant from the holy 
realm fits with the structural notion of homology (again, the terms here are mine).  He 
specifically makes a correlation between the remote Sitra Aḥra and the notion of ten 
unholy sefirot parallel to the ten holy sefirot,
10
 and his argument strongly implies the 
same correlation between geographical remoteness and the other homologous images as 
well.  Second, in relation to the essence of the Sitra Aḥra, Tishby associates homology 
between the holy and unholy realms with dualism, on the ground that it implies direct 
competition between two comparable realms – the notion of "’this’ confronted with 
‘this’" [הז תמועל הז] (Ecclesiastes 7:14).11  This association between homology and 
dualism also comports with the paradoxical relationship I identified in the Introduction 
between "resemblance" and "menace."   
 
The structural conception of "concentricity," by contrast, envisions the Sitra Aḥra as a 
series of kelipot wrapped around the "mo'aḥ," [חמ , or Aramaic moḥa, אחומ], the kernel, 
                                                 
6
 Zohar II, 38a. 
7
 Zohar II, 263a. 
8
 Tishby, MZ, I, 288.   
9
 Professor Ada Rapoport-Albert has pointed out to me the striking similarity between these two visions of 
the Sitra Aḥra and two kabbalistic visions of the relationship between the levels within the holy dimension, 
which the Lurianic tradition calls the contrast between "circles" and "straightness" (רשויו םילוגע).  See 
generally Pachter, ‘Iggulim ve-Yosher:  le-Toldoteha shel Ide’ah’, 69-83.   However, while Lurianic 
kabbalah is replete with homologies between the divine and demonic realms, it does not, to my knowledge, 
transpose the contrast between “circles” and “straightness” to the demonic realm.  
10
 Tishby, MZ, I, 300.   
11
 Ibid., 301.   
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the essence – or even, the "brain" or, more figuratively, "consciousness"12 – a term used 
to designate the holy realm.  This structure consists of either three or four kelipot 
surrounding the  mo’aḥ of holiness.  Although the term, "kelipah," may be used, 
especially in later strata of the Zohar, as a general synonym for the Sitra Aḥra, the 
passages that use it to portray a concentric image of the structural relationship of the 
unholy and holy realms take very seriously the phenomenal image it evokes.
13
   This 
phenomenal image entails geographical contiguity between the holy and the unholy.   The 
first kelipah, nogah ("brightness," הגונ), is thus usually portrayed as beginning right at the 
border of the holy  mo’aḥ.  It partakes of aspects of both holiness and unholiness, and, to 
use Tishby's term, forms a "kind of bridge" between the two realms.
14
  A passage in the 
Zohar Ḥadash even states that it is "joined" or "clings" to the  moḥa (אחומב דחאתמ).15   
Indeed, the number of kelipot identified in this concentric model – three or four – seems 
to depend on whether nogah is even included in the ranks of the kelipot or whether its 
proximity to the moḥa means that it is not truly a kelipah, an ambivalence I explore 
below.  In any case, though both the homology and concentricity models posit a “split” 
between the divine and the demonic, that split is far less sharp in the latter model, with 
nogah placed indeterminately in relation to the divide. 
 
Tishby argues that structural concentricity (to use my term) represents a "restriction" on 
the bolder dualism of the rival model of homology.  For Tishby, the fact that there are 
three or four kelipot, rather than ten levels as in the holy realm, is only one indication of a 
deeper difference between the two structural conceptions concerning the essence of the 
Sitra Aḥra – viz., that the kelipah/mo’aḥ structure portrays it as less "Other."  Tishby thus 
believes that the concentric kelipot pose a lesser threat precisely because of their lesser 
degree of resemblance to the holy dimension – again, recalling the paradoxical 
                                                 
12
 I borrow this translation of “ mo’aḥ” from Wolfson, Circle in the Square, 123 & 138.  Wolfson uses it to 
render the Lurianic term “moḥin.”    
13
 See Ra’ya Mehemena, Zohar III, 227a-b, where the organic metaphor is taken very concretely, dividing 
the four kelipot in accordance with the different parts of a nut and a strand of wheat. 
14
 Tishby, MZ, 301 [רשג ןיעמ]. 
15
 Zohar Ḥadash 38a-b:  
 ול הגנו ,ביתכד ,הגנ אוהה היוגב דיחא והיא ,שא אוההו .אד ןמ וגל אדו ,אד ןמ וגל אד ,ןרחסד אחומל ןיפילק ןוניא לכו
אחומב דחאתמ אקד והיא אדו ,אלוכ ןמ וגל והיא יאה .ביבס 
And all these are kelipot for the moḥa that they surround; this within this; and this within this. And 
this fire, it joins within itself this brightness [nogah], as it is written, ‘and a brightness was about 
it’ [Ezekiel 1:4].  This is the innermost of all and this is that which clings to the moḥa.   
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relationship between resemblance and menace.   Even leaving aside geographical 
proximity, Tishby views structural concentricity as lending itself more to an 
interpretation of the kelipot as subsidiary to the holy, indeed, as potential allies of the 
holy realm.   
 
Tishby seeks to highlight these differences between homology and concentricity by 
contrasting the first level of the Sitra Aḥra in each of the two structural conceptions.  In 
one passage in the Zohar describing the ten-sefirot structure, the first level is the darkest 
and most frightening, associated with Sama’el and Lilith, here called "shadow" and 
"death."
16
  In the three- or four-kelipot structure, by contrast, the first level is that of 
nogah, the "innermost" of all the kelipot.  As I have noted, nogah contains within itself 
both good and evil and may, as we shall see, accomplish both holy and unholy acts.
 
   A 
comparison of these two "first levels" of the Sitra Aḥra thus suggests a form of "splitting" 
that divides the demonic itself into a bad and a less bad, even potentially good, form. 
 
To summarize:  Tishby implicitly argues for a correlation between rival positions on 
three axes:  the essence of the Sitra Aḥra in relation to the holy (dualism versus 
"restricted dualism"), its geography (remoteness versus proximity), and its structure 
(homology versus concentricity).   He thus posits two coherent visions of the Sitra Aḥra:  
structural homology, geographical remoteness, and essential dualism, on the one hand; 
structural concentricity, geographical proximity, and a substantially diminished dualism, 
at times even approaching alliance, on the other.  Indeed, the contrast drawn by Tishby is 
so stark that we might be tempted to conclude that, rather than a "mental struggle" 
engaged in by the "author of the Zohar," we simply have two different traditions, or two 
different authors or groups of authors, which have both been placed at some point by 
compilers within the "Sefer Ha-Zohar.”17   
 
I argue that Tishby's overarching conceptual edifice is deeply inadequate as a 
hermeneutic framework, an inadequacy particularly surprising given Tishby's virtuosity 
as a textual interpreter throughout Mishnat Ha-Zohar.  At the simplest level, one could 
                                                 
16
 Zohar II, 242b. 
17
 On the problematic quality of the Zohar as a “book,” see above, p. 10, n. 1.    
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easily show that many of the vast number of passages in the Zohar on the Sitra Aḥra 
contain elements of both of Tishby's ideal-types.  Far from lining up specific stances on 
essence, geography, and structure to form a coherent image of the Sitra Aḥra in the way 
that Tishby's argument would lead one to expect, such passages present a variety of 
combinations of such stances that defy the coherence of the models.  More importantly, 
the juxtaposition in many passages of elements that Tishby would associate with 
divergent models appears neither as a haphazard yoking together of different perspectives 
nor as a strained product of an arduous "mental struggle."  Rather, the heterogeneous 
images are thoroughly woven into the passages' literary texture – indeed, as I shall show, 
their heterogeneity is often crucial to the power of such passages.    
 
Surprisingly, the very passage Tishby gives as his prime instance of the proximity of the 
demonic and the divine is itself a text in which the Sitra Aḥra is portrayed in accordance 
with the ten-sefirot structure – a juxtaposition of structural homology with geographical 
proximity.  This text, which I cited in the Introduction, declares that the ten demonic 
sefirot are attached to the Shekhinah, albeit to a rather unpleasant aspect of her: 
  
הב רטעתאד ,אליעל ןישידק ןירטע ןירתכ רשע קיפא אוה ךירב אשדוק ,יזח את אוהו ,והב שבלתמו ו
:אדורפ ןמת תילו ,ארמוגב אדיחאד אבוהלשכ ,אוה ןוניאו ןוניא  אלד ןירתכ רשע תיא אנד ליבקל
אתתל ןישידק ,המכח ירקאד אשידק ארטע דחד ארפוטד אמהוזב ןדיחא ןוניאו , ןורקא אד לעו
תומכח18  
 
Come and see.  Kudsha Berikh Hu [the Holy One blessed be He] brought forth ten 
crowns, holy diadems, above, with which he crowns himself and enclothes 
himself.  And they are He, and He is they, like a flame joined to a burning coal, 
and there is no separation there.  Parallel to this are ten crowns, which are not 
holy, below, and they are joined to the zohama of the fingernail of a holy diadem, 
which is called Ḥokhmah [Wisdom – here, the Shekhinah]. And, therefore, they 
are called Ḥokhmot [wisdoms]. 
 
                                                 
18
 Zohar III, 70a. 
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In this passage, the Zohar's language stresses the homology between the two realms, 
using a single term, "ten crowns," to describe the holy and unholy sefirot, and two 
versions of a single term to describe the unholy sefirot and the holy sefirah to which they 
are immediately joined (Wisdom/Wisdoms; תומכח/המכח).  At the same time, the passage 
portrays the ten holy sefirot as geographically proximate to the ten unholy sefirot, a 
geographical stance to which Tishby draws our attention despite its seeming 
incompatibility, within his general framework, with structural homology.  Moreover, this 
proximity is described in a manner which sets up a homology between the relationship of 
the divine to the holy sefirot, on the one hand, and the divine to the demonic sefirot, on 
the other.  In the case of the former relationship, that of Kudsha Berikh Hu to the holy 
sefirot, we are told, "and they are He, and He is they, like a flame joined [da-aḥida] to a 
burning coal" [ארמוגב אדיחאד אבוהלשכ ,אוה ןוניאו ןוניא אוהו]; in the case of the relationship of 
the unholy realm to the Shekhinah, we are told, "and they are joined [aḥidan] to the 
zohama of the fingernail of a holy diadem" [אשידק ארטע דחד ארפוטד אמהוזב ןדיחא ןוניאו].   
 
The comparison of the two "joinings" is central to the force of the passage and its 
elements of similarity and contrast compel our attention.  Both portray intimate 
connections on the phenomenal level – but these connections stand in deep contrast to 
each other, the one beautiful, the other repulsive.  These phenomenal similarities and 
differences are highlighted, at the rhetorical level, by the use of some of the same terms 
to describe both connections.  The language of the passage thus compels us to ponder the 
relationship between two "joinings," that of the highest divine level to the sefirot and of 
the divine to the demonic realms – just as it calls out for us to ponder the shocking fact 
that the structurally homologous "ten crowns" of the demonic reside in the closest 
proximity to the Shekhinah.  Though the assertion of identification, in the first part of the 
excerpt, between Kudsha Berikh Hu and the holy sefirot is absent from the description, in 
the second part of the excerpt, of the relationship of the Shekhinah to the unholy sefirot, 
the use of the same verb to describe the two relationships (“joined”, ahida/ahidan) calls 
out for the reader to ponder the extent of the difference between them.  These provocative 
challenges, whose force depends on a paradoxical deployment of heterogeneous images, 
is a key feature of the literary power of this passage, as well as of Zoharic writing 
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generally.  I would even say that the demand it makes that the reader contemplate these 
paradoxical relationships may be the very “point” of the passage.   
 
I cited this passage in my Introduction, arguing that it presents a general puzzle, that of 
the relationship between two sets of cardinal Zoharic portrayals of the Sitra Aḥra:  those 
highlighting the power and highly organized structure of the demonic, on the one hand, 
and those portraying the emergence of the demonic through abjection, that is, from the 
refuse of the divine, on the other.  The “fingernail zohama” passage sets forth both of 
these portrayals, precisely by means of its defiance of Tishby's framework through its 
juxtaposition of structural homology and geographical proximity.  Indeed, it creates a 
complex form of homology between the divine and the demonic through juxtaposing two 
homologous images of proximity (Kudsha Berikh Hu to the holy sefirot and the 
Shekhinah to the unholy sefirot), on the level of tropes, and utilizing parallel textual 
constructions to portray these two images, on the level of constructional schemes.  The 
notion that the weighty and mighty structure of the unholy sefirot maintains itself in a 
most precarious fashion, clinging to the most flimsy of supports, the dirt under the 
fingernail of the Shekhinah, expresses the baffling relationship of simultaneous 
independence and dependence that the demonic bears to the divine.   
 
This passage is neither "dualistic" nor "anti-dualistic," nor does it show a "mental 
struggle" between them:  rather, its paradoxes are a powerful expression of the 
uncanniness of the concurrent absolute opposition and intimate connection between the 
two realms.  "Dualism" and "anti-dualism," homology and concentricity, remoteness and 
proximity:  all become so many textual devices to provoke this sense of uncanniness.  
This uncanniness also ultimately expresses the urgency and precariousness of the 
technique of splitting as a management of ambivalence. That the link between the two 
realms is that of refuse, the "zohama of the fingernail," also powerfully serves to 
highlight the notion that that which emerges through abjection of refuse can come to take 
on the form of a highly structured and formidable realm – a notion I broached in the 
Introduction but will only fully explore in Chapter Two. 
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Juxtapositions of seemingly contradictory images are no less striking when we come to 
passages that foreground the "concentric" portrayal of the Sitra Aḥra.  The Zohar passage 
that portrays the kelipot at their most benign is an elaborate development of the 
concentricity image, a seeming proof-text for Tishby's understanding of kelipah-mo’aḥ 
imagery.  It is, however, immediately preceded by a passage portraying a thoroughly evil, 
personified female kelipah – a clear evocation of Lilith, though she is not named.  These 
two passages, the "benign kelipah" passage and the "Lilith-kelipah" passage are presented 
in the text as continuous – indeed, I will proceed to read them as if they formed a single 
passage of which they form sub-passages.  A detailed analysis of the puzzling 
relationship between these two continuous yet opposed sub-passages raises in acute form 
the problematic quality of Tishby's models.   
 
The "benign kelipah" sub-passage, at I:19b-20a, describes the relationship between 
kelipah and  mo’aḥ as complementary – as body to mind, as a protective covering to a 
protected essence, and as a garment to the body.   
 
 ,אחומל ןייפח ןיפילק המכו ,וגל אחומ אלכו ,והב אמלע אנקתאלו אמלעב ירבמל ה"בק ךירטצא אלכו
אלע הדוקנד אזר שירמ ,אתתו אליע אנווג יאהכ אמלע לכואלכ ,ןיגרד לכד אפוס דע ה  וגל אד והיא
 .יאהל יאהו יאהל הפילק יאהד חכתשאד דע ,אד ןמ וגל אדו ,אד ןמ  וריהנ הוה האמדק הדוקנ
 וטישפ אוההו  .הינימ וטישפ טשפתאד דע היליד ויקנו וקיקדו וכיכז עדנמל ארועש היל תילד ,האמינפ
הדוקנ איהה אשבלתאל אלכיה דח דיבעתא הדוקנ איההד…  האמדק רוא וטישפ טשפתא אלכיה אוהה
 ,ריתי האמינפ ךיכזו קיקד וריהנ והיאד אלכיה אוההל אשובל והיא האמדק רוא אוההד וטישפ אוההו
 אחומ אד ,אדל אדו ,אדל אשובל אד חכתשאד דע ,אדב אד שבלתאו אדב אד טשפתא האלהלו ןאכמ
ובל אדד ג"עאו ,הפילק אדורחא אגרדל אחומ והיא דיבעתא ,אשא  19  
 
Kudsha Berikh Hu had to create everything in the world, arraying the world.  All 
consists of a kernel [moḥa] within, with several shells [kelipin] covering the 
kernel [moḥa].  The entire world is like this, above and below, from the head of 
the mystery of the primordial point to the end of all rungs:  all is this within this 
                                                 
19
 Zohar I, 19b-20a.   I have adopted the textual emendations given by Matt in his Aramaic Texts, vol. 1, 
41.     
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and this within this [da le-go min da ve-da le-go min da], so that this is the shell   
of this, and this of this [de-hai kelipah le-hai, ve-hai le-hai].    
The primordial point is inner radiance – there is no way to gauge its translucency, 
tenuity, or purity – until an expanse expanded from it.  The expansion of that 
point became a palace, in which the point was clothed ….   That palace expanded 
an expanse: primordial light.  That expansion of primordial light is a garment for 
the palace, which is a gossamer, translucent radiance, deeper within.  From here 
on, this expands into this, this is clothed in this, so that this is a garment for this, 
and this for this.  This, the kernel [moḥa]; this, the shell [kelipah].   Although this 
is a garment, it becomes the kernel [moḥa] of another layer.20 
 
Kelipot are thus generated as a result of each level "expanding." This "expansion" 
crystallizes so as to become that level's covering, its garment, and, at least from the fourth 
sefirah downwards, its kelipah: "this expands into this, this is clothed in this, so that this 
is a garment for this, and this for this.  This, the kernel [ moḥa]; this, the shell [kelipah]."  
This process marks the divine unfolding from its highest level to the lowest level, the 
"end of all rungs."    
 
The first enclothing of one level by the next lower level occurs when the "primordial 
point," presumably the sefirah of Ḥokhmah, “expands.”  This "expansion" becomes a 
"palace," presumably the sefirah of Binah, that then enclothes it.  The term "kelipah" is 
not used for this first enclothing.  Nor is it used for the next “expansion,” the "primordial 
light" (presumably the fourth sefirah, Ḥesed), that serves as the “garment” for the 
“palace.”  The term “kelipah” only appears at the next level, as a description of the entity 
that enclothes this "primordial light" (presumably the fifth sefirah, Gevurah, the sefirah 
of "Might").  And, "from here on," the sub-passage informs us, this relationship of moḥa 
to kelipah characterizes all subsequent "expansions" and enclothings, so that what 
appears as a kelipah on one level will appear as a  moḥa from the perspective of the 
subsequent level.   This "benign kelipah" sub-passage strongly suggests the essentially 
non-threatening quality of the first kelipah named as such, and seemingly of all 
                                                 
20
 Matt I, 151-152 (I have modified the translation to bring out the repetition of the demonstrative 
pronouns).    
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subsequent kelipot, both by explicitly proclaiming the relativity of the “kelipah” 
designation and by describing the generation of the kelipot in terms identical to the 
generation of Binah out of Ḥokhmah, i.e., an “expansion” and an “enclothing” of a 
higher, clearly holy, level. 
 
In this passage, the difference between the terms "kelipah" and “moḥa” is thus portrayed 
as merely relative rather than essential – that which appears as "kelipah" on a higher level 
may appear as "moḥa" on a lower level, that which appears as "moḥa" on a lower level 
may appear as kelipah on a higher level.  This conception is as far removed as possible 
from that of absolute alterity between the divine and the demonic.  If one takes this 
passage seriously, one should reject the notion of an entity which is "essentially" a 
kelipah, which is irremediably split from the holy.  The merely relative difference 
between the terms is accentuated by the incessant repetition of the same demonstrative 
pronouns (“this,” designated by both “da” and “hai”) to designate both – a use of 
repetition, as we shall see, that is the exact opposite of almost all uses of repetition in the 
case of Zoharic juxtapositions of the divine and demonic. Thus far, this text confirms 
Tishby's framework – it combines structural concentricity, geographical proximity, and, 
on the question of essence, an anti-dualism so strong that one cannot even speak of two 
"essences."
21
   
 
However, in the immediately preceding sub-passage, and apparently continuous in the 
printed text, the Zohar portrays the first kelipah as a personified, diabolical entity, 
specifically as one possessing the archetypal features of Lilith – killing children, seducing 
men, and so on.  Indeed, this entire sub-passage may be described as a kabbalistic 
reworking of all the basic elements of the Lilith myth, restating the Ben-Sira narrative in 
a Zoharic key.  Even aside from textual contiguity, shared terminology and narrative 
imagery at the beginning of each sub-passage make the "Lilith-kelipah" text seem 
continuous with the "benign kelipah" text – and it is this very commonality that strikingly 
highlights their differences.    
                                                 
21
 See Zohar II, 108b for a view diametrically opposed to this relativistic understanding of  kelipah and  
mo’aḥ: 
 אחומ ןמ אחומו ,יוה ארחא ארטסמ  הפילק  לכ 
Every kelipah is from the Sitra Aḥra, and every  moḥa from  moḥa 
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Indeed, this "Lilith-kelipah” sub-passage portrays a process with a beginning very similar 
to that of the “benign kelipah sub-passage” but with a strikingly different sequel.    
 
ארחא הפילק קיפאו ,טשפתא הפילק איההו ,אחומל הפילק ירבתא ,האמדק רוא וריהנ זינגתאד רתבד 
...אתחנו אקלס ,תקפנד ןויכ 22  
 
After the radiance of primordial light was treasured away, a shell [kelipah] was 
created for the kernel [moḥa].  That shell [kelipah] expanded, generating another 
shell [kelipah].  Emerging, she ascended and descended …23 
 
The "Lilith-kelipah" sub-passage thus begins with the key feature of the "benign kelipah" 
conception, the covering of the "primordial light" by a kelipah.  Moreover, the further 
development of this first kelipah is portrayed using the same verb ("expanded," טשפתא) in 
both sub-passages.  Thenceforward, however, the two sub-passages part ways.  In the 
“Lilith-kelipah” sub-passage, something happens at that point that disrupts the process: 
rather than the smoothly unfolding process that structures the "benign kelipah" sub-
passage, in which each  moḥa is surrounded by a kelipah that will serve in turn as a  moḥa 
for the level beneath it, the first kelipah in the “Lilith-kelipah” sub-passage "generates 
another kelipah" which is essentially, rather than merely relatively, a kelipah – indeed, it 
might be better to translate the phrase kelipah aḥra [ארחא הפילק], as “an Other Kelipah," 
on the model of the "Other Side," the Sitra Aḥra.  This "Other Kelipah," disrupts the 
seamless story of the generation of kernels and shells, each of whose nature is merely 
relative.  Moreover, this "Other Kelipah" becomes immediately personified (as "she", i.e., 
Lilith) and is essentially evil. 
  
It is thus the generation of an essentially "Other” kelipah, rather than one that is merely 
relatively a kelipah, that generates the female devil.  It is as though there were a 
malignant metastasis of a healthy process – with a "good" kelipah generating the "bad" 
kelipah, Lilith.  This metastasis presents a striking contrast with the smoothly unfolding 
                                                 
22
 Zohar I, 19b. 
23
 Matt I, 148. 
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generation of benign garments/kelipot in the immediately subsequent "benign kelipah" 
sub-passage.  The personification of this "Other Kelipah," the movement from the 
catachresis of a kelipah-generating-a-kelipah to the prosopopeia by which this malignant 
kelipah becomes the monstrous personage of Lilith, also seems important for the 
crystallization of an essentially evil realm. 
 
An index of the metastatic nature of the generation of the Lilith-kelipah may be found in 
the sub-passage’s portrayal of its/her geographical relationship to the holy dimension.  
The sub-passage tells us that, prior to Adam and Eve's sin, God had cast Lilith to the 
"nether regions of the sea" [אמי ילופשב].24  This phrase is closely related to the "crevice of 
the great abyss" [ ר אמוהתד אבקונאב ], in which Tishby tells us the geographically remote 
Sitra Aḥra, associated with the homology structure, normally resides.25   From the 
perspective of Tishby's framework, although this remote location for the Sitra Aḥra 
accords with the dualist position on its essence, it clashes with the concentric structural 
model with which this sub-passage begins.   
 
Reading the "Lilith-kelipah" and "benign kelipah" portrayals together as one passage, we 
find that the concentricity image is itself split, doubled into a healthy and malignant form, 
one in which Tishby's three axes line up (the "benign kelipah" sub-passage) and one in 
which they do not (the "Lilith-kelipah" sub-passage).  The force of the entire passage 
derives from the juxtaposition of these two very different portrayals whose basic 
rhetorical framework they nonetheless share.  The text seems designed to function as a 
provocation that works on the reader by juxtaposing two radically different results of the 
"expansion" of the first kelipah – a provocation that depends on attributing as much 
similarity as possible to the two processes.  Indeed, one could even say that this similarity 
between the two versions of the concentricity structure, the "benign kelipah" and the 
"Lilith-kelipah," is itself a kind of parallelism on the rhetorical level, and even a form of 
homology on the structural level.  We thus rediscover the relationship between 
"resemblance" and "menace" in the relationship between the two forms of the 
concentricity structure itself.    
                                                 
24
 Zohar I, 19b. 
25
 Tishby, MZ, 300.   This phrase appears numerous times in the Zohar, including II, 163b & 173b. 
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The two sub-passages, to put it slightly differently, thus represent a "splitting" into a 
benign and a malignant form of the very process of the generation of the concentric 
kelipot, leading, respectively, to good and bad kelipot.  To recur to Tishby's models, the 
doubling of this process gives us a seemingly "anti-dualist" form in which merely relative 
kelipot are generated, and a seemingly "dualist" form, the product of some disruption or 
metastasis in which essentially evil kelipot are generated.   One might, of course, attribute 
these differences to the relative dominance of Neoplatonic versus "Gnostic" sources 
within each of the sub-passages, or, more proximately, to the Zohar's Geronese and 
Castillian precursors.   Yet, the striking similarity of the terminology in the two sub-
passages and their apparent continuity in the text suggests a very different approach to 
reading.  Whatever the two sub-passages’ historical origins or influences, I contend that 
one should take seriously the recurring linguistic features of the text and the apparent 
continuity of its parts.  The power of the passage as a whole emerges from its 
juxtaposition of the seemingly heterogeneous conceptions in the two contiguous sub-
passages, those of the benign and malignant portrayals of the generation of the kelipot.  
As in the "fingernail zohama" passage, it is the contemplation of the baffling puzzle 
posed by the juxtaposition of these heterogeneous portrayals that would appear to be one 
of the main goals – or at least effects – of the passage.    
 
Moreover, an examination of the dynamics of the geographical axis in the Lilith-kelipah 
sub-passage adds not only further layers of complexity to my thus far relatively static 
comparison of the two sub-passages, but also links the passage as a whole to issues of 
abjection and identity-formation – themes which I only fully explore in Chapter Two.  In 
the “Lilith-kelipah” sub-passage, as I have already noted, it is by an affirmative act of 
expulsion – or, to be more precise, two separate acts of expulsion – that Lilith is sent to 
her remote exile in retribution for her nefarious activities.  These activities concern 
precisely her interference with identity formation on both the angelic and human levels.  
Lilith first sought out the "small faces" [ירטוז יפנא], presumably the cherubim, and desired 
to "cleave to them" and "be portrayed in them" [והייווגב ארייטצאלו והב אקבדתאל תאעב],26 to 
                                                 
26
 Zohar I, 19b; Matt I, 148 (translation modified).  Cf. bḤagigah, 13b. 
  
 
63 
 
parasitically take on their form – rhetorically, a kind of rapacious auto-prosopopeia.   For 
this interference with "the small faces," Kudsha Berikh Hu "separated her from there, 
bringing her down below" [אתתל הל תיחנו ןמתמ ה"בק הל שרפא].27    
 
When human beings were created, the sight of the union of Adam and Eve, the "complete 
image" [םילש אנקויד],28 causes Lilith to fly away.  Apparently, this refers to a second 
attempt to interfere with subject-formation, this time on the human level – for by 
interfering with the union of Adam and Eve, she would have prevented the formation of 
the "complete image," that union of male and female which, in the Zohar, is 
indispensable for the full formation of subjectivity.  She then again returns to perform 
mischief with the "small faces" – an act for which Kudsha Berikh Hu “casts her into the 
nether regions of the sea" [אמי ילופשב הל ליטאו].29  After Adam's sin, Kudsha Berikh Hu 
allows her to emerge from this exile and she acquires power over children, "the small 
faces of humanity” [אשנ ינבד ירטוז יפא].30  Finally, after the birth of Cain, she succeeds in 
mating with Adam and brings forth improper subjects, "spirits and flying demons" [ ןיחור 
ןיסיטו] – or, rhetorically, achieving her goal of monstrous prosopopeia.31   
 
In this sub-passage, the characteristic activity of Lilith, the "Other Kelipah," is thus an 
interference with the proper "expansion" of beings, divine, angelic, and human.  This 
interference may be described more abstractly in terms of the unfolding of the sefirot – a 
perversion of the expansion of the divine light – or in more corporeal terms as the 
disruption of the proper generation of "faces," both angelic and human.  In both sets of 
images, the Lilith-kelipah seeks to appropriate and divert the vitality and, indeed, the 
identity of holy entities at the very moment of their formation.  The expulsion of Lilith, 
the "Other Kelipah," is an essential prerequisite for the proper unfolding of the formation 
of subjectivity at all levels of the cosmos. The geographical remoteness of this originally 
proximate figure comes about at a subsequent phase of the drama of creation and as an 
essential step in its unfolding. 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Zohar I, 19b; Matt I, 149. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. 
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Finally, while I only fully explore this theme in the next chapter, this dimension provides 
an insight into why the "Lilith-kelipah" sub-passage precedes the "benign kelipah" sub-
passage.   As we might expect in accordance with an account of identity formation 
through abjection, it is only after expulsion of inassimilable elements, as described in the 
"Lilith-kelipah" section, that one can present a smoothly unfolding identity as in the 
"benign kelipah" section.  The smooth, organic development of the "benign kelipah" 
section only becomes possible after the violent struggle with the abjected Lilith in the 
preceding section. 
 
Nevertheless, the instability of this kind of abjection is expressed in the instability of 
Lilith's banishment to the depths of the sea – and here the theurgical effect of human 
action, for good or ill, comes into play.  The first opportunity for escape from her abject 
refuge comes with the first sin, that of Adam and Eve.  Lilith's banishment is thus 
inversely linked to that of Adam and Eve from the Garden.  Just as the stability of human 
identity formation is linked to the abjection of Lilith, so the disruption of identity 
formation is linked to the partial suspension of her banishment.  After the relaxation of 
her expulsion, not only does she acquire power over human children, she succeeds in 
mating with human beings.    
 
In fact, the sub-passage declares that, after her release from her banishment to the depths 
of the sea, Lilith's new residence is by the side of a powerful biblical image of eternal 
instability, that of the "flaming sword which turned every way” [תכפהתמה ברחה טהל] 
(Genesis 3:24) barring the way back to the Garden of Eden:  she "dwells there by that 
flaming sword, for she emerged from the side of that flame" [ טהל אוהה יבגל ןמת אבתיו  ,ברחה
טהל אוההד ארטסמ תקפנ איהד ןיגב].32 The episodic strengthening of that flame, presumably by 
human sin, allows Lilith to roam the world to engage in her identity-disrupting mischief.  
This flaming sword may evoke a number of different sefirotic connotations in the Zohar.  
If one interprets it here consistently with the rest of the passage, one might surmise that 
the "sword" refers to Gevurah and the "flame" to the "strong judgment" that represents a 
                                                 
32
 Ibid. 
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hypertrophy of Gevurah, of whom Lilith and the Sitra Aḥra generally are a further 
metastasis.
33
 However, a more common Zoharic reference of this image is to Malkhut, the 
Shekhinah, which "at times turns to mercy and at times to judgment."
34
  That this 
connotation of the "fiery sword" may be intended here is supported by another passage, 
closely related to the “Lilith-kelipah” sub-passage just cited, in which the Zohar declares 
that Lilith "hangs from" or "depends on" [אילת] the Shekhinah to whom she "cleaves" 
[קבדתא].35  The movement "downward" in Lilith's location in relationship to the divine – 
from Gevurah at the beginning of the passage to Malkhut further on – may itself be a 
result of her banishment.   
 
In either case, this cleaving of Lilith to the Shekhinah recalls the cleaving of the ten 
sefirot of the Sitra Aḥra to the "zohama of the fingernail" of the Shekhinah in the passage 
I discussed above.  Cleaving to fingernail filth or to a fiery, ever-turning sword are both 
images of divine/demonic links whose fundamental characteristics are neither remoteness 
nor proximity, but instability.  Both passages, though with very different configurations 
of the geographical and structural alternatives, express the central paradox of the 
relationship of the holy realm and the Sitra Aḥra – on the one hand, the constitution of 
both realms as a result of abjection and, on the other hand, the immense power possessed 
by the Sitra Aḥra despite its emergence as subsidiary to the holy side, as a crystallization 
of its refuse or its malignant metastasis.   
 
                                                 
33
 This interpretation would also make this image consistent with another key portrayal of the emergence of 
the Sitra Aḥra, in Zohar I, 148a. 
34
 For the Shekhinah as the "ever-turning sword," see Zohar II, 27b (Tosefta).  In interpreting the flame 
here as the Shekhinah, I depart from Matt who views it, perhaps more consistently with the rest of the 
passage, as applying to Gevurah.  See Matt I, 149 n.328.  My interpretation is based both on parallel 
passages using this image and on the "ever-turning" quality of the sword, which strongly suggests, as in 
other passages, the ambivalent Shekhinah. 
35
 Zohar I, 33b.  I adopt Matt’s textual emendations given in his Aramaic Texts, vol. 1, 55 and the Matt 
translation, I, 208-209.  The interpolations in square brackets are mine:   
 לכמ ארטוז ארוהנ  ,תראמ יאהב אילת יהיאו ,אמלע ייברל הרכסא אילת הבד יהיא אתתל ,תראמ יהי רמא יסוי יבר
 אלבקמ אלד אכשחתאד ןינמזו ,ןירוהנ ןינייז ןוניא לכ אתתל ןיילת היבו ,הראמ אוהה הידהב קבדתאד ןיגב....ארוהנ
נרחא...ארוהנד וריעז ןיגב ,ןי ...אמלעב תיליל אללכאל ,אילת היב אלכ 
Rabbi Yose said, "let there be תראמ (me'erat), curse, below, for diphtheria in the world's children 
depends on her [i.e., Lilith], and she depends upon this תראמ (me'orot), smallest of all lights, 
sometimes darkened, receiving no light. … that הראמ (me'erah), curse clung to it.  All those other 
species below [i.e., demonic forces] depend upon it because of the diminution of this light … 
everything depends on this, including Lilith in the world. 
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I would like to highlight two implications of the preceding discussion.  The first concerns 
the manner of approaching heterogeneous images in the Zohar.  Rather than seeking to 
uncover rival coherent models underlying these images, I affirm the need to first read 
each passage as a whole while refraining for as long as possible from determining its 
overall meaning.  Such a reading can reveal whether the force and meaning of a passage 
might stem precisely from the way it juxtaposes heterogeneous images.  In the face of a 
passage marked by heterogeneous or seemingly incompatible images, this approach can 
obviate the urgency of choosing among a number of unsatisfying alternatives – including 
harmonizing the text’s seeming discrepancies, interpreting the text as a struggle between 
the models within the heart of a single author, or inferring that the text must be a 
patchwork stemming from multiple authorship. The privilege this approach accords to 
very close readings of the text follows the imperative proclaimed by Liebes to attend to 
the Zohar’s literary dimensions.  It carries Liebes' imperative further than he does, as I 
show in the remainder of this chapter, by focusing on the way the texts produce meaning 
by means of distinctive deployments of such detailed rhetorical aspects as constructional 
schemes and tropes.  Above all, it embraces textual heterogeneities as meaning-producing 
provocations rather than as merely apparent problems to be dispelled in one way or the 
other.  This approach to reading tends to highlight ambivalence, the instability of 
resolutions of conflicting forces (rhetorical or ontological), and textual indeterminacy.  
 
A second implication concerns the affinity between this way of reading and latent 
Zoharic ontologies, particularly concerning subject-formation.  In other words, though 
my emphasis on rhetorical analysis stresses the need for at least a provisional agnosticism 
about overall models, it also implies a certain affinity for conceptions to which the 
rhetorical forms seem suited, particularly that of “splitting,” the main concern of this 
chapter, and "abjection," the primary focus of the next chapter.  I caution, again, 
however, that the affinity of rhetorical forms and doctrinal conceptions is sometimes 
deployed in a counter-intuitive way, that is, in such a way as to create a textual effect 
precisely through running counter to the reader's expectations.    
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B. Signifying Ambivalence – Schemes and Tropes  
 
Three of the principal ways in which the Zohar achieves “splitting” in its portrayal of the 
relationship of the divine and demonic are the following:  sometimes an image is 
doubled, appearing in both holy and unholy forms; sometimes a single image is divided, 
thus belonging to both realms; and sometimes the ambivalence takes the form of textual 
indeterminacy, giving rise to conflict among later commentators about whether specific 
images are to be interpreted as associated with the holy or the unholy realms.    
 
It might be tempting to use Tishby's framework to associate the first effect, that of 
doubling, with the notion of the relationship of the Sitra Aḥra to the divine as 
geographically remote, structurally homologous, and essentially dualistic; the second 
effect, that of division, with the notion of this relationship as geographically proximate, 
structurally concentric, and only relatively dualistic, if at all; and the third effect, that of 
textual indeterminacy, with more complex textual constructions in which elements from 
both of Tishby's models are combined.  My discussion in the preceding section, however, 
has cast doubt on whether these associations between geography, structure, and essence  
capture the way the Zohar deploys its heterogeneous images.  I have suggested, instead, a 
turn to close textual readings to discover the way the Zohar deploys heterogeneous 
images in its portrayals of the Sitra Aḥra.  
  
In this section, I attend to two different kinds of rhetorical techniques Zoharic texts use to 
achieve the splitting effects described above.  At times, these effects are achieved through 
the phenomenal content of images – for example, a creature that is physically divided 
between its demonic and divine parts.  At other times, however, these effects are 
achieved primarily through the way phrases, sentences, or paragraphs are constructed, 
rather than the semantic content of the words.  In other words, I focus not only on tropes, 
such as metaphor and metonymy, but also on what rhetoricians calls the constructional 
"schemes" in which such images appear.
36
  This detailed inquiry into the way the Zohar 
                                                 
36
 The classic distinction between tropes and what I here call "schemes" was given by Quintillian (who 
refers to the latter as “rhetorical figures”): 
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"signifies" the Sitra Aḥra is imperative in the context of a work so attentive to language 
both stylistically and thematically. 
 
   
1. Schemes: the Seductions of Rhetorical Parallelism 
 
Attending to constructional schemes entails a focus not on the selection of images, but on 
the way phrases, sentences, and larger units are constructed.  One literary theorist 
describes such schemes as the ways such compositional units are “balanced," as opposed 
to the choice of words within them.
37
  My analysis of Tishby has demonstrated the need 
for an interpretive method that goes beyond developing coherent models, even competing 
models, as a way of grappling with Zoharic texts' paradoxical features.  Starting with the 
way small textual units are assembled and produce meaning serves to highlight the 
distinctiveness of the Zohar's textual operations and ultimately heightens insight into its 
doctrinal content.  Moreover, since the Zohar is a text (or collection of texts) that 
strikingly foregrounds its compositional and stylistic virtuosity, beginning with 
constructional schemes seems particularly apt.   
 
It is important to note that any particular constructional scheme can function in the 
service of more than one meaning, a feature that Brian Vickers calls the "polysemous" or 
"poly-functional" nature of such schemes.
38
  The Zohar is, of course, famous for using 
tropes to signify different metaphysical elements in different contexts, but it is just as 
                                                                                                                                                 
4. …A trope, then, is an expression turned from its natural and principal signification to another, 
for the purpose of adorning style, or, as most of the grammarians define it, "an expression altered 
from the sense in which it is proper to one in which it is not proper." … 
5. In tropes, accordingly, some words are substituted for others, as in metaphor, metonymy, 
antonomasia, metalepsis, synecdoche, catachresis, allegory, and, generally, in hyperbole….  
7. Nothing of this sort is necessary in figures. … 
2.  [V]erbal figures are of two kinds.  One, as they say, lies in the formation of phrases; the other is 
sought in the collocation of them… [W]e may call the one rather grammatical and the other 
rhetorical.. …   
Quintilian, Institutes, 145, 183 (Book 9.2.4,5, & 7; Book 9.3.2)  Because the phrase “rhetorical figures” 
evokes a broader meaning for most current readers, I have chosen to use Lewis Turco’s term 
“constructional schemes” for these techniques.  Turco, The New Book of Forms, 63.  The specific technique 
I linger on most in the text, anaphora, is discussed by Quintilian at ibid., 193 (Book 9.3.30), though he does 
not use that term..        
37
 Turco, The New Book of Forms, 63.  
38
 Vickers, ‘Repetition and Emphasis in Rhetoric:  Theory and Practice’, 91-92. 
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important to note that the way it constructs its phrases also has this "polysemous" quality.  
This quality is particularly important with regard to the theme under discussion, the 
doubled, divided, and destabilized portrayals of the relationship between the divine and 
the demonic.    
 
I will particularly focus on one constructional scheme that Zoharic texts frequently 
employ to signify the relationship between the divine and demonic realms.  I refer to the 
phrase, "there is … and there is …." [it … ve-it; תיאו... תיא] – in which the same noun 
recurs after each "there is" – but in which the first use refers to the divine realm and the 
second to the demonic realm.  Such schemes may consist of an exact repetition of a brief 
phrase, as in the statement that "there is a 'field', and there is a 'field'" [it sadeh ve-it 
sadeh; הדש תיאו הדש תיא]39 – in which the first "field" refers to the Shekhinah and the 
second to her diabolical female counterpart, elsewhere called Lilith.   They may also take 
more elaborate forms, some of which I will analyze below.  The effect of such schemes is 
to split the image between its divine and demonic forms – an effect that comes primarily, 
often exclusively, from the construction of the phrase, rather than from the content of the 
repeated word.  It is thus the constructional scheme, rather than the referent of the trope, 
that is the main way such texts produce meaning.    
 
The scheme "there is … there is…" is an instance of rhetorical "parallelism" – though I 
strongly emphasize that we must take that word here as a description of a constructional 
scheme, rather than as an ontological description as in Tishby's use of the term 
"parallelism."  Specifically, the "there is … there is …" construction is an instance of the 
establishment of rhetorical parallelism by means of anaphora, the production of a textual 
effect through repetition of the first word or phrase in contiguous sentences or clauses.
40
  
It is generally deployed in conjunction with a number of other techniques, including what 
the rhetoricians call isocolon (in which successive clauses are of equal length) and 
parison (in which successive clauses are of equal or corresponding structure).  The Zohar 
has other ways of constructing rhetorical parallelism, but, for reasons that should become 
                                                 
39
 Zohar I, 122a. 
40
 For the definitions in this paragraph, see Vickers, ‘Repetition’, 93 & 100. 
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clear, I will focus on those constructed through the use of anaphora and its auxiliary 
schemes. 
 
The parallel scheme, "there is … and there is …," is very common in Talmudic and 
midrashic literature, both in Hebrew and Aramaic.   In this literature, it is deployed in a 
number of different ways – from asserting legal distinctions41 to presenting opposing 
views
42
 to moral contrasts.
43
   There are also a few occurrences of repetition of the "there 
is" phrase in the Bible itself, which, though few in number, give a further sense of its 
range.  These occurrences use this scheme to add emphasis,
44
 to present a moral and 
factual contrast,
45
 and to produce a cumulative effect of compatible, though different, 
notions.
46
  Of course, creating parallelism through various forms of repetitive structures – 
anaphora, isocolon and parison, or mere repetition of successive words (epizeuxis) – is a 
very common constructional scheme in the Bible generally.  As Lewis Turco points out, 
such constructions have a number of different meanings, including those in which 
parallel phrases are synonymous, antithetical, synthetic (in which a successive phrase or 
phrases are consequences or corollaries of a predecessor phrase), and climactic (in which 
successive phrases represent amplifications of their predecessors).
47
   These kinds of 
techniques and meanings, as well as some of the specific biblical passages characterized 
by parallelism, play an important role in the Zohar generally but particularly in its 
                                                 
41
 See, e.g., bBava Kama, 45b. 
42
 See, e.g., bBekhorot, 42b. 
43
 See, e.g., bPesaḥim, 50a. 
44
 II Kings 10:15:  
  שי בדנוהי רמאיו ךבבל םע יבבל רשאכ רשי ךבבל תא שיה וילא רמאיו שיו 
And he saluted him, and said to him, Is thine heart right, as my heart is with thy heart? And 
Jehonadab answered, It is [yesh va-yesh]. 
Note that the emphasis added by the repetition in the Hebrew is absent from the translation.  This is often 
the case with constructional schemes, a phenomenon that highlights their significance for textuality.  This 
kind of simple repetition is more properly called epizeuxis rather than anaphora. 
45
 Ecclesiastes 7:15: 
ותערב ךיראמ עשר שיו וקדצב דבא קידצ שי  
…there is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that prolongeth 
his life in his wickedness.  
46
 Jeremiah 31:16-17:   
ביוא ץראמ ובשו הוהי םאנ ךתלעפל רכש שי יכ...  םלובגל םינב ובשו הוהי םאנ ךתירחאל הוקת שיו  
…for thy work [ki yesh sakhar] shall be rewarded [lit:  ‘for there is reward for thy work’], saith 
YHVH; and they shall come again from the land of the enemy. And there is hope [ve-yesh tikvah] 
in thine end [lit:  ‘and there is hope for thine end’], saith YHVH, that thy children shall come 
again to their own border. 
Again, the anaphora disappears in the KJV translation. 
47
 Turco, The New Book, 10-11. 
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discussions of the Sitra Aḥra – of which one example would be its use of the familiar 
verses from Ecclesiastes, "a time to … and a time to …."48  
 
Although this constructional scheme may seem at first glance rather abstract, as well as 
rather commonplace in the Jewish tradition, the frequency and the manner of its use in 
the Zohar demand reflection.  By first examining the way this scheme functions, we can 
better analyze how Zoharic passages produce their textual effects, without prejudging 
their ontological visions.  Indeed, at times, the Zoharic texts produce their distinctive  
atmosphere primarily through playing on the polysemousness of its constructional 
schemes, their capability of signifying different ontological positions.   Moreover, while 
this scheme is found particularly frequently in the context of portrayals of the relationship 
of the holy realm to the Sitra Aḥra, it is by no means limited to them.   
 
I note that the anaphora "there is … and there is …" appears to contain, on its face, an 
ontological assertion.  Perhaps the Zohar's insistence on this formulation in relation to the 
demonic serves to distinguish its vision of the real, all-too-real, existence of evil – an 
existence posited as rivaling that of the divine – from any Neoplatonic view of evil as a 
mere privation of being.
49
  This feature means both that we cannot completely separate 
the rhetorical and ontological levels and that we require vigilance not to prejudge their 
relationship.   Indeed, attention to the complexities of the Zohar’s appropriation of this 
biblical and rabbinic scheme may contain clues to its portrayal of the cosmos generally. 
 
                                                 
48
 Ecclesiastes 3:1-8.  See Zohar II, 155b, Matt, V, 410 (translation modified): 
תע תיאו תע תיא( ,ח ג תלהק )אנשל תעו בהאל תע ,אליעל והיא תע ,והיא אתונמיהמד אזר תע אוההד , תע ירקא אדו
ןוצר… ,בהאל תע אד לעו ,בהאל שנ רב בייחתאד תע והיא אד .יהלאד אזר יהיאד ארחא תע תיאו"םירחא ם , בייחתאו
היל אנשמל שנ רב ...  תע אד לעואנשל 
There is a time, and there is a time.  A time to love, and a time to hate (Ecclesiastes 3:8).   There is 
a time above, for that time is mystery of faith, and this is called a time of favor.  ... So, a time to 
love – this is the time whom a person must love.  And there is another time, who is mystery of 
other Elohim, whom a person must hate ... So, a time to hate. 
49
 A related insistence may be found in Yitsḥak Sagi Nahor's commentary on the Sefer Yetsirah.  He relates 
the difference between the Sefer Yetsirah's "simple" and "double" letters to the divergent nature of the 
relationship between positive and negative forms they designate.   In the case of the "simple" letters, the 
negative forms are mere privations [הרסהו תורדעה םא יכ םניא]; in the case of the "doubled" letters, the 
negative forms have their own autonomous basis [המצע ינפב הבס הל שי תחא לכ].  Sefer Yetsirah Im Peirushe 
Kadmone Ha-Rishonim, 19 & 16.  The use of the term "double" to designate those counterparts that have an 
autonomous basis is itself a rather paradoxical notion.  See also the discussion in Scholem, Origins of the 
Kabbalah, 293.     
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The Zohar uses the anaphora "there is … and there is …." in three main ways.  The first 
usage, my prime concern, creates rhetorical parallelism between the divine and the 
demonic realms (as in the "field" example given above -  הדש תיאו הדש תיא ).  The second 
usage creates rhetorical parallelism between upper- and lower-level cosmic structures.   
This second usage can operate to compare and contrast either the upper and lower levels 
of the divine (or demonic) realm as a whole
50
 or two specific higher and lower sefirot.
51
  
A third usage creates rhetorical parallelism between two entities at the same level of 
either the divine or demonic realms – mercy and judgment, left and right, or male and 
female.
52
   
 
Passages characterized by this scheme often produce their effects in part through the 
sheer poetic sensuousness of the repeated anaphora.  One receives the impression that the 
text could keep multiplying the anaphora to include more and more facets, more and 
more terms – with the specific elements far less important than the repetitive cadence of 
the anaphora.  It is almost as though the text were trying to induce a vision of the cosmos 
in the reader through a rhythmic chant.   The following passage provides a brief example 
of this technique: 
 
ןלילצ ןיימ תיא ,ןרירמ ןיימ תיאו ןיקותמ ןיימ תיאד ןיגב מ תיאו םלש ןיימ תיא ,ןריכע ןיימ תיאו ןיי
הבירמ ימ המה אד לעו ,וטטק53  
For there are sweet waters and there are bitter waters, there are clear waters and 
there are filthy waters, there are waters of peace and there are waters of strife.  
And therefore they are “Waters of Strife” [Numbers 20:13] 
 
                                                 
50
 Zohar II, 23a: 
 יזח את תיא  ןייזחתמד ןינווג ,תיאו ןייזחתמ אלד ןינווג 
Come and see:  there are colors that are seen and there are colors that are not seen. 
51  Zohar III, 137b: 
  תיא   ימחר תיאו  ימחר ,ןיקיתעד קיתעד ימחר ,םילודג םימחר ןורקא ןוניא ,ןיפנא ריעזד ימחר ,םתס םימחר ןורקא  
There is compassion and there is compassion.  The compassion of the Ancient of Ancients is 
called “the great compassion”; the compassion of Ze’er Anpin is just called “compassion.” 
52
 For an example in the demonic realm, see, e.g., Zohar III, 207a: 
ד ונייהוהדוהי יבר רמא קחצי יבר רמא ,תיא ןיאתת ןירתכ ןילאב תיאו אנימי  אלאמש ,ירמח אנימיד ארטסמ , המכ
אנמיקואד ,ינתא ילאמשד ארטסמו  
And this is as Rabbi Yitsḥak said in the name of Rabbi Yehudah:  in these lower crowns there is 
right and there is left:  from the side of the right, male donkeys, as it has been established, and 
from the side of the left, female donkeys. 
53
 Zohar I, 66a.    
  
 
73 
 
This passage also suggests the non-transparent relationship between the rhetorical and 
ontological levels – problematizing, for example, the susceptibility of individual images 
to being identified either with specific sefirot or even with more general levels of the 
divine and demonic realms.  To be sure, some traditionalist commentators interpret the 
three parallel pairs of "waters" in this passage as referring to the left, right, and center of 
each of the two realms.
54   Yet such interpretations do not seem compelled or even 
motivated by the context of the passage; indeed, their forced quality serves primarily to 
highlight one of the many ways the Zohar's poetic imperatives often swamp such 
hermeneutic aspirations. The sheer rhythm of the repeated anaphora in this passage, 
which seems to lend itself to indefinite extension, makes efforts to identify specific 
references for its terms seem secondary or irrelevant. 
 
Nevertheless, in other passages, such efforts to distinguish the references of the 
successive phrases may make more interpretive sense.  Indeed, these kinds of passages 
work through a juxtaposition of several instances of distinct, though related, 
anaphorically established parallelism.  An example of such a complex juxtaposition is the 
following passage containing both upper/lower and divine/demonic parallelism: 
 
 ,אתתל ןיריעז ןוותא ,אליעל ןוניא ןיברבר ןוותא ,ןיריעז ןוותא  תיאו  ,ןברבר ןוותא  תיאד  ןיגב
ב ןימייקד ןיאלע ןישידק ןהמש  תיאד  ןיגב .אליעלד אנווגכ אתתל אלכו אלולמ אלב אבלו אחורד וער
 ןינרחא ןהמש תיאו  .והיילע וערו הבשחמד וכישמבו ,הלמב ןימייקד ןיאתת ןישידק ןהמש תיאו  ,ללכ
 אבאסמד ארטסמ והיאד ,ארחא ארטס אוההמ ןוניאד ,אתתל  אדבועד וערב אלא ןימייק אל ןילאו
רחא ארטס והיאד ןיגב ,היבגל אתתלד אדבוע אוההד וער אקלסל ,אתתל ןידבועב אלא והיא ואל א
                                                 
54
 Both the Sulam, I, 51 and the Matok Midevash, II, 81 interpret these three kinds of "water" as the left, 
right, and center columns of the holy and demonic dimensions.  Another passage, Zohar I, 80a (Sitre 
Torah), is more explicit, though it may be a later interpolation: 
תודוסי עבראמ אפוג ארב אד אמגודבו ,...םימו רפעו חורו שא רכד אד םימ ,השודקד ןקיתמ םימ אוה אדו , םימ תיאו
 םירראמהערה רצי ןוניאד ,אבקונ אשידק אשא תיא ,הרז שא הארכונ אשא תיאו ,רכד והיא אשידק חור.... , חור תיאו
ערה רצי אד אבאסמ ,... אשידק רפע תיא ,אבאסמ רפע תיאו, 
And on this model, he created a body from four elements, fire and wind and earth and water 
…water is male, and this is sweet holy water, and there are accursed waters which are the evil 
inclination.  There is holy female fire, and there is alien fire, “the strange fire.” … Holy wind is 
male and there is unholy wind which is the evil inclination … There is holy earth and there is 
unholy earth.  
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 ארטס אוההב יקסעתמד ןוניא לכו ,םדק ינב ןוניאו םעלבד אנווגכ ,ןוהב אבאתסאל ,אמלע יאהד
ארחא.55 
 
For there are great letters and there are lesser letters.  Great letters are those 
above; lesser letters below.  And all below is as above.  For there are holy upper 
names that exist in the will of the spirit and the heart without any verbalization; 
and there are holy lower names that exist in the word and in the drawing upon 
them of thought and will.  And there are other names below, those that are from 
that Other Side [Sitra Aḥra], which is the contaminated side.  And these only exist 
through the will to action below, to raise the will to action below to it [i.e., to the 
Sitra Ahra].  For the Other Side is not [והיא ואל] except through the actions of this 
world, in order to contaminate by means of them, like Balaam and those sons of 
the East and all those who occupy themselves with the Other Side. 
 
In this passage, two kinds of primary parallelism are at work – that between the upper 
and lower divine ["there are letters … and there are letters"; ןוותא תיאו... ןוותא תיא] and 
between these two divine levels and the demonic realm ["for there are names … and there 
are names … and there are names" ןהמש תיאו... ןהמש תיאו... ןהמש תיאד].   The two divine 
levels, the two kinds of "letters," can be read as the holy forces emanating from Binah 
and Malkhut, respectively.
56
  The latter forces, the vehicles of channeling vitality from 
the divine to the earthly level, are then, by means of anaphora, placed rhetorically parallel 
both to the holy forces above them and to the demonic forces below them.  Moreover, in 
addition to the  anaphora that juxtaposes the great and lesser letters [ ,ןברבר ןוותא  תיאד  ןיגב
 ןיריעז ןוותא  תיאו ], the passage adds two overlapping anaphoras referring to three kinds of 
names:  first, a juxtaposition of the upper and lower divine levels – "for there are holy 
upper names … and there are holy lower names" [  ןיאלע ןישידק ןהמש  תיאד...  ןהמש תיאו  
 ןיאתת ןישידק]; second, a juxtaposition of the divine and demonic realms – "and there are 
holy lower names … and there are other lower names" [  ןהמש תיאו... ןיאתת ןישידק ןהמש תיאו
אתתל ןינרחא].   
 
                                                 
55
 Zohar II, 180b. 
56
 Compare related passages such as Zohar II, 174a and II, 205b. 
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This complex set of rhetorical parallelisms is consistent with the content of the passage – 
which is focused on the relationship between the metaphysical level and the human.  The 
divine "names," upper and lower, are portrayed from the perspective of their relationship 
to human will, thought, and word; the demonic "names" are portrayed from the 
perspective of human action – with the reference to Balaam clearly alluding to the 
practice of black magic.
57
  The passage, then, establishes parallelism through rhetorical 
structure and also portrays the active establishment of ontological connection between the 
levels.   Particularly since the content of the passage is itself linguistically focused, 
concentrating on "letters" and "names," the persuasiveness of its portrayal of the efficacy 
of such practices – and perhaps, as I suggest below, that efficacy itself – may itself be a 
product of the rhetorical technique of anaphorically established parallelism. 
 
An even more complex instance, with a somewhat different configuration, is provided by 
the following passage: 
 
אליעל אנימי תיא ,ימי תיאואתתל אנ ,אליעל אלאמש תיא ,אתתל אלאמש תיאו , אליעל אנימי תיא
האלע השודקב ,ארחא ארטסב והיאד אתתל אנימי תיאו ,האלע השודקב אליעל אלאמש תיא ,
ארהנתאל אליעל אשידק רתאב ארהיס ארשקתאל אתומיחר ארעתאל , שירפאד אתתל אלאמש תיאו
אליעלד אתומיחר,  לו אשמשב ארהנאלמ הל שירפאו אשיב איוחד ארטס אוה אדו ,הידהב אברקתא
 אהרוהנ תכשחתאו ,אליעלמ הל שירפאו ארהיסל הל ךישמ ןידכ ,תרעתא אתתלד אד אלאמש דכד
אשיב איוחב תקבדתאו58 
 
There is Right above, and there is Right below.  There is Left above, and there is 
Left below.  There is Right above in supernal sanctity; and there is Right below 
on the Other Side [Sitra Aḥra].  There is Left above in supernal sanctity, arousing 
love, linking the moon with a sacred site to shine.  And there is Left below, 
blocking love from above, preventing Her from shining through the sun and 
drawing near.  This is the side of the evil serpent, for when this lower Left 
                                                 
57
 References to Balaam as a master magician abound in the Zohar.  See, e.g., Zohar III, 207b. 
58
 Zohar I, 53a. 
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arouses, it draws away the moon, separating Her from above, so Her light darkens 
and She cleaves to the serpent.
59
 
 
In this passage, the two kinds of primary parallelism at work are those between the divine 
and the demonic, here identified with upper and lower levels [it le-ela… ve-it le-tata;  תיא
אתתל תיאו... אליעל], as well as between the right and the left dimensions [it yamina … it 
semola; אלאמש תיא...אנימי תיא] that characterize both realms.  The passage also creates 
rhetorical parallelism between two metaphysical theurgical actions – the action of the 
holy left side in arousing love between the male and female (the "sun" and the "moon") 
and the action of the demonic Left in separating them and in drawing the female to the 
demonic.  Following Charles Mopsik, we could distinguish between these two kinds of 
actions either as "theurgy" in contrast with "theoclasty," i.e., construction versus 
destruction of the divine, or, perhaps more precisely, as "white theurgy"versus "black 
theurgy,"  i.e., construction of the divine versus construction of the demonic (along the 
model of "white magic" versus "black magic").
60
 
 
Several observations can be made about the juxtapositions in these three passages.  First, 
in all of them, as I noted above, the anaphoric rhythm is foregrounded and takes on a 
rhetorical force of its own.  The power of such passages largely derives from the 
repetition of the anaphora as it takes us from left to right, from above to below, and from 
divine to demonic.   In the second and third of these passages, this rhetorical power seems 
to pass over into ontological efficacy.  It appears as though it were the rhetorical force of 
the parallelisms that opens up the theurgical access among the various planes – or, at the 
very least, that makes that access persuasively plausible to the reader.  In the second, 
"letters and names," passage, such parallelisms induce the reader to be carried along from 
plane to plane to the point of assenting to the efficacy of Balaam's magic.  The 
overlapping rhetorical parallelisms create the sense of ontological accessibility from the 
upper divine levels to the lower divine levels to the human level – and then, staying with 
the image of a "lower” level, but shifting from the holy to unholy realms, creating the 
sense of accessibility from the metaphysical demonic level to the human level of Balaam.  
                                                 
59
 Matt I, 295 (translation modified). 
60
 Mopsik, Les Grands Textes de la Cabale : Les Rites qui Font Dieu, 85 & 98.   
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The rhetorical creation of a sense of the plausibility of ontological efficacy through such 
overlapping parallelisms may be even more pertinent in the third, "left/right, 
above/below" passage.   
 
In this last passage, the seductive power of the constructional scheme may also be viewed 
as the very basis of the seductive power of the demonic.  The hypnotic power of 
anaphoric repetition, the overlapping and even confusion of levels, dimensions, and 
realms it induces, may be the secret of the success of the demonic in taking the 
Shekhinah away from her proper consort.  The complex juxtapositions of parallelisms, 
leading hypnotically from level to level, from dimension to dimension, and from realm to 
realm, marked by repeating terms linked by the "there is … there is …" anaphora, 
reversing their valences as the passage shifts from one plane to another, create the danger 
of confusion and the appeal of misprision, producing the plausibility, and perhaps even 
the ontological possibility, of the contamination of the divine by the demonic.   And yet, 
as in the "names and letters" passage, it is also the juxtapositions of rhetorical 
parallelisms that make plausible, and perhaps even possible, the "good" access among 
levels, such as those between the human, the lower divine, and the upper divine. 
 
Second, if one sought to express the ontological conception suggested by such rhythmic 
anaphoric passages, one would be tempted to articulate a vision of infinite 
correspondences, each facet of the universe reflected in all others – a vision expressed in 
the well-known formula, "as above, so below" [  יכה אליעלד אנווגכאתתל תיא ].61  This formula 
is restated in the Zohar in a variety of different forms, and appears in the second of these 
three passages in the form, "everything below is in the manner of above" [ אלכו  אנווגכ אתתל
אליעלד].  However, such a seamless move from rhetorical figure to ontological vision is 
rendered deeply troubling in the context of my discussion here:  for the presence of the 
demonic as one of the cosmic realms brought into correspondence with all others renders 
this vision both problematic on the level of its possibility and disturbing on the level of its 
theological, moral, and cognitive implications. 
 
                                                 
61
 Zohar II, 186b. 
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While these troubling qualities emerge from my discussions throughout this thesis, I will 
briefly sketch the relationship between anaphoric parallelism and the "as above, so 
below" formula.   The Zohar uses this formula in a number of ways, seemingly drawing a 
number of different implications that are not necessarily always consistent with each 
other.  Such implications range from the ontological, in the form of a kind of  Platonic 
idealism (the notion that everything below is based on a model above);
62
 to the 
performative, in the form of a theurgical imperative (the notion that the repair or even 
construction of the divine above depends on human action below);
63
 to the visionary, in 
the form of a portrayal of the prelapsarian human being as dwelling in a place in which 
all facets of the universe, above and below, are reflected and accessible to experience.
64
  
Keeping in mind the demonic facet, however, brings to the fore a disturbing side to each 
of these possible implications: if everything below has its model above, this must also 
apply to evil; if actions below can theurgically effect the construction of the divine, so 
can they act to damage it and give ascendancy to the demonic ("white theurgy" versus 
"theoclasty" and "black theurgy");
65
 if the prelapsarian Adam lived in a place from which 
                                                 
62
 Zohar I, 186b: 
  אמגוד הל תיא אלד אמלעב הלמ ךל תילדאליעל 
For there is nothing in the world for which there is not a model above 
63
 Zohar III, 113b: 
 שב אשידק אמש דיבע ולאכ יאדואתתל  דיבע והיאד  אנווגכ  ,ומיל אליעל  רעתא  יכה  ,  
This is certainly as though he [a human being] had made the holy Name in its perfection; just as he 
does below, so it is aroused above 
To be sure, in Neoplatonism, the possibility of theurgy, in the form of attracting divine energy to the world, 
is not only consistent with, but based on, the ontological vision of correspondences between dimensions 
("cosmic sympathy").   Yet, kabbalistic theurgy is often based on a kind of reverse Platonism, in which the 
upper levels depend on the lower levels, including the human level, for their construction.  This may also 
be expressed on the ontological level, in which the human level may be asserted to be the "root" of the 
divine level.  See  Idel, Kabbalah:  New Perspectives,175-176 and  Mopsik, Les Grands Textes, 377-378. 
64
 Zohar I, 38a (Hekhalot di-Bereshit): 
אתמכח לכו ןיאלע ןיזר לכ ןמתמ לכתסאו ימח הוה ,ןדעד אתנגל ה"בק היל ליעאד אתעשב יזח את…  ינה לכד ןיגב
רד אנקוידבו ,אליעלד אזרד אנקוידב לילכ יוהמל ,אתתלד אנווגכ והב תיאו ,אליעלד אנווגכ והב תיא ןילכיה ,אתתלד אז
םדאד הירויד הוה והבו 
Come and see:  at the hour that the Kadosh Barukh Hu made him enter the Garden of Eden, he 
looked and saw from there all the supernal mysteries and all wisdom ... for in all these palaces, 
there is [all] as it is above, and there is [all] as it is below, so that it will be included in the image 
of the mystery above, and in the image of the mystery below, and in them was the dwelling-place 
of Adam. 
65
 See Zohar III, 47a:  
 אלא חכתשא אל אליעלו ,אליעל חכתשאד ןיגב אלא ,אתתל חכתשא אל אלכד אתועירג ,קחצי יבר רמא אייח יבר רמא
יאהו יאהב יאה איילת אלכד ןניפליד ,אמלע יבוחב אתתל חכתשא דכ יאהב 
Rabbi Ḥiya said in the name of Rabbi Yitsḥak:  the diminution of all is only found below because 
it is found above; and above, it is only found when it is found below due to the sins of the world – 
for we have learned, that, in all, this is dependent on this, and this on this. 
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all divine facets could be experienced, the postlapsarian human might live in a place from 
which the divine and the demonic are equally proximate – indeed, it was in this later 
dwelling place, the "first palace" in which Hosea was commanded to dwell, with which I 
began this thesis.   
 
In any case, I argue that, in passages such as the three under discussion here, the 
plausibility of all three kinds of implications, the ontological, theurgical and visionary, 
derives much of its force from the constructional scheme of anaphora-based parallelism.  
It is as though the parallel rhetorical structures create channels of ontological accessibility 
along all three levels (the upper and lower metaphysical levels and the human level) and 
between their counterparts in the holy and unholy realms.  Just as the rhetorical 
parallelism linking the human, the lower divine, and the upper divine constructs a 
beneficent accessibility, so the parallelism between the divine and the demonic constructs 
a perverse accessibility.  When it comes to the latter parallelism, such passages 
rhetorically establish the paradoxical conjunction of "resemblance" and "menace."    
 
In addition to the nefarious power and demonic seductiveness rendered plausible by 
anaphoric repetition, another kind of danger is that of the interpretive indeterminacy that 
such parallelism creates, an indeterminacy affecting the interpretation of particular terms 
as well as their relationship.  Two passages in the Zohar explicitly broach the problem of 
such interpretive indeterminacy.  The first, based on a midrashic homily, concerns the 
meaning of the word "end" [ץק; kets] as it appears in the last chapter of the book of 
Daniel.  The chapter contains a complex and mysterious end-of-days vision, including a 
number of doublings and antitheses (12:2, 12:5 and 12:10), all of which baffles Daniel 
(12:8).  In the midrash, Daniel is portrayed as beset by anxiety about whether he would 
meet a blessed or cursed fate.  Even after receiving a favorable reply, he continues to 
worry about the meaning of the last verse of the chapter informing him that he would 
receive his ultimate reward at "the end of days."
66
  The latter word is spelled in a 
seemingly quasi-Aramaic fashion, rather than in the more conventional Hebrew form [ ץק
                                                                                                                                                 
I note that in reading the first word of this saying as "אתועירג", rather than "אתוערב", I follow the Mantua and 
Cremona editions of the Zohar, as well as the version of Cordovero, rather than the Vilna edition.    
66
 Ekhah Rabati in Midrash Rabah, III, 97b (2:6).    
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ןימיה , kets ha-yamin, as opposed to םימיה ץק, kets hayamim] – which, if re-read hyper-
literally as Hebrew, could mean "the end of the Right."  According to the midrash, Daniel 
was uncertain as to whether this phrase indicated the final judgment day, the “End of 
Days” [םימיה תירחא] or the time of the messianic salvation of the Jewish people [ תירחא
ןימיה – the "end of the Right”], interpreted as the end of the bondage of God's right hand 
during Israel's exile.    
 
The Zohar passage paraphrases this narrative but further exploits the reading of "yamin" 
as "right" by proclaiming a parallelism between "right" and "left" and presenting it 
through anaphora:   "there is kets to the right and there is kets to the left" [ אנימיל ץק תיא
אלאמשל ץק תיאו ].67  This reformulation has the effect of transforming the doubled term 
kets from its midrashic understanding as two different "end-times" into a kabbalistic 
understanding as two different kinds of personified entities, a holy entity and a demonic 
entity – the latter identified with the "snake … who comes from the side of the smelting 
of gold" [יתאק אבהדד אכותהד ארטסמ  ... שחנ אד].  Moreover, it transforms the midrashic 
alternative between two time-periods, in both of which righteous judgment will be 
achieved, into a contrast between holiness and the demonic – and even if the association 
between judgment and the demonic is not inconsistent with Zoharic imagery, this 
antithetical contrast is quite out of keeping with the intent of the midrash.   In the Zohar's 
interpretation, set up by the anaphora, Daniel's uncertainty, aroused by the indeterminacy 
in the meaning of the term kets, takes on a truly terrifying cast – for he now turns out to 
be in doubt as to whether he is being associated with a divine figure or a demonic serpent.  
 
A second passage also based on the indeterminacy in the meaning of the term kets gives 
this uncertainty an even more ominous turn.  In this passage, the Zohar combines the 
midrashic homily on Daniel with a midrash concerning Jacob's final words to his sons – 
viz., that he sought to reveal to them the "end of days," spelled by the midrash in 
accordance with the Daniel form [ןימיה ץק; kets ha-yamin], but was unable to do so 
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because the "Shekhinah departed from him."
68
  Responding to Jacob's fear that this 
departure was due to a defect in his progeny, the sons recited the Shema, which signified 
that "just as there is in your heart only One, so there is in our hearts only One."
69
  The 
Zohar closely follows this midrash but reinterprets the meaning of the word "One" in two 
ways.  It first views "One" as referring to the holy side in opposition to the demonic side: 
  
 הוה אשירפ אהד ללכ ארחא ארטסב וקיבד ןל תיל ,'וגו דחא אלא ךבלב תילד אמכ ירמא ןוניא ןידכ
 אדוחיב אנחנאו ךסרעמשחמב אלו וערב אל ארחא ארטסמ ללכ ןניוה אלו אדחהב70  
 
Then they replied, ‘Just as there is only One in your heart, [so there is only One in 
our heart].’  We have no attachment to the Other Side at all, for it was removed 
from your bed.  We abide in single unity, not deriving from the Other Side at all, 
neither in desire nor in thought.
71
  
  
Moreover, the Zohar interrupts its Jacob narrative with an anaphorically established 
parallelism between the two kinds of kets: 
 
 .םימיה ץק תיאו ןימיה ץק תיא ,ץק תיאו ץק תיאד אנמיקואד אמכ ץק אוהה ןול האלגל אעב והיאו
 ץק ,אימשד וכלמ אזר אד ןימיה ץק ארחא ארטסד אזר אבייח וכלמ אד םימיה72 
 
He wished to reveal to them that end [ץק, kets], as we have established – for there 
is kets, and there is kets!  There is kets ha-yamin [ןימיה ץק], end of the right 
(Daniel 12:13), and there is kets ha-yamim [םימיה ץק], end of days.  Kets ha-
yamin, End of the right, is mystery of the kingdom [Malkhu] of heaven.  Kets ha-
yamim, End of days, is the wicked kingdom [Malkhu], mystery of the Other Side 
[Sitra Aḥra].73 
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69
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In this Zoharic re-interpretation, the two kinds of kets are again transformed from their 
midrashic sense of alternative fates for an individual or nation into opposed metaphysical 
entities.  In this passage, these entities are more clearly designated as the "kingdom of 
heaven," presumably the sefirah of Malkhut, on the one hand, and the "wicked kingdom, 
mystery of the Sitra Aḥra," on the other – presumably, the demonic counterpart to 
Malkhut, Lilith.  The passage teaches us that these two kinds of kets must be radically 
separated.    
 
Furthermore, like other passages I have discussed in this chapter, this passage combines 
the parallelism between the divine and demonic realms with that between the upper and 
lower levels of the divine.  Specifically, as in the "letters and names" passage, these 
levels are presumably Binah, the "upper world," and Malkhut, the "lower world".   
Though not using the "there is … there is …" anaphora,  this part of the passage 
establishes the relationship between the two levels through closely parallel phrases – and 
thereby introduces a second set of meanings for the word “One”: 
   
 אזרב ןניוהד ןנא ףוא ,דחא והיאו האלע אמלעד אזרב תנאד דחא אלא ךבלב תילד אמכ ורמא ןוניא
והיא האתת אמלעד  דחאתובבל ירת ורכדא אד לעו74  
 
They said, ‘Just as there is only one in your heart – since you are within the 
mystery of the upper world, which is one – so too with us, for we are within the 
mystery of the lower world, which is one.’  Therefore, two hearts are mentioned.75 
 
The passage thus coordinates two parallelisms, that between the divine and demonic 
realms and that between upper and lower levels of the divine – with radically different 
stances in relation to each.  The declaration by Jacob's sons in the midrash, affirming 
their shared faith in one God, becomes both a statement about the choice of the "One," 
the "kingdom of heaven" as opposed to the "wicked kingdom" of the “Other Side,” as 
well as a statement about the unity between two holy "Ones," the "upper world" and the 
"lower world."   Moreover, the passage also portrays the two holy unities, that of Jacob 
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with Binah and of his sons with Malkhut, as preparing the way for still another unity – 
that between the divine bride (Malkhut, as empowered through her unity with her forces 
embodied in the sons) and her consort, the divine bridegroom (often identified with 
Jacob, prepared for divine marriage by his relationship to his "mother," Binah).
76
   By the 
end of the passage, the multiplicity of unifications of "Ones" has taken us far from the 
simple affirmation of divine unity in the midrash.   
 
Yet this passage takes on its full significance only by comparison with a closely related 
passage in a work of Moshe de Leon, the Sefer Ha-Mishkal.  In that work, De Leon cites 
both the Daniel and Jacob midrashim and describes the relationship of the two kinds of 
kets as that of kelipah and  mo’aḥ.  The Sefer Ha-Mishkal, however, takes a rather 
different approach to the question of the two kinds of kets than the Zohar passage's 
unequivocal call for their radical separation.  The Sefer Ha-Mishkal pronounces both an 
imperative to separate the two realms and a prohibition on their separation.  Thus, on the 
one hand, the "end [kets] of all flesh will be distanced from the sweet milk, and the holy 
people should make for themselves an extraordinary distance” from it.77 On the other 
hand, Jacob "sought to break the kelipot and to reveal the  mo’aḥ within … and since they 
[i.e., the kelipot] are needed for the world, the Shekhinah departed from him."
78
  At first 
reading, these two imperatives seem contradictory, and, indeed, the tension between the 
two subsists throughout the discussion.  To be sure, one might seek to harmonize the two 
kinds of statements by reading the text as affirming that the two realms must be 
integrated, but only in the proper way – presumably through the subordination of the evil 
realm to the needs of the good.  Under any interpretation, however, the Sefer Ha-Mishkal 
would reject the Zohar's commendation of Jacob for having sought an absolute separation 
between the divine and the demonic forms of kets.     
 
The Sefer Ha-Mishkal and Zohar passages thus take two quite different stances on Jacob's 
management of the ambivalence embodied in the anaphoric parallelism of the two kinds 
of kets, on how to read their antithetical homonymy.  For the Zohar passage, Jacob 
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properly separated the two kinds of kets, facilitating the union of higher and lower levels 
of the divine in and through the correspondence between Jacob's relationship to Binah 
and his sons' relationship to Malkhut.  In the Sefer Ha-Mishkal, by contrast, it is Jacob's 
separation of the two kinds of kets that brings about the rupture of his union with the 
Shekhinah and detracts from the requirements of the cosmos.     
 
A different kind of indeterminacy comes to the fore in a passage in the Zohar concerning 
the term, "thousand," elef [ףלא].  This passage discusses the question of whether the term 
should be interpreted as "holy" or as "profane" [לוח] in the context of two verses, one 
from the Song of Songs (8:12) and one from Exodus (38:28).  In a somewhat different 
manner than in the “kets” passage, this discussion also echoes an uncertainty bequeathed 
from rabbinic literature – specifically, a Talmudic discussion concerning the Song of 
Songs verse.  The Talmudic discussion, however, does not focus on the term elef, but 
rather on the sacred or profane identity of the "Solomon" in the verse, "thou, O Solomon, 
must have a thousand" [המלש ךל ףלאה] (Song of Songs 8:12).79  Displacing the rabbinic 
uncertainty about the meaning of the term "Solomon" in the Song of Songs verse onto the 
term elef, the Zohar passage compares the valence of the latter term in the Exodus and 
Song of Songs verses.   
 
The passage seems, at first, certain about the "profane" [לוח] meaning of the term in the 
Song of Songs verse, but uncertain about its valence in the verse from Exodus, which 
concerns the construction of the mishkan, the desert sanctuary.  The passage decides, 
however, that the word carries different valences in the two verses, proclaiming "there is 
elef and there is elef" [ףלא תיאו ףלא תיא ].80  Moreover, the "profane" [לוח] nature of the 
non-holy elef is not simply that of earthliness, as in the Talmudic discussion, but of a 
demonic nature, “from the contaminated Sitra Aḥra" [אבאסמ ארחא ארטסמ].81   The passage 
goes on to inform us that the divine and demonic realms must be separated, but with an 
important qualification: 
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לוחל שדק ןיב אשרפאל ןניעבד ןיגב ,אוה יכה ארקד אזרו( ,י י ארקיו ) לוחה ןיבו שדקה ןיב לידבהלו
רוהטה ןיבו אמטה ןיבו .לוחה ןמ שדקל תיא ושירפד בג לע ףא אד לכ םעו , היל תיא אדח אקלוח
דקבאלאמשד ארטסמ השו ,המלש ךל ףלאה ביתכד אוה אדה ,לוחה ימוי ףלא ןוניאד , ימוי ןוניאו
אתולגד.82 
 
For it is necessary to separate the holy from the profane.  And this is the secret of 
the verse (Leviticus 10:10), “And that ye may put difference between holy and 
unholy, and between unclean and clean.”  And nonetheless, even though the holy 
has a separation from the profane, it has one portion in the holy from the left side.  
As it is written, “thou, O Solomon, must have a thousand” [Song 8:12], these are 
the thousand profane days, and these are the days of exile.  
 
In relation to the two options that were broached concerning the relationship of the two 
kinds of kets, integration versus separation, this passage maintains the tension between 
them by juxtaposing them in a manner at once stark and unstable, and whose meaning is 
far from clear.  It presents an antithetical and asymmetrical parallelism between the two 
options, which fully appears only from a strictly literal translation:  on the one hand, "the 
holy has a separation from the profane" [ לוחה ןמ שדקל תיא ושירפד]; on the other hand, the 
latter "has one portion in the holy" [השודקב היל תיא אדח אקלוח].   Of course, the word I am 
translating here as "has" is the same word, "תיא" that appears in the common Zoharic 
anaphora used to create parallelism between the divine and demonic (in such contexts the 
appropriate translation is "there is").  The meaning of this "having," however, particularly 
in relation to the demonic "having one portion in the holy," is not evident from this text. 
 
Given that the unholy elef is said to be the "days of exile," the passage seems to suggest 
that the demonic "having" of a holy "portion" is a relationship of capture, the capture of 
the earthly and/or divine "Israel."  This passage could then be interpreted along the lines 
of other Zoharic passages which discuss the capture of the Shekhinah ("Kenesset 
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Yisra’el") by the demonic, usually described as an assault from the "left side."83  
Alternatively, though this would fit less well with the "exile" theme, it could be 
interpreted along the lines of those passages which describe the demonic as having an 
ontological foothold in the cosmos through its link to a small aspect of the Shekhinah (as 
in the "fingernail zohama" passage).  The uncertainty between these two interpretations 
may be related to the uncertain role of the proof-text from the Song of Songs.   The plain 
language of the verse seems to indicate that the elef, which the Zohar asserts is 
demonically "profane," belongs to Solomon, rather than vice versa, rendering the "exile" 
reference problematic.  This uncertainty, in turn, brings us back to the indeterminacy of 
the repeated word, "has," "תיא," in the two sides of the parallelism between the divine and 
the demonic "having" in the passage.    
 
Again, the works of Moshe de Leon shed significant light on this passage – here by 
showing that the interpretive problem may lie not only with the reader but with Solomon 
himself.  In several of his works, de Leon interprets this verse as alluding to the deeper 
meaning of Solomon's relationship to his thousand wives and concubines – the profane 
elef.
84
  Thus, according to the Shekel Ha-Kodesh, Solomon took on these wives because 
of his desire to fully know and perfect (or "complete") the Shekhinah, the "Tree of 
Knowledge of Good and Evil," by coming into relationship with its "evil" side.
85
  This 
side consisted of Solomon's thousand foreign wives, who are in the "domain of the Other 
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El"
86
 – and who constitute, in Mopsik's gloss, the "exterior branches" of the "tree."87  
However, rather than restoring the proper relationships between the good and evil sides 
of the "tree," presumably by pressing the latter into the service of the former, Solomon 
was seduced into abandoning the good side and cleaving to the evil side.  This was 
Solomon's "error” [ותועט], a term, Mopsik declares, that seems deliberately chosen by de 
Leon over a term like "sin."
88
  Solomon "intended to perfect the interior of this level in 
the secret of good and evil" [ רדמה ןכות םילשהל ןווכתנוערהו בוטה דוסב תאזה הג ]89 – again, 
presumably to integrate the two sides of the "tree" by subordinating the evil side to the 
good, fulfilling the proof-text offered by de Leon, "the queens and the concubines, and 
they praised her" [הולההיו םישגליפו תוכלמ] (Song of Songs 6:9).  Tragically, the 
dangerously intimate knowledge of the Sitra Aḥra required by Solomon's risky quest led 
him astray, so that he "abandoned all that was above and cleaved to the nether region" 
[הטמל קבדתנו הלעמלש המ לכ בזע ].     
 
The Zohar passage about the elef acquires its full meaning when read against the 
background of this discussion in the Shekel Ha-Kodesh.  In light of the latter discussion, 
we find that the uncertainty expressed by the Zohar about the term "elef" and the 
obscurity of the Zohar passage itself – affecting both the term "elef" and the directionality 
of the "having" of this "elef" – correspond to a more dangerous uncertainty, that besetting 
Solomon's active quest for proper understanding and practice in relation to the Sitra 
Aḥra.  Something akin to the "mistake" attributed to Solomon in the Shekel Ha-Kodesh, 
his overestimation of the ease with which the demonic could be fully known and properly 
integrated into the divine and his underestimation of its autonomous seductiveness, may 
be read into the otherwise obscure transition in the Zohar passage from the Song of Songs 
phrase "Solomon must have a thousand" [המלש ךל ףלאה] to the interpretation of that elef 
as the days of exile.   
 
In light of my analysis in this section, I would argue that Solomon's "error" and the 
resulting "exile" must be seen, at least in part, as an effect of the complex set of 
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indeterminacies surrounding the Song of Songs verse, some inherited from rabbinic 
times, others surfacing in 13
th
 century texts.   The Zohar passage's uncertainties and 
dangers, both those of the reader of the passage and those of Solomon to which the 
passage implicitly alludes, should be related to the uncertainties and dangers set up by the 
complex juxtapositions of rhetorical parallelisms throughout the Zohar.  From this 
perspective, Solomon's "wisdom" failed him, at least in part, due to his misreading of the 
significance of the anaphora, "there is elef, and there is elef."   The rhetorical structure 
sets up an ontological expectation not only of a seamless set of correspondences among 
all dimensions of the cosmos, but also of relatively easy access, on the level of 
knowledge and practice, from one dimension to the other.  In this interpretation, Solomon 
was seduced by the rhetorical impression of seamlessness and, confusing the rhetorical 
for the ontological, committed a fatal "mistake." 
 
De Leon’s Sefer Ha-Mishkal has a very similar discussion of Solomon's ill-fated quest, 
intertwined with, among other things, its consideration of the term "kets" I have analyzed 
above.
90
  The Sefer Ha-Mishkal relates Solomon's quest to those of a number of other 
figures in the tradition, including Adam, Noah, and Elisha ben Avuyah (all of whom 
failed the ordeal) and Abraham (who succeeded).
91
  The discussions of Adam, Noah, and 
Abraham have their close parallels in the Zohar, as does the Sefer Ha-Mishkal's extensive 
discussion of the prophet Hosea who also sought to gain the same sort of knowledge and 
perform the same sort of tikun as Solomon.
92
  It was, of course, with the possibilities and 
dangers embodied in Hosea that I opened this thesis.  
  
After discussing some of the various ways the Zohar uses rhetorical parallelism, I return 
to the question of its relationship to the two models of the Sitra Aḥra described by 
Tishby.  It should by now be evident that rhetorical parallelism does not determine the 
ontological status or relationship of the two juxtaposed realms.   On the contrary, the 
"polysemous" quality of such constructional schemes are crucial to the Zohar's evocation 
of the urgency and gravity of the fateful struggles inherent in its portrayal of cosmos, the 
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difficulty of drawing the crucial distinctions necessary for correct interpretation and 
practice, and the sublime opportunities and terrifying dangers facing both the readers of 
the Zohar and the human and divine figures it portrays.  As the passages discussed above 
have shown, rhetorical parallelism sets the stage for the complex dramas of divine, 
demonic, and human quests for ontological unity and separation, and for the tragic 
misapprehensions and catastrophes that have eternally beset such quests. 
 
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that rhetorical parallelism does not bear a simple 
relationship to the two models of the Sitra Aḥra discussed in the preceding section or to 
specific alternatives along any of their axes – geographical, structural or essential.  Thus, 
although anaphorically established rhetorical parallelism might be read as suggesting 
structural homology, the Zohar uses it to portray the relationships between the divine and 
demonic characterized by concentricity, as well as those characterized by homology.   
 
Perhaps the clearest example of the use of rhetorical parallelism to depict concentricity 
comes in the context of a discussion of the "curtains" of the mishkan.  This image appears 
in the Zohar in the midst of a complex passage about the relationship of the soul to the 
various levels of the divine.   The passage's principal imagery is that of "heavens" [םימש] 
and "firmaments" [ןיעיקר], terms it uses interchangeably.93  The passage introduces its 
exposition of the various divine levels with the notion that “there are heavens and there 
are heavens" [םימש תיאו םימש תיאד]; it then proclaims, based on Psalms 104:2, that the 
lower heavens are "ten curtains" [תועירי רשע] by means of which divine providence is 
exercised in the world.
94
  Several folios later, the passage explores the relationship 
between these holy entities and their unholy counterparts.   
 
השודק רטסלד אתתלד ןיעיקר ןוניא לכ ןילטנ אעיקר יאהמ , ןיעיקר ןוניאל וטמד דע רטסלד ןינרחא
ארחא ,םיזע תועירי ןורקא ןילאו... , תיאד ןיגב תיאו תועירי תועירי...  ןיעיקר ןוניא םיזע תועירי  
ארחא ארטסד ןינרחא... רבלד ןיעיקר ןילאו... וגלד ןיעיקר ןוניא לע ןייפח ןילאו ,אחומ לע הפילקכ ,
אחומ לע אמייקד ושילק אוהה ןוניא וגלד ןיעיקר , ןורקא ןילאווהיל םימש" ה95 
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By this heaven are conveyed all heavens below on the side of Holiness, until 
reaching those other heavens of the Other Side [Sitra Aḥra], called “goat 
curtains.” …  For there are curtains and there are curtains! … Goat curtains are 
other firmaments, of the Other Side … and those are exterior firmaments … and 
these cover the interior firmaments, as kelipah on moḥa.  The interior firmaments 
are a thin membrane [kelishu] that stands on a moḥa, and these are called 
“heavens for YHVH” [Psalms 115:16].96   
  
Here the parallelism between upper holy heavens and lower holy heavens is 
supplemented by the parallelism between holy lower firmaments and impure lower 
firmaments.  However, this tripartite structure (upper holy / lower holy / lower unholy) 
which we have already seen a number of times, does not mark the image of the curtains.  
Rather, "there are curtains and there are curtains" – i.e., two sets, corresponding to holy 
and unholy lower "firmaments," the second set identified with the biblical phrase "goat 
curtains" [םיזע תועירי]97 to stress their demonic character.  The limitation of the "curtains" 
imagery to the two lower levels emphasizes the phenomenal image of covering it evokes.  
The uppermost level is not referred to as a "curtain," for it is not a covering but that 
which is covered – specifically, a  moḥa which is covered by holy curtains, the "inner 
firmaments."  These firmaments, whose character as coverings has been established by 
identifying them with "curtains," are called a kelishu [ ושילק ], a thin membrane, that 
covers the  moḥa.  By contrast, the "outer firmaments," identified with "the goat 
curtains," are called a kelipah.    
 
Thus, in presenting its central images, the passage employs an anaphorically established 
rhetorical parallelism, even while its elaboration of the "firmaments"/"curtains" 
association emphasizes the concentric structural relationship of the Sitra Aḥra to the holy 
realm, as well as of the lower level of the holy realm to the upper levels.  This clear 
combination of rhetorical parallelism and structural concentricity provides a further, 
rather stark demonstration of the inadmissibility of a seamless movement from rhetorical 
                                                 
96
 Matt VI, 213 (translation modified). 
97
 Exodus 26:7. 
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impression to ontological status.
98
  The anaphorically established parallelism, which 
yields the antithetical homonyms "firmaments/firmaments," and which might seem suited 
for structural homology, is here deployed in the service of a portrayal of structural 
concentricity.
99
     
 
I note that, in the Sefer Ha-Mishkal, Moshe de Leon offers an explanation for the 
phenomenon of homonymy between two entities one of which is  mo’aḥ and one of 
which is kelipah (though not in the context of the kind of constructional schemes I have 
been discussing in this section).  Addressing the question of how the word kets can be 
used to name both a kelipah and a mo’aḥ, de Leon focuses on the physical image of a nut, 
a primary source for the kelipah/mo’aḥ imagery.100 De Leon explains that, even though 
the kernel is the essence of the nut, the shell is also called "nut" when it is attached to the 
kernel.  The homonymy results from the phenomenal integration of the shell and the 
kernel.  When detached from the kernel, however, the shell loses the name "nut" and is 
merely called "shell."   
 
This explanation, however, is not particularly persuasive even in the context in which de 
Leon makes it – after all, the kelipah in question is called "kets" when it is at its most 
demonically destructive:  "the kets of all flesh … for it has no aspiration other than 
destruction and desolation"  [ןוממשו תילכת אלא ותריקח ןיא יכ... רשב לכ ץק].101   Moreover, 
this explanation is completely inadequate when it comes to the Zohar.  Divine/demonic 
homonymy is one of the main techniques that the Zohar uses to set the two realms in 
                                                 
98
 A number of features in this passage lend themselves to a comparison with the "benign kelipah" passage.  
In both passages, concentricity is characterized as "kelipah" at lower levels and as a finer sort of covering at 
the higher levels – here called kelishu, there called "garment."  However, here the level of the kelipah is 
clearly identified as pertaining to the Sitra Aḥra and the notion of the relativity of the very status of kelipah 
and mo’aḥ is absent.   
99
 It is striking that a very similar portrayal of two sets of concentric entities that cover the Shekhinah is 
found in a passage whose basic imagery – that of "days" – seems far less congenial to the "covering" trope.  
At Zohar II, 204a, the Zohar tells us that "there are days and there are days" [םימי תיאו םימי תיא].  In this 
passage, as in the "curtains" passage, these entities surround the Shekhinah (here called the "holy point," 
identified with the Sabbath).  Like the "curtains," the "days" both protect and receive sustenance from the 
Shekhinah.  And, like the "curtains," they are doubled by "profane days" which stand "outside," in the Sitra 
Aḥra.  Again, the "there is … there is …." anaphora is used in a context of concentricity, perhaps even 
more striking because of the incongruity of "days" as coverings for a central "point," and even more so as 
two concentric sets of coverings. 
100
 Sefer Ha-Mishkal, 158. 
101
 Ibid.  Although the translation of תילכת as "destruction," in the sense of ןוילכ, is somewhat unusual, it 
seems clearly warranted by the context.  Cf. Bamidbar Rabah, II, 122c (18:12). 
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antithetical contrast, particularly when it is declaring an imperative to make an absolute 
separation between them.   Indeed, the forced quality of de Leon’s explanation only 
serves to highlight the disjunction between rhetorical form, such as the use of antithetical 
homonyms, and ontological status, such as the greater or lesser “splitting” between the 
two realms. 
 
Rhetorical parallelism is far from the only technique that the Zohar uses to set up 
relationships of resemblance-and-menace between the divine and the demonic.  In 
particular, a full analysis of the way the Zohar signifies ambivalence requires a 
consideration of tropes, as well as schemes – as both rhetorical techniques may be used 
for related ends.  I have argued, for example, that the seductiveness of the demonic, or at 
the very least, the power of the Zohar to convince us of the seductiveness of the demonic, 
partly lies in hypnotic, chant-like rhetorical parallelisms, established through the 
constructional scheme of repeated anaphoras.  By contrast, in a passage I will explore in 
detail below, the Zohar portrays the seductive power of the demonic as based on 
phenomenal resemblance, specifically that of nogah to the holy light.  In addition, in the 
passage in which I presented my analysis about rhetorical seduction, the "upper left/lower 
left, upper right/lower right" passage, there was a strong suggestion of a homologous 
structural relationship between the divine and the demonic (although, as I have insisted 
throughout this section, a correlation between rhetorical parallelism and ontological 
homology must never be assumed).  By contrast, the "nogah/seduction passage," as we 
shall see, occurs in a context describing a contiguous, concentric relationship between 
nogah and the holy dimensions – as is, of course, generally the case with nogah.   I, 
therefore, now turn from a focus on constructional schemes to a focus on certain key 
tropes in which the often dangerously ambivalent relationship between the divine and 
demonic is expressed.   
 
     
2.  Tropes – Images of Hyperbolic Ambivalence 
 
As I noted above, many of the Zohar's central images can be read as either divine or 
demonic, an effect achieved through the doubling, division, and indeterminacy of such 
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images.  In this section, I focus on the way the Zohar’s use of tropes achieve these three 
effects.   In addition, I emphasize the way certain individual images present a further 
paradoxical quality:  a concentrated capacity to embody diametrically opposite 
superlatives, an extremely high level of holiness and an extremely base level of 
contamination.  Such paradoxically concentrated images embody potent constructions 
and attempted managements of ambivalence, as well as manifesting their extreme 
fragility.  At the rhetorical level, such simultaneously "highest" and "lowest" tropes, in 
which a single image can signify radically opposed meanings, may be called "antithetical 
hyperboles."  The dangerously indeterminate meaning of any such image, its potential to 
embody either or both of two radically incompatible valences, is due not only, or even 
primarily, to difficulties originating with the interpreter of the text, but rather to the 
nature of the image itself.      
 
      a.  Dragons 
 
Some of the most elaborately developed ambivalent imagery of the demonic in the Zohar 
is found in relation to a variety of reptilian creatures – the naḥash, שחנ, the ḥivya, איוח, the 
tanin,  ןינת, and livyatan, ןתיול, variously rendered in English translations as snakes, 
serpents, sea monsters, whales, crocodiles, leviathans, and dragons.   I am partial to the 
last of these terms primarily because of its mythic resonance but also because of the 
descriptions of some of these creatures in the Zohar, which feature multiple wings, fire-
breathing, gargantuan size, awesome power, fearsome swinging tails, and so on.  In any 
event, while some of these translations may seem more suitable for one or the other of the 
reptiles, the Zohar also often uses two or more of the reptilian designations 
interchangeably.  In relation to these creatures, one finds all three key characteristics of 
ambivalent Zoharic imagery:  doubling, division, and indeterminacy.  This phenomenon 
is perhaps not surprising, for the ambivalent status of such creatures goes back to rabbinic 
literature, to the Bible, and undoubtedly much earlier.
102
  More proximately in the history 
                                                 
102
  The leviathan appears in the Talmud and midrashic literature as both a dangerous and potentially 
domesticable creature.  For example, reading the verse, “that leviathan, whom thou hast made to play 
therein,” [ וב קחשל תרצי הז ןתיול ] (Psalms 104:26), a midrash describes this creature as one of God's 
domestic animals.  See Shemot Rabah I, 146a (15:22).  The images of these creatures in kabbalah as well as 
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of kabbalah, this ambivalence was elaborated by Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen, one of the main 
precursors for Zoharic writing on the Sitra Aḥra.   
 
I highlight these creatures both because of their importance in the history of kabbalistic 
writing about the Sitra Aḥra and because of their challenge to some of the key 
dichotomies used to analyze such writing.  For example, on the one hand, images of 
structural homology, as well as schemes of rhetorical parallelism, are used to present the 
relationship between the holy and unholy reptilian counterparts – as in the Zohar's 
statement, "this serpent is death of the world … and he is on the left.  And there is 
another serpent of life on the right side " [ תיאו ,אלאמש רטסל אוהו ... ,אמלעד אתומ אוה איוח יאה
י רטסב ייחד ארחא איוחאנימ ].103  On the other hand, Joseph Gikatilla, an author closely 
related to the Zohar circle, portrayed the snake with the imagery of concentricity:   
 
 ויה וירוחא ,תונחמבש ןוציח לתוכל רבוחמ היהו השודקה תונחמ ילתכל ץוחמ דמוע היה הליחתבו
 ץוח יפלכ תונופ וינפו לתוכב תוקובד104 
 
And in the beginning he stood outside the walls of the camps of holiness and was 
attached to the outermost wall of these camps.  His hindquarters cleaved to the 
wall and his face was turned outward.    
 
The true place of residence of Gikatilla’s snake is thus contiguous, indeed attached, to the 
"walls" surrounding the "holy camps”; he is even almost part of the “wall,” his back 
attached to the “inside,” the holy realm, but his face turned to the “outside,” the demonic 
realm.  This portrayal of the snake as a liminal entity between the holy and unholy realms 
is closely related to portrayals of the kelipah of nogah, an indispensable element of the 
concentric image of the kelipot.  Gikatilla declares that the snake serves a divine purpose 
as long as it keeps to its proper place, guarding the border between the holy and the 
unholy.  The snake only becomes destructive when it leaves its appointed place just 
                                                                                                                                                 
in earlier literature have been analyzed by Yehudah Liebes in a variety of his works.  See, e.g., Sod Ha-
Emunah ha-Shabeta'it, 328-329.   
103
 Zohar I, 52a. 
104
 Gikatilla, Sod Ha-Naḥash u-Mishpato, 192.  See also Scholem, On the Mystical Shape, 78-80. 
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outside the garden and enters it – a vivid instance of the perversion of the concentric 
relationship, other versions of which I discuss below. 
   
More commonly, though, the demonic reptiles are presented in a relationship of structural 
homology to their holy counterparts.  Thus, Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen's Ma'amar 'al Ha-Atsilut 
Ha-Semalit systematically portrays the doubling of the reptile into "good" and "bad" 
forms.
105  The Ma'amar introduces the livyatan first as a term for the sefirah of Yesod 
which unites the divine bride and bridegroom.  Using the terms livyatan, tanin, and 
naḥash nearly interchangeably, it goes on to describe a blind reptile [רוענינת] who serves 
as a demonic counterpart to the sefirah Yesod, uniting Lilith and Samael.  It then declares 
that each of the three demonic entities, Lilith, Samael, and their phallic intermediary 
(their shoshbin, ןיבשוש), may be called a livyatan.  The passage's emphasis on homology 
between holy and unholy entities
106
 implies that the term livyatan may also be applied to 
each of the three relevant divine entities, the Kadosh Barukh Hu, the Shekhinah, and their 
shoshbin, the sefirah Yesod.
107   In another text, Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen analogizes the 
messiah to a snake who takes his vengeance on an evil snake.
108
  This text seems to be 
the source for the equivalence between the messiah and the snake, reinforced by their 
numerical equivalence (358 = שחנ = חישמ), influential in Sabbatean and post-Sabbatean 
texts, particularly in Moshe Ḥayim Luzzatto.109    
 
Such reptilian doubling occurs in numerous places in the Zohar.  The naḥash, is, of 
course, one of the Zohar's key appellations for diabolical figures – though it sometimes 
                                                 
105
 See Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen, 'Ma'amar 'al Ha-Atzilut Ha-Semalit’, 99-101.  The doubling relationship 
between the holy and unholy is summarized on p. 100: 
 כ.םלענה ךרד לע הלעמל ןכו  .וטושפכ םיב אמט לודג ןינת שי ךכ ןינת ארקנו וטושפכ םיב רוהט ןתיול שיש םש 
Just as there is a pure livyatan in the sea, literally, and it is called tanin, so there is a great impure 
tanin in the sea, literally.  And so it is above in the way of concealment.   
106
 Ibid.: 
רוהט ,הז םע הזו הז םע הז םארב הבקנו רכז ןתיול ףאו ל"ז ורמא ןכו רוהט ונניאשו 
And so they said, and even the livyatan was created male and female, this with this, and this with 
this, the pure and the one who is not pure. 
107
 These associations are made explicit by Cordovero, in Pardes, II, 55c-d, commenting on the Yitsḥak 
Ha-Kohen text.  I note that this passage has been implicitly commented on in a wide range of other texts, 
including the Sefer Ha-Peli'ah, 24b, and Ḥayim Vital's Sefer Ha-Likutim, 50a.     
108
 Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen, ‘Ta'amei Ha-Ta'amim’, in Scholem, Kabbalot, 111.    On these themes in the Zohar, 
see Liebes, ‘Ha-Mashiaḥ shel Ha-Zohar’, 35-38.  
109
 Sefer Tikunim Ḥadashim, 372: 
  שחנ לבקל ,שחנ והיא אד אנוגכ חישמו  אד 
And the Messiah in like manner is a snake, corresponding to that snake 
  
 
96 
 
refers to the male devil, Samael, and sometimes to his female consort.
110
  Of the ḥivya, as 
I have noted, the Zohar tells us that there is a bad, "left" form, a form which "is death to 
the world," and a good, "right," form, a ḥivya of "life" – both of which always accompany 
every human being and who thus seem to be more like shedim, the demonic spirits that 
pervade everyday life.
111
  A related set of splits apply to the consideration of the taninim 
– at times portrayed as embodiments of evil, at other times portrayed as representing the 
holy "fathers," presumably the sefirot of Ḥesed, Gevurah, and Tif’eret.112   One passage 
explicitly relates these two uses:  after a lengthy portrayal of the demonic taninim, the 
passage announces that "superior taninim abide above – those that are blessed … These 
rule over all the fish of the sea" [ ןיאלע איינינת  לכ לע ןיטלש ןילא... ןאכרבתמד ןוניא ןימייק אליעל
ןימי ינונ].113   
 
In another passage, the homology between the taninim , or at least their human avatars, is 
portrayed as a product of the struggle between them.  In this passage, the taninim are said 
to be Jacob and Esau,
114
 figures often taken as embodiments or agents of the central 
divine and demonic personages.  Jacob is described as engaged in battle with Esau, who 
"cleaved to the crooked ḥivya."  In this battle, Jacob uses tactics that draw upon that 
demonic reptile’s holy counterpart, the "other crooked ḥivya"115 – the human fraternal 
battle thus participating in the cosmic war between the holy and unholy reptiles.    
                                                 
110
 Contrast Zohar I, 23b, (naḥash as Sama’el), with I, 148a (Sitre Torah), (naḥash as Sama’el’s female 
consort). 
111
 Zohar I, 52a. 
112
 For the latter interpretation, see Zohar III, 39b: 
.אלכ לע ןשרתשמו אתימדקב ןייקתשמ ןוניאד ןהבא ןילא םילודגה םינינתה תא 
 “The great taninim”:  these are the fathers, for they are irrigated first [i.e., receive divine vitality 
from the higher levels] and spread their roots over all. 
113
 Zohar II, 27b, Matt IV, 107 (translation modified).  I have adopted Matt’s textual emendation in his 
Aramaic Texts, vol. 4, 44. 
114
 Zohar I, 138b. 
115
 Zohar I, 138a-b, Matt II, 271 (translation modified):   
 אמיקע איוחכ הילע ךשמתא יודבוע לכב אד לעו ,אמיקע איוח אוההב אקבדתאל היל הוה ושעד עדי הוה בקעי ,יזח אתו
ארחא  ביתכד יאמ ,ןועמש יבר רמאד אה יכ ,אד אייתאו ,ךירטצא יכהו ומיקעב אתמכחב ארביו )אכ א תישארב(
 דיבעתא יאדו ,והייניבד ןיגרד ראש ןילא ,תשמורה היחה שפנ לכ תאו ,ושעו בקעי אד ,םילודגה םינינתה תא ם"יהלא
ךירטצא יכהו ארחא איוח אוההד הילבקל םיכח בקעי 
Come and see:  Jacob knew that Esau had to cleave to that crooked serpent, so in all his dealings 
he conducted himself toward him like an other crooked serpent, with wisdom, with crookedness, 
and so it had to be.  This accords with Rabbi Shim’on’s comment on the verse:  And Elohim  
created the taninim (Genesis 1, 21) – Jacob and Esau; and every living creature that moveth – 
other rungs between them.  Indeed, Jacob became cunning toward that other serpent and so it had 
to be. 
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At least one Zohar passage opts for a divided, rather than doubled, image of the 
relationship between the good and bad dimensions of the snake.  The snake who “bows 
its head to the dust" while “he raises his tail, … dominates, and strikes,” is a creature 
physically divided between the Shekhinah and the Sitra Aḥra. 116  This divided snake may 
be viewed as an icon of the deep ambivalence with which the Shekhinah is portrayed 
throughout the Zohar – merciful and destructive, maternal and monstrous, the 
indispensable gateway to holiness and the divine entity most susceptible to capture by the 
demonic.
117
    
 
                                                                                                                                                 
The exact metaphysical status of "Jacob" in this passage is complex, as suggested in the immediately 
preceding lines, Zohar II, 138a, Matt II, 270 (translation modified):   
  ול ארקיו )כ גל תישארב( ביתכ המ ארחא רתאב ,שנ רבד אדי לע ירקא אל הימש רתא לכב ,בקעי ומש ארקיו אכהו
יאתתב אהלא תנאו יאלעב אהלא אנא ל"א ,לא בקעיל היל ארק ה"בק ,לארשי יהלא לא 
Similarly, here, He called him Jacob.  He was never named by a human being.  Elsewhere what is 
written?  The Elohim of Israel called him El (Genesis 33:20) – Kudsha Berikh Hu called Jacob El, 
saying, “I am God in the realms above; you are God in the realms below.” 
The Zohar’s interpretation here derives from bMegilah, 18a.  The Talmudic teaching runs directly counter 
to the teaching in Bereshit Rabah, I, 94c (79:8), which attributes the divine naming of Jacob to Jacob 
himself and declares that he was punished for its arrogance.  Naḥmanides’ commentary on the Genesis 
verse makes explicit the notion of Jacob’s apotheosis, identifying his earthly divinity with that of the 
Shekhinah.   See Matt II, 270-271, n. 27. 
116
 See Zohar III, 119b: 
 דכ איוח ,שחנכ אלזא יאדו יהיא ,אתולגב לארשיד )אנווג יאהכ( אתשה ,'וגו ךלי שחנכ הלוק )בכ ומ הימרי( ,רמאו חתפ
ףוא ,הימק וחכתשאד ןוניא לכל יחמו טילש אבנז קילס ,ארפעל אשיר ףיפכ )אנידב א"ד( והיא  אתולגב אתשה יכה
 ,אתתל איפכתאד אשיר ,יחמו טילשו אליעל קילתסיד אבנזל דיבע ןאמ ,טילש אבנזו ,ארפעל ףיפכ אשיר ,אנווג יאהכ
 היל רבדמ אוה ,ארפעל ףיפכ והיאד בג לע ףא ,אשיר יאה ,יונלטמל היל ליטנ ןאמו ,אבנזל היל רבדמ ןאמ ,אד לכ םעו
ךלי שחנכ הלוק ,אד ןיגב ,יונלטמל: ו ףיפכ אשירו ,ןייחמו ןיטלשו אליעל ןיקלס ,אבנזב ןדיחא ןוניאד ןימע ראש אתשה
ארפעל  
He opened and said:  “The voice thereof shall go like a serpent” (Jeremiah 46:22).  Now that Israel 
is in exile, she [the Shekhinah] certainly does go like the snake.  When the snake bows its head to 
the dust, it raises his tail, dominates, and strikes all those found before it.  So even it is in like 
manner now in exile:  the head is bowed to the dust, and the tail dominates.  What causes the tail 
to ascend upward, dominate and strike?  The [fact that the] head is bowed down.  But nonetheless, 
what is it that drives the tail and what bears it on its journeys?  This head.  Even though it is 
bowed to the dust, it still drives [the tail’s] journeys.  Therefore, “The voice thereof shall go like a 
serpent.”  And at the present time, the other peoples, who cleave to the tail, ascend and dominate, 
and strike, and the head is bowed to the dust. 
117
 A terrifying passage in the Ra’ya Mehemena,  Zohar III, 282a, contains a succinct portrayal of such 
capture:   
 הידבוע( ,ימוא אוה ךירב אשדוקו ,איבכוכ ןיב ל"אמסד אניק יהיאו ,הליד אתולגב רהסה תיבב תוכרסב אריסא ךלמ תבו
ה"והי םאנ ךדירוא םשמ ךנק םיש םיבכוכ ןיב םאו רשנכ היבגת םא )ד א 
And the king’s daughter is bound in manacles in prison, in her exile, which is the nest of Sama’el 
among the stars.  And Kudsha Berikh Hu swears (Obadiah 1:4), “Though thou exalt thyself as the 
eagle, and though thou set thy nest among the stars, thence will I bring thee down, saith YHVH.”  
Much of the passage is concerned with the perverse domination of the “mistress,” the Shekhinah, by her 
“handmaiden,” Lilith. 
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One final Zoharic instance of this image must be mentioned, the ḥivya portrayed at the 
beginning of the Sifra de-Tseni'uta
118
 – or, at least, this instance as interpreted by 
Yehudah Liebes.  According to Liebes, this ḥivya refers to a "divine force that seeks to 
return from the harmony in creation" – that balance between left and right, male and 
female, to which the Sifra di-Tseni'uta, indeed the entire Zohar, is dedicated – to the state 
of primordial "chaos."
119
  This ḥivya is a force that "never rests from its destructive 
efforts," but that also "symbolizes a foundational and deep-rooted movement of 
existence," one that "is destined to prevail and triumph."
120
  Ultimately, this ḥivya 
"reveals its nature as the solitary God,"
121
 the God who is referred to in the verse, "And 
YHVH alone shall be exalted in that day" (Isaiah 2:11).  This bold interpretation, which 
makes the ultimate force for cosmic destruction identical to the ultimate divine, is 
associated by Liebes with the doctrine of the cosmic cycles, or shemitot, a doctrine 
generally absent from the Zohar
122
 and explicitly rejected by Moshe de Leon.
123
  It may 
also be linked to the general notion, formulated especially in the kabbalah of Ezra and 
Azriel of Gerona, of the need for a "theurgy of maintenance" to counteract the tendency 
of the sefirot to return to the En-Sof, due either to their natural desire for their source or 
as a result of human sin.
124
  Indeed, if Liebes is correct, this arresting image of hyperbolic 
ambivalence may be closely associated with the astonishing identification by Ezra of 
Gerona of the highest level of the divine with "death and perdition," and with the "anti-
cosmic vector" in kabbalah.
125
 While Liebes' interpretation is far from self-evident, it is 
made possible by the recurrence of hyperbolically ambivalent images, particularly of the 
reptilian variety, throughout the Zohar.
126
      
                                                 
118
 Zohar II, 176b, Matt V, 551: 
  ,םיעזו רבעא ,ןיפתכא דיחא )ארוחא( אשיר ,אשירב אבנז ,ןאכלו ןאכל טשפתמו ,ךירא ,איוחד וזיחכ ,ןיפילגד יפולג
זינגו ריטנ 
Gravings of engravings, like the appearance of a long serpent, extending here and there – tail in 
the head, head behind the shoulders, enraged and furious, guarded and hidden. 
119
 Liebes, Torat Ha-Yetsirah, 135-136 [סואכה בצמ לא האירבבש הינומרההמ רוזחל שקבמה יהלאה חכה]. 
120
 Ibid., 136 [חילצהלו רבגתהל הדיתע תאזו... היווהה לש תישרושו תידוסי העונת למסמ... ולש סרהה תונויסנמ חנ וניא]. 
121
 Ibid. [דיחיה לאכ ועבט תא הלגמ]. 
122
 Ibid. 
123
 See, e.g., Sefer ha-Mishkal, 92-93.  See Liebes, ‘Ketsad Nitḥaber’, 72. 
124
 Idel, New Perspectives, 181-182.  See also Mopsik, Les Grands Textes, 103-106.  Mopsik sees these two 
divergent explanations as a contradiction within the writings of Ezra of Gerona.   
125
 Farber-Ginat, ‘Kelipah Kodemet La-Pri’, 118-142. 
126
 Liebes' interpretation rests on the parallel between two successive portrayals at II, 176b.  The first seems 
to portray an ultimate return of the creation to chaos, followed by the verse about the solitary God: 
 אוהה םויב ודבל ה"והי בגשנו )אי ב היעשי( ,ךשחו והבו והת ףוסבלו...  
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Turning to textual indeterminacy, the third effect I associate with this ambivalent 
imagery, the history of the reception of the Zohar suggests that one may fairly 
characterize at least some of the Zoharic taninim as indeterminate in relation to the 
distinction between divine and demonic identities.  For example, the taninim who figure 
in the most extended Zoharic discussion of the subject, the so-called "Ma'amar Ha-
Taninim" in Parashat Bo,
127
 have been the subject of sharply conflicting interpretations.  
Some traditional commentators view these creatures as demonic and others as holy; still 
others interpret the taninim in this passage as referring both to their holy and unholy 
forms.
128
  Nor is it surprising that such images were favored in Sabbatean writings, as in 
the Derush Ha-Taninim of Nathan of Gaza, a commentary on this Zohar passage.  
According to Scholem, for Nathan, the “great tanin” alludes both “to a holy entity and to 
a demonic entity which is to be repaired by the holy entity whose name is identical to 
it."
129
  Nor should this indeterminacy be reduced to willful misreading by the interpreters; 
rather, it can be seen as an almost predictable effect of the Zohar's practice of doubling 
and dividing such images.   
 
The story of the post-Zoharic career of these creatures is long and varied; indeed, this 
reception history could even be used as a guiding thread through the maze of kabbalistic 
history as a whole.  In the central writings of kabbalah after the Zohar, the doubling of 
                                                                                                                                                 
And in the end, "tohu and bohu and darkness," [Genesis 1:2], ""And YHVH alone shall be exalted 
in that day" (Isaiah 2:11). 
The second portrayal on this page describes the activities of the snake.  Its ultimate fate is identified with 
the taninim in Genesis of whom the Talmud, bBava Batra 74b, tells us that God killed the female:  
חןיריעז ןימוי ףלאל ד...אבר אמיד ןיימב הישיר רבתא... ורזחתא דח ,ווה ןירת  
Once every short thousand days, its head is broken in the great sea… they were two, and reverted 
to one. 
 Liebes' interpretation makes this passage an instance of the paradoxical notion that the source of evil lies in 
the "acosmic" tendency of the divine.  See generally Farber-Ginat, ‘Kelipah Kodemet’. 
127
 Zohar II, 34a-35b. 
128
 Compare, for example, the interpretations of Ḥayim Vital (taninim in Zohar Bo as demonic) with those 
of the Sulam and, perhaps, the Vilna Gaon (taninim in Zohar Bo as holy).  Ḥayim Vital, Sefer Ha-Likutim, 
4c; Sulam, VII, 201-211; Gaon of Vilna, Yahel Or, 1c (pagination in commentary to Parashat Shemot).  
Cordovero, though his interpretation focuses on the taninim as holy, also stresses the strict parallelism 
between the holy and unholy dimensions as key to understanding the passage.  Or Yakar, VII, 176b.  See 
also Pardes, 55c-d.  Ibn Tabul interprets the taninim in the passage as referring both to the holy and unholy 
dimensions.  See Rubin, “Derush ha-taninim” le-R. Yosef ibn  abul, 22-86.  Rubin also provides an 
overview of the range of interpretations of the passage. 
129
 Scholem, Be-Ikvot Mashi'aḥ, 11 [ ומשש השודקבש רבד ותוא י"ע ןקתימה הפלקבש רבד לע םגו השודקבש רבד לע
ומשכ]. 
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the dragon into holy and unholy forms became the theme of highly elaborate discourses – 
in Lurianic writings,
130
 as well as in later writers such as Luzzatto,
131
 the Vilna Gaon,
132
 
and Shlomo Elyashiv133 (not to mention the Sabbatean writings in which it forms a key 
theme).  Such texts, even the latest among them, often echo their 13
th
 century precursors, 
making this reptilian theme a leitmotif of the kabbalistic tradition as a whole.  Thus, in 
the early 19
th
 century, Yitsḥak Isaac Ḥaver wrote that messianic times will be "in the 
secret of the snake” [שחנה דוסב],134 echoing a related statement made nearly six centuries 
earlier by Yosef Gikatilla.
135
  In those times, the "two snakes of the Sitra Aḥra" will be 
annihilated by the "two snakes of holiness," identified with Moses and the messiah
136
 – 
harking back to themes first elaborated in Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen. The permutations of this 
imagery in the tradition form a long and complicated story which I will not fully present 
here; much of it has been analyzed in depth by Yehudah Liebes as well as by others.
137
   
However, I do wish to draw attention to certain aspects of this reception history that shed 
light on the reptilian imagery in the Zohar as well as on other Zoharic images of 
hyperbolic ambivalence.    
 
                                                 
130
 See, e.g., Vital, Sefer Likutei Shas, 15a-b.  Vital restates the three-part schema of Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen, 
with two reptiles signifying the male and female of both the divine and the demonic and a third on each 
side signifying the Yesod that unites them.   On the shifting significance of the snake between holiness and 
unholiness in the Zohar and Lurianic kabbalah, see Liebes, ‘Tren Orzilin de-Ayalta’, passim.    
131
 For example, in a messianic vein, in the Sefer Taktu Tefilot, 37: 
אמטה שחנה ותוא לע שודקה הז שחנ קזחתיש ידכ ...  רחאה הז שחנ ריבעהל חישמ אוהש םהלש שחנ קיזחת דימו
אמט רקש 
in order to strengthen this holy nahash over that contaminated nahash ... and may you 
immediately strengthen their snake who is the messiah in order to remove the other, false, 
contaminated nahash... 
The identification of the messiah with the snake abounds in Luzzatto writings.  See, e.g., Tikunim 
Ḥadashim, 19-20:   
 לאב ושעוה ךירטצא הילבקל חישמו ... ,שחנ והיאד חישמ הילבקלו .ושע אדו ן"טשה והיא ... .יאדו ףקתתא ןילא םי
עאל הירתבא ךהימל .אלכמ היל ארק  
And Esau will be strengthened in these [other] Elohim … He is the Satan and it is Esau.  And 
confronting /corresponding to him is the messiah and he is naḥash … and the messiah 
confronting/corresponding to him [Esau] must go after him and uproot him from all. 
132
 See, e.g., Sifra di-Tseni’uta Commentary, 12b, 28a.   
133
 See, e.g., Sefer Sha'are Leshem Shevo ve-Aḥalimah, 365a: 
  .ודי תחת ושבוכל הפילקד ןינתה לע אוה טלוש היה ןכלו... ומצע השודקד שחנהב ושרוש היה ה"ע וניבר השמ 
 The root of Moses was in the holy naḥash himself, …  And therefore he ruled over the tanin of 
kelipah to subjugate him under his hand. 
134
 Sefer Pitḥe She’arim, 111b. 
135
 Gikatilla, Sod Ha-Naḥash, 199:  “The naḥash is in the secret of purity [הרהטה דוסב אוה שחנה ].”  . 
136
  Sefer Pitḥei She’arim, 112b.    
137
 See, e.g., Liebes, Sod Ha-Emunah Ha-Shabeta’it, 328-329.    
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In the Ra’ya Mehemena  and Tikune Ha-Zohar, the ambivalent quality of the snake 
sometimes takes the form of portrayals of it as protean, capable of transformation back 
and forth from the divine to the demonic.  This dynamic is described at the level of the 
relationship of human beings to intermediate spiritual forces, with frequent reference to 
the transformations between staffs and snakes in the biblical story of Moses and 
Pharaoh's magicians.  Individuals come to be associated with the unholy "snake" or the 
holy "staff," depending on the quality of their deeds; the shift between the two is 
described either as a shift between two aspects of Metatron,
138
 between a shed [דש, a 
demonic spirit] and an "angel,"
139 or between a shed and Shadai [ידש, a divine name].140  
In retrospect, this shifting back and forth seems to anticipate Sabbatean discourse about 
the messiah who entertains a shifting relationship to holiness and unholiness – as well as 
other discourses, like that of Luzzatto, produced in the Sabbatean wake.
141
 
 
The second development in the Ra'ya Mehemena is the greater emphasis on the 
possibility of a positive, or even divine, meaning for the livyatan.  In one passage, it is 
identified successively with Moses, with those who have merited identification with the 
sefirot of Tif’eret and Yesod, and finally with Yesod itself.142  To be sure, an explicit 
identification of the livyatan with Yesod already occurs in the Zohar itself in at least one 
passage,
143
 echoing the similar usage in Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen. 
 
These two developments come together in the writings of Ḥayim Vital.  The protean 
ambivalence of the snake – its ability to shift back and forth from snake to staff – 
becomes a feature of a specific stage in the development of the divine figure of Ze’er 
Anpin.  According to Vital, the name "snake" is the "secret of the immature phase" of 
Ze’er Anpin [שחנ ארקנ תונטק דוס].144 This is a stage in the evolution of this partsuf in 
                                                 
138
 E.g., Tikune Ha-Zohar, 93b. 
139
 E.g., Ra’ya Mehemena, in Zohar III, 277a. 
140
 Ibid. 
141
 See, e.g., the following from Luzzatto’s anti-Sabbatean tract, Kin'at Hashem Tseva’ot, 98:  
הטמה ךפהתה ןינע אוה םירבדה לכ שרוש הנה הטממ שחנמו ,שחנל תופילקב חישמה תושבלתה אוהו ...הטמל 
Behold that the root of all things is the matter of the transformation of the staff from a staff to a 
snake, and from a snake to a staff.  …  And this is the enclothing of the messiah in the kelipot.   
I return to the theme of “enclothing” in Chapter Three. 
142
 Ra’ya Mehemena, in Zohar III, 279a. 
143
 Zohar III, 60b.   
144
 Sefer Peri Ets Ḥayim, 517-518. 
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which the demonic forces attach themselves to him, a stage in which he exists in the 
"secret of the staff who turns into a snake" [שחנל ךפהנה הטמה דוס אוהש].  This is, 
consequently, a dangerous stage of the divine with which to occupy oneself
145
 – a danger 
again borne out by its Sabbatean use.  This correlation between the “immature” Ze’er 
Anpin and the snake on the basis of their shared instability in relation to the divide 
between divine and demonic is implicitly related to the passage in the Zohar I call the 
"Bald God" passage, to which I shall shortly turn.
146
  
 
Before doing so, however, I turn to three late texts, all from the first half of the 20
th
 
century, that show that this reception-history culminates in an ever-increasing 
concentrated ambivalence in the reptilian creatures themselves.  The first text, in Shmuel 
Bornstein of Sochatchov's Shem Mi-Shemu’el, takes as its point of departure the 
Talmudic notion that snakes bite without any gain to themselves.
147
  Bornstein 
emphasizes that this distinctive trait is shared by the holy and unholy snakes, and it is 
precisely this feature that makes  each a pure representative of good and evil, 
respectively:  just as the evil snake does evil for its own snake, so the good snake seeks to 
do good for its own sake.
148
   It is thus precisely the unique trait they share – that of pure 
disinterestedness – that makes the good and evil snakes opposites.  This interpretation of 
the relationship of the two snakes is a particularly stark example of the key feature of 
ambivalence, the radical incompatibility between nearly identical doubles.   
 
Moreover, Bornstein tells us that the holy snake, identified here with Jacob, is called a 
"snake" by virtue of its antithetical relationship to its demonic counterpart [ שחנל המוד אוהו
                                                 
145
 See Liebes, ‘Tren Urzilin de-Oraita’, passim.   
146
 The "Bald God" passage is found at Zohar III, 47a-49b and my discussion below is at pp. 104-114.  
Although Vital does not refer to the "Bald God" passage in this context, he elsewhere associates the stage 
of the "immaturity" [תונטק] of Ze’er Anpin with the word "Ish," in contrast with the name "Adam" 
associated with his "maturity" [תולדג].  See, e.g., Ets Ḥayim, 14b.  The dangerous feature of the Ish, his 
connection with the demonic forces, and consequent need for purification is the central theme of the "Bald 
God" passage.    
147
 See, e.g., yPe'ah 4a.  Bornstein refers us to the Talmud Bavli, Bava Kama, but I have been unable to 
find this notion there.  The Yerushalmi passage is quoted in the Esh Kodesh text which I discuss at the end 
of this section.   
148
 Sefer Shem mi-Shemu’el, Sefer Bamidbar, 224b.  Bornstein cites this idea in the name of his father, 
Avraham Bornstein.  I thank Shaul Magid for this reference. 
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הלילשב].149  In other words, we learn the nature of the holy (a "snake" by virtue of its 
unmotivated goodness) as a back-formation from that of the unholy (a "snake" by virtue 
of its unmotivated harmfulness).  On one level, this statement undoubtedly constitutes an 
insight into the entire history of the kabbalistic use of reptilian imagery to portray holy 
entities.
 150
  Yet, I would also extend this insight from the semantic and epistemological 
level to that of the ontological nature of the dynamic relationship between the divine and 
the demonic, in conformity with my general notion of splitting as simultaneously 
rhetorical and ontological.  It also highlights the instability of the crucial boundary 
between the divine and the demonic and some of the dangers posed to cognitive and 
religious clarity that may result from the homonymy between such intimate, and yet 
radically opposed, rivals.     
 
Two other late works takes this one step further – and perhaps closer to the rabbinic 
sources as well as to the kind of early kabbalistic tradition represented by the Gikatilla 
passage cited above.  In such works, there is only one snake, an entity that is uniquely 
suited for both good and bad.  Such a notion can be found both in the Talmudic passage 
upon which Bornstein based his homily and in another passage noting that the snake was 
destined to be king of the animals and was then cast down to the level of the most cursed 
among them.
151
  In the Sha'are Leshem, Shlomo Elyashiv interprets this latter Talmudic 
dictum as implying that the snake belonged to the level of Da'at, Knowledge, one of the 
highest divine levels, closely connected with the sefirah of Keter (and evoking 
associations both with sexuality and with the Tree of Knowledge).  This level is 
composed of both the left and the right cosmic dimensions, making it uniquely suited for 
choice between good and evil.
152
  The Esh Kodesh of Kalonimus Kalmish of Piasetzna 
presents the snake in a manner even closer to the first Talmudic passage:  the one and 
                                                 
149
 Ibid.  The same dynamic may be found in Ibn Tabul.  Rubin, “Derush ha-taninim", 39-40. 
150
 As an epistemological matter, the possibility of learning about the holy from the unholy, this process is 
suggested in a very different context in the Zohar itself.  See Zohar I, 194a; Tishby, MZ I, 289.   
151
 bSotah 9b. 
152
 Sha'are Leshem, 351b:  
 אוהש םושמו .עדונכ לכה לע הלעמל הלועש הצקה לא הצקה ןמ חירבמ אוה תעדהו תעד 'יחבמ אוה ושרושש םושמ
'ב ללוכ אוה רשא תעדהמ ןאכל תוטהל הריחבה חכ כ"ג וב היה ןכל ג"וח ןירטע  ןאכלו 
For [the snake’s] root is from the aspect of Da’at and Da’at reaches from end to end, which goes 
above all, as is known.  And because he is from Da’at which includes two crowns, Ḥesed and 
Gevurah, therefore there was within him the power of choice to incline to one side or the other.  
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only snake is a creature abstracted from natural needs and from natural causality.
153
  This 
creature performs the pure and uncompromised will of God, without any mediation [ אלב
תושבלתה; literally, without enclothing] – whether it be for good or ill.  The appearance of 
the snake may signify either the arrival of unmotivated evil as an expression of pure 
divine judgment, or of unmotivated salvation as an expression of pure divine mercy.
154
  
These three late texts bring the hyperbolic ambivalence embodied in the snake imagery to 
a supremely concentrated form, though they may be justly read as simply drawing forth 
the implications of the image present in kabbalah at least as far back as the Yitsḥak Ha-
Kohen – or in the Jewish tradition as far back as the Talmud and beyond. 
 
    b.  The Dragon's Fellows:  the "Bald God," 
          Koraḥ, and Job 
 
This excursus on the ever-intensifying concentration of hyperbolic ambivalence in 
reptilian imagery in kabbalistic history can illuminate other kinds of ambivalent Zoharic 
imagery.  Specifically, I turn to three images:  the image of the "Bald God," developed in 
the course of an elaborate narrative about the relationship between the divine and the 
demonic, the image of Koraḥ, closely related to the "Bald God" image, and the image of 
Job as presented in two quite different passages.  Each of these images embodies 
hyperbolic ambivalence, though in distinct ways.   
 
The "Bald God" passage
155
 presents itself as an extended reflection on Leviticus 13:40:  
"And the man whose hair has fallen off his head, he is bald; yet is he clean [tahor]" [ שיאו
ר טרמי יכאוה רוהט אוה חרק ושא ].  The importance of this passage is suggested by the strong 
reactions it has aroused in commentators.  Tishby has called the central part of this 
passage "strange and obscure."
156
  The troubling quality experienced by Tishby may be 
viewed as a latter-day scholarly version of the kind of trouble expressed in  Lurianic texts 
about the close and dangerous connection between the "immature" Ze’er Anpin and 
                                                 
153
 Kalonimus Kalmish Shapira of Piasetzna, Sefer Esh Kodesh, 60-62.  I thank Shaul Magid for this 
reference. 
154
 Of course, the author's extreme situation in the Warsaw Ghetto provides the context for this teaching.   
155
 Zohar III, 47a-49b. 
156
 Zohar III, 48b.  See my discussion below.  The quote from Tishby is from MZ I, 150 [םותסו רזומ ]. 
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demonic forces – for, as I asserted above, the "Bald God" passage serves as an implicit 
sub-text for that Lurianic discussion.  The Lurianic link between the "snake" and the 
"immature" Ze’er Anpin also provides support for the notion that the "Bald God," as well 
as other instances of hyperbolically ambivalent images such as Koraḥ and Job, can be 
viewed as the "dragon's fellows" – paradoxically concentrated images crucial for 
understanding the relationship between the divine and demonic in the Zohar and later 
kabbalah.  The “bald God” passage is crucial for understanding the phenomenon of 
“splitting” in the Zohar; in the exposition that follows, however, I will necessarily touch 
on themes concerning abjection that I broached in the Introduction but will only fully 
explore in Chapter Two 
 
The "Bald God" passage opens in a seemingly digressive fashion.  After quoting the 
verse from Leviticus, the passage refrains from exploring it but turns instead to the nature 
of Solomon's wisdom, focusing on the cognitive relationship between contraries.  Basing 
itself on a number of verses from Ecclesiastes, this discussion presents the relationship 
between contraries as indispensable and complementary.  It arrives at a number of 
maxims expressing this view:  "without the existence of folly in the world, there would 
be no wisdom … the benefit of light only comes from darkness … a person cannot know 
the taste of sweetness until he tastes bitterness" [ יוה אל ,אמלעב חיכש אתוטש הוה אל אלמלא
ניא עדי אלד...אכושח ןמ אלא אייתא אל ארוהנד אתלעות...  אמלעב חיכש אתמכח דע אקיתמד אמעט ש
ארירמ םיעטד].157  This complementarity seems relatively harmonious, with the one 
exception of a hint of the demonic origin of folly, which "is aroused from an other place" 
[ארחא רתאמ רעתאד].  Despite this relatively collaborative relationship between opposites, 
the passage cites as a proof-text the phrase from Ecclesiastes 7:14, “‘this’ confronted with 
‘this’ hath made the Elohim,”  [ םיהלאה השע הז תמעל הז תא םג ] – a phrase that often evokes 
a homologous and menacing realm of the demonic, a vision rather more ominous than the 
cognitively complementary opposites of the "light/darkness" variety. 
 
Then, without any explicit transition, the passage continues by puzzling about the 
existence of multiple Hebrew words to signify a human being, particularly Ish [שיא] and 
                                                 
157
 Zohar III, 47b.  Cf. Wolfson, ‘Light Through Darkness: The Ideal of Human Perfection in the Zohar’, 
73-95.   
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Adam [םדא].  The passage makes it clear that these terms refer both to different kinds of 
people and also to different facets of the male divine, either (as in the Lurianic reception 
of this passage) two forms of the divine figure elsewhere called Ze’er Anpin, specifically 
its divergent harsh and benevolent forms, or the two divine figures Arikh Anpin and Ze’er 
Anpin – or perhaps a differentiation within the male divine distinctive to this passage.  
Before proceeding to an analysis of the dynamic unfolding of the passage, I note that it 
uses a number of different devices to juxtapose these different personae – among others, 
parallelism, antithesis, and hierarchical ordering.  Thus, at one point in the exposition, it 
presents the relationship between the harsh and benevolent figures through the means of 
anaphora, juxtaposing two kinds of "faces" [“there are faces, and there are faces,”  םינפ תיא
םינפ תיאו].158  It also differentiates between various kinds of "Ish" [שיא] by means of 
different scriptural adjectives.
159
  In another place, the passage sets the terms "Ish" [שיא] 
and "Adam" [םדא] in opposition; in still another place, it declares that the proper semantic 
relationship between the terms "Ish" and "Adam" is that of hierarchical ordering: 
"whoever is under the rule of Adam is called Ish"  [ םדאד ינטלוש תוחת והיאד ןאמ לכ , ירקתא
שיא ].160  Understanding the relationship between these various devices requires attention 
to the dynamic unfolding of the passage, for it is in their disparate strategic deployment 
that the meaning and force of the passage reside.   
 
The narrative section of the passage may be divided into three, somewhat overlapping, 
phases:  a) the emergence of the Ish, initially a harsh divine figure, linked with the 
demonic, produced through the expulsion of refuse from the highest levels of the divine; 
b) the integration of the Ish into the service of the Adam; and c) the persistence of the 
alterity of the Ish.  My discussion will necessarily involve a bit of simplification of this 
thick-textured discussion which occasionally shifts back and forth between stages.    
 
After setting forth the difficulty of the problem through an elaborate narrative frame, the 
passage embarks on a portrayal of the emergence of the dangerous Ish, an emergence 
                                                 
158
 Zohar III, 49a. 
159
 Zohar III, 48a-b.  See my discussion below at pp. 107-108.    
160
 Zohar III, 48b. 
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associated with the "dark lamp," the botsina de-kardinuta [אתונידרקד אניצוב].161 This 
paradoxically named entity, whose actions initiate the process of emanation in a number 
of passages in the Zohar, here appears as the source of inchoate, volatile particles, the 
"sparks" – the latter portrayed in a manner very similar to that in the Idra Zuta, where the 
sparks are identified with the "kings of Edom," unstable, evanescent entities whose refuse 
is the raw material for the realm of the Sitra Aḥra.162  These sparks then crystallize into a 
unity and "enter … the Body," [אפוגב... ןילייע], the latter term a common reference to 
Tif’eret or to Ze’er Anpin as a whole, and it is then that this figure is "called Ish."   The 
botsina de-kardinuta (or perhaps the sparks of which it is the source)
163
 then descends on 
the Ish's head, marks him as belonging to the side of harshness, and links him to the 
demonic:  his "skull" becomes "thoroughly red as a rose, and his hair is red within red, 
and the lower crowns of below hang from it" [ ירעשו ,אדרווכ אלכ אקמוס יאהד אשירד אתלגלוג
אתתלד ןיאתת ןירתכ הינמ ןיילתו ,יקמוס וגב יקמוס  ].164    
 
This startling portrayal of a red-haired male divine figure from which demonic "lower 
crowns" hang, a kind of description for which one might be more prepared in relation to 
the Shekhinah,
 165
 is undoubtedly what made this text seem so "strange and obscure" to 
Tishby and so dangerous to Vital.
166
  Indeed, perhaps to prepare us for this surprising 
                                                 
161
 On the botsina di-kardinuta, see Liebes, Perakim Be-Milon Sefer Ha-Zohar, 145-151, 161-164. 
162
 For the identification of the sparks with the kings of Edom, see the Idra Zuta, Zohar III, 292b.  For the 
notion that some aspects of the kings are never rectified and thus serve as the basis for the Sitra Aḥra, see 
the Idra Raba, Zohar III, 135b and Tishby, Netive Emunah u-Minut, 25-26.  "Edom" may be associatively 
linked with the "redness" of the hair of Ze’er Anpin caused by the botsina di-kardinuta.   See also Zohar II, 
254b for the association of the production of the sparks with the purging of divine refuse.  See my 
discussion in Chapter Two, pp. 150-155. 
163
 The passage shifts from portraying the sparks as descending to the Ish to portraying the botsina itself as 
descending.  It seems to me that the botsina in the second portrayal is a synechdoche for the sparks. 
164
 Zohar III, 48b.  The only other place in the Zohar where phrases akin to “red within red” (in the forms:  
אקמוס וגב אקמוס and יקמוסד יקמוס) appear is in the Idra Raba, Zohar III, 136b and 137a.  In that passage, it 
also evokes the harshest aspect of judgment of Ze’er Anpin, the aspect that unleashes all forces of 
destruction – i.e., the aspect in which judgment is most closely link to the demonic. 
165
 I note that the more conventional association of long red hair would be with Lilith.  See bEruvin 100b; 
Zohar I, 148a (Sitre Torah).  I have noted the Lilith-like transformations of the Shekhinah in a number of 
places in this dissertation. 
166
 See the discussion of this passage by Liebes, in Ketsad Nitḥaber, 53-67.  Liebes shows how the themes 
of this passage received quite different elaborations in the Zohar and in Joseph of Hamadan, reflecting key 
contrasts between kabbalistic conceptions.  Most strikingly for my purposes here, Joseph of Hamadan takes 
the name Ze’er Anpin as a name for the Shekhinah – the figure in relation to whom we would not be 
surprised to find a stage of "redness."  For Joseph, moreover, the divine hair-shaving so central to this 
passage concerns, not the removal of impurities from the divine, but rather the withdrawal of the holy 
emanations at the end of a cosmic eon, a shemitah.  The doctrine of the shemitot is largely absent from the 
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portrayal, the Zohar prefaces it by adding to the antithesis between Ish and Adam a phrase 
marked by rhythmic repetitions of the word Ish, interspersing its divergent senses:   
  
 שיא אכהד שיאו ,קידצ שיא רשיו םת שיא ןנינת אהד שיא אלו ,שיא ירקא אפוגב ןילא ןילייע דכו
דח אלכו אניד הילוכד ביתכ המחלמ167 
 
When [the sparks] enter the Body, it is called Ish , and not Ish , for we have 
learned “Ish, blameless and upright” [Job 1:8], “a righteous Ish” [Genesis 6:9], 
and the Ish here, an “Ish of war” [Exodus 15:3] is written – entirely Judgment and 
all is one.
168
 
  
As with the repeated anaphoras in some of the passages analyzed above, this kind of 
rhythmic repetition highlights the intimacy, contrast, and potential overlap between 
antithetical homonyms.   
 
Perhaps even more striking is the next section, describing the process of the purification 
of the Ish, and the consequent mitigation of his dangerous alterity, his link to the Sitra 
Aḥra.  Since his connection to harsh judgment and the demonic is through his hair, the 
remedy prescribed is the shaving of the head.   Only through this process may the Ish be 
called "pure" [tahor].
169
  That this purification of a divine figure is presented as the deep 
meaning of purification from the abhorrent disease of leprosy in Leviticus 13 heightens 
the arresting quality of this passage – particularly when we remember that the "leprosy" 
in question comes from the upper reaches of the divine through the botsina de-kardinuta.  
I note that, although the passage does not explicitly make the analogy, this purification 
process seems akin to circumcision, the removal of an impure covering to reveal the 
purity within, a theurgical operation the Zohar elsewhere prescribes for the Yesod of 
Ze’er Anpin and which I discuss in sub-section C. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Zohar and was rejected by Moshe de Leon, though Liebes argues that it survives in at least one passage in 
the Sifra di-Tseni'uta.  Ibid., 63-64. 
167
 Zohar III, 48b.  I have adopted Matt’s textual emendations in his Aramaic Texts, vol. 7, 119. 
168
 Matt, VII, 304 (translation modified). 
169
 Ibid.: 
 האלע דסחמ ,שילגתאו ארעש הינמ רבעתא דכו... רוהט ירקתאו ,אלכ םסבתא 
And when the hair passes from him and he is shorn, all is sweetened from the supernal Ḥesed, and 
he is called “pure” [tahor]… 
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If we think about this passage in terms of Tishby's two models, we find a by now familiar 
juxtaposition of elements from seemingly incompatible structural conceptions.  First, the 
covering of the Ish by harsh, red hair is produced by the sparks of the botsina de-
kardinuta, explicitly identified elsewhere with the production of the refuse [ תלוספ ] of the 
divine.
170
  This covering is both a proto-demonic substance and is explicitly linked to the 
demonic "lower crowns."  I note that the latter term suggests the homology model of the 
relationship between the divine and the demonic; nonetheless, the key physical image 
here, that of the covering of the divine by a proto-demonic layer, suggests the 
concentricity model – or, more precisely, we have here an instance of the homologous 
demonic realm, the "lower crowns," "hanging" from a concentric demonic (or at least 
proto-demonic) layer, the red hair, itself an amalgamation of the refuse from the highest 
divine level that now contingently covers a lower divine figure.   
 
The text thus envisions a three-stage process.  First, the action of the botsina de-kardinuta 
generates sparks from unnamed, upper reaches of the divine.  They then appear in 
solidified and dangerous form, that of harsh, red hair, covering the head of the Ish.  This 
movement from the concealed sparks within the highest level of the divine to the outer 
covering of a lower level marks progress towards the goal of purification – for the 
method of ultimate separation from impurity seems thereby clearly delineated, viz., a 
divine head-shaving.  The concentricity image thus proves to be an intermediate stage 
between the harsh judgments contained within the divine and the severing of the link to 
the "lower crowns":  concentricity as a way-station on the path to the achievement of 
dualistic homology – a theme I explore in detail in the next chapter.   Here I would 
reiterate that the juxtaposition of elements from seemingly incompatible images of the 
relationship of the divine and the demonic does not make the text incoherent, but rather is 
indispensable to its narrative and literary force – as well as to its ontological vision.  
 
The image of the Ish that results from the purification process is that of a shaven, bald 
figure, another startling image of a deity.   It is here that the passage finally returns to the 
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 Zohar II, 254b. 
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Leviticus verse cited at the outset of the passage ("And the man whose hair has fallen off 
his head; he is bald yet is he clean [tahor]"), indicating that this unexpected image of the 
deity as a baldheaded personage is the center of the entire passage.  The passage tells us 
that the Ish is called "pure" [רוהט] rather than "holy" [שודק] because the former term 
indicates that the current state has been achieved only after a prior, impure state, citing as 
a proof text Job 14:4  "Who can bring a pure thing [tahor] from an impure [tame]" [ ןתי ימ
אמטמ רוהט].  The shaved head is thus a sign that the Ish was, indeed, impure in his prior 
state.  Thus, like the first, "Solomon's wisdom" section of the passage, this section shows 
that the favored form only appears through emerging from its disfavored counterpart:  
wisdom from folly, light from darkness, sweetness from bitterness in the "Solomon's 
wisdom" section, purity from impurity in the "Bald God" section.   And yet, by 
distinguishing "purity" from "holiness," this second section gives this scheme a rather 
darker turn – for it tells us that the bald head is itself a sign of its erstwhile impurity, that 
very impurity which was linked to the demonic "lower crowns."  By contrast, the "holy" 
divine, as opposed to the merely "pure," is embodied in a head full of hair.  Indeed, "one 
is not called ‘holy’ except when the hair hangs down, for holiness depends on the hair" 
[ילת ארעשב השודקד ,ארעש ילת דכ אלא ירקתא אל שודקד].171 Hair can thus denote either 
demonic-linked impurity or the highest holiness; conversely, a shaved head denotes both 
a being’s purity but also its origin in impurity and inability to achieve "holiness."   
 
It is, nonetheless, precisely in that state of ambivalent "purity," bearing the trace of its 
past impurity in its baldness, that the Ish can become an instrument of the Adam.  The 
latter, the male divine figure in his "holy," rather than "pure" form, uses the Ish as an 
instrument of war
172
 – a use presumably made possible precisely through the Ish's 
continuing association with the side of judgment.  From being a malevolently dangerous 
figure connected to the demonic, the erstwhile antagonist of the Adam, the Ish, once 
shorn of his menacing red hair, becomes the Adam's military deputy.  The danger posed 
to the divine by the Ish in his red state becomes "sweetened" and pressed into the service 
of the Adam, with his dangerousness presumably limited to those who deserve it.   
 
                                                 
171
 Zohar III, 48b.  
172
 Zohar III, 49a. 
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It is at this point that the discussion takes another unexpected, but also clarifying, turn.  In 
this third section, playing on the identity of the letters in the word "bald" and the name 
"Koraḥ" [חרק],173 the passage tells us that the rebel leader was made "in the manner of the 
upper realm" [אליעלד אנווגכ] – specifically, in the likeness of the Ish after his head is shorn 
of his harsh, red hair.
174
   It was his awareness of his divine resemblance that made Koraḥ 
resent Aaron's position.  And it was also this very resemblance that led to God's 
condemnation of Koraḥ to the ultimate punishment:  "I made you in the  manner of the 
upper realm.  You did not wish to ascend among the upper beings. Descend below, and 
be among the lower beings, as it is written, 'and they descended alive into Sheol'" 
(Numbers 16:30) [   ,ןיאתתב יוהו אתתל תוח ,ןיאלעב האלעאל תיעב אל ,אליעלד אנווגכ ךל תידבע אנא
הלואש םייח ודריו )גל זט רבדמב( ביתכד ].175  Koraḥ stands on a knife's edge between extremes:  
between dwelling among (or as one of?) the divine beings [ןיאלעב], and descent into hell 
among (or as one of?) the demonic beings [ןיאתתב].  His fate, due to his misreading of the 
hyperbolically ambivalent trope of baldness, also shows the grave dangers inherent in an 
"as above so below" cosmos where the crucial divide between divine and demonic is 
highly precarious and even uncertain.   
 
The most daring implication of this passage is that this hyperbolic ambivalence, this 
capacity for shifting between the highest and the lowest, also affects the divine Ish, an 
implication suggested by the very similar terms used to describe the two.  The Ish, too, 
stands between his links to the demonic below ("and the lower crowns of below hang 
from him" אתתלד ןיאתת ןירתכ הינמ ןיילתו ) and his inclusion in the higher divine level, the 
Adam ("and this Ish is included in Adam," םדאד אללכב שיא יאהו ).  Wolfson, indeed, goes 
so far as to suggest that the red-haired figure evokes the figure of Esau,
176
 a key 
personification of the demonic in the Zohar, often identified with Sama’el himself.  We 
would thus have the startling result that the initial state of a central aspect of the divine is 
to be identified with the Devil and in need of purification to fully assume his identity as a 
good deity.  I will return to this suggestion by Wolfson in the Conclusion.   
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 This play is used, to different effect, in the Talmud, bSanhedrin 109b. 
174
 Zohar III, 49a. 
175
 Ibid. 
176
 Elliot R. Wolfson, ‘Light through Darkness’, 81 n.29. 
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The line immediately following the conclusion of the Koraḥ section juxtaposes the two 
kinds of Ish through the use of anaphoric parallelism, suggesting that the ambivalence is 
of an enduring character:  "there are faces and there are faces" [  םינפ תיאו םינפ תיא ].  On 
the one hand, "there are" those "faces of anger" [םעז לש םינפ] linked to demonic forces, 
portrayed in terms that recall the Ish’s red hair and its pendant “lower crowns”:  "and all 
those who hang from the side of these faces are impudent and fierce, for they are not of 
compassion”  [ימחרמ אלד ,והלכ ןיפיקת והלכ ןיפיצח ,םינפ ןוניאמ ןיילתד ןילא לכו].177 On the other 
hand, "there are" those faces that have been shaven, and, consequently, from which the 
"impudent” and “fierce" forces have "all passed away and been broken" [ והלכ ןרבעתמ
ורבתאו].178  These persistent, antithetical faces are here linked to the presence or absence 
of facial hair, with reference to the verse in Leviticus that follows the initial "bald man" 
verse.
179
   
 
The very next Leviticus verse, moreover, discusses the possibility of a leprous sore, a 
nega [עגנ] appearing on the bald part of the head or face.   From the perspective of this 
Zohar passage, which portrays divine baldness as a result of purification, this new 
possibility indicates the merely provisional success of such purification.  Indeed, with 
reference to this verse, and as if to reinforce the notion of the enduring potential for 
divine oscillation between purity and impurity, the passage discusses how such 
contamination of the divine can be caused by human sin and repaired by human action.  
Such contamination can affect both the male and female aspects of the divinity.   It is the 
enduring office of the priest to diagnose which side of the divine has been infected and 
thereby to determine the proper sacrifice to repair the damage.  This ongoing 
susceptibility of the Ish to both "black" and "white" theurgy confirms that the oscillation 
of this divine figure between extremes is an always latent possibility, posing an ever-
present danger and promise.
180
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 Zohar III, 49a. 
178
 Ibid. 
179
 Leviticus 13:41:   
 אוה רוהט אוה חבג ושאר טרמי וינפ תאפמ םאו 
And he that hath his hair fallen off from the part of his head toward his face, he is forehead bald: 
yet is he clean. 
180
 The close association between the shaving of the divine head with human theurgical practice is 
emphasized in a brief story in Zohar I, 217a, whose enigmatic quality becomes illuminated only through 
reading it in conjunction with the “Bald God” passage. 
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The anaphora, "there are faces, and there are faces," thus strongly implies that the 
relationship between the two states of the Ish is not merely a question of a one-time 
transition between one stage and another, but rather embodies a permanent potential for 
fluctuation between the two.  This distinction between "faces" and "faces" in the latter 
part of this section of the passage thus serves a rather different function than the 
distinction between "Ish" and "Ish" in the earlier part of the section.   The earlier 
distinction between homonyms precedes the narrative about the integration of the Ish into 
the service of the Adam through the severing of his connection to the demonic effected by 
the divine shaving.  The later distinction between antithetical homonyms comes after this 
narrative – and it can thus serve as a reminder of the ongoing danger to the divine posed 
by the establishment of an autonomous demonic realm, itself a byproduct of the process 
of purification.    
  
The Ish and Koraḥ, like the snake, are thus images of hyperbolic ambivalence.  The 
shaven, "pure" Ish is marked by the invisible trace of his impure counterpart.  Moreover, 
although that impurity has become provisionally invisible, it is always ready to make its 
resurgence. The shaven Ish is thus an image of the potential for oscillation between purity 
and impurity.  Although the beginning of this section of the passage declares that the Ish 
is the figure who is (or, alternatively, who should be) under the rule of the Adam, the text 
then devotes itself to showing not only the process by which the original duality between 
them comes about and the method for achieving the submission of the former to the 
latter, but also the instability of this achievement.   
 
The passage further emphasizes this feature through its association of the Ish with Koraḥ.  
The latter descended into hell in his bald state – indeed, precisely as a result of his 
misunderstanding the meaning of this state, a misunderstanding that can be attributed to 
the dangerous indeterminacy of the hyperbolically ambivalent image of baldness.  Like 
the unmotivated action of the snake in the interpretation of the Shem mi-Shmuel, it is the 
very trait that makes Koraḥ distinctive that makes him suited to the highest highs or 
lowest lows.  The bald head, like the snake, becomes an image whose meaning is 
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intrinsically indeterminate – capable of signifying absolute purity or absolute impurity.181  
Finally, like the snake in texts from Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen to Luzzatto and beyond, Koraḥ is 
also linked to messianic expectation – for, according to the Zohar, siding with one 
position in a Talmudic dispute,
182
 Koraḥ is destined ultimately to rise from hell.   Indeed, 
the radical ambivalence of Koraḥ in the Zohar may also presage his rehabilitation in a 
late text like the Me Ha-Shiloaḥ as the figure in the story of his conflict with Moses 
possessed of the higher, even divine, truth.
183
  In any event, the "plausibility" of two 
opposite fates for this figure seems congruent with the hyperbolic ambivalence that he 
embodies.  
 
In addition to the snake, Koraḥ, and the Ish, I now turn to one more image in the Zohar 
that shares in this kind of hyperbolic ambivalence, that of Job.   Like these other images, 
Job is characterized by a distinctive trait which makes him suited for superlative 
performance in both the holy and demonic realms.  In Job's case, that trait is fear, his 
"essence":   
   
 ארטסד ןיב השודקד ןיב אליעלד הלמד ןיגב .היליד ארקע הוה וליחד אוההבו ,וליחדב ליחד הוה בויא
 אלא היבג ברקמלו אתתל אליעלד אחור אכשמאל שנ רב ליכי אל ,ארחא וליחדב184 
 
Job feared with fear.  And in this fear was his essence.  For concerning any matter 
above, either in the holy realm or in the Sitra Aḥra, a person cannot draw its spirit 
from above to below or to come near to it except through fear. 
  
By virtue of the concentration of purpose made possible by that fear, the passage implies, 
Job was able to serve as one of Pharaoh's chief demonic magicians.
185
  And also by virtue 
of that fear, Job was able to repent and to turn to the service of the true God.   
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 The specific kind of fellowship between Koraḥ and the reptilian creatures that I am advancing here is 
not explicit in the text.  I note that one passage in the Zohar, III, 79a, links Koraḥ and the snake, though 
without the complex ambivalence contained in the "Bald God" passage. 
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It is instructive to compare the image in this "fearful Job" passage with another passage, 
which I call the "clean hands Job" passage.
186  This second passage attributes Job's 
punishment to his refusal to give the Sitra Aḥra a portion of the sacrifice he offered to 
God.  If he had done so, the Sitra Aḥra would have "cleared the way and departed from 
the sanctuary,” and the holy side would have “ascended to the highest level."187  In this 
refusal to give the Sitra Aḥra a share of his offering, Job failed to act like God himself 
who, the Zohar declares, offered Job to Satan in order to distract him from his desire to 
persecute Israel.
188
    
 
According to the "clean hands Job" passage, it was Job's desire to keep absolutely 
separate from the Sitra Aḥra that led to the latter acquiring the power to torture him.  
Job's hyperbolic desire for separation thus led to the hyperbolic oscillations in Job's 
fortunes – the ultimate happy life, succeeded by the ultimate unhappy life, succeeded by a 
return to the ultimate happy life.
189
  The "clean hands Job" passage is a narrative of 
hyperbolic oscillation.   
 
The passage concludes by pointing to Job's failure to "integrate good and evil" [   לילכא אלו
ערו בוט].  This phrase can be read as implying a general Zoharic teleology toward the 
integration of the divine and the demonic.  It is, however, hardly free from ambiguity – 
for, after all, the goal of the gift to Satan by Job would have been to ensure the departure 
of the latter, the goal God himself sought to achieve by offering Job to Satan.
190
  The 
ambiguity of the goal this passage prescribes for Job is one more indication of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 יאו ,היבגל אתתל אליעלמ הלמ איההל הילע ךישמא והיא ,אשידק האלע הלמב ןיוכיא היתוער יא אקבדתאל היתוער
היבגל אתתל אליעלמ הלמ איההל ךישמא והיא ,היב ןיוכיאו ארחא ארטסב. 
If his aspiration focuses on a supernal, holy entity, he draws that entity from above to himself 
below.  If he aspires to cleave to the Sitra Aḥra, focusing there, then he draws that from above to 
himself below. 
186
 Zohar II, 34a.  Cf. Wolfson, ‘Light through Darkness’, 87-88. 
187
 Zohar II, 34a:  אליעל אליעל קילתסא השודקד ארטסו ,אשדקמ לעמ קלתסיו אחרא ינפי   
188
 Zohar II, 33a.  The passage even suggests that Satan had a reasonable legal claim against the family of 
Abraham, of whom Job was viewed as a distant relation. 
189
 Zohar II, 34a. 
190
 Wolfson interprets the passage as clearly favoring the integration of good and evil.  Wolfson, ‘Light 
through Darkness’, 87-88. Wolfson interprets the inducement to the Sitra Aḥra to depart as signifying the 
termination of the autonomous existence of the Sitra Aḥra, rather than its spatial departure.  It seems to me, 
though, that the passage's divergent pronouncements point to a fundamental ambivalence. 
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unstable management of ambivalence at work here.   It is this passage's distinctive 
manner of allowing the two "plausible" and opposite goals to coexist within the same 
short text, other versions of which I have shown in my analysis of the passages 
concerning the kets in the Zohar and the Sefer Ha-Mishkal. 
 
There are at least two ways one may productively read the "clean hands Job" text in 
relation to the "fearful Job" text, without taking a stance on the "single versus multiple 
authorship" question.  One might read the "fearful Job" narrative as the pre-history of the 
"clean hands Job" and thus as an explanation of the latter's deficiency.  In this reading, 
Job had once been as exclusive in his worship of the demonic as he was now in his 
worship of the divine.  This exclusivity led to his failure at the later stage with regard to 
the Sitra Aḥra – whether we interpret that failure in terms of seeking the Sitra Aḥra's 
departure or its integration.   However, this reading cannot account for the tone of the 
"fearful Job" passage.  In this passage, Job's "fearfulness," his ability to concentrate 
purely on the object of his worship, is portrayed as the source of his extraordinary ability 
to link up to metaphysical forces, be they divine or demonic.  No critique is offered of 
this trait as such.  Indeed, without it, Job would not have been able to effect the radical 
and blessed conversion of his identity, to shift from being a hyperbolic worshipper of the 
demonic to that of the divine.  Moreover, this very trait allows the passage to compare 
Job favourably with Balaam and Jethro.  All three were said to have been magicians in 
the service of Pharaoh – and yet, while Job, due to the purity of his "fear," converted 
rapidly and radically to the worship of God, Balaam never converted and Jethro only did 
so much later and only after many miraculous demonstrations of God's power.    
 
Rather than forming two parts of one narrative, I propose that the two Job passages 
represent two very different ways of portraying ambivalence between the incompatible 
goals of the integration and banishment of the Sitra Aḥra.  In the "clean hands Job" text, 
phrases favoring integration of the divine and the demonic coexist with those favoring 
their  separation, the latter goal even portrayed as shared by God himself.
191
  In this 
passage, Job's desire for separation from the Sitra Aḥra is unequivocal; it is the Zohar's 
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evaluation of this desire that is ambivalent.  By contrast, in the "fearful Job" passage, the 
Zohar presents Job as a figure of hyperbolic ambivalence, concentrated in his fearful 
“essence."  This "essence" renders him hyperbolically suited for both divine and demonic 
service.  And while Job may thereby seem to be the very embodiment of the integration 
of the two realms, it is precisely this trait that makes it impossible for him to live this 
integration, to serve more than one master simultaneously.  The very trait that makes him 
a superlative servant of the demonic also makes him a superlative servant of the divine – 
and also renders him unable to do both at the same time.    
 
The Ish, Koraḥ, the "fearful Job":  three icons of hyperbolic ambivalence, three true 
fellows of the dragon.  Each, in his own way, embodies both intimacy and 
incompatibility between the divine and demonic by means of a distinctive trait that lends 
itself to radically opposite valences.  The selflessness of the snake, the shaved head of the 
Ish, the baldness of the Ish and Koraḥ, the fearfulness of Job – each of these traits makes 
it radically impossible for these icons either to integrate the divine and demonic or to 
fully expel one of them.  For each of these figures, to express his "essence" means to live 
one side of the dichotomy exclusively, and yet such exclusivity also means betraying that 
same "essence" that marks him as belonging to both.  As a hermeneutic matter, these 
images are absolutely indeterminate:  for it is the distinctive trait that makes them legible 
as belonging to one extreme that simultaneously makes them legible as belonging to the 
other extreme.     
 
Rather than a choice between dualism and dialectical integration, an analysis of such 
images culminates in radical undecidability – in relation to which both dualism and 
dialectical integration would be equally plausible and equally impossible resolutions.   At 
every moment, the images contain an active, even if invisible, trace of a contrary past or 
future:  the snake can operate for good or ill, Koraḥ can ascend or descend, the "Bald 
God"'s hair can grow back or a blemish can develop on his very baldness, Job's fear can 
lead him to oscillate from one side to the other.   
 
As the Zohar tells us, the very word "pure," tahor, suggests an emergence from impurity, 
a failure to achieve "holiness," and a possible relapse into impurity.  In the face of the 
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active trace such images contain of their opposites, any interpretation of them which 
insists on their univocity, even as a result of a dialectical reconciliation, would work to 
repress the enduring quality of such traces on which the texts insist.
192
 As Derrida has 
commented in the context of related images in philosophical texts, such images "mark the 
spots of what can never be mediated, mastered, sublated, or dialecticized through any 
Erinnerung or Aufhebung."
193
  A reading of these images that seeks to refrain from 
effacing the heterogeneousness of the various pronouncements about them should take as 
its guide not the stark alternative between integration and separation, or even a dialectical 
relationship between them, but rather, the undecidability inherent in hyperbolic 
ambivalence.   
 
Such images in the Zohar resemble dream images in a specific sense described by Freud, 
for whom dreams 
 
show a particular preference for combining contraries into a unity or for 
representing them as one and the same thing. Dreams feel themselves at liberty, 
moreover, to represent any element by its wishful contrary; so that there is no way 
of deciding at a first glance whether any element that admits of a contrary is 
present in the dream-thoughts as a positive or as a negative.
194
 
 
 
C.  Ambivalence Thematized:  Variations on Seduction 
 
Images of hyperbolic ambivalence raise in acute form the danger of the gravest cognitive 
and religious errors.  The indeterminacy of the mark or trait that both joins and separates 
two entities (or two phases or aspects of one entity) when one belongs to the holiest and 
                                                 
192
 Cf. Kofman, Lectures de Derrida, 81:  "The passage from double determination to univocity is not the 
consequence of a progress in reason but of repression." 
193
 Derrida, Dissemination, 221. 
194
 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, 353.  Others, of course, have made an association between 
kabbalistic and dream images.  In the specific sense that I intend here, that of the antithetical quality of 
kabbalistic images, see Luzzatto in Klaḥ Pitḥe Ḥokhmah, 26: 
םולחב האורה שממ ומכ ,הזל הז םייכפה וליפא תונוימדב תואריל תוריפסה תולוכי 
The sefirot can even appear in images that are opposites of each other, exactly as [it is for] one 
who sees in a dream.  
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the other to the unholiest dimension, makes interpretation the most hazardous of 
enterprises.  Moreover, since the Zohar is primarily concerned not with neutral cognition 
but with will and desire, the danger is really that of seduction, deception, and self-
deception.  The Zohar passage on Koraḥ, for example, portrays him as deluding himself 
through misreading the ambivalent sign of his baldness, a misreading into which he was 
led by his jealousy of Aaron and his desire for priestly power.  This fatal combination of 
semiotic ambivalence and intense desire seduced Koraḥ into misreading his phenomenal 
resemblance to the divine and brought about the catastrophic reversal of his destiny from 
dwelling with the divine to banishment to the demonic.  The prevalence in the Zohar of 
doubling, division, indeterminacy, and hyperbolic ambivalence at the level of images, in 
addition to that of hypnotic parallelism at the level of schemes, means that the danger of 
seduction and deception is irreducible.     
 
In the last section of this chapter, therefore, I turn to a text which takes seduction as an 
explicit, central theme, and brings together a number of the different ways this danger 
arises.
195
  This text is a section of a lengthy passage based primarily on a structurally 
concentric portrayal of the Sitra Aḥra.  The passage contains a wide range of the key 
rhetorical techniques used in the Zohar to portray the relationship between the divine and 
the demonic.  Analysis of this text will also give me the opportunity to explore nogah, the 
"brightness," that liminal entity whose ambivalence has both ontological and rhetorical 
dimensions.  As I noted above, one Zoharic passage declares that nogah is the 
"innermost" of the kelipot and "clings to" or even “unites with” the holy mo’aḥ.196   It is 
this liminality of nogah that prepared it for its eventual role in Lurianic kabbalah as the 
crucial battleground between holiness and unholiness – a role it already played in at least 
one 13th century text.
197
   
                                                 
195
 Zohar II, 203a-b. 
196
 Zohar Ḥadash, 38a-b.  The Aramaic “דחאתמ” means “to cling to,” but often is used in the Zohar as a 
play on the Hebrew word “one” [דחא], whose letters it contains.   
197
 See Yosef Gikatilla's discussion of the biblical prohibition on a tree’s fruit during the first three years – 
called in Leviticus 19:23, orlah [הלרע], the same word for "foreskin."  Gikatilla associates the fruit of these 
three years with the "three hard kelipot."   In the fourth year, fruit may be eaten but only when physically 
brought to Jerusalem or transmuted into money and brought to Jerusalem.  Gikatilla associates the fruit of 
the fourth year with nogah.  He mentions only the second of the two options for using it, that of converting 
it into money, and refers to it by the phrase "םימדב לוליח".  In the context of the fruit law, this formula would 
mean "deconsecration though money," but Gikatilla clearly intends it to be taken in its more literal meaning 
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The Zohar passage under discussion here presents nogah in the midst of a broad 
discussion of the demonic generally, explores the ambivalence of this entity in a manner 
which leaves significant issues unresolved, and extends this ambivalence to the realm of 
the kelipot generally – a text thus not only about ambivalence but also itself marked by 
ambivalence.  The text presents the concentric kelipot through an interpretation of the 
celestial phenomena that announce the vision of the chariot in Ezekiel 1:4:  
   
 ביבס ול הגנו תחקלתמ שאו לודג ןנע ןופצה ןמ האב הרעס חור הנהו אראו למשחה ןיעכ הכותמו
שאה ךותמ: 
 
And I looked, and, behold, a whirlwind came out of the north, a great cloud, and a 
fire infolding itself, and a brightness [nogah] was about it, and out of the midst 
thereof as the color of amber [ḥashmal], out of the midst of the fire.  
 
This verse serves as the basis for related, though far from identical, portrayals of the 
concentric kelipot elsewhere in the Zohar and in other 13
th
 century writings, notably in 
Moshe de Leon's commentary on Ezekiel's vision.
198
   
 
The passage interprets each of the first of the three phenomena announcing Ezekiel's 
vision – wind, cloud, and fire – as belonging to the realm of the kelipot, though not 
without ambivalence and seemingly in an ascending order of their association with evil.  
It traces the source of the “wind” to the "north," presumably the sefirah of Gevurah.  
Although it assigns a holy task to this kelipah, that of protecting the  moḥa, it also 
explains that, in accordance with the verse, "for evil appeareth out of the north" [ ןופצמ
הערה חתפת] (Jeremiah 6:1), evil “Other Sides cling” [ ןדחאתא ןינרחא ןירטס] to it.  It refers to 
the second of the phenomena, the "great cloud," as "dregs of gold" [אבהדד אתיפסוס], an 
important Zoharic image in passages tracing the Sitra Aḥra to the metastasis of the 
sefirah of Gevurah.  This “cloud” is, however, doubled by a holy cloud, as I shall shortly 
                                                                                                                                                 
of "deconsecration through blood" – evoking a mortal struggle to purify the nogah.  See Gikatilla, Sha'are 
Orah, 212-214.    
198
 See Moshe de Leon, Perush ha-Merkavah  le-R. Moshe de Leon, 59-61. 
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discuss.   The “fire” is most clearly ominous, associated with “hard judgment” [ אניד
אישק].  As to the fourth of these phenomena, nogah, the Zohar expresses a far more 
complex ambivalence, as I shall shortly show in detail.  This ambivalence is reflected in, 
among other things, the passage’s declaration that the alternative interpretations it offers 
of nogah are “all good and proper” [אוה תואיו ריפש אלכו].199   
  
To turn to my main theme in this section:  the passage explicitly declares two of the 
phenomena, the "cloud" [ןנע] and nogah, to be seductive.  Their seductive powers, 
however, derive from very different sources.  This difference goes to the heart of 
divergent textual techniques used in the Zohar for portraying the relationship between the 
divine and the demonic.   
 
As to the cloud, the passage declares it must be distinguished from its holy equivalent and 
that the two are opposites on the phenomenal level – the holy cloud absolutely 
illuminated and illuminating, the Ezekiel cloud absolutely dark and darkening.  Despite 
this stark difference, the dark cloud "knows how to seduce" [יתפמל עדיד]200 – or, perhaps 
we should say, very skillful "knowledge" is required for the seduction to succeed 
precisely because of its phenomenal difference from its divine counterpart.  Given the 
phenomenal antithesis between the holy and unholy clouds, such cunning must rely on 
something other than inducing the target of seduction to make a simple cognitive 
misjudgment.  One might, of course, speculate that the unholy cloud's seductive appeal 
comes precisely from the attractiveness of alterity.  The text, however, does not take this 
path.  Rather, it implicitly suggests that the seductive power of the dark cloud is purely 
rhetorical, rooted in the identity of the term designating the two contraries – a seductive 
power expressed by the cadence of the text, rhythmically repeating the key word "cloud," 
the musical Aramaic “anana,” in an almost chant-like manner, sliding between the holy 
and unholy meanings:  
  
                                                 
199
 Note also that the very term "nogah" is used in the Ra’ya Mehemena to refer to the Shekhinah, an entity 
also situated at the boundary of the holy and the unholy and portrayed in complex ways as mediating their 
relationship. Ra’ya Mehemena, in Zohar III, 282b. 
200
 Zohar II, 203a. 
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אננע אוהה ,אננעל אננע ןיב יזח את דל י רבדמב( ביתכד ךננעו )די די םש( ,םמוי םהילע ה"והי ןנעו )
 אננע ,אד אננע לבא ,אננע אוהה וג ןוזחתא ןירוהנ לכו ,ריהזו ריהנד אננע והיא יאה ,םהילע דמוע
הימק האזחתאל ןילכי אלד ןירוהנ לכ ענמ לבא ,ללכ ריהנ אלד ךושח201 
 
Come and see, between cloud and cloud [ben anana le anana], that anana of 
which it is written (Numbers 10:34), “And the cloud [anan] the Lord was upon 
them by day,” (ibid. 14:14), “and that thy cloud [anan] standeth over them” – this 
is that anana that illuminates and shines, and all lights are seen in that anana.  But 
this anana, dark anana that does not illuminate at all, but blocks [mana] all lights 
so that they cannot be seen before it.
202
 
  
The seductiveness the passage attributes to nogah, however, is quite different.  Unlike the 
demonic cloud, which is the phenomenal opposite of its divine counterpart, nogah 
visually resembles its counterpart, the holy light, as its very name (“brightness”) 
indicates.  Nogah is thus portrayed as that which seduces by virtue of its ability to be 
visually mistaken for the true light, especially when presented in a seductive context.  
Perhaps befitting the theme of seduction, the passage describes this seduction in a 
deceptively simple text that is far more obscure than would appear on first reading.  Note 
that, in my translation, I have graphically indicated certain lacunae and obscurities:      
 
ארוהנ אלטנל אתתאל יתפמ הגנ יאהב , ביתכ אד לעו(ג ה ילשמ )הכח ןמשמ קלחו , ארוהנ אוהה יוש
תירבד הילבקל , יתפמ ךכ יניגבוהירוהנ אלטנו היל ,אתתאל יתפמד איותפ והיא אדו , ביתכד(םש )
וגו הרז יתפש הנפטת תפנ.'203 
 
With this nogah, [X?] seduces the woman to take light.  And therefore it is written 
(Prov. 5:3), "and her mouth is smoother than oil."  [X?] put this light opposite the 
covenant and thereby seduced him/it and took his/its light. And this is the 
seduction that seduces the woman, as it is written (ibid.), "for the lips of a strange 
woman drip as an honeycomb,” etc.... 
                                                 
201
 Zohar II, 203a-b. 
202
 I have tried with my transliterations to give some sense of the rhythmic quality of this text. 
203
 Zohar II, 203b. 
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Before attempting to decipher these lines, I first note that they stand in contrast to 
Tishby's notion that the concentric kelipot resemble the holy side to a lesser degree than 
the homologous Sitra Aḥra and that this feature makes them less dangerous.  Here the 
quintessential concentric kelipah, nogah, resembles the holy dimension to such an extent 
as to pose a mortal danger of seduction through deception.    
 
Some of the key referents of this excerpt are far from clear.  First, the agent of the 
excerpt's first act of seduction, the subject of the first verb "seduces," is not given, an 
absence I note in my English translation with the symbol "[X?]."  Some commentators 
seek to remedy this difficulty by interpretively supplying the missing subject.  Cordovero, 
for example, declares the agent of the seduction to be the "snake," or, more precisely, the 
"upper snake" [הלעמל שחנה] who confronts the "upper Adam" and the "upper Eve," i.e., 
Tif’eret and Malkhut.204  This interpretation has much to commend it, dramatically 
increasing the legibility of the text by aligning it with other Zoharic passages about the 
seduction of Adam and Eve.
205
  It also helps explain the use of the proof-text from 
Proverbs ("and her mouth is smoother than oil"), provided that we understand the "snake" 
here as feminine, as Lilith, as do other Zoharic passages about the seduction in the 
Garden.
206
   
 
Nevertheless, this interpretation suffers from the fact that such a "snake" or, indeed, any 
personified demonic figure at all, is not mentioned in this passage.  Cordovero thus seems 
to be engaged in a bit of prosopopeia of his own, provoked by the syntactical 
insubstantiality of the text.  An alternative interpretive strategy would be to transmute the 
first verb into passive voice.  One would then translate the first clause as "the woman was 
seduced by this nogah." This strategy would make nogah into the covert agent as well as 
the means of the seduction, which seems more consistent with the way the Ezekiel 
phenomena are treated in the rest of the passage.  Still another alternative would be to say 
                                                 
204
 Thus, e.g., Cordovero, Or Yakar, XI, 39. 
205
 E.g., Midrash Ha-Ne'elam on Shir Ha-Shirim, Zohar Ḥadash, 69a. 
206
 E.g., ibid.; Midrash Ha-Ne'elam on Ekhah, Zohar Ḥadash, 91d.  This interpretation does face a small 
difficulty in that Moshe de Leon emphatically identifies nogah with a masculine entity.  See Moshe de 
Leon, Perush ha-Merkavah  le-R. Moshe de Leon, 60.  To be sure, there is no need to assume complete 
consistency between the symbolic associations in the two texts, whether or not they are by the same author. 
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that occulting the identity of the seducing subject is all too appropriate, given that the 
seduction here emerges from deception – indeed, perhaps there is no true subject at all 
but only an alluring appearance.  A final alternative, as I shall discuss shortly, is that this 
obscurity, like some others in this text, may be a product of textual emendations due to an 
unresolved 13
th
 century controversy. 
 
Under any of these interpretations, it is the "brightness" of  nogah that explains its ability 
to seduce "the woman" and thereby "to take light."  Nevertheless, even the referent of the 
latter phrase is not clear:   since the verb is in the infinitive and its object is in an 
uninflected state, the seducer could be interpreted either as appropriating the light of the 
woman or, alternatively, as inducing her to receive his – or her, or its – light.207  
Uncertainty also attaches to the referents of the masculine pronoun and possessive in the 
next sentence:  "[X?] placed this light opposite the covenant and thereby seduced him/it 
and took his/its light" [ תירבד הילבקל ארוהנ אוהה יוש ,הירוהנ אלטנו היל יתפמ ךכ יניגבו ].  No 
masculine noun appears in the text to provide a clear referent for the phrase’s pronoun 
and possessive.  To avoid this difficulty, some commentators do not feel bound by the 
gender of the pronoun ("seduces him") and possessive ("his light").
208
  Moreover, they 
interpret the "covenant" as a reference to Malkhut, thus completing the reading of the 
object of the seduction as feminine.
 209
  This reading is supported by the textual variants 
listed by the Sulam (and adopted by Matt) in which the pronoun and possessive in this 
phrase are given feminine forms – perhaps suggesting that at least some copyists or 
editors were also striving to resolve the puzzle of the referents in the passage.
210
  I note 
that the Sulam itself, in its Hebrew translation, favors a mix of these variants, making the 
phrase read:  "he seduced her and she received his light" [ קלו התוא התיפורוא הח ].211 
 
                                                 
207
 Cordovero and the Lurianic interpretation favor the former view.  Or Yakar, XI, 39; Ets Ḥayim 112b-c.  
The Sulam, however, favors the latter.  Sulam X, 57. 
208
 Both Cordovero and the Lurianic texts assume that the referent here is the "woman."  Or Yakar XI, 39; 
Vital, Sha'ar Ma'amere Rashbi, 205b.  The Sulam translates the pronoun as "her" and the possessive as "his 
light."   
209
 On the sefirotic reference of the word "תירב," compare Zohar I, 116b (תירב as the Shekhinah) with Zohar 
I, 32a (תירב as Yesod).  The latter, of course, is the more intuitive and common reference.     
210
 Sulam X, 57.  The Sulam does not give the source of these variants.  Both the Mantua and Cremona 
editions have the masculine forms.   
211
 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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Another reading, however, one that would render the excerpt more consistent with other 
Zoharic passages about the Garden, would understand this phrase to refer to the seduction 
of the male consort of the "woman" who was seduced at the start of the excerpt, just as 
Adam was seduced after Eve.  This reading which would take the "covenant" as the 
Yesod, the male phallus, its more common referent in the Zohar.  Keeping the pronoun 
and possessive in the masculine form, this reading would understand the seduction of 
"him" and the appropriation of "his light" as referring to Adam – and/or to the divine 
"upper Adam."  The second sentence of this text would thus refer to the way the seducer 
in the Garden turned to seduce and expropriate Adam after the successful seduction and 
expropriation of Eve, a narrative turn explicitly found in at least one other Zoharic 
Garden text.
212
  Nevertheless, the obscurity of the referents in this text, as I have 
suggested, is perfectly suited to its subject-matter – seduction through the substitution of 
one kind of light for another.   
 
As I mentioned above, this text may also be an implicit record of a disagreement among 
13
th
 century kabbalists – specifically, about whether it is appropriate to speak about 
seduction and even sin in relation to divine figures like Tif’eret and Malkhut.213  This 
notion of divine seduction and sin seems to be explicitly endorsed by Moshe of Burgos 
who insists on the parallels between the earthly and divine sins – and even refers to illicit 
"desire and undermining" [רוערעו הואת] on the part of Malkhut, corresponding to that of 
Eve.
214
  One passage in the Zohar
215
 appears to explicitly engage with this Moshe of 
Burgos formulation and to seek to mitigate its scandalousness by declaring that the 
seduction of the "primal Adam" concerns a figure lower on the cosmic scale than that of 
the highest divine figures, a figure who crystallized on the second day of Creation
216
 – 
                                                 
212
 Midrash Ha-Ne'elam on Shir Ha-Shirim, Zohar Ḥadash, 69a.  Note that the seducer in this passage is 
the demonic female, the “woman of whoredom” [םינונז תשא], who seduces first Eve, then Adam.   
213
 Tishby presents this debate in MZ I, 299-300. 
214
 Moshe of Burgos, ‘Ma’amar Al Sod “Hasir Hamitsnefet Harim Atarah”’, 50.  See also Moshe of 
Burgos, ‘Hosafot me-Ibud Ma’amaro shel R. Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen al ha-Atsilut’, 194-195.  To be sure, on p. 
195 he seems to step back from the very notion that he had just expounded.  See also an apparent 
articulation of the same notion in Todros Ha-levi Abulafia, Otsar Ha-Kavod, 28b.  
215
 Zohar II, 144a-b.    
216
 Tishby seems undecided about whether this passage is a polemic against the Moshe of Burgos position 
or an attempt to conceal it.  MZ I, 300.   The fact that the Zohar, in a number of places, clearly refers to 
mating between the males and females of the holy and unholy couples seems to strongly suggest the latter.  
See my discussion in Chapter Two, pp. 191-220.  
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perhaps evoking an angelic figure, in accordance with the midrashic view adopted 
elsewhere by the Zohar that the angels were created on that day.
217
  I suggest that the text 
under discussion here, with its unclear referents, might implicitly record layers of 
engagement between these two views.  The text seems to refer to the successive 
seduction of the divine Adam and Eve by nogah or perhaps by a demonic personage 
using nogah as an instrument.  The unclarity of its referents might very well indicate the 
deletion or distortion of certain elements of an earlier and clearer version in order to 
obscure that doctrine in relation to the divine Adam.  Whatever the merits of this 
speculative suggestion, the theme of the text, the dangerous play between "brightness" 
and "light," is suited both to seduction and to uncertainty about the identity of both 
seducer and seduced.      
 
Indeed, the text itself suggests the importance of this uncertainty to the seduction process 
with its statement that "[X?] placed this light on the covenant and thereby seduced …" – 
implying that this act enabled the seduction through inducing the seduced "woman" to 
mistake the one for the other.   I note again that it is the very contiguity of nogah and the 
holy Yesod that enables the former to place itself next to the latter, and thus in a position 
from which to lead the "woman" astray.  Thus, as in the "Bald God" passage, it is the 
concentricity of the kelipah that is an essential component of its dangerous quality, in 
both cases linking the divine to the demonic, though with different techniques.   
Moreover, given the demonic female evoked by the Proverbs proof-text, the seduction by 
nogah through its placement next to the covenant also suggests a gender-substitution in 
the seduction process – in which the demonic female seduces the holy female by passing 
herself off as male, a theme that emerges in various forms in seduction scenes in the 
Zohar.
218
  I caution that we must keep in mind the obscurity about whether the seductive 
"light" in this part of the excerpt is the light appropriated from the "woman" or that of 
                                                 
217
 See Zohar I, 18b-19a; Bereshit Rabah I, 1b (1:3).    
218
 The Midrash Ha-Ne'elam on Ekhah, in Zohar Ḥadash, 91d, suggests that it was the demonic female 
who seduced Eve:  "for a woman can only be seduced by another woman" [ אתתאב אלא תתפתא אל אתתאד
ארחא].   (This is even more explicit in the parallel passage in Zohar Ḥadash, 69a.)   Mopsik suggests a 
same-sex seduction scene or, alternatively, that the seductive demonic snake combines masculine and 
feminine features.  Mopsik, Le Zohar: Lamentations, 137-138.  Compare also the seduction scene in which 
a "fool" is seduced by a Lilith-like figure who turns into a murderous armed male who casts him into hell.  
Zohar I, 148a-b (Sitre Torah).   
  
 
127 
 
nogah itself, with the latter option thereby affirming that "brightness" may itself be called 
"light."   
 
The danger portrayed here is not only that of deception or self-deception but rather of an 
ontological ambivalence.  Here, as elsewhere, both in the Zohar and its successors, nogah 
is genuinely suitable for service to both the divine and demonic dimensions; indeed, even 
its seductive potential seems able to be put to both good and evil purposes.  In the text 
just cited (at least in the interpretation that I favor), nogah robs the divine of its true light 
due to its phenomenal resemblance and geographical closeness to it, enabling it to place 
itself in the position of the divine phallus; yet, in another part of the passage, these very 
same traits enable nogah to perform precisely the opposite action, to remove the demonic 
blockage that prevents the shining forth of the divine phallic light.  The Zohar describes 
this operation as divine circumcision, the removal of the "foreskin" of impurity.    
 
ןיזרד אזר הלע אנעמש אשידק אניצובמ לבא ,הלרע דכ לע ירש אשידק אמייק ,אשדקמ אבאסל , ןידכ
האלגלמ בכעתא אשדקמ אוהה ,הלרע וגמ אמייק תאד אזר ,הגנ יאה דכו וגל לאע ,ןיב שירפאו הלרע 
אשדקמ ןיבו ,למשח ירקא ןידכ ,למ אילגתאו שח ,למ והמ , רמא תאד המכ(ד ח עשוהי )עשוהי למ ,
אמייק תאד אזר ,הלרע וגמ האלגתאלמ בכעתא אלד. 219 
 
But from the Holy Lamp I have heard mystery of mysteries.  When foreskin 
settles on holy Covenant, defiling the sanctuary, then that sanctuary is prevented 
from revealing the mystery of the sign of Covenant within the foreskin.  When 
this radiance [nogah] enters within, separating foreskin from the sanctuary, it is 
called למ שח (ḥash mal) -- ḥash, quickly, revealed; mal.  What is mal?  As is said: 
Joshua למ (mal), circumcised (Joshua 5:4) – mystery of the sign of Covenant, not 
prevented from being revealed from within the foreskin.
220   
 
The foreskin disrupts the proper union between the holy phallus and the Shekhinah (the 
"sanctuary") by blocking revelation from the former to the latter, as well as by polluting 
the Shekhinah – presumably through her union with the impure entity, the "foreskin." 
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 Zohar II, 203b. 
220
 Matt VI, 159-60. 
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When it is performing this crucial surgery separating impurity from purity, nogah thus 
becomes a holy entity, or the holy variant of itself, the "ḥashmal."  Unlike the two 
"clouds," the two variants of the nogah/ḥashmal entity are related not through 
homonymy, but rather through phenomenal resemblance, as well as by effecting a 
transition from one state to the other through passing from the service of the unholy to 
that of the holy realm (and presumably vice versa).  Indeed, in contrast with the "clouds," 
there seems to be only one entity, shifting between holy and unholy forms.  
Nogah/ḥashmal thus proves to be one of those hyperbolically ambivalent entities I have 
called "the dragon's fellows."   
 
Nogah/ḥashmal is particularly well-placed for the delicate operation of divine 
circumcision due to its location at the threshold between the holy and unholy dimensions, 
and well-equipped to achieve it, due to its affinity with both the impure and pure sides.  
In other words, the same traits that make nogah dangerously seductive also empower it 
for holy service as the divine mohel. Though the text does not use the word "seduction" 
in the context of the circumcision, the spirit of the text suggests that, just as nogah 
seduces the woman/Shekhinah in order to rob its light, so ḥashmal cunningly deceives the 
demonic foreskin in order to separate it from the holy Yesod and permit the latter's light 
to shine. This implicit link between seduction and circumcision is a remarkable 
consequence of the concentricity of the kelipah.  Like the Ish in the "Bald God" passage, 
nogah is able to switch sides, as it were, with the aggression it formerly used for unholy 
purposes now pressed into the service of the holy.   Moreover, such a cunning procedure 
to induce the departure of the foreskin by nogah/ḥashmal, an entity with marked 
similarities to the snake as I noted above, further reinforces the notion that it is one more 
"fellow of the dragon."   Indeed, this stratagem to accomplish the circumcision would 
make it akin to the Zohar's Jacob who adopted the methods of the snake to mislead and 
then cause the departure of Esau.
221
   
 
The circumcision of the divine phallus, the removal of its demonic covering, strongly 
resembles the shaving of the head of the Ish – and may even serve as the implicit model 
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for it.  This link may also help in the interpretation of this divine circumcision, one of 
those theologically scandalous notions that abound in the Zohar.  The presence of the 
foreskin on Yesod might be understood in a number of ways.  If understood on the model 
of its human counterpart as the initial state of the phallus, it could be understood as an 
instantiation of the Zoharic dictum that “it is the way of the kelipot to precede the moḥa” 
[אחומל ןימידקמד ןיפילקד אחרא יכהד]  222  – or, in Kristevan terms, that the primordial condition 
of the divine requires abjection of refuse in order to establish a bounded identity. 
Alternatively, we could interpret this demonic presence, like the red hair of the "Bald 
God," as a derivative condition, a consequence of the fall-out from an initial abjection at 
a higher level.  The removal of the foreskin, the quintessential concentric kelipah, would 
thus be a stage in the production of dualism through successive acts of abjection, a key 
theme in Chapter Two.  Moreover, just as the face of the Ish seems capable of switching 
"sides" as a result of human sin, so the foreskin – contrary to its human model – may be 
able to return to cover the holy phallus as a result of the "black theurgy" of human sin – 
as suggested in at least one Zoharic passage.
223
   
 
A third possible explanation for the presence of the foreskin, suggested in a short text 
from Moshe of Burgos, would heighten still further the ambivalence and potential for 
oscillation of nogah/ḥashmal. 224  In the Moshe of Burgos text, the Yesod is blocked from 
bestowing its shefa due its covering by a "turban" – a covering undoubtedly modelled on 
the foreskin.  Moshe of Burgos attributes the presence of this covering to the seduction of 
the divine phallus by Lilith.  The Zohar passage under discussion here, replete with 
images of seduction and blockages of light, suggests a kinship with the Moshe of Burgos 
text.  In this reading, the foreskin might have taken its place on the Yesod as a result of a 
seduction of the divine – in accordance with the reading I have favored of the 
nogah/seduction excerpt.  The theme of seduction in this excerpt makes a link to the 
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 Zohar I, 263a (Hashmatot). 
223
 Zohar II, 258a. 
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 Moshe of Burgos, ‘Ma’amar ‘al Sod “Hasir ha-Mitsnefet Harim ha-Atarah”, 50: 
יותיפ חור הרבע לוכיבכ  לא חכה ןמ תאצל שודקה ימינפה חכה הסכתנ וזב...םלוע דוסי תדמ לע גרטקמה תיליל דצמ
תוערו תורז תותכ ודלונ האלהו זאמו הב שבלתנ תינחורה תפנצמה חכש ,לעופה  הטמו הלעמ םלוע יבירחמ 
A spirit of seduction, as it were, passed from Lilith the accuser over the attribute of Yesod Olam 
… Thus, the internal holy power was covered over from going from potentiality to actuality, for 
the power of the spiritual turban became enclothed in it.  And from that time on, evil and strange 
bands were born, destroyers of the world above and below. 
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seduction scene in Moshe of Burgos very persuasive.  From this perspective, moreover, 
the Zohar passage might be interpreted as identifying nogah with the foreskin, since both 
are described as adjacent to the divine light emanating from Yesod and covering it over – 
an identification that, indeed, is explicitly made in Lurianic texts.
225
  Nogah/ḥashmal  
would thus be responsible both for the presence of the foreskin on the Yesod and for its 
removal – indeed, it might even be the very entity that, in its two opposite guises, both 
requires removing and does the removing. 
 
The implications of the deep-rooted ambivalence about nogah for the relationship 
between the divine and demonic generally is thematized in this passage in the form of an 
unresolved disagreement between two of the Zohar's sages.  This disagreement, between 
the overall narrator of the homily, R. Yitsḥak, and R. Hamnuna Saba, splits between them 
the two poles of the ambivalence underlying much of the Zohar's discussions of this 
relationship. 
 
ביבס ול הגנו ,… ובאסמד ארטס אלא אד ארטס תילד בג לע ףאד ,ביבס ול הגנ , היל ךירצטא אלו
רבל היל אייחדל שנ רבל ,אמעט יאמ ,ביבס ול הגנד ןיגב , ארטסהיל תיא אתונמיהמד השודקד , אלו
אנלק היב אגהנאל ךירטצא ,אתונמיהמד השודקד ארטסב אקלוח היל בהימל ךירטצא אד לעו . בר
רמא יכה אבס אנונמה ,הגנ יכו ביבס ול ,אנלק היב אגהנאל ךירטצאו 226 
 
"And brightness was about it" [Ezekiel 1:1]:  … even though this side is nothing 
other than the side of contamination, there is brightness about it.  Therefore a 
person should not cast it outside. Why?  Because "a brightness was about it," it 
has a side of the holiness of faith, and one should not treat it with contempt. 
Therefore it should be given a portion in the holy side of faith.  Rav Hamnuna 
Saba said as follows:  "could there be a brightness about it?!" And it should be 
treated with contempt.  
 
If our knowledge of nogah was limited to this short text, we might even think that it was 
simply a good entity or phenomenon – perhaps, as in another passage, the aspect of the 
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holy light that reaches the kelipot.
227
  The disagreement between the two sages seems 
limited to the question about whether or not the first three kelipot, wind, cloud, and fire, 
are indeed surrounded by this "brightness."  R. Yitsḥak's affirmative view leads him to 
pronounce that the "side of contamination" in general should neither be "treated with 
contempt" nor "cast outside."  R. Hamnuna Saba's negative view, rejecting the notion that 
nogah surrounds the kelipot, brings him to the opposite conclusion about the treatment of 
the realm of the kelipot generally.   
 
R. Hamnuna Saba's position is the more common view of nogah.  It is consistent with the 
physical image of the concentric kelipot as surrounding the holy dimension, with nogah 
closest to the mo’aḥ, rather than surrounding it.  The outermost kelipot can therefore be 
safely "cast outside" without disturbing the holy dimension.  R. Yitsḥak's position is a 
very exceptional understanding of the geography of nogah, even though it conforms far 
more to the language of the Ezekiel verse.  It stands directly contrary to the standard 
image of the concentric kelipot, in which the kelipot closest to the  mo’aḥ bear the most 
kinship to it.  His affirmation that the kelipot are surrounded by nogah, therefore, should 
be seen as a consciously emphatic assertion of a less adversarial relationship between the 
divine and the demonic.  The disagreement between the two sages also bears a strong 
resemblance to the conflicting general attitudes toward the kelipot analyzed above, for 
example, in relation to the kets.   
 
The disagreement between the sages turns on a single signifier, the letter vav, "ו" – 
specifically, whether the phrase, "and brightness" [ve-nogah, הגנו], should be read in 
either a declarative or ironic tone.  This signifier, like some of the hyperbolically 
ambivalent images discussed above, thus becomes radically indeterminate, poised 
between opposite meanings.  A single letter, the single line of the "ו", here stands as the 
knife's edge which divides the two sides of the ambivalence.   Indeed, the possibility that 
the difference between holiness and unholiness could depend on reading a single letter 
ironically or declaratively introduces a radical indeterminacy into this gravest of 
distinctions – if anything, even more efficiently and insidiously than that affecting words 
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 See Zohar Ḥadash, 38a-b, which seems both to describes nogah as one of the four kelipot and to declare 
that it only surrounds them and is not "in" them. 
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like "kets."  There are no clear criteria, of course, for distinguishing irony from 
earnestness.   In this connection, it is useful to recall Liebes' claim that one of the key 
roles of the Sitra Aḥra in the Zohar is precisely to introduce the destabilizing role of irony 
into kabbalistic teaching, rendering derisory any attempt to definitively fix any "doctrine 
of the Zohar."
228
  The oscillations in this passage between positive and negative 
portrayals of nogah, at the levels of both image and syntax, seem particularly apt for this 
liminal element between the holy and unholy dimensions.   
 
Moreover, the dispute between R. Yitsḥak and R. Hamnuna Saba also suggests an 
explicit Zoharic ambivalence about the relationship of the concentricity structure to the 
homology structure.  The bottom line of the dispute about nogah is whether one should 
"cast it outside" [רבל היל אייחדל].  If, as Tishby maintains, the geographical proximity to 
the holy side is one of the key features that distinguishes rival portrayals of the demonic, 
then the dispute is very fundamental indeed.  R. Hamnuna Saba's call for the "casting 
outside" of the concentric kelipot could lead to their transformation into a separate realm, 
homologous to the holy dimension.  Indeed, as I have already broached in the context of 
the Ish and will discuss more fully in the next chapter, a number of Zoharic passages 
portray the concentricity of the kelipot as an intermediate step between the expulsion of 
refuse from the highest level of the divine and the achievement of the more thorough 
banishment of the kelipot to a separate realm.  By contrast, R. Yitsḥak's position that the 
concentric kelipot should "not be cast outside," recognizes the irreducible intimacy in the 
relationship between the divine and the demonic.  The difference between the remote and 
proximate Sitra Aḥra would thus in this passage come to form the terrain of a dispute 
between two Zoharic sages – perhaps reflecting actual disagreements among 13th century 
kabbalists, perhaps a textual manifestation of the fundamental ambivalence involved in 
the establishment of bounded identities through abjection, perhaps both.  Again, the two 
images are not simply two "models," but literary devices dynamically deployed in 
relation to each other, here in the form of a complex dispute between two views about 
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 Liebes, ‘Zohar ve-Eros’, 8. Liebes points to the Zohar's discussion of Isaac's name.  Isaac, the sefirah of 
Gevurah, often the root of the Sitra Aḥra in the Zohar, is identified with laughter, because of his 
destabilizing of fixed meaning – transmuting the cosmic opposites into one another:  
אימב אשאו אשאב אימ ףלחאד ,הודח אתוחידב קחצי 
Yitsḥak –  jesting, joy, for he transforms water into fire, fire into water. 
Zohar I, 103b, Matt II, 136 (translation modified).  
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"contempt" for the kelipot – and the normative imperative, or even ontological 
possibility, of "casting them outside."   
 
Whether or not the dispute between R. Yitsḥak and R. Hamnuna Saba represents an 
actual dispute within Zoharic circles, their coexistence within the Zohar is a symptom of 
an irreducible quandary in the construction of identity.  Abjection can always only be a 
partial or provisional expulsion of the undesirable elements, since they and the subject 
originate in the same undifferentiated primordial state.  Full expulsion can never be 
achieved, and the remote Sitra Aḥra will always maintain a connection with the holy 
dimension, even if by the flimsiest of links, such as the "zohama of the fingernail" of the 
Shekhinah.  Any attempt to sever the link, as in the shaving of the head of the Ish or the 
circumcision of the divine phallus, can never be more than a provisional measure – the 
hair can grow back, even the foreskin can return.  Conversely, any attempt to fully 
integrate the concentric kelipot into the service of the holy – or at least to integrate nogah, 
that portion of the concentric kelipot that seems most amenable to such integration – can 
also never be fully succcessful.  Nogah can perform the divine circumcision, becoming 
transformed into the holy ḥashmal, but it can, in the next moment, seduce the divine 
female by virtue of its brightness, becoming an agent of Sama’el.  Both the project of 
casting the Sitra Aḥra "outside," where it would be a wholly external, if homologous, 
realm, and that of integrating it into the service of the divine are utopian dreams, 
expressions of the same impossibilities set up by the construction of identity through 
abjection.  Indeed, one might say that, at the deepest level, R. Yitsḥak and R. Hamnuna 
Saba, and the historical differences their dispute may or may not record, are part of the 
same  dream – and that the construction of Zoharic texts from divergent juxtapositions of 
their competing impossibilities is the source of their literary and spiritual power. 
 
D.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has been devoted to the question of how to "read the Sitra Aḥra," in 
particular, how to read the divergences in its Zoharic portrayals.    In the first section, I 
presented and systematized Tishby's approach of identifying divergent models, each with 
a structural, geographic, and essential dimension.  This approach is consistent with that of 
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reading the Zohar as a terrain of conflict between divergent tendencies, identified at the 
broadest level with Gnosticism and Neoplatonism.  I have criticized this approach as 
inadequate for reading Zoharic texts – in part because many of them combine elements of 
the putatively divergent models, but even more importantly, because the juxtaposition of 
divergent elements is crucial to the Zohar's textuality, its way of producing meaning.  
Turning to a close examination of that textuality, I looked at two different kinds of 
rhetorical techniques, constructional schemes and tropes.  In relation to both, I identified 
the ways the Zohar both establishes and destabilizes the difference between the divine 
and the demonic.  First, I looked at the way the Zohar produces a split between the two 
realms through constructional schemes, particularly anaphoras, rather than through the 
content of images.   These schemes produce a difference between the two realms in the 
construction of phrases and paragraphs, a construction in which a single term becomes 
transformed into a pair of antithetical homonyms.  I also showed the way this 
construction produces a distinctive danger of conflation between the two realms, through 
the seductive effect of hypnotically rhythmic and indefinitely extendible passages that 
slide between realms, dimensions, and levels.    In these schemes, splitting through 
rhetorical parallelism thus both establishes the difference between the two realms and 
produces a distinctive danger of seduction and confusion.  Second, I looked at the ways 
the Zohar produces splitting between the divine and demonic dimensions through its 
distinctive use of the content of certain tropes.   Such images may be doubled into divine 
and demonic forms, internally divided between the two dimensions, or remain 
indeterminate in relation to the distinction.   I particularly focused, however, on the 
production of certain images that are hyperbolically ambivalent, belonging 
simultaneously to the highest and lowest realms.  Such tropes yield their own distinctive 
danger of misprision and seduction.  Finally, I examined in some detail a passage in 
which the two kinds of seduction formed the very theme of the Zoharic exposition.   
 
Though I concentrated in this chapter on splitting as the construction and destabilization 
of difference between two realms, I continually came upon the question of the genealogy 
of such splitting – the ways two distinctive dimensions are produced through the 
dynamics of abjection.  This was particularly the case in my explorations of the "Bald 
God" passage, as well as in the nogah passage.  With the discussion of "casting out" in 
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the latter passage, I have reached the point of a natural transition to my direct discussion 
in Chapter Two of the construction of identity, both divine and demonic, through 
abjection. 
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Chapter Two: 
 Origin, Intimacy, and Sustenance 
 
... this abyss that must be constituted into an autonomous site … and into a 
distinct, that is signifiable, object …  
 - Julia Kristeva1 
 
... ,אבקונו רכדד וזיחב ...אננת אוהה טשפתא ,ףיקת אזגור וגמ אקפנ אננת דכד  אשיר
 חנו ,טאשו ליזא ,תיחנו קילס ...אטשפתאל אקפנד רתא לע אלצ ,לצ והיאו ... ,היתכודב
תומ ירקאד ארחא 2 
 
For when smoke goes forth from within fierce wrath, that smoke spreads 
… appearing as male and female…The head that goes forth to spread … 
ascends and descends, roams about, and rests in its place.  … and it is 
“Shadow,” a shadow on another place called “Death.”3 
  - Zohar   
 
A.  Introduction 
 
 
In this chapter, I shift my focus from splitting, which portrays – even if in unstable and 
ambivalent form – an existing difference between the divine and demonic, to abjection, 
which portrays the generation, seeking out, and nurturing of that difference.  This change 
of focus brings with it a shift in the locus and nature of agency in the relationship 
between the two realms.  In passages marked by splitting, active relationships between 
the divine and demonic primarily take place through the episodic transgression by 
demonic entities of rhetorical and phenomenal boundaries.  In this chapter, by contrast, 
my focus is on the ways in which it is the divine (or, at the highest reaches, the proto-
divine) that enters into relationship with the demonic, usually through the medium of an 
inchoate, often repulsive, emission. Specifically, I will be concerned with:  a) constitution 
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 Kristeva, Pouvoirs de l'horreur, 119. 
2
 Zohar II, 242b. 
3
 Matt VI, 405 (translation modified). 
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of the demonic:  the emission by the divine (or proto-divine) of inchoate secretions which 
then crystallize into an autonomous "Other Side" inhabited by defined figures and 
entities; b) intimacy with the demonic:  the drive for intimate relationships between 
constituted divine and demonic figures, relationships for which the refuse of the divine 
usually serves as the medium; and c) sustenance of the demonic:  the nurturance of the 
demonic by the divine, providing it with indispensable vitality, through relationships 
whose abject nature at times manifests in the refuse of the divine which serves as their 
medium and at other times simply inheres in the improper mixtures such relationships 
entail.   
 
In all these relationships, the Sitra Aḥra appears as an inevitable ontological byproduct of 
the construction and reconstruction of divine subjectivity, sustained through 
replenishment from divine vitality, and posing a danger, a temptation, and a potential 
resource for the divine.  To appropriate Kristeva’s terms, the Sitra Aḥra thus proves to be 
that "unavoidable abomination" which is "nevertheless cultivated," that "demonic 
doubling" which the divine "designates, brings into existence, and banishes," that 
“fantasy of an archaic force that tempts" the divine all the way "to the loss of differences" 
– and that which is ultimately "unrejectable, parallel, inseparable from the proper” divine 
and yet its absolute other.
4
  
 
At a rhetorical level, such texts involve a variety of techniques that may be systematized 
in terms of a two-step operation.
5
  First, a “trope of limitation”:  a movement from an 
image of plenitude to that of deficiency, usually associated with the emission of some 
inchoate refuse or unstable ephemera, but also with the mere fact of the majestic divine 
consorting with the most debased partners (in Hamlet’s apt words, “sating itself in a 
celestial bed and preying on garbage”).  This incongruous transition can be generally 
characterized as a form of irony, portraying a presence that proves to be an absence, an 
omnipotence that utterly fails to achieve its goal, a holiness that issues in unholiness, a 
majesty that stoops to debasement, a meaning that proves to be meaningless.  The 
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 Kristeva, Pouvoirs de l'horreur, 126. 
5
 As noted in the Introduction, I have adapted the terms for the tropes in this sentence from Harold Bloom.  
See Introduction, p. 11, n. 46. 
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emission of inchoate, ephemeral, or unpleasant byproducts occurs as a miscarriage of an 
action expected to have grandly creative effects:  in one Zoharic image, like a mighty 
striking of a blacksmith’s hammer, an action aimed at creating a stable and desired 
object, which succeeds only in giving off a flurry of dangerous and short-lived sparks.
6
  
Such a trope of limitation is then followed by a “trope of representation,” in which the 
stage of inchoate byproducts is succeeded by the crystallization of distinct holy and 
unholy structures and personages.    
 
As I noted in the Introduction, both aspects of this process may be viewed as catachreses 
in the classical sense – “abuses” of language which purport to name that for which no 
“proper term” exists.  Catachresis is apt here both in relation to the implausible reversal 
from divine plenitude to abject refuse and to the monstrous products that emerge when 
the refuse crystallizes to form the demonic realm.  Both processes are “unspeakable” in 
the idiomatic sense of that word and no “proper” description fits them.7  Insofar as the 
texts depicts such crystallizations as those of demonic personages, such as Sama’el and 
Lilith, the catachresis employed is that of a monstrous prosopopeia.  The emergence of 
these new structures and personages, however, is not the end of the process.  Rather, the 
rival crystallizations, the proper divine self and the (im)proper demonic Other, then enter 
into complex relations with each other, those of intimacy and nurturance, in which the 
dynamics of abjection and consolidation – and re-abjection and re-consolidation – are 
replayed on a variety of cosmic levels, and in which tropes of limitation and 
representation succeed each other in a dynamic whose end is only forecast in a messianic 
future.  
 
Before turning to those dynamics in detail, however, I turn to a brief discussion of the 
place in kabbalistic discourse of narratives of the origin of the Sitra Aḥra.  As in Chapter 
One, I find it useful to present my own understanding through critical engagement with 
                                                 
6
 Zohar III, 292b: 
רביע לכל ןיקיז קיפא ,אלזרפד אנמב שתכא דכ ,)אתפזרמ א"ס( אפצרמ אנמוא יאהכ 
Like this craftsman who strikes on an iron tool with a hammer, and brings forth sparks in every 
direction 
(I note that I favor the textual variant “אתפזרמ” to read this passage.) 
7
 On a related point in antiquity, compare Runia, ‘Naming and Knowing: themes in Philonic theology’, 76-
80, with John Whittaker, 'Catachresis and Negative Theology: Philo of Alexandria and Basilides', 61-82. 
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that of Isaiah Tishby and the Scholem tradition’s grand schema of conflict between 
“Platonic” and “Gnostic” strands in kabbalah.     
 
B. The Origin of Evil:  Theogonic Narrative versus Theological Explanation 
 
   1. Introduction 
  
Many kabbalistic texts discuss the emergence of the Sitra Aḥra, though at widely varying 
length and emphasis.  Such discussions vary in genre from mythic narrative to conceptual 
explanation to a range of intermediary forms.  Some texts seem concerned, to a greater or 
lesser extent, with reconciling their portrayal of evil with potential objections from 
philosophical theology, while others seem indifferent to such concerns.  Some texts 
devote themselves to portrayals of ongoing encounters between personified divine and 
demonic forces, in which the ultimate origin of the latter seems of lesser moment, while 
others take pains to describe in detail the source of the demonic.  While the 
Scholem/Tishby tradition might line up this range of genres and concerns with the 
variable allegiances of particular texts to Neoplatonic as opposed to “Gnostic” 
tendencies, such differences need not stem from any identifiable historical filiations.  
 
Moreover, kabbalistic texts, particularly the Zohar, at times pose putatively theological 
challenges, either in implicit or explicit form, not with the goal of initiating theological 
discourses, but rather, as literary foils, as occasions to initiate mythological elaborations.  
Rather than answering the theological question, such passages proceed to elaborate 
narratives in which the seeming incontrovertibility of the axiom underlying the putative 
challenge evaporates.  A particularly clear example, which I discuss below, is provided 
by a Zoharic discussion of the verse, “Thou shalt not seethe a kid in his mother's milk” 
(Exodus 23:19).
8
  One Zoharic sage advances a seemingly unanswerable theological 
objection to interpreting the imagery of this verse in accordance with classic Zoharic 
decoding – which would view a “kid” as an embodiment of the demonic and “mother” as 
a name for the Shekhinah.  Such an interpretation would make a divine entity the 
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 Zohar II, 125a.  See my discussion below at page 144-147. 
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“mother” of a demonic entity, a theologically inadmissible position.  Far from engaging 
in some sort of theological apologetics, Rabbi Shim’on treats the question as simply an 
occasion to describe the processes by which this precise state of affairs could come to be, 
implicitly treating the theological axiom of the absolute separation of the divine from any 
demonic taint as irrelevant – or more precisely, the ontological condition it demands 
becomes transformed into one among a range of possible conditions.  This technique of 
using a theological objection as a literary element bears a kinship to the technique I 
described in Chapter One of the deployment of images from seemingly incompatible 
models in the service of a single passage’s literary effects.           
 
Perhaps the boldest texts, in the sense of most indifferent to theological objection, are 
those that recount the origins of the Sitra Aḥra in the most primordial “temporal” or 
structural levels of the divine (or proto-divine) realm.  Despite their seeming radicalism, 
such notions may be found in a range of key 13
th
 century texts, long predating their 
elaboration by Lurianic and Sabbatean writers.
 9
   Tishby argues that this position was 
broached in the Zohar as one of its highest secrets,
10
 elaborated in some Lurianic 
writings, though concealed in others,
11
 and fully emphasized only in Sabbateanism.
12
  For 
Asi Farber-Ginat, by contrast, the origin of evil in the highest levels of the divine is a 
common theme in much of early kabbalah – one, moreover, that cannot be traced to a 
legacy of historical Gnostic sources.
13
  To be sure, she notes that texts that shift this 
emergence to lower levels of the divine realm reflect a desire to “moderate” the 
radicalism of the original thesis.
14
     
 
The emergence of the demonic out of refuse at the most primordial levels, preceding the 
full elaboration of the divine structure, is highly significant for my argument, since it 
indicates that the formation of divine and demonic subjectivity is always subsequent to 
the process I am calling abjection. However, I will be just as concerned with the 
narrative structure of the process of subject-formation-through-abjection as with its 
                                                 
9
 Farber-Ginat, ‘Kelipah Kodemet La-pri’, 118-119.   
10
 Zohar III, 135a-b; Tishby, MZ I, 296. 
11
 See Tishby, Torat ha-Ra, 56-57.    
12
 Wirzubski, ‘Ha-Te’ologiah ha-Shabeta’it shel R. Natan Ha-Azati’, 210-64.    
13
 Farber-Ginat, ‘Kelipah Kodemet’, 118-119.    
14
 Ibid., 118, n. 2. 
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relative locus in theogonic and cosmogonic processes.  The fact that one can find subject-
formation-through-abjection processes at all levels, a continual construction and re-
construction of the divine and demonic, is, for me, the most significant phenomenon.  Not 
only does it show the deep-rootedness of these processes in the tradition, but it also 
shows the impossibility of their definitive achievement, an impossibility that confirms the 
theory of abjection.  From my perspective, the primary issue is not the degree of 
radicalness as measured by the locus of these processes, but rather, their proliferation and 
persistence at all cosmic levels, notwithstanding significant variations among them.        
 
  
2.   Tishby, "Dualism," and Abjection 
 
Tishby's discussion of “dualism” deserves close examination, for I believe that critical 
reflection on his analysis of Lurianic, as well as Zoharic, doctrine, can contribute to 
understanding the latter.  I refer in particular to a feature that characterizes his discussion 
of both the Zohar and Lurianic kabbalah:  his apparent conflation of two possible 
interpretations of the presence of evil (or proto-evil) at the most primordial level:  1) an 
irreducible and primordial “dualism” of antagonistic forces – a position, sometimes called 
“absolute” or “radical” dualism;15 and, 2) the pervasive diffusion of the roots of evil 
within the primordial divine (or proto-divine), a position I propose to call that of 
“duality,” or more precisely, depending on the text, “proto-duality” or “crypto-duality.”16   
A primordial dualism between independent good and evil forces does not appear as such 
in any normative kabbalistic text.  To be sure, the contrast drawn by Nathan of Gaza 
between the “light that contains thought” and the “light that does not contain thought,” 
reformulated by Farber-Ginat as the “cosmic” and “anti-cosmic” “vectors,” may have its 
roots in 13
th
 century texts, including the Zohar.
17
  However, it is not wholly clear that the 
“anti-cosmic” forces in the 13th century texts are either independent or in themselves evil; 
indeed, although this is not the place to elaborate this point, I would argue that, at least in 
                                                 
15
 See Stoyanov, The Other God, 4.    
16
 Of course, the specific terms I have chosen to designate the two views are not crucial, but rather the two 
different understandings I am using them to designate.   
17
 See generally, Farber-Ginat, ‘Kelipah Kodemet’, especially 126-30.  Liebes, Sod Ha-Emunah Ha-
Shabeta’it, 57 and fns. 74 & 77. 
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some of the pertinent texts, these “anti-cosmic” forces can be better understood through 
the framework of abjection.  In any case, it is not “dualism” that informs the Zohar, but 
rather “duality,” as I have defined those terms.   Tishby’s theoretical conflation of 
“dualism” and “duality” (in my definition of those terms) stands at odds with his analysis 
of the primary materials at a detailed textual level.  It is this conflation which renders 
deeply flawed his analytical framework – based on a dichotomy between the “dualistic 
tendency” and “restrictions on dualism”18 – for reading many Zoharic texts.  
 
I begin with Tishby’s analysis of Lurianic doctrine.  Tishby argues that Lurianic kabbalah 
rests on a myth of divine “catharsis,” aimed at purging the hidden roots of evil in the En-
Sof itself.  For Tishby, the entire Lurianic system – from the initial tzimtzum, to the 
breaking of the vessels, to the series of tikunim culminating in the final cosmic 
redemption – is motivated by the desire to expel the root of evil outside the divine, 
bringing it from its concealed hiding place in the divine into a separate and revealed 
form.  By bringing evil into the open as a distinct realm, this process also aims at making 
possible its utter destruction.
19
   
 
The difference between duality and dualism, as I have defined them, can serve as a 
vehicle for describing this myth.  The primordial reaches of the divine are characterized 
by a latent duality, not yet articulated into an opposition, between forces of kindness 
[םידסח] and judgment [תורובג] – the latter either a source or, at times, even a euphemism 
for the demonic.  Lurianic texts contain imagery that may be described either as crypto-
duality or proto-duality:  one text speaks of the “filth and thickness of judgment in the 
light of the En-Sof,” like a “drop in the great sea,” suggesting a crypto-duality.20 Another 
text speaks of the power of judgment as akin to a “grain of dirt in the great sea,” which 
“does not make filth and is not felt,” suggesting perhaps more of a proto-duality – though 
the text goes on to say that this “dirt” is “revealed” when the “water is filtered,” perhaps 
also suggesting a crypto-duality.
21
  In any case, by contrast with these images of a latent, 
                                                 
18
 Tishby, MZ I, 288. 
19
 Tishby, Torat ha-Ra, 54-57. 
20
 Vital, ‘Derush al Olam Ha-Atsilut’, 17 [לודגה םיב הפיטכ...ףוס ןיאה רואבש ןידה תויבועו תוריכע].   
21
 Ibn Tabul, Derush Ḥeftsi-Bah, 1d.  [ הלגתי םימה וננתסישכו שגרנ וניאו תוריכע השוע וניא לודגה םי ךותב רפע ריגרג
רפעה אצמיו  ].   
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primordial duality in the En-Sof, the ongoing drama of purification and tikun is designed 
to produce a cosmic dualism:  good on one side, evil on the other – in order to make it 
possible for the former to separate itself from the latter and, indeed, vice versa, and 
thereby make it possible for a properly constituted divine to directly combat a “properly” 
(or perhaps “improperly”) constituted demonic.  In this narrative, dualism is thus the goal 
of a process of catharsis which aims at the production of a distilled, identifiable, and 
localizable domain of the demonic out of the inchoate primordial mélange – a tactic that 
forms a crucial part of a grand divine strategy to destroy evil.   
 
Tishby, however, in his theoretical discussions, does not describe the myth's relation to 
dualism in this way.  Rather, he begins his work on the Lurianic doctrine of evil with 
Scholem’s notion of the perennial struggle between Neoplatonic and Gnostic tendencies, 
which he associates, respectively, with monistic and dualistic views about evil.
22
 Though 
he maintains that the dualistic, Gnostic strand tends to predominate in kabbalistic views 
about the origins of evil,
23
 he portrays Lurianic kabbalah as marked by the tension 
between the two, whose coexistence he posits "in the heart of its creator."
24
  Much of 
Tishby's interpretive work in presenting the Lurianic doctrine is devoted to distinguishing 
the more theologically acceptable monistic strands from what he considers the 
"authentic," more "mythological," dualistic strands.
25
  I note that this interpretive 
structure would not be substantially modified even if we rejected the notion of a 
historically identifiable “Gnostic” influence in favor of one conceptually or 
phenomenologically defined.     
 
However, in view of the distinction I have outlined between duality and dualism, which I 
believe provides a better framework for Tishby's own explication of Lurianic doctrine, 
the grand narrative of a struggle between monism and dualism is simply a distraction.  
Dualism, as it emerges in Tishby's own descriptions, is not a primordial condition in 
Lurianic kabbalah, but rather, is produced as an interim stage during the multi-phased 
process of the divine struggle with evil.  It is not a radical mythological position in 
                                                 
22
 Tishby, Torat Ha-Ra, 13-14.   
23
 Ibid., 15-16. 
24
 Ibid. 60. 
25
 See, e.g., ibid., 39-52, 64-65. 
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relation to which the kabbalist might feel compelled to step back and establish 
“restrictions”; on the contrary, it is a bold theurgical achievement that is the central goal 
of divine striving and kabbalistic practice.   
 
Indeed, every additional act of such purification produces a further "revelation of matter 
and refuse."
26
  Again, dualism is here a goal, or more precisely, an interim tactical goal, 
of the process, rather than its origin; the latter would rather be found in the primordial 
proto-duality in the highest reaches of the En-Sof.  The process is designed to cause a 
series of cumulative "distantiations" of undesirable elements from the En-Sof, "so that 
judgment will be able to be revealed” and increasingly “come into existence from one 
level to the next."
27
  Or, to put it in Kristeva’s terms:  it is precisely the abjection of 
inassimilable elements which increasingly "make them exist”; they are constructed into 
an autonomous realm through the very series of acts that "banish them."
28
 
 
When it comes to the Zohar, Tishby's discussion is equally, or perhaps to a greater extent, 
framed by the supposedly perennial tension between Gnostic and Neoplatonic strands (or 
the phenomenological or conceptual features designated by those labels) – though he is 
rightly far more cautious about positing a single "authentic" Zoharic doctrine.  Tishby 
identifies a process of catharsis at the most primordial level of the divine in several 
Zoharic passages.
29
  This process begins with the production of sparks by the "lamp of 
darkness" or “hard spark” [אתונידרקד אניצוב; botsina de-kardinuta]30 as it strikes within 
primordial "Thought" [הבשחמ].  The following text from the Hekhalot di-Pekude portrays 
this process most concisely:  
 
  ,ןיצוצינ קיפאו ,הבשחמ וג קילסו ,אתונידרקד אניצוב שטב ,הבשחמ וג ,אתונמיהמד אתוריש אשיר
רירבתאו ,הבשחמ וגמ תלוספ רירבו ,רביע ןירשעו האמ תלתל קירז ןיציצנ 31.  
 
                                                 
26
 Ḥayim Vital, Mevo She’arim, 6c [ לכבו תלוספהו רמוחה יולגו וריבח לע ףסונ רוריב שדחתמ םלוע  ]. 
27
 Ibid., 1c  [הגרדמ רחא הגרדממ תווהתהלו תולגתהל ןידה לוכיו... תפסונ הקחרה ס"אמ קחרתיש יד ]. 
28
 Kristeva, Pouvoirs, 126. 
29
 Tishby, Netive Emunah u-Minut, 25-26. 
30
 On the botsina de-kardinuta, see Liebes, Perakim be-Milon Sefer Ha-Zohar, 167-173. 
31
 Zohar II, 254b. 
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The head of the beginning of faith: within Thought, the dark lamp knocked, and 
ascended within Thought, and brought forth sparks.  It cast sparks upon three-
hundred twenty sides, and sifted/clarified/purified refuse from within Thought.  
And it was sifted/clarified/purified.
32
  
 
For Tishby, this "clearly mythical" conception is a Zoharic reworking of the midrashic 
notion of the "worlds that were destroyed"
33
 into an image of the "purification of divine 
Thought from the roots of evil that were mixed in it and blocked the process of the holy 
emanation."
34
   Tishby tells us that the "author" of the Zohar scattered the various parts of 
this myth of the "Gnostic dualism of good and evil" within divine Thought in three 
different passages, presumably seeking to protect the esoteric status of this daring 
doctrine.
35
  Nonetheless, we find the same dilemma in Tishby's work on the Zohar's 
conception of the origin of evil as in his work on the Lurianic conception.  As I have 
noted, his essay on the Sitra Aḥra in Mishnat ha-Zohar36 is thoroughly structured by the 
notion of a tension between “the dualistic tendency” and "restrictions on dualism.”  
 
A key, and symptomatic, example he gives of such a "restriction" is the notion that evil is 
generated out of the holy dimension.
37
  This notion was elaborated in a variety of forms 
in early kabbalah, from the Bahir to Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen, and plays a key role in both the 
Zohar and Lurianic kabbalah.  Such a notion would indeed embody an anti-dualist 
position if it was formulated in truly instrumentalist terms, according to which the 
demonic was created and endures purely as a servant of divine justice, what some have 
called a “monarchian dualism.”38  Such a conception, though proclaimed in kabbalistic 
texts such as some passages in the Tikune Ha-Zohar, stands at great odds with the 
                                                 
32
 רירבתא and its cognates pose translation difficulties.  The Zohar uses it with a semantic range that 
includes “sifting” (perhaps its literal meaning), “selection“ (a Talmudic usage), and “clarification” – the 
latter both in the familiar conceptual sense, but even more so in the sense of separating a liquid from matter 
suspended within it, as in “clarifying wine.”  
33
 Bereshit Rabah, I, 4b-c (3:7). 
34
 Tishby, Netive Emunah, 25-26:    תוליצאה ךילהת תא ובכעו הב םירועמ ויהש ערה ישרשמ תיהלאה הבשחמה ךוכיז
השודקה .    
35
 Ibid.:   ערו בוט לש תיטסונגה תוינשה.  I have translated  תוינש as “dualism,” even though it may also be 
translated as “duality,” because Tishby is here using this term to mean “dualism” as I have defined it above. 
36
 Tishby, MZ I, 285-307. 
37
 Ibid., 295. 
38
 Stoyanov, The Other God, 4. 
  
 
146 
 
perennial rebellions of the demonic, with the “slave who becomes king and the 
bondwoman who supplants her mistress” – rebellions that constitute central concerns not 
only of the Zohar, but also of the very works that contain passages that seem to embrace 
“monarchian dualism,” including the Tikune Ha-Zohar.  
 
More importantly, as I have shown in relation to Tishby's discussion of Lurianic 
kabbalah, notions of the emergence of the demonic out of the divine, even its most 
primordial reaches, are far from incompatible with the cathartic myth that Tishby sees as 
the most authentic manifestation of the "dualistic" and "Gnostic" strand in kabbalah.  On 
the contrary, at the very heart of the myth lies a portrayal of the generation of evil from 
good – or rather, the distillation of a pure evil from a heterogeneous, though 
predominantly good, primordial mélange, or, perhaps even more precisely but also more 
provocatively, the distillation of a pure demonic evil and a pure divine good from a not 
yet coherently characterizable primordial reality.  This primordial reality has no proper 
name, but is rather the impersonal “En-Sof”:  a primordial reality that one 14th century 
text declares to be completely unmentioned in the Bible, a position that is also implicit in 
some Zoharic texts.
39
 From the perspective I affirm here, the reason for this textual 
absence should be attributed as much to its ontological indeterminacy as to its 
transcendence of human language – or rather, the latter derives from the former.  This 
indeterminacy is primarily the lack of a “face” – whether one thinks of the Lurianic term 
partsuf, or to the Zoharic process of tikunin, which, both in the Sifra de-Tseni’uta and the 
Idra Raba, take as their central focus the unfolding of the “head” of Atika Kadisha.40  The 
En-Sof, from this perspective, is thus only a “proto-divine,” insofar as it cannot be 
considered a personal deity and cannot create a stable cosmos, until it has received its 
tikun, its face, or, in rhetorical terms, its prosopopaeia.
41
   
                                                 
39
 Sefer Ma'arekhet ha-Elohut, 131a.     The Zohar implicitly endorses this position in passages such as I, 
15a, which asserts the primordial subject of the verb “created” in Genesis I, 1 is absent from the verse.    
40
  See, e.g., Zohar II, 176b; III, 128b.    
41
 Compare Moshe De Leon’s declaration that the primordial name “היהא,” literally, “I will be,” signifies 
that the highest level of the divine has no “known name” [עודי םש] – and that “I will be and I will construct 
my existence and draw forth the drawing-forth of being that it may exist” [ תכשמה ךישמאו יתואיצמ הנבאו היהא
אצמהל היוהה].  Moshe De Leon, Sefer Shekel Ha-Kodesh, 98.  Farber-Ginat, ‘Kelipah Kodemet’, 137, 
interprets this passage as declaring that the highest level of the divine “lacks existence in its own being  
[תימצעה התיווהב תואיצמ תללושמ].”  On the inability of the pre-tikun divinity to create a stable cosmos, see, 
e.g., Idra Raba, Zohar, III:128a & 135a-b, and my discussion below, pp. 150-155. 
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I suggest that, beyond the desire for fidelity to Scholem's historical narrative, the apparent 
internal contradiction in Tishby is due to the inadequacy of his conception of catharsis to 
describe the workings of the myth in both the Zohar and Lurianic kabbalah.  Tishby's 
model of catharsis assumes a coherent being that is troubled by undesirable elements 
within itself and seeks to purify itself by expelling them.  This model, however, does not 
describe why this being would be troubled by these elements: if the En-Sof is a coherent 
being before the catharsis begins, why should it be troubled by elements of its own 
being?  And, if it is indeed troubled by those elements, then should we not reject the 
notion that it was a coherent being before their expulsion?  Tishby implicitly posits a 
tension between the monism of a coherent being and the dualism of its elements – a 
tension he attributes ultimately to the historical tension between Neoplatonic and Gnostic 
tendencies.  This perspective, however, leads him into such impasses as portraying the 
genealogical posteriority of evil as a retreat from dualism despite the fact that the 
constitution of distinct realms of good and evil out of a primordial proto- or crypto-
duality is the very essence of the supposedly "dualist" myth of catharsis (that Tishby so 
vividly explicates) and the goal of all kabbalistic practice. 
 
By contrast, the account of the formation of subjectivity through abjection enables us to 
avoid the aporias into which Tishby was led – or, rather, to explicitly thematize the 
paradoxes underlying them.  For this account, there is no coherent subject prior to the 
attempt to expel the "refuse."  Rather, the expulsion of “refuse” is what allows a coherent 
subject to come into existence.  To use Kristeva’s formulation, such expulsion is a 
"primary repression" which "operates before the emergence of the self and its 
representations," for it makes this emergence possible.
42
  The existence of a coherent 
subject (or, more precisely, a subject striving for coherence) would be an after-effect of 
the process of purification, not its agent – as would the existence of a coherent "Other" of 
the subject, the fully constituted Sitra Aḥra.  Dualism, between a subject and its others, 
would be a product of the process of the constitution of a coherent subject.   This process 
                                                 
42
 Kristeva, Pouvoirs,18.  Green, in a similar spirit, portrays “God casting the roots of anger and harshness 
out of the emergent divine Self.”  A Guide to the Zohar, 118.  The puzzle remains, however, concerning the 
identity of the subject of the verb “casting,” prior to the “emergence of the Self.” 
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can help explain what Liebes calls the "paradoxical link" in the Zohar between the 
"forces that precede the emanation" of the sefirot and the "forces of evil."
43
 
 
The advantages of this perspective include, above all, obviating the need to see 
kabbalistic texts, including the Zohar, as terrains of competition between incompatible 
perspectives either bequeathed by religious history – a putatively monistic Neoplatonic 
tradition and dualistic Gnostic tradition – or antagonistically residing within the “heart” 
of their “creators.”  On the contrary, it explains the necessary link between the striving 
for the expulsion of refuse, essential for the construction of a coherent divine subjectivity, 
and the coming into being of a structured realm of the Sitra Aḥra – between, one might 
say, the constitution of a monistic subject and a dualistic cosmos.   It also explains why 
the structured realm of the Sitra Aḥra is a belated structure, which comes into being from 
the inchoate formlessness of "smoke," "dregs," "refuse," and so on – as well as why the 
nameable divine is also a belated structure, a product of “tikunin,” however variously that 
word might be translated and however various its meanings might be in different 
kabbalistic texts.  Finally, by stressing the precariousness and ultimate impossibility of 
the project of the definitive construction of a purified and bounded subject, it explains 
why kabbalistic texts describe an endless series of expulsions of refuse and purifications 
in divine and human history, necessitated  by an endless series of returns of the deadly 
impurities (at least in pre-messianic times).
44
  It shows how the two seemingly opposite 
goals in relation to the Sitra Aḥra – annihilation and incorporation45 – are both responses 
to the same dilemma, that of the subject confronting that with which it was inextricably 
associated before it came into full existence.  And it explains why these two responses are 
equally pyrrhic projects.  Coherence and boundedness do not characterize the primordial 
state but, by their very nature, characterize a condition that opposes itself to something 
else, an other, an "Other Side" – and when it comes to subjectivity, that "Other" emerges 
                                                 
43
 Liebes, Perakim, 350. 
44
 To be sure, many kabbalistic texts seek to shield the highest reaches of the divine from any vulnerability 
to evil.  This notion is foregrounded already in the Tikune Ha-Zohar, e.g., 98b, 108b.  In my view, this 
tendency, however prominent, often seems at great odds with such texts’ own accounts of the relationships 
of the divine and demonic.  Indeed, some writers who exhibit this tendency are also those whose mythic 
imagination about the demonic runs most freely, such as Cordovero (e.g., Pardes Rimonim, 80c-d) and 
Luzzatto (e.g., Sefer Taktu Tefilot, 308) – it seems almost as if their theological safety precautions allows 
them to unleash their demonic imagination. 
45
 Scholem, On the Mystical Shape, 77. 
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from the same amalgam as the subject.  That which is abjected comes from the same 
amalgam as the subject doing the abjecting – or, rather, they both emerge from that which 
precedes the identifiability of "same" and "other."   “Catharsis,” if that term suggests a 
definitive separation of the subject from that which destabilizes it, is thus both a belated 
and ultimately futile project, an inevitable and impossible dream, a struggle not so much 
initiated by a subject as that through which the subject seeks to constitute itself – and can 
only ever partially and provisionally succeed.  
 
Before proceeding, I note that, although my critiques of Tishby's discussions of the Sitra 
Aḥra in the Zohar and in Lurianic kabbalah are similar, I do not intend to minimize the 
differences between these two literatures.  Such differences are, of course, many and 
highly significant, including a vast range of Lurianic images and ideas not present, or 
only adumbrated, in the Zohar, as well as the genre differences, the predominantly 
expository style of Lurianic texts by contrast with the literary virtuosity of the Zohar.  
Moreover, while contradictions abound even within individual textual expositions of 
Lurianic kabbalah, let alone among them, they are more than matched by the vast 
heterogeneity of ideas and images in the Zohar.  It is, of course, far beyond the scope of 
this thesis to explore these differences.  Nonetheless, I assert that the dynamics of 
abjection provides an important corrective to the rather loose use of the notion of 
"catharsis" used in scholarship on both Zoharic and Lurianic texts. 
  
 
3.  Levels of Abjection 
 
In this section, I present a number of key Zoharic texts which portray the ontological 
processes of abjection and crystallization, conveyed through tropes of limitation and 
tropes of representation, at a variety of different levels.  In doing so, I foreground the 
structure of the process rather than the question of the level at which evil originates.  If, 
as both Kristeva's portrayal of abjection and the bulk of kabbalistic texts suggest, the 
struggle to achieve proper subjectivity is interminable, and its anxious and dangerous 
relationship to inchoate refuse and crystallized antagonists irreducible, then one would 
expect similar features to reappear at all levels.  And this is, indeed, what one finds, 
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notwithstanding the significant differences among levels.  This proliferation of similarly 
structured processes at different levels demonstrates both the indispensability and 
precariousness of abjection in the construction of  bounded subjects – requiring continual 
constitution and reconstitution (or reconsolidation) of the divine and demonic at all 
levels.
46
      
  
In what follows, I will discuss four of these levels.  In the first two levels I discuss, 
constitution-through-abjection is portrayed all the way from its initiation in inchoate 
emissions to its culmination in demonic crystallizations; interestingly, these two levels 
are the highest and lowest cosmic levels, "primordial Thought” (presumably the level of 
Keter or perhaps the upper reaches of Ḥokhmah) and “earth” (Malkhut).  The second two 
levels I discuss are two intermediate levels, associated with the “left” side of the divine, 
Gevurah and Binah, in which abjection is portrayed as part of the ongoing process of an 
already constituted structure.  I note that there is a fifth level at which these processes can 
be tracked, that of Yesod.  However, a discussion of this level requires the introduction of 
a variety of themes which will be more suitable in Section C of this chapter.      
 
a. “Thought” 
 
The first level I discuss is that of primordial “Thought.”  I will use the three texts 
suggested by Tishby, beginning with the Hekhalot di-Pekude excerpt I have already 
quoted.  This text portrays the production of sparks at the highest level of Thought: 
 
 ,ןיצוצינ קיפאו ,הבשחמ וג קילסו ,אתונידרקד אניצוב שטב ,הבשחמ וג ,אתונמיהמד אתוריש אשיר
רירבתאו ,הבשחמ וגמ תלוספ רירבו ,רביע ןירשעו האמ תלתל קירז ןיציצנ 47.  
 
                                                 
46
 This perspective would lessen the significance of the distinction Wolfson makes between “cathartic” and 
“emanative” notions of the emergence of evil – a distinction he links closely to the question of whether the 
demonic is “posterior” to the divine.  See Wolfson, ‘Left Contained in the Right’, 32.  As I show below, 
passages that portray the emergence of evil at ‘lower,’ ‘posterior’ levels are marked by narratives structured 
similarly to those at ‘higher,’ ‘prior’ levels.  This confirms the notion of the necessity, and fragility, of 
abjection-and-crystallization. 
47
 Zohar II, 254b. 
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The head of the beginning of faith: within Thought, the dark lamp knocked, and 
ascended within Thought, and brought forth sparks.  It cast sparks upon three-
hundred twenty sides, and sifted/clarified refuse from within Thought.  And it was 
sifted/clarified/purified.  
 
The botsina de-kardinuta is associated throughout the Zohar with the first stages of the 
emanative process, most famously in the very first lines of Zohar Bereshit – where it 
“goes forth within the concealed of the concealed, from the head (or mystery) of En-
Sof”48 and produces, or becomes, the inchoate and colorless kutra be-golma [  ארטוקאמלוגב , 
“a cluster of vapour forming in formlessness”49); it then proceeds to produce the colors 
which will shape all divine and cosmic forms.  In the Hekhalot di-Pekude excerpt, the 
botsina “knocks” and “ascends within Thought.”  This action is neither attributed to an 
identifiable subject nor linked to the pursuit of a clear goal.
50
 Despite the vigor and 
boldness of its “knocking” and “ascending” within primordial Thought, however, the 
botsina ironically succeeds in producing only “sparks” – an action identified with the 
“sifting out” of "refuse" from within Thought.  The ultimate outcome of this “sifting” is 
the crystallization of two separate realms, holy and unholy – “this joy, and this sorrow, 
this life, and this death, this good, and this evil, this Garden of Eden, and this Hell, and all 
of this the reverse of this” [  אדו ,ןדע ןג אד ,ער אדו ,בוט אד ,תומ אדו ,םייח אד ,וביצע אדו ,החמש אד
אדד אכופהב אד אלכו ,םנהיג ].51   
 
In Kristevan terms, this initial movement of the subject-less botsina is that of an inchoate 
desire to establish a distinct and bounded subject – a desire which thus necessarily, albeit 
paradoxically, precedes its subject.  This initial movement, however, cannot achieve the 
separation of the subject from the primordial state of undifferentiation without first 
expelling that which cannot be assimilated, the abject.  Without the travails of abjection, 
the nascent desire for separation cannot be realized – or, in kabbalistic terms, the 
                                                 
48
  The text, Zohar I, 15a, with its variants, is as follows: 
 אמלוגב ארטוק ףוס ןיאד )אזרמ ,א"נ( אשירמ ומיתסד םיתס וג ]קיפנ א"נ[ קיפנו אתונידרקד אניצוב 
Like Matt, I, 107, I favor the first variant in brackets, though I translate the passage somewhat differently.   
49
 Matt I, 108.  
50
 This is perhaps in contrast with the Zohar Bereshit passage which is, somewhat unclearly, prefaced by 
the words “in the beginning of the will of the King” [ אכלמד אתונמרוה שירב].  Zohar I, 15a.  Matt renders this 
phrase as “at the head of the potency of the King.”  Matt I, 107. 
51
 Zohar II, 255a. 
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primordial "Thought" cannot give rise to distinct sefirot and partsufim without the sifting 
out of its “refuse” and, ultimately, the crystallization of the realm of evil.   
 
A text from the Idra Zuta, a more elaborate, if somewhat un-linear, version of this 
process, supports this interpretation:  
 
 אמלע ירבא אל דעןיפנאב ןיפנא ןיחיגשמ ווה אל ,וברחתא יאמדק ןימלע ךכ ןיגבו , יאמדק ןימלעו
ודיבעתא אנוקת אלב ,אנוקתב הוה אלד אוההו ,ןיצוצנ ןיקיז ירקא , אפצרמ אנמוא יאהכ(ס" א
אתפזרמ ,)אלזרפד אנמב שתכא דכ ,רביע לכל ןיקיז קיפא ,ןיקפנד ןיקיז ןוניאו ,ןיריהנו ןיטיהל ןיקפנ ,
 ןיכעדורתלאל ,יאמדק ןימלע ןורקא ןילאו ,ומייקתא אלו וברחתא ךכ ןיגבו , אקיתע ןקתתאד דע
אשידק , אנמוא קיפנו(ד"אנאמ א )היתונמואל: 
ןליד אתינתמב אנינת יאה לעו ,ןיקיזב ןיקיז קיפא אצוצינד( ,נ"ןיצוצינ ןיקיז קיפא אניצובד א ,) תלתל
רביע ןירשעו האמ ,ןיקיז ןוניאו ,א יאמדק ןימלערתלאל ותימו ןורק , אנמוא קיפנ רתבל(ס"אנאמ א )
היתונמואל ,אבקונו רכדב ןקתתאו ,ותימו וכעדתאד ןיקיז ינהו ,אלכ םייקתא אתשה: 
אצוצינ קיפנ אתונידרקד אניצובמ ,אפיקת אשיטפ ,יאמדק ןימלע ןיקיז קיפאו שטבד , יברעתמו(ד" א
יכדתמו )איכד אריואב ,אדב אד ומסבתאו 52 
 
Before the world was created, they were not gazing face-to-face.  And, 
consequently, the primordial words were destroyed.  And the primordial 
words were made without tikun.  And that which is without tikun is called 
‘scattering sparks.’  It is like a craftsman:  when the hammer strikes an 
iron tool, it brings forth sparks in every direction. And these sparks that 
come forth, come forth glowing and shining, and are extinguished at once. 
And these are called the primordial worlds. And, consequently, they were 
destroyed and did not endure – until Atika Kadisha received his tikun and 
the craftsman went forth to do his craft. 
In regard to this, we learned in our Mishnah, that the lamp brought forth 
scattering sparks upon three-hundred twenty sides, and these sparks are 
called ‘primordial worlds,’ and they died immediately. Afterwards, the 
craftsman went to do his craft.  And it received its tikun as male and 
                                                 
52
 Zohar III, 292b. 
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female.  And these sparks, that were extinguished and died, now all 
endured.   
A spark came forth from the dark lamp, a strong hammer, which knocked 
and brought forth sparks, primordial worlds, and they mingled in the pure 
air, and were sweetened each with the other.
53
  
 
Given the Zohar’s recurrent emphasis on relationship, particularly male-female 
relationship, for the establishment of a proper subject, the stage before "face to face” 
contemplation at the beginning of this excerpt should be understood as a stage prior to the 
constitution of any proper “face,” any proper subject.54  If the stage prior to the “face to 
face” is equivalent to the stage prior to a proper creative subject, the action of the botsina 
should thus also be said to lack a proper subject, for it initiates the process that eventually 
leads to the formation of such a subject.   
 
The "blacksmith" image, in which a subject wields a hammer that stands in for the 
botsina, would, in this reading, be an imperfect analogy, as suggested by the fact that the 
Zohar, in a relatively rare gesture, explicitly flags it as an allegory [יאהכ , “like this”].  
Perhaps the allegory is offered to make the action of the subject-less knocking of the 
botsina a bit more palatable.  In any case, this blacksmith is, at best, a very incomplete 
subject, one who has not received his “tikunin” and thus incapable of truly creating.  The 
only outcome of this incomplete subject's action is the momentary appearance of the 
"primordial worlds," here identified with the sparks that emerge, burn, illuminate, and are 
immediately extinguished.  The "blacksmith" intends to create, but his pre-tikun 
subjectivity misfires, yielding only ephemeral, useless, dangerous byproducts.  It is only 
when the creative subject is completed, here by means of the tikun of the face of Atika – 
or, in rhetorical terms, by means of prosopopeia – that a full creative subject can emerge, 
                                                 
53
 I have made a selection from the textual variants in my translation. 
54
 See, e.g., Zohar III, 7b: 
 דח אוה ואל גלפו ,ירקא אפוג גלפ אבקונ אלב רכדד 
For a male without a female is called half a body, and a half is not one. 
The “face-to-face” in III, 292b is probably that of the male-female relationship – though this view is not 
free from difficulty, since a little further on in the passage, the "face to face" refers to the relationship of 
Ze’er Anpin and Atika Kadisha.  Zohar III, 292b. 
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an "artisan” who can “proceed with his craft." And it is only then that a stable cosmos can 
emerge.   
 
An interesting feature of this passage, as compared with the Hekhalot di-Pekude passage, 
is that it concludes with the revival and sweetening of the extinguished sparks, rather than 
their “sifting” out as "refuse” and crystallization as “Hell."  Still a third option concerning 
the fate of the sparks is provided by a closely related text in the Idra Raba:  "some of 
them were sweetened, and some of them were not sweetened at all" [ ןוהנמו ,ומסבתא ןוהנמ
ללכ ומסבתא אל].55  In any case, all of these outcomes, in which holy or unholy entities, or 
both, eventually emerge from sparks, are seemingly impossible destinies for these 
inchoate ephemera that had “died immediately.”  Indeed, this catachrestic use of the word 
“death” in the context of the “death of the Kings” is addressed explicitly in the Idra 
Raba.
56
 
 
The third text cited by Tishby completes this portrayal, highlighting the way in which the 
emitted “sparks” consolidate to form an adversary to the divine.  This text forms the 
prologue to the “bald God” passage I have analyzed at length in Chapter One.  Here I 
focus exclusively on this prologue, which explicitly shows the crystallization of the 
byproducts of the botsina into a demonic force: 
 
 ןארובגד ארטסב ןדיחאתמו ןאפלגתמ יצוצינ שמחו ןירשעו האמ תלת יקפנ אתונידרקד אניצובמ אנאת
או אדחכ ןדכלתמו תורובג ןורקאדשיא ירקא אפוגב ןילא ןילייע דכו ,אפוג דח ודיבעת  ...  םושמו
אישק אניד אוה ירקא יאהד 'רעשב ןדכלתמו ןדחאתמ יאתת ינידד  ...  אקמוס יאהד אשירו אתלגלוג
אתתלד ןיאתת ןירתכ הינמ ןיילתו יקמוס וגב קמוס הירעשו אדרווכ אלכ 57 
 
It has been taught:  From the Lamp of Adamantine Darkness issue 325 sparks – 
engraved in and joined to the side of Gevuran, called Gevurot – and they 
converge as one, becoming one body.  And when these enter the Body, it is called 
Ish …  And because lower judgments cling and join to the hair of this one, he is 
                                                 
55
 Zohar III, 135b. 
56
 Ibid. 
57
 Zohar III, 48b. 
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called Harsh Judgment …The skull of the head of this one is completely red as a 
rose, and his hair red within red.  From it hang lower crowns of below…58  
 
This passage makes explicit the end of the story begun in the other two:  the movement 
from the emission of refuse to its consolidation as a mighty force able to subjugate and 
re-create the divine.  The sparks, which the  Idra Zuta passage asserts had “died 
immediately,” here “converge as one”; these ephemera are now transformed into 
“mights” or “judgments” [תורובג, Gevurot], becoming the “red hair” to which the 
demonic “lower judgments” and “lower crowns” “cling and join.”  The covering of the 
“Ish” by this red hair comes to determine his very nature:  he is now called “Harsh 
Judgment” upon which the demonic sefirot “hang” or “depend,” and can only separate 
himself from them through a metaphysical shaving.  For the purposes of this chapter, the 
important point here is the clarity with which the passage describes the consolidation of 
the sparks, whose ephemeral and dispersed nature is highlighted in other passages, into a 
mighty force that takes possession of the divine Ish, transforming him into a new, 
fearsome, red-haired figure from whom the demonic sefirot hang – a demonic deity, a 
veritable Lord of the Underworld.  Taking the three passages together, the tale of the 
“sparks” proceeds from their appearance as inchoate emissions to their crystallization 
into a mighty and at least temporarily victorious colonizer of the divine.    
 
In rhetorical terms, this is a tale that begins in irony:  the irony of the derisory misfire of 
the vigorous creative act – be it of the bold botsina or the mighty “craftsman” – which 
succeeds only in producing ephemeral sparks.  It then proceeds to catachresis and 
prosopopeia:  the impossible consolidation of those ephemera into a mighty force that 
conquers and re-creates the divine Ish, transforming it into the personified chief of the 
demonic realm.  
   
 
 
 
                                                 
58
 Matt VII, 304-6.  I have adopted most of Matt’s textual choices, but slightly modified his translation.  
Note his new translation of אתונידרקד אניצוב. 
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b. “Earth” 
  
I now turn from the highest level of the divine to the lowest.   In relation to this level, a 
crucial passage appears near the beginning of Zohar Bereshit, which may be called the 
"snow in the water" passage.  This text links the formation of “the earth,” that symbol of 
feminine divine entities, usually Malkhut, with the emission of refuse and the generation 
of the demonic realm.  The passage is a complex intertextual artifact, weaving together 
biblical passages portraying creation with those portraying the visions of Elijah and 
Ezekiel, as well as a number of midrashic sources.  The passage is mysterious in mood, 
marked by deeply evocative, yet obscure, imagery – and its enigmatic quality is 
underlined by the widely divergent interpretations by traditional commentators of some 
of its key images.   
 
The passage’s mysterious atmosphere immediately emerges in its opening lines:     
 
 וגו והבו והת התיה ץראהו ,'אנד תמדקמ אקייד התיה ,אגלת איימ וג ,אמהוז הנימ אקפנ , אוההב
איימב אגלתד אליח ,אפיקת אשא הב שיקאו , הוהותאידעתאו תלוספ הב,59 הת תדיבעתאו"ו , רתאמ
(נ"א ,ארודמ )תלוספד אניק אמהוזד.60 
 
"And the earth was Tohu and Bohu."  "Was," precisely – prior to this moment.  
Snow in the midst of water:  zohama emerged from it, from the force of snow in 
water.   And a strong fire struck it and there was refuse in it.  And it was 
removed
61
 and became Tohu:  from the place [or, the dwelling place]
 62
 of 
zohama, the nest of refuse.   
. 
The air of mystery is created both by the way the passage explicitly begins in medias res 
(“was”) and by its evocative and unexplained opening image (“snow in the water”).   
 
                                                 
59
 Matt's edition omits this word. 
60
 Zohar I, 16a. 
61
 The Sulam translates this as "became pregnant."  Sulam II, 29.  Matt's edition omits this word.   
62
 The version “from the place” [רתאמ] is that of the Zohar Mantua Edition; the Cremona Edition has “the 
dwelling place” [ארודמ].  Cordovero and Matt favor the latter.  See my comment below at note 69.   
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Analyzing this text in relation to its precursor materials allows one to track the manner by 
which Zoharic writing achieves its effects.  The notion that the “earth” as it first appears 
in the biblical text “already was” is a hyper-literal gloss on the second verse of Genesis, 
which is also found in the Bahir (and is already broached, with a very different intent, in 
Bereshit Rabah).
63
  However, the text pushes the anteriority of the earth further back than 
does the Bahir.  The Bahir preserves the link between the verb (“was”) and the first 
subsequent noun (“Tohu”), proclaiming the initial state to have been one of baffling 
Tohu; it then breaks the link between the two nouns (“Tohu” and “Bohu”), declaring that 
that initial state is followed by the more substantial Bohu.
64
  By contrast, this text breaks 
the link between the verb and both nouns, thereby creating an interval before the 
appearance of Tohu, a time of a primordial state of "the earth was," a state not named, 
much less characterized, in the verse.  The effect of the Zoharic gloss is to empty out the 
earth of any possible characterization, reducing it to pure primordiality, as separate from 
any prior act of a creator as from any subsequent emanations from it – indeed, a state of 
primordial discontinuity.    
 
Without transition, the text then simply announces its central image: “snow in the water.” 
It is crucial to the rhetoric of the passage that it does not even explicitly make a link 
between this image to that of the “earth was,” as though any link to anything would spoil 
the primordiality of the state the text wishes to evoke.  The primordial image thus 
abruptly placed on the darkened textual stage evokes a timeless and placid hibernal scene, 
a plenitude of natural beauty – that is, until one reads further and discovers that it 
immediately gives way to an arduous, violent drama, beginning with the emission of the 
zohama that immediately, and in defiance of phenomenal experience, succeeds the 
opening image.   
 
The source of the image of the "snow-in-the-water" is undoubtedly the Pirke Rabbi 
Eliezer:  “Whence was the earth created?  He took of the snow under the throne of glory 
and threw it on the water; the waters froze and became the dust of the earth.”65  This 
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 Bereshit Rabah, I, 3a (1:15); Sefer Ha-Bahir, 3. 
64
 Sefer Ha-Bahir, 3.   
65
 Pirke Rabbi Eliezer, 11 (ch. 3): 
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vignette is a majestic fable of divine power, a tale of a king who insouciantly reaches 
under his throne and playfully casts a snowball which instantly becomes the earth.  The 
Zoharic text, by contrast, takes this tale and thoroughly interrupts its meaning, in a 
manner similar to its operation on the biblical text:  detaching the snow in the water both 
from the prior the act of the divine king and from the subsequent generation of a 
perfected earth.     
 
Rhetorically, the work performed by the Zoharic text on its midrashic precursor is, on a 
first appreciation, an act of irony, in which the seemingly majestic act of a putatively 
omnipotent deity succeeds in producing only slime, rather than a beautifully structured 
cosmos.  The term zohama evokes something not merely inchoate, but repugnant, 
implicitly evoking a repulsive sexual emission.
66
   However, it is an even stronger 
operation than irony – for, as we saw, the initial, off-stage, act of the text in relation to its 
precursor had been to elide the divine subject of the tale, an hors-texte prerequisite to the 
presentation of the snow-in-the-water as a primordial scene.  This elision transforms the 
initial turn of the text itself, that from pristine form to inchoate repulsiveness, into a 
subject-less event, defying phenomenal experience and even syntax.  I note that the 
Zoharic writer must have assumed that its precursor text would be familiar to his readers, 
who would thus sense this elision.
67
  Shorn of its agent, initiating act, and majesty, the 
tale becomes the site of a distinctively Zoharic portrayal of the dramatic emergence of a 
fully formed cosmos through struggle with nascent demonic forces.  The latter first 
appear as inchoate zohama, but are then crystallized, as a result of the very struggle to 
purify the divine, into mighty adversaries.   
 
I turn to consider the latter process in detail.  After the emission of the zohama, the next 
event is the striking of "harsh fire” – an event very similar to the striking of the botsina 
                                                                                                                                                 
 אסכ תחתש גלשמ תארבנ םוקמ הזיאמ ץראה ץראה רפע ושענו םימה ואפקנו םימה לע קרזו חקל דובכה 
This account appears to be a reimagining of bYoma 54b and an imaginative reading of Job 37:6.  At least 
two other Zoharic passages also use the Pirke Rabbi Eliezer account:  Midrash Ha-Ne’elam Ruth, at Zohar 
Ḥadash, 76a-b and, in a manner much closer to the passage here, Midrash Ha-Ne’elam Shir Hashirim, at 
Zohar Ḥadash, 60a.  There are interesting differences between the second of these passages and the one I 
am discussing in the text but their analysis await another day. 
66
 See my discussion of the term zohama below, at p. 192-193. 
67
 Maimonides, for example, refers to the Pirke Rabbi Eliezer “snow under the throne” account as “famous 
words” ["םימסרופמ םירבד"].  Maimonides, Moreh Ha-Nevukhim, 221. 
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de-kardinuta in the "primordial Thought," Idra Zuta, and "Bald God" passages.   Like the 
striking of the botsina de-kardinuta, that of the "harsh fire" yields another inchoate 
byproduct, that of refuse [תלוספ].  Unlike the “sparks” in the Idra Zuta passage, this 
byproduct does not “die immediately,” but rather gives way to protean stuff, Tohu – 
portrayed as something both "within form" and, "as one contemplates it, no form at all" 
[ אנקוידב והיא אתשה ,ללכ אנקויד היל תיל היב ןלכתסמ דכ ].  This portrayal of Tohu thus posits it 
as a transitional stage between inchoate zohama and a fully crystallized entity.
68
   
   
The emergence of Tohu coincides with the formation of a stable space for the incubation 
of form:  “from a place of zohama,” it becomes a “nest of refuse”69  The subsequent steps 
ratchet up the defiance of phenomenal experience:  a further "sifting and purification" of 
Tohu results in a firm crystallization of the first formidably destructive entity, the "great 
mighty wind, splitting mountains and shattering rocks" of Elijah's Horeb vision [   יאה דכ
או רירבא והתףירצ , הינמ קיפנ(אי טי א םיכלמ ) אמחד אוהה םיעלס רבשמו םירה קרפמ קזחו הלודג חור
והילא].  Still further purifications, of the "Bohu" and "Darkness" of Genesis 1:2, produce 
two additional destructive forces evoked in Elijah’s vision, "earthquake" [שער] and "fire."  
And it is only thus that the "earth" fully emerges – accompanied by the emission of 
zohama and the drama of its eventual crystallization into mighty destructive forces.   
 
At the ontological level, the “snow in the water” passage is a concise portrayal of the 
inextricability of divine creativity, the abject, and the crystallization of the demonic.  The 
move towards creation, which throughout the Zohar is identical with the unfolding of 
divine subjectivity, is immediately attended by the abjection of zohama.  The series of 
acts that seek to purify this zohama ultimately leads to the crystallization of the demonic 
with which the divine will forever be at odds.  The midrashic vignette thus becomes 
transformed from one of pure divine omnipotence into one in which the emergence of the 
divine structure comes only at the cost of the constitution of its demonic adversaries.  
                                                 
68
 Some commentators associate the Zohar's interpretation of Tohu here with the philosophers' "hylic 
matter," citing, for example, Naḥmanides’ commentary on Genesis 1:2.  Matt I, 118n.75; Buzaglo, Sefer 
Mikdash Melekh, 80.  While this concept may very well be in the background of the Zohar passage, an 
overemphasis on it, I believe, detracts from a full understanding of the passage. 
69
 I am here following the Mantua version [...אמהוזד רתאמ].  In the Cremona version [ וזד ארודמ...אמה ], 
favored by Matt, the two appositional phrases are synonymous, rather than denoting a transition from a 
more inchoate to a more stable place. 
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At a rhetorical level, the process by which inchoate slime and refuse consolidate to 
produce the formidable adversarial forms, “mighty wind,” “thunder,” and “fire,” consists 
of a series of catachreses – for it hardly needs to be said that the emergences of these 
formidable forces from a “sifting” of the insubstantial Tohu, Bohu, and Darkness have no 
phenomenal correlates.  The rhetorical power of this passage lies precisely in these 
catachreses, these “abuses of language,” these grafts of impossibly mixed images onto 
each other, as in the “sifting” of “zohama” to produce a “mighty wind.” These 
catachreses may be called acts of morpho-poeisis, the poetic making of form (like 
prosopopeia, but where the forms in question are not “faces”).70  The persuasiveness of 
these acts of morpho-poeisis stems from the unexpected audacity of the trope, the boldly 
discontinuous turn to representation.   The morpho-poeitic movement from “zohama” to 
“mighty wind” is just as startling as the prior, ironic movement from divine omnipotent 
majesty to the emission of the “zohama.”   
 
The insistence on place here – “from the place of zohama, the nest of refuse” – is also 
rhetorically significant.  If metaphor always involves the transport of a term to a 
“borrowed place,” catachresis is an “abusive” form of such transport – a transport of a 
term to an improper place, a place it has not politely borrowed but violently usurped.
71
  
Indeed, this passage consists of a series of improper movements – from zohama, to 
refuse, to Tohu, to “place of zohama,” to “nest of refuse.”  This movement produces the 
site for  the morpho-poeitic consolidation of the demonic forces – wind, earthquake, and 
fire, an entire demonic structure whose emergence is coeval with the emergence of the 
holy “earth.”  
 
It is thus only through two sets of bold tropes – limitation and representation – that a fully 
formed cosmos emerges.  The emergence of form from a sifting of the inchoate is just as 
defiant of experience and language as the emergence of the inchoate from plenitude.  Just 
                                                 
70
 Using the term “morpho-poiesis” in this way is of recent vintage.  See Tamisari, ‘The Meaning of the 
Steps is in Between: Dancing and the Curse of Compliments’, 274-286.  Tamisari defines “morphopoiesis” 
as “speaking forms into place.”  It thus provides a useful rhetorical term for instances when “prosopopeia” 
is not strictly applicable.   
71
 Parker, ‘Metaphor and catachresis’, 60-73. 
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as the emission of zohama from the snow-in-the-water is an unexpected, unanticipatable, 
irony, so the emergence of formidable form from Tohu and Bohu are unexpected, 
audacious acts of morpho-poiesis that just as thoroughly defy phenomenal experience and  
rhetorical convention.  In these ways, the Zoharic text overturns the midrashic vignette 
from a triumphant tale of an already constituted subject enacting verbs of power to one in 
which an ironic preface of a subject-less mishap is followed by impossible 
representations of the emergence of form from the inchoate.  “Catharsis,” at least as 
commonly understood, cannot begin to capture the operations of this text.   
 
The technique of creating a gap in the story of creation, in which to insert the previously 
untold drama of the emergence of the demonic, can be seen quite explicitly in the Zohar’s 
treatment of the Pirke Rabbi Eliezer imagery, but it also may now be viewed simply as a 
reading of the first three verses of Genesis.  The first verse is a majestic overview, a tale 
of the seemingly instantaneous creation of heaven and earth in their entirety.  The third 
verse proceeds with a detailed elaboration of this triumphant total act, with the 
instantaneous creation through divine speech of the specific elements of heaven and 
earth, beginning with light.  The unsettling second verse, by contrast, has long provoked 
both traditional midrashists and modern scholars into offering incompatible theories 
about its hidden mysteries or relationship to other Near Eastern creation myths.  The 
Zohar treats the second verse as performing the same function in relation to the creation 
story as the Zohar’s reading itself performs in relation to the Pirke Rabbi Eliezer story – 
as creating a gap in the smooth unfolding of creation, a gap in which the initial move 
towards creation, which I suggest the Zohar renders subject-less, is diverted by the 
emergence of forces adversarial to that move.  The Zohar reads the relationship of the 
second verse of Genesis to the first verse as a rhetorical irony, with the triumphant total 
creation of the first verse undermined by the struggle with the chaos and dark in the 
second.  Indeed, the second verse begins with the very word, “the earth,” that was the 
ostensibly triumphant final word of the majestic announcement of creation in the first 
verse.  I suggest that it was the second verse’s irony at divine expense that troubled the 
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midrashist who wrote of it, "if it were not written [in the Scripture], it would be 
impossible to say it."
72
   
 
It is only after an arduous process, concealed within the otherwise enigmatic second 
verse, that divine subjectivity can truly act freely, indeed that this subjectivity truly 
comes on the scene.  It is notable that it is only in relation to the creation of light in the 
third verse that God first speaks.  The creation of light proves to be not simply a detailing 
of the totalizing act announced in the first verse, but rather an act only made possible by 
the primordial struggle with the forces of darkness of the second verse.  And yet, this 
creation will forever be shadowed by the dark forces that emerged simultaneously with 
the initial subject-less move toward creation.
 73
   
 
A brief review of the disagreements among later commentators about the identity (divine 
vs. demonic) of the various entities mentioned in the passage is very instructive. The 
significance of these interpretive variations goes beyond the frequent phenomenon of 
difficult Zoharic passages giving rise to dramatically divergent understandings.   Rather, 
in this case, such differences are deeply symptomatic of the obscurities inherent in the 
dynamics of abjection.   If neither the (divine) subject nor its (demonic) others are 
primordially given, but rather come to be through an arduous struggle of mutual 
differentiation, then it is not at all surprising that the location of a particular entity in 
relation to the dividing line between the two dimensions might be difficult to determine 
in a poetic portrayal of the process. 
 
I focus here on the transition from "zohama," to "Tohu," to "mighty wind” in three 
commentaries:  Shalom Buzaglo's Mikdash Melekh (18
th
 century), Cordovero's Or Yakar 
(16
th
 Century) and Shim’on Ibn Lavi's Ketem Paz (16th century).74 If one is willing to 
delve behind Buzaglo’s Lurianic terminology, his interpretation seems closest to the spirit 
                                                 
72
 Bereshit Rabah, I, 1d (1:5):     ורמאל רשפא יא בותכ רבדהש ילוליא    
73
 A precursor to this Zoharic view may be found in Bereshit Rabah I, 3b (2:1):   
אייבוכ תקיפא הגפ איהד דע היכרב ר"א  
Rabbi Berakhia said:  “while it [i.e., the earth in Gen. 1:2] was yet unripe, it brought forth thorns.”  
74
 Other important differences, that I will not discuss here, include the question of the valence of the two 
substances of the "snow" and the "water." Cordovero (Or Yakar I, 145a) associates the first with the 
coarsening of divine shefa associated with "water." Buzaglo (Mikdash Melekh, I, 80) associates the "snow" 
with the male quality of compassion and the "water" with the female quality of judgment.   
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of the passage.  For this commentator, the zohama is a by-product of the union of the 
snow and the water (respectively, the Lurianic “drop of Aba” and “drop of Ima”) with the 
former the purer of the two.  He offers alternative explanations of the source of the 
zohama:  either it comes solely from the "drop" of Ima or from both "drops."  In any 
event, in accordance with the analysis I have been developing, the zohama ironically 
comes from the emissions of “drops” that are quite literally the “seminal” (or “ovular”) 
acts of the generation of life.
75
   
 
This abjection is then followed by crystallization.  First, Tohu is produced from the 
separation and concentration of the initial zohama; Buzaglo proclaims Tohu to be both a 
"kelipah," and, perhaps more precisely, the "root of the kelipot."
76
  The "mighty wind" 
then emerges from Tohu, and corresponds to the "first of the four kelipot that Ezekiel 
saw, 'And behold, a stormy wind,’ etc. [Ezekiel 1:1]."77  This process of the 
crystallization of the zohama into Tohu and then into the four Ezekiel phenomena 
ultimately yields a personified demonic realm – specifically, the demonic male and 
female, the Lurianic “Ze’er and Nukva of Kelipah” – morpho-poiesis yielding 
prosopopeia.   
 
Cordovero’s interpretation differs from that of Buzaglo, at times dramatically so.  His 
description of the origin of the zohama involves the somewhat ambiguous mixture of 
images he uses elsewhere in his portrayal of the origin of the kelipot.
78
  On the one hand, 
he sees the zohama as one stage in the gradual coarsening of entities as they descend the 
chain of being [תואיצמל תואיצממ ןקתעהו הטמל םירבדה תובעה]79– from the purity of water to 
the coarser stage of snow (the reverse of Buzaglo’s water/snow hierarchy) and then to 
zohama.  On the other hand, this imagery portraying the generation of the zohama is 
combined with others that suggest a rather more discontinuous relationship between 
purity and impurity, a discontinuity marked by abjection, specifically digestive refuse and 
the refuse of afterbirth.  Whether or not these two sets of images can be reconciled, it is in 
                                                 
75
 This kabbalistic irony may derive from a rabbinic sarcasm at the expense of human arrogance:  “Whence 
do you come?  From a foul drop” [החורס הפטמ תאב ןיאמ].  mAvot 3:1. 
76
 Mikdash Melekh, I, 80. 
77
 Ibid., 81:  'וכו הרעס חור הנהו והילא הארש תופילק 'דמ הנושאר הפילק איהו 
78
 Cf. Pardes, II, 53b-d. 
79
 Or Yakar I, 145a. 
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the subsequent stages that Cordovero's view diverges most sharply from that of Buzaglo.  
First, Cordovero offers a far more foreshortened process than Buzaglo.  The Tohu that 
emerges from the zohama is already purely, exclusively evil [ודבל ער], rather than a way-
station to the crystallized kelipot.
80
  Finally, in even more striking contrast to Buzaglo, 
the three mighty forces of Elijah's vision are holy forces, whose role is to subdue the 
kelipot.
81
  This foreshortening suggests a Cordoveran discomfort with the abject, a desire 
to move past it towards a crystallized dichotomy between good and evil as quickly as 
possible.
82
   To be sure, reading the Zoharic text to foreshorten the movement from the 
inchoate “zohama” to the purely evil “Tohu” also comes at the price of heightening the 
transition’s phenomenal impossibility and rhetorical impropriety, emphasizing the 
monstrously catachretic quality of the text.  
 
Finally, a brief mention of the complex discussion of Shim’on Ibn Lavi rounds out the 
range of variations in interpreting this passage.  Reversing some of Cordovero’s key 
associations, this commentator declares that Tohu is a holy entity, indeed, perhaps even 
one of the highest holy entities, Keter or Binah.
83
  The first of the phenomena in Elijah’s 
vision, the "mighty wind," is a demonic crystallization out of the refuse of Tohu, a "dreg" 
[גיס] that “is drawn down below into the kelipot of the nut” [  זוגאה תופילקב הטמל ךשמנה ];84 
the second and third of the phenomena, the “earthquake” and “fire,” are crystallizations 
of refuse that descends from two other entities that Ibn Lavi portrays as holy, Bohu and 
Darkness.  To be sure, he also declares that there is a Tohu on the side of holiness and a 
Tohu on the side of the kelipah, the latter Tohu identified with “hylic matter.”85  He 
                                                 
80
 Ibid. 
81
 Or Yakar, I, 145b-c.  I note that elsewhere in the Or Yakar, V, 220a, Cordovero refers to the first three 
forces in Elijah’s vision as kelipot.  In Pardes, II, 55d-56a, he quotes a passage from the Ra’ya Mehemena,  
Zohar II, 227, which identifies the four entities of Genesis with the four forces from Elijah’s vision, and 
refers to these four entities as four kelipot. 
82
 Nonetheless, it is telling that there is substantial ambiguity in Cordovero about the origin of the first of 
these forces, the "mighty wind."  In the course of the same discussion, he offers three views:  a) that it 
emerges from the purification of Tohu (Or Yakar, I, 145b); b) that it is identified with the holy "spirit of 
God" [םיהלא חור] that hovers over the waters, which emerges “from the [holy] emanation itself” [ ךותמ שממ
תוליצאה], and is absolutely discontinuous with Tohu (Ibid., I, 145b-c); and, finally, c) in an assertion that 
may be intended partly to mediate this tension, that it is a holy force that descends into the demonic world 
to purify it and then emerges from it unscathed (Ibid., I, 145b).    
83
 Ibn Lavi, Ketem Paz, I, 48c. 
84
 Ibid., 50c. 
85
 Ibid., 48d. 
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supports this homology between the holy and unholy Tohu with reference to the 
Ecclesiastes verse, “also ‘this’ confronted with ‘this’ hath made the Elohim.”    
 
These interpretive variations reflect divergent ways of responding to the paradoxes in the 
process of abjection, different ways of constructing and managing the ambivalence that is 
inevitable given the emergence of the divine and the demonic from primordial 
undifferentiation.  Specifically, the interpretive differences here concern the relative 
autonomy and power of the demonic:  Cordovero hastens to give the upper hand to the 
holy forces by positioning the phenomena in Elijah's vision on the holy side, while 
Buzaglo portrays those phenomena as fearsome destructive forces.  They also concern the 
relative anteriority of the two dimensions:  while Ibn Lavi stresses the supreme holiness 
of the earliest emerging substance, Tohu (despite its unholy homologue), Cordovero and 
Buzaglo stress its unholy character.  To be sure, some of these interpretive positions are 
rather closer to the plain meaning and spirit of the text than others; their divergences 
remain, nonetheless, highly symptomatic of the paradoxes of abjection.  If neither the 
(divine) subject nor its (demonic) others are primordially given, but rather emerge 
through an arduous struggle of differentiation, then it is not at all surprising that the 
location of a particular entity in relation to the dividing line between the dimensions 
might be difficult to determine.  Nor is it surprising to find a lack of clarity about the 
agent of the process of the emergence of the holy cosmos and its unholy counterpart – for 
the identity of the agents are only established as a result of the process.     
 
One striking expression of this inherent indeterminacy is the notion found in Ibn Lavi, as 
well as other kabbalistic texts, that the word "Tohu" may refer to the highest level of 
either the divine or the demonic.
86
  In doubling Tohu between holy and unholy forms, 
and portraying it as an intermediate stage between zohama and a crystallized demonic 
realm, such texts bring together the splitting and abjection perspectives.  I note that the 
                                                 
86
  The influential commentary on the Sefer Yetsirah by Yosef ben Shalom Ashkenazi, a 14th century 
author outside the Zohar circles, (commonly misattributed to the Ra’avad), also presents Tohu as a superior 
divine level, the sefirah of Ḥokhmah.  Sefer Yetsirah Ha-Shalem, 77.    
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notion of a holy form of Tohu does not appear as such in the Zohar, though it seems to 
me to be compatible with its spirit.
87
       
  
c. “Fierce Rage” 
 
I turn from the emergence of evil through processes at the highest and lowest divine 
levels to those that take place at two intermediate levels, those of Gevurah and Binah.  
The processes described at these levels do not concern the initial constitution of 
structures or personages; rather, they involve disruptions of the identity of already-
constituted structures or personages, the rectification of which brings about the 
reconstitution of those structures and personages.  Nonetheless, the processes are quite 
homologous to those that place at the highest and lowest levels – beginning with the 
emission of inchoate refuse, requiring reconsolidation of the divine structure, and 
accompanied by the ever-present danger of the crystallization of an autonomous demonic 
realm as a result of this process.     
 
I first turn to the Zohar’s most prevalent portrayal of the advent of the demonic, its 
emergence as a byproduct of the dissociation of divine subjectivity associated with the 
hypertrophy of Gevurah, the sefirah of divine judgment.  In this context, the ironic trope 
of limitation portraying the emergence of refuse out of a plenitude is not that of an 
intentional act of divine majesty going pathetically astray, but rather the tragicomic 
spectacle of a fierce divine passion, the fire of God’s wrath, yielding an inchoate miasma, 
mere smoke.  This volatilization of divine ferocity, its transformation from exorbitance 
into intangibility, is then followed by a trope of representation, a prosopopeia, in which 
the smoke becomes personified, crystallizing as the mighty adversaries of the divine, the 
                                                 
87
 The description of the first stages of emanation at the beginning of Zohar Bereshit (Zohar I, 15a, a 
passage that may be called the "tehiru" passage) and the portrayal of the emergence of refuse and the 
demonic several folios later in the "snow in the water" passage contain very similar language.  Both portray 
the emergence of color and form from inchoate stuff – the “zohama” and Tohu in the “snow in the water” 
passage and the tehiru and the kutra be-golma [“a cluster of vapour forming in formlessness”] in the tehiru 
passage.  Both describe the striking of a flame as driving the process – the “hard fire” in the “snow in the 
water” passage, the botsina de-kardinuta in the tehiru passage.   The parallels are close enough to suggest 
that the Tohu/Tohu doubling, with its bringing together of splitting and abjection, is close to the spirit of 
the Zohar – although an exact one-to-one correlation between the images of the two passages may not be 
drawn.    
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diabolical male and female, Sama’el and Lilith, with their own autonomous place in the 
cosmos.    
 
Two Zoharic passages elaborately portray the two steps of this process, one in Zohar Va-
Yetze, the other in Zohar Pekude.  While the two passages should be read as 
complementary, the most complete portrayal is in the latter:   
 
ור וגמ אקפנ אננת דכד ,אד לע אד ,אזגור רתב אזגור ליזאו ,אננת אוהה טשפתא ,ףיקת אזג
 אננת יראש דכו .ףיקת אזגור אלכ יוהמל ,אבקונו רכדד וזיחב ,אד לע טילשו ביכר אדו
 אזגורד אננת טשפתא רתבלו ,אטשפתאל הדוקנ דחד וקיחדב ,אזגור וגמ קיחד ,אטשפתאל
.אשאבאל םיכח איוח דחכ ,ומיקעב 
 אל אקפנד אשיר ,היתכודב חנו ,טאשו ליזא ,תיחנו קילס ,ךושח והיאד אגרד והיא ,אטשפת
 ארחא רתא לע אלצ ,לצ והיאו .אזגור וגמ קיפנד אננת אוההמ אבשיתאל אגרד אמייקו
 ןוניא ןיגרד ןירת ,אנמיקוא אהו ,תומלצ ירקא אדחכ והייוורת ןרבחתמ דכו ,תומ ירקאד
אדחכ ןארבחתמד… 88 
 
For when smoke goes forth from fierce wrath, that smoke spreads, wrath 
after wrath, this upon this, this riding and ruling this, appearing as male 
and female, becoming all a furious wrath.  As smoke begins to spread, it 
pushes from within the wrath through the pressure of one point, spreading.  
Then the smoke of wrath spreads twistingly, like a certain ḥivya skilled in 
doing evil. 
The head that goes forth to spread is a dark rung.  It ascends and descends, 
roams about, and rests in its place.  The rung endures, settling, out of that 
smoke that goes forth from wrath.  And it is “Shadow,” a shadow on 
another place called “Death.”  And when the two of them join as one, it is 
called “Shadow of Death.” As we have established, they are two rungs 
joining as one.
89
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 Zohar II, 242b-243a. 
89
 Matt VI, 405 (translation modified). 
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This passage portrays a process structured in a fashion similar to those at the two levels 
discussed above.  A strong initiative emerges from within the divine sphere, here, the 
swelling of "fierce wrath" [ףיקת אזגור] , a hypertrophy of Gevurah; this strong initiative 
produces an inchoate, miasmic emission – here, smoke; this inchoate element is then 
described, in mysterious imagery and poetic cadences, as spreading out and beginning to 
take on visible, personified form, the "appearance of male and female" [אבקונו רכדד וזיחב]; 
these adumbrated "appearances" then take on a more substantial existence – significantly, 
in the form of "settling" and acquiring "places" in the cosmos, indeed, becoming 
metonymically identified with those "places," those of "Shadow" and "Death."  Having 
gained this autonomous foothold in the cosmos, this male and female can then engage in 
a diabolical version of the coupling of the divine male and female.  Having acquired 
distinct form, place, and vitality, they can then descend into the world to do their 
mischief.  This passage thus portrays the complete process of the emergence of evil:  
from the dissociation of subjectivity as a result of the swelling of anger; to the abjection 
of smoke; to crystallization as the male and female devils – or, in rhetorical terms, from 
the irony of the emergence of insubstantial smoke out of fierce divine anger to the 
prosopopeia involved in the crystallization from that smoke of the faces of the diabolical 
enemy.     
 
The second passage is found in the Sitre Torah section printed in Zohar Va-Yetze: 
  
ארתס ןירתסד ארתס ,קחציד ארהיטד אפקותד וגמ( ,קפנ )ארמחד אידרוד וגמ ,אריטק וציענ דח קפנ ,
אבקונו רכד דח לילכ ,אדרווכ אקמוס ,ןיליבשו ןירטס המכל ןשרפתמ ,אמס ירקא ארוכד"ל , היבקונ
רידת היוגב אלילכ ,רטסב והיאד המכ ארחא ארטסב ימנ יכה השודק ,אדב אד ןלילכ אבקונו רכד. 
אמסד אבקונ"ירקא שחנ ל ,םינונז תשא ,רשב לכ ץק ,םימיה ץק ,אדחכ ןקבדתמ ןישיב ןיחור ןירת90  
  
The secret of secrets: 
Out of the scorching noon of Isaac, 
out of the dregs of wine, 
a fungus [or "complex"] emerged, a cluster [or "form"], 
                                                 
90
 Zohar I, 148a. 
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male and female together, 
red as a rose, 
expanding in many directions and paths. 
The male is called Sama'el, 
his female is always included within him. 
Just as it is on the side of holiness, 
so it is on the other side [Sitra Aḥra]: 
male and female embracing one another. 
The female of Sama'el is called Serpent [Naḥash],  
Woman of Whoredom,  
End of All Flesh, End of Days.  
Two evil spirits joined together
91
 
  
As should be evident, these two passages contain very closely related narratives.  Both 
portray the emergence of a structured form of evil from the inchoate byproducts that issue 
from the hypertrophy of Gevurah.  In this second passage, the "dregs of wine" (filling the 
role played by "smoke" in the first passage) emerge from the "scorching noon of Isaac" 
(in the place of the first passage's image of the hypertrophy of Gevurah, "fierce rage").  
Indeed, the irony of the sequence "scorching noon  dregs of wine" is even greater than 
"fierce rage  smoke."  They then gradually and mysteriously crystallize – beginning 
with the minimal proto-form of "a fungus … a cluster," and then taking on the 
personified form of the diabolical male and female couple, explicitly designated spatially 
as existing "on the Other Side," and coming to mate with each other, just like the divine 
couple on the holy side.  In this passage, the prosopopeia is more explicit, as the inchoate 
fungus gives rise to two named personages, already proceeding to “embrace one 
another.”  In both passages, the rapidity of the process and the recurring references to 
“spreading out” evoke the image of a metastasis, “the movement of pain, disease, 
function, etc., from one site to another within the body … as in many malignancies.”92 
                                                 
91
 This somewhat free verse translation is from Daniel C. Matt (trans.), Zohar:  The Book of Enlightenment, 
77.  The first two words I added in brackets are adapted from the Sulam's Hebrew translations [ & הבכרה
הרוצ].  Sulam, V, 13. 
92
 Oxford English Dictionary.  I note that metastasis is also the name for a rhetorical technique, the “rapid 
transition” from “one type of figure to another.” 
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Although these passages portray the crystallization of the demonic out of the abject, they 
do not explicitly tell us of the effect on divine subjectivity of the hypertrophy of Gevurah 
and its attendant abject byproducts.  Another passage dealing with smoke, which may be 
called the “pleasing aroma” passage, implicitly completes the picture.   The passage 
discusses the effect on God’s wrath of Noah’s postdiluvian sacrifice.  It portrays the 
theurgical modulation of Gevurah, thanks to which divine anger can wax and wane 
without the emergence of an autonomous demonic – or, to use the terms of the two 
passages already discussed, where the emission of the abject does not lead, though 
metastatic “spreading out,” to the acquisition by the demonic of a stable “place” in the 
cosmos.  The passage can thus indirectly teach us, by a sort of a contrario inference, 
about the disruptions of divine identity wrought by processes which do generate 
stabilized demonic entities, as in the two passages discussed above.   
 
The passage first seeks to explain how destructiveness emerges from the divine, 
specifically the divine wrath associated with the “nose,” an image of  Gevurah.  
 
 ד והיאו ויגלמ קיפנ שא אננת ןידכו ,אדב אד ןדחאתאו ,יכה קד והיא ואלד רבל ארחא הלמב דיחאו ,ק
.אשא וגמ אננת היב קיפנד אמטוח ךינמיסו ,שיגרד הלמב אשא דיחאתאד ןיגב ,אמעט יאמ ,אקלס 93 
 
 Fire issues from within, and is tenuous, grasped by another substance, without, 
less tenuous; they are grasped by one another.  Then smoke ascends.  Why?  
Because fire is grasped by sensate substance.  Your symbol for this is the nose, 
through which smoke issues out of fire.
94
 
 
It is, significantly, this abjected by-product, the “smoke,” rather than its source, 
the divine “fire,” that “destroys everything.”95   
 
                                                 
93
 Zohar I, 70a. 
94
 Matt I, 412. 
95
  Zohar I, 70b [אלכ יצשו]. 
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After portraying the emergence of the destructive smoke, the passage describes 
the theurgic effect of the divine inhaling of the “sweet savour” of the sacrifice: 
 
  אלכ דיחאתאד דע ,וגל וגל אחיר אוההב שינכתא )שיגרתא( אמטוחו ,הירתאל אשא רדהאד ןיגב ...
הירתאל בתו  אזגור חנד דע   ,... הבשחמ וגל אלכ ברקתאו96 
 
 … for fire returns to its site, and through that aroma the nose contracts inward, 
inward – till all is embraced, returning to its site, all drawn in toward Thought 
...until wrath subsides.
97
    
 
Theurgically thwarting the metastasis of divine wrath, the “pleasing aroma” pacifies the 
destructiveness embodied in the smoke, as well as the wrath embodied in the fire, by 
reunifying them with the upper levels of the divine – and “all is embraced and returns to 
its site.”   
 
The passage thus portrays the relation between constituted subjectivity and  experiences 
of abjection.  Specifically, it portrays the disturbance of subjectivity brought about by the 
emission of miasmic byproducts as a result of the flaring of divine anger.  This 
hypertrophy of Gevurah leads to the loss of coherence of the divine subject, the 
displacement of its elements from their proper sites – above all, the dissociation of divine 
wrath from divine “Thought” (or, sefirotically, of Gevurah from Ḥokhmah or Keter)   
The “pleasing aroma” of the sacrifice induces the divine subject to take a deep breath, to 
take a moment to draw back from “Thought-less” anger.  Just as a person might try to 
regain control of himself after an attack of rage, this deep breath allows the divine to re-
align its “Might” to its “Thought.”   The deep breath thus enables the various elements of 
the divine to resume their proper proportions, regain their proper places, and reconnect to 
each other.    With the reconstitution of Gevurah in its proper “site” after the abjection of 
its dangerous byproduct, the destructive force embodied in “smoke,” the divine subject 
can regain its coherence.  Having disrupted the movement from abjection to 
crystallization, from miasmic emission to a structured demonic cosmos, the theurgy of 
                                                 
96
 Zohar I, 70a. 
97
 Matt I, 412. 
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sacrifice yields a divine subject in which “all is embraced, returning to its site.”  The 
coherence of the divine subject is thus subject to these recurrent processes of abjection 
and reconsolidation.   
 
We need now only read this passage in relation to the passages in which the abject 
emissions from Gevurah do lead to the consolidation of an autonomous demonic realm to 
obtain the full picture.  The construction of a coherent divine subjectivity is precarious, 
vulnerable to periodic experiences of dissociation, and requiring periodic efforts of 
reconsolidation.  The abject byproducts associated with these periodic crises lead to the 
crystallization, or reinforcement, of an autonomous demonic realm.  Only extraordinary 
human action can disrupt this otherwise inevitable construction of the demonic as a result 
of the periodic crises of the coherence of the divine subject. 
 
d. “The River” 
 
Finally, I turn to perhaps the most obscure example of the constitution of evil from 
abjection, the processes associated with the sefirah of Binah.  When it comes to 
portraying the relationship of Binah to harsh judgment and thence to the demonic, the 
Zohar is at its most overtly paradoxical and seemingly most concerned to avoid 
contaminating the holy with the unholy.  The following declaration portrays this 
relationship at its most inexplicable: 
 
היב חכתשא אל אניד לחנ יאהבד בג לע ףא ןנינתד ,הינמ ןירעתמ ןיניד98 
 
As we have learned:  even though judgment is not found in this stream, judgments 
are aroused from it. 
 
In such a pronouncement, the question of how an entity which is itself pure compassion, 
in which “no judgment is found,” could "arouse” judgment seems deliberately foreclosed, 
if not forbidden.  The irony here, of the perfectly compassionate Binah arousing 
                                                 
98
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judgment, is not even attributed to an action, as with the botsina, or with a swelling 
emotion, as with the fire of the divine wrath, but simply posited as a mystery.  The irony 
here seems to verge on an inexplicably tragic reversal.     
 
Other passages, however, provide rather more elaboration, while maintaining a greater or 
lesser sense of mystery.  The three passages I will discuss here portray both linguistic and 
ontological relationships between Binah and judgment, though the stress in each is on the 
disjunctive or diversionary nature of such relationships.  The first passage contains both 
linguistic and ontological dimensions, with emphasis on the former – specifically, on the 
mystery of those places in the Bible when the divine name which is written as the 
Tetragrammaton, YHVH, signifying compassion, is read as Elohim, signifying 
judgment.
99
  This disjunction epitomizes the mystery of Binah: 
 
רתא לכב ןוניא ימחר ןוותא אהו ,ם"יהלא ירקא יאמא ... לכב ה"והי  יכפהמד אתעשבו ,ימחר רתא
ם"יהלא היל ןנירקו ,ה"והי ביתכ ןידכ ,אנידל ימחר איבייח ...  
אתנגל םא ירקתא ארהנ יאהו...  ביתכ ךכ ןיגבו ,ןירעתמ ןיניד אהרטסמ אה ,אהדוחלב ימחר ירקא
אהרטסמ אניד דיגנתאו ,ימחרב ןוותא ,אנידב דוקנו ,ימחרב 100 
 
Why is it called Elohim [i.e., though written as YHVH] since these letters 
[YHVH] are compassion in every place?! ... YHVH is in every place compassion, 
but at a time when sinners transform compassion into judgment, then it is written 
YHVH and we call it Elohim ... And this river is called the mother of the garden 
… She is called compassion when she is alone, yet from her sides judgments are 
aroused.  And therefore, it is written in compassion [i.e., as YHVH], and 
vowelized in judgment [i.e., as Elohim]; the letters in compassion, and judgment 
flows from her sides. 
 
At the linguistic level, the link between Binah and judgment is thus a relationship 
between a semantic essence, the unvowelized letters, and semantic expression, the 
vowelized letters.  The movement from one to the other is a reversal from compassion to 
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judgment, the two great Zoharic opposites.  This reversal is introduced by a question, an 
astonishment that that which is “compassion in every place” can be read as judgment.  In 
relation to this passage, which treats explicitly of the problematics of verbal expression, 
rhetorical analysis seems very apt:  the trope here is a classical instance of irony, a 
disjunction, or misfire, between the articulated word and the semantic essence it purports 
to express.  This rhetorical reversal is also evoked ontologically in terms hinting at 
something like the organic emission of refuse:  the essence of Binah, the “mother of the 
garden,” is compassion, yet when she expresses herself, she emits judgment from “her 
sides,” an emission in contradiction to her proper essence.  At the phenomenal level, then, 
the passage portrays a relationship between the judgments that emerge from the “sides” 
of Binah and, albeit implicitly, the compassion which emerges from her “front.”  I note 
that the passage attributes this disjunction between essence and expression to “black 
theurgy,” the effect of human sin on the divine, capable of turning an essentially 
compassionate entity into an expressively judgmental one.    
 
A second passage focuses on the ontological dimension.  This passage is concerned with 
the ontological preconditions of the dominance on Rosh Hashanah of judgment, here 
evoked by the name of Isaac, and with the theurgical effect of the blowing of the shofar, 
the latter term evoking both the earthly horn and the divine Shofar, a name of Binah.  The 
dominance of judgment turns on a paradox:  on the one hand, Binah is the mother of the 
three “fathers,” Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the sefirot of Ḥesed, Gevurah, and Tif’eret.  
Since she is compassion, the only way for judgment, Gevurah, Isaac, to dominate is by 
the cessation of the flow of her beneficence.  And yet, Isaac’s force can only come from 
this maternal source.  The Zohar portrays this paradox, that Isaac can only dominate 
when his Mother is both separated and not separated from him, in a series of statements 
of which the two key phrases are the following:     
 
היא ואלד בג לע ףא רהנ יאהו אניד ,היב ופקתתאו הירטסמ יקפנ ןיניד ... 
 ןינבל אקני אלד לודג רפוש אוהה קלתסא דכ ,ףקתתא קחצי ןידכ ,אמלעב אנידל ןקתתאו:101 
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This river: even though it is not itself judgment, judgments come forth from its 
side and are strengthened through it … When that Great Shofar ascends and does 
not suckle its children, then Isaac is strengthened and receives his tikun for 
judgment in the world. 
  
These two phrases must be read together.  The first begins with the familiar assertion of 
Binah’s ontological purity, that “it is not judgment.”  It continues, however, by declaring 
that “judgments issue from its side” and, moreover, “are strengthened through it.”  The 
significance of this is further illuminated through the second phrase: Isaac, one of Binah’s 
“sons,” is strengthened precisely, and paradoxically, when his mother no longer “suckles” 
those “sons.”  Taken together, the two phrases yield the following:  when Binah 
“suckles,” i.e., bestows vitality upon them in a direct, proper way, then the cosmos 
receives only compassion; but when her influence is not proper and direct, viz., when it 
“issues from her side,” then what flows from her is judgment – and it is this indirect, 
“sideways” flow that “strengthens” Isaac.  The blockage that besets Binah, the cessation 
of her “suckling,” separating her from her “sons,” leads to the indirect emission from her 
of that which strengthens Isaac, a condition closely associated with the strengthening of 
the Sitra Aḥra.102   (I explore the “suckling” trope at length below in section C).     
 
A third passage provides even more of a window into the dynamics of abjection – as well 
as of reconsolidation – lurking in the background of the Zoharic mysteries of Binah.  This 
passage, which may be called the “Binah-as-Teshuvah” passage, consists of a series of 
homilies on the question of when the name Teshuvah (i.e., repentance, but literally, 
“return”) is appropriate for the sefirah of Binah.   Each homily concludes with versions of 
the refrain, “and then it is called Teshuvah.”  The close relationship in the Zohar (and 
Jewish tradition generally) between the meriting of a name and ontological achievement 
suggests that this refrain also portrays an ontological event.  This recurrent 
rhetorical/ontological structure, in turn, suggests the implicit ontological disruption for 
which the state of Teshuvah (“return”) is a subsequent repair and reconsolidation.  The 
use of the appellation of Teshuvah in this passage, a relatively uncommon usage in the 
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Zohar, links this text to other 13
th
 century texts in which the abjection dimension is 
clearer.   
 
The first homily in this passage begins with the mysterious issuing forth from Binah of 
stern, destructive, even evil forces in dramatically more graphic language than in the 
excerpts above. 
 
דכ ימחר לע ןיטילש הרובגד יופלוקב ןדחאמ ןיפילג ינידרג ןיקפנ אמיאד ארטסמ”:זט רבדמב( אא"י )
 .והלכב רעתא אתוטטקו שממ ןימילש אלד ןיריסח ןימלע וחכתשא ןידכו .שממ 'יי לע ,'יי לע םידעונה
לע ןיטילשו ימחר ןרעתמו ןרבעתמו ןיניד ןמסבתמ אתתל ןוהידבוע ןירישכמ אמלע ינב יאו  אוהה
אישק אנידמ רעתאד אשיב103 
 
From the side of Mother issue engraved guardians, clutching clubs of Gevurah, 
prevailing over Compassion, as is said:  gathered together over YHVH (Numbers 
16:11) – over YHVH, precisely!  Then the worlds are found lacking, truly 
incomplete, and strife is aroused in them all.  But if inhabitants of the world 
rectify their actions below, then judgments are assuaged and disappear – and 
Compassion is aroused, overpowering that evil aroused by harsh Judgment.
104
   
 
This rare explicit proclamation of the emergence of evil forces from Binah is linked to 
the emergence of the "incomplete worlds that are not whole" – a reference to the midrash 
of the “destroyed worlds” and its Zoharic adaptation.  It thereby associates the emissions 
from Binah with the primordial refuse emitted as a byproduct of the action of the botsina 
de-kardinuta (which, as I showed above, was associated with the “destroyed worlds” in 
the Idra Zuta).  As I discussed above, the Idra Zuta associates the latter process with the 
incompleteness of the would-be creator of these worlds who has not yet received his 
tikun, i.e., the complete construction of his subjectivity.  And, indeed, this is precisely 
what follows in this passage, the repair of Binah and her achievement of the name and 
status of Teshuvah through human action.  This repair is portrayed as the return of all the 
elements of the divine to their proper places, essential for the achievement of this name:    
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ימויקב בת ארתכו ארתכ לכה ,אדחכ והלכ ןאכרבתמו ,הירתאל דחו דח לכ ןיביית דכו , ןאכרבתמו
אדחכ והלכ ,ןיפילג יטידלקב אמיא אמסבתמו ,אהרטסל ןיבייתו ,אמילש הבושת ירקא ןידכ105 
 
Every single crown returns to its status, all blessed as one.  And when each and 
every one returns to its place and they are blessed as one, Mother is sweetened by 
engraved keys, and they return to her sides.  Then she is called Complete 
Teshuvah.
106
  
 
The “return” of the elements of the divine subject, each to its proper place, is expressed in 
language nearly identical to the restoration of the coherence of divine subjectivity 
through Noah’s sacrifice which I described in the previous section.  We see a very similar 
reconsolidation of subjectivity here, subsequent to its disruption by improper emissions, 
yielding a newly coherent subject, “Complete Teshuvah.” 
 
The production of destructive and incomplete worlds from Binah, and her appellation as 
Teshuvah, strongly suggests that this text be read in relation to the key 13
th
 century 
precursor to the Zohar’s reflections on evil, Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen's Ma'amar al Atsilut Ha-
Semalit.   The Ma'amar describes an "emanation, emanated from the power of Teshuvah" 
[הבושתה חכמ לצאנ דחא תוליצא].107  This emanation serves as a “curtain that separates the 
emanation of the upper levels, among whom there are no alien emanations” [ ןיב לידבמ ךסמ
ןהמע תורז תוליצא אלו תושודקה תולעמ לכ תוליצא].   This Teshuvah-emanation, in principle,  
should thus emanate only holy beings.  Immediately, however, things go awry, as essence 
clashes with realization: 
 
ותוריהזמו תוכז תומשנ לש תכ אוה ונממ לצאנש תוליצאה תלחת... תוליצא ןהש תומשנה ולאו
 לעופה לא חכה ןמ םתאצ םדוקו לכהמ םלענה יפכ ליצאמה קיח ךותב תוזונג חכב ודמע םיכאלמה
םיתיחשמ םינוימדמו תורז תורוצמ דחא םלוע לצאנ. 
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The beginning of the emanation that is emanated from it is the group of pure and 
radiant souls … And these souls, which are the emanations of the angels, existed 
in potentia within the bosom of the Emanator, since it is hidden from all.  But 
before they could emerge from potentiality to actuality, one world was emanated 
composed of alien forms and destructive images.  
108
 
 
Indeed, three such destructive worlds are emanated successively, each seeking to 
“undermine and confound” [לבלבלו גרטקל] the proper process of emanation.  After each 
such emanation appears, it is destroyed by the Emanator, a destruction that takes the form 
of a return to the source, as a candle is extinguished by immersing its wick into the very 
oil which sustained it.
109
    
 
In this text, we have a combination of themes closely related to the Zohar's "Binah-as-
Teshuvah" passage. As in the latter passage, deficient, destructive, and evil forces, 
associated with deficient “worlds,” emerge from Binah.  The Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen passage 
links this evil emanation to a tragic mishap in the act of emanation:  Binah was preparing 
to emanate good forces, when it inexplicably emanated evil forces in their stead.  By 
contrast, the Zohar is silent on the occasion for the emanation:  though the subsequent 
unfolding of the passage suggests that it was a result of human sin, the “incomplete 
worlds” theme suggests its link both to the Ha-Kohen Ma’amar and to the frequent use of 
the “destroyed worlds” myth in the Zohar to refer to a primordial mishap in the divine 
unfolding, unconnected to human action.  Another key difference between the two 
passages lies in the fate of the destructive forces.  In the Ma’amar, they are destroyed 
through their “return” to Teshuvah; in the Zohar passage, they are sweetened through 
their “return” to their proper places.   In both texts, however, the appellation Teshuvah 
stems from this entity’s role as a place of “return”; moreover, both fates can be seen as 
forms of reintegration into the divine, bringing to an end the disruption of its proper 
unfolding caused by improper emissions.   
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A missing link of sorts between the Zohar and the Ma’amar is provided in a manuscript 
passage quoted by Moshe Idel, who describes it as both very close to the Ha-Kohen 
brothers and under apparent Zoharic influence.
110
  In the midst of a narrative about 
emanation clearly derived from Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen, this passage explicitly associates the 
Zoharic trope of the emission of “refuse” with Binah and links this emission to the 
constitution of demonic forces.  The passage thus describes the "forces of impurity" as 
having been emanated before the “forces of purity” for “initially the refuse was sifted” 
[תלוספה ררבנ הלחת יכ הרהטה תוחכ םדוק ולצאנ האמטה תוחכ ].111  Specifically, these “forces of 
impurity” were “emanated from the refuse of Teshuvah" [ תוחכ ולצאנ הבושתה תלוספמ יכ
האמוטה ].  The text also refers to the "refuse of Tohu" which comes from Teshuvah [ תלוספ
הבושתהמ היהש והותה ].112  This text thus contains themes linking the themes of the Ha-
Kohen Ma’amar, the Zohar “Binah-as-Teshuvah” passage, and other Zoharic passages 
discussed above.  Although apparently written after the Zohar (or at least some of it), this 
text makes explicit the processes of abjection in relation to Binah that I have argued are 
implicit in the Binah/Teshuvah passage as well as other passages discussed here.        
 
In this section, I have shown very similar processes at four quite different levels.  
Ontologically, at each level, the initial position is one of divine plenitude or tranquillity 
(among others:  primordial Thought, snow-in-the-water, a tranquil “nose,” a judgment-
less Binah), followed by the emission of some refuse (sparks, slime, smoke, evil forces of 
judgment), followed by the constitution or reconstitution of structured spaces inhabited 
by divine and/or demonic personages and structures (the demonic that crystallizes from 
the “unsweetened” sparks, the Tohu that comes from the zohama, Sama’el and Lilith that 
emerge from the smoke, the destructive “guardians” that emerge from Binah).  At a 
rhetorical level, I have identified a recurrent pattern of tropes of limitation, in the form of 
various kinds of irony, followed by tropes of representation, the morpho-poeisis and 
prosopopeia that evoke the crystallization of divine and demonic structures and 
personages.    
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 4.   The Divine and the Demonic:  A Family Affair 
  
Although I have thus far highlighted the similarity of processes occurring on divergent 
levels, I do not intend to minimize the importance of the differences among them.  I have 
noted, for example, that the primordiality of subject-formation through abjection is 
portrayed in a particularly striking way in the Hekhalot di-Pekude text dealing with 
“Primordial Thought” – in which the very subject of the action of the botsina de-
kardinuta is absent, since it will only be formed through the process of abjection 
provoked by the botsina itself.   At other levels, such as Binah and Gevurah, the 
portrayals do not concern the initial constitution of a particular sefirah or its initial 
integration into the entire divine structure but with its re-construction and re-integration 
after a disruption involving the re-appearance of the abject.   
 
Differences among levels also concern the relative concretion of the images:  the 
mysterious and almost untranslatable "botsina de-kardinuta" striking within "Thought," 
on the one hand, and more sensuous images such as “snow-in-the-water” and “fire and 
smoke,” on the other.  Such differences become further accentuated when we move to the 
Zoharic passages that portray the emergence of the Sitra Aḥra through the most concrete 
images of "generation," that is, through images of human procreation and family dramas.   
In such passages, the portrayal of the relationship of abjection to subject-formation is the 
explicit theme.  Using such human images to portray metaphysical processes, these texts 
are more concrete, more routinized, and, perhaps, even more provocative than those 
discussed above.  Such passages have two inter-related emphases – the relationship of 
holy progenitors to good and evil offspring and the sibling relationship between such 
offspring. 
a. Procreational Purification:  the "Afterbirth” passage 
 
A paradigmatic passage with the first of these emphases is contained in a passage in 
Zohar Terumah that may be called the "afterbirth" passage.
113
  This passage is an 
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elaborate variant of several Zoharic passages describing the divine unfolding through an 
exegesis of the first and second days of creation.  In keeping with this scriptural context, 
the passage focuses on the vicissitudes of “light,” usually associated with the male 
dimension of the divine, often with the sefirah of Ḥesed and the patriarch Abraham.  The 
passage identifies, in the repetitive structure of signifiers in the third verse of Genesis, an 
interruption of the smooth unfolding of the divine.  This repetition appears only in the 
Hebrew – yehi or va yehi or - רוא יהיו רוא יהי.  The first “yehi or” is associated with the 
right side, the second with the left – indeed, not just any left, but the left (implicitly 
associated with Isaac) from which the Sitra Aḥra emerges.  The repetition of the word 
“light” thus shifts the meaning of its second iteration to its opposite, the "darkness" 
ultimately manifested in the evil deeds of the corrupter Esau, Isaac’s son, and here 
implicitly identified with Sama’el.114  This kind of repetitive structure – in which 
repetition becomes a way to signify radical difference – is a favorite Zoharic 
constructional scheme, that of anaphora, as I showed in Chapter One. That the English 
translation, "'Let there be light,' and there was light,” does not have the same effect 
highlights the fact that this meaning is produced purely by the scheme, rather than the 
semantic content.   
 
The emergence of the right is thus immediately followed by the emergence of a 
potentially malevolent left; indeed, the very divine attempt to lead the right from 
potentiality to actuality – from the command “yehi or” to its realization “va-yehi or” – 
begins the process leading to the emergence of the Sitra Aḥra.  This is a sequence that we 
have now seen a number of times, in Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen’s Ma’amar as well as in a 
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 Zohar II, 167a, Matt V, 467-468 (translation modified): 
 ,רוא יהי רמאד ןויכ ,רוא יהיו ...אנימי והיאד האמדק רוא אד ,רוא יהי אלא ,איגס ןכ יהיוב אהד ,רוא יהיו ביתכ יאמא
 ארטסב אתיירואד האמדק יהיוד ןאכמ .אלאמש אד רוא יהיו אד לעו ,אלאמש קפנ אנימיד אזרמו ,אלאמש קפנ אנימימד
א"נ( היבד ןיגב ,אמעט יאמ ,הכרב ןמיס והיא ואל ךכ ןיגבו ,הוה אלאמשד  ,אמלע יפנא ךישחאד ךשח אוהה קפנ )הינמד
 שיא יהיוב םייקתא ,דיצ עדוי שיא ושע יהיו )זכ הכ םש( ביתכד ,הוה יהיו יאהב ,יודבועו ושעד אזר ילגתא דכ אד אנמיסו
רשימ חראב ןוכהי אלד אמלע ינב האתפל ,דיצ עדוי. 
Since it says Let there be light! Why is it written And there was light?  It would have sufficed to 
say And it was so.  Well, Let there be light! – primordial light, which is the right.  And there was 
light – for right generated left, and from mystery of right issued left.  So, and there was light – 
left.  From here we see that the first יהיו, Va-yehi, and there was, in the Torah was on the left side, 
and therefore it is not a sign of blessing.  Why?  Because by it emerged that darkness who darkens 
the face of the world.  The mnemonic is that when the mystery of Esau and his actions was 
revealed, it was by this יהיו, Va-yehi:  ושע יהיו, Va-yehi Esav, And Esau was a cunning hunter 
(Genesis 25:27) – to seduce inhabitants of the world not to walk on the straight path. 
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number of Zoharic passages.  The passage then associates the next verse, "And God saw 
the light that it was good" [בוט יכ רואה תא םיהלא אריו] with the emergence of the “Central 
Column,” which "resolves the dispute between right and left” [   אנימיד תקולחמ שירפא
אלאמשו].115  This reconciliation between right and left can only happen after the 
emergence of the “darkness” and its crystallization into “Esau” – i.e., only after the 
expulsion of the abject and its consolidation into an adversary.  Only after this departure 
of the inassimilable is the creation of light completed such that God “saw that it was 
good.”116    
 
The passage then goes on, through an exegesis of the Genesis account of the second day, 
to map this process onto a vivid organic description modeled on human procreation.  
First, it associates the three elements highlighted in the account of the first and second 
day – light, water, and firmament – with the cosmic right, left, and center.  It then 
associates the light with male "seed" which is placed into female "water."  During the 
pregnancy that follows this entry of "seed" into "water," a "body" gradually takes form, 
associated with the cosmic "center" and the "firmament."   
  
ירקא ,אפוגד אנקוידו ארויצ ףילגאו רייצתאד ןויכ ךותב עיקר והיא אדו ,עיקר ירקאו וטישפ אוהה ש
 דיגנאד א"ד( אתוחל אוהה שירקא אהד ,םימש עיקרל ם"יהלא ארקיו ביתכ ,שירקאד רתבלו ,םימה
 אתוחל אוהה ,ויקנב יקנתאו אפוג רירבתאד ןויכ .םימ ןוניא וג הוהד אפוגד )תלוספ אוהה ראתשאו
תה וג דבעתא אקד ,תלוספ הוה ,ראתשאו דיגנתאד דיבעתא ןוהנמו ,ןירוכע םיערה םימ ןוניאו ,אכו
אבקונו רכד ,אמלע לכל אגרטקמ ,תלוספ117  
 
Once the form and the image of the body was fashioned and engraved, that 
expansion congealed, and it was called “firmament” – and this is “a firmament in 
the midst of the waters” (Genesis 1:6).   After it congealed, it is written:  “Elohim 
called the firmament Heaven” (ibid., 8), for the moisture of the body within that 
water congealed.  Once the body was sifted/clarified/purified and thoroughly 
cleansed, the moisture that flowed and remained was refuse, which was made in 
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the smelting.  And those are evil, filthy waters. And from them refuse was made – 
Accuser of the whole world, male and female.
118
 
 
The engenderment of a fully formed individual "body,” a term often identified in the 
Zohar with the sefirotic structure as a whole or at least with its central personage, Kudsha 
Berikh Hu or Ze’er Anpin, suggests that the “seed” and “water” might be identified here 
with the sefirot of Ḥokhmah and Binah, often referred to in the Zohar as the mother and 
father of the divine son, Kudsha Berikh Hu / Ze’er Anpin.   Alternatively, they may refer 
to the male and female dimensions internal to this male figure, the sefirot of Ḥesed and 
Gevurah, though the pregnancy imagery would then seem far less apt. 
 
After the engenderment of this “body” that is "thoroughly cleansed" and "purified" [ ןויכ
ויקנב יקנתאו אפוג רירבתאד], something "remains," a formless "moisture."  This "remainder," 
this abject, is the aspect of the "water," the left side, that was not assimilable by the 
“body.” This inchoate remainder is the "refuse" that is “made” as such in the “smelting” 
process [אכותה וג דבעתא אקד ,תלוספ הוה], a refuse which then comes to be named "filthy 
waters."  From this fluid refuse, identifiable, personified forms then crystallize, the 
diabolical male and female.  The demonic forces that emerge from the inassimilable 
remainder, the inevitable byproduct of the process of procreation, thus emerge out of the 
same process that leads to the crystallization of the divine “body.”   In a parallel passage 
in Zohar Bereshit, the byproduct of the union of the left and right in the firmament is 
Hell, which crystallizes out of the “fire of wrath” [אזגורד אשא] that arises with the first 
emergence of the left side.
119
  Such passages can be read as variations on still other 
Zoharic passages portraying the birth of the divine son and daughter after gestation in the 
womb of the divine mother – but which may lack the portrayal of abjection.120    
 
A bit further on in the passage, the Zohar proceeds to a further portrayal of the purging of 
refuse [תלספ] through procreation.  It portrays the three sons of Eve as stages on the way 
to purification – Cain an attempt to purge the refuse from the left, Abel from the right, 
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and Seth as the complete purification.
121
  Although this section of the passage may partly 
refer to the first human family, it is a short version of a more elaborate narrative in the 
Idra Raba which explicitly refers to a divine family – Ze’er Anpin identified with Adam 
as father, the Matronita with Eve as mother, and Cain, Abel, and Seth as clearly 
metaphysical personages.  Cain and Abel are associated with contaminated spirits, whose 
contamination is identified with their inassimilability into the divine structure, 
particularly its bounded subjectivity, its “body”:   
 
  ןוהנמ עדנמל ,ןוהיבגל ברקיד ןאמ לכ ןבאסמו ,ןיבאסמו ןיקיחר והלכ ,אפוגב וללכתא אלד ןירתכ ןוניא לכ
ןילמ: ... מ אה יכה יא ,אמית יכו אללכמ רבל ןווהיל יא םולשו סחד ,אל ,אפוגד אללכב ןוהתילו ןישידק ןיכאל
 ]אלא[... ימייקתמ אלו ןישידק ווה אל ,אשידק אפוגד אללכב ןוהתילד ינהמ רב ,םדאד אללכב ]ןיכאלמ[ והלכ
והיידהב ברקיד ןאמ לכ ןבאסמו ,ןיבאסמ ןוניאד ,אפוגד122 
 
All of these crowns that were not included in the Body, they are all distant and 
contaminated.  And they contaminate anyone who draws near to them in order to 
learn things from them… And if you say, if so, behold the holy angels, they are 
not included in the Body!  No, heaven forbid, for if they were outside, not 
included in the holy Body, they would not be holy and they would not endure … 
[But rather,] all [angels] are included in ‘Adam,’ except for those who are not 
included in the Body, for those are contaminated, and contaminate all who draw 
near to them. 
 
I return to this theme of the generation of contaminated spirits below.  Here, I only wish 
to stress the notion that the test for holiness is identified with the possibility of “inclusion 
in the Body.”  Or, in Kristeva’s terms:  that which a bounded subject must exclude from 
its “clean and proper body” is the abject; or, conversely, the abject is that which cannot 
be included in subjectivity.  Approaching too close to the abject is disastrous for the 
subject, contaminating it, ruining its bounded nature. 
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Before concluding this sub-section,  I note that, in the middle of the "afterbirth" passage, 
the Zohar interpolates an alternative description of the divine unfolding, that of the "first 
Adam" [האמדק םדא] to which the gendered dimension of the interaction between “light,” 
“water,” and “firmament” is not applicable [ אלבו ארוכד אלב אבקונ ];123 the gendered 
description is then ascribed to the “second Adam” [אניינת םדא].124  This alternative 
description features the same three elements, light, water, and firmament, but their 
interaction happens within the mishḥata [אתחשמ] (a term meaning both “measure” and 
oil),
125
 rather than in the womb, and there is no mention of refuse.  Instead of the 
gestational and family dramas of the first description, the alternative process is said to 
happen in a “straight path” [רשימ חראב].126   
 
In comparison with the lengthy and elaborate gendered description, this part of the 
passage is short and enigmatic; it also comes as an interruption between two phases of the 
main description, both structured by gender and the purging of contaminants.  There is 
wide disagreement among the traditional commentators about the meaning of this 
interpolation, and about how to understand the distinction between the "first” and 
“second” Adam."127  According to Cordovero, the key difficulty that compels the Zohar 
to elaborate the alternative portrayal is that, otherwise, one would be imputing the 
presence of "waste" [רתומ] to Binah.128 Of course, given the identification of Binah with 
the Supernal Mother, this desire to avoid sullying Binah can only appear highly 
symptomatic to any psychoanalytically attuned reading.  Cordovero’s comment must also 
be associated with the complex dynamics I discussed above in relation to Binah, whose 
“sides” are the source of din.  In any case, it is unclear how Cordovero would reconcile 
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his comment here with the passage in Zohar Bereshit asserting the identity of the 
gestational processes in Binah and Malkhut.
129
   
 
The co-existence of the two portrayals of the generation of “Adam” lend themselves to a 
number of interpretations, variations of those I have broached in relation to other 
juxtapositions of incompatible images in the Zohar.   We may, of course, simply be faced 
with two different traditions or views juxtaposed by the author or compiler.  We may be 
reading yet another portrayal of two conditions of the divine, to be placed in a series with 
such texts as the opening of the Idra Raba, with its two states of Atika, or the very 
different dynamics in the “Bald God” passage.  In any case, I would argue their very 
obscurely explained co-presence within this passage suggests a particularly acute instance 
of the construction and management of ambivalence.    
 
The structure of the passage, in which the non-gendered description is interpolated 
between two phases of the gendered description, could also be read as an instantiation on 
the expository plane of processes homologous to those I have shown on the ontological 
plane.  Just as a number of passages show how the emission of refuse and the 
crystallization of the demonic are necessary ontological preparations for the full 
accomplishment of divine creativity, so here a description of the emission of refuse and 
the crystallization of the demonic are necessary expository preparations for a description 
of the process without the emission of refuse.  And just as the precarious accomplishment 
of divine creativity is always followed ontologically by further relapses that require 
further tikunin, so the exposition of the “straight” process of divine unfolding is followed 
by further elaboration of the purification process.        
 
  b. Brothers and Sisters 
 
I now turn to passages that emphasize the sibling relationship between the divine and 
demonic, a logical, or rather genealogical, corollary of the notion that the same 
progenitors give birth to both holy and unholy offspring.  I have already touched on this 
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question in my discussion of the “afterbirth” passage, in which the birth of the “Body,” 
usually synonymous with the central divine figure, Kudsha Berikh Hu, is a product of the 
same processes which give rise to the devil and his consort.  In this section, I will focus 
on other examples, in which the sibling relationship between divine and demonic 
personages is the central focus of the text.   
 
I first turn to an elaborate passage at Zohar III:55b-56a that discusses Isaac's paternity of 
both Esau and Jacob.  Implicitly rejecting the view of a midrash endorsed by Rashi,
130
 the 
passage stresses that Esau was formed from the first seminal “drop" emitted by Isaac, and 
Jacob from the second "drop."
131
 Esau's ruddiness, the color of judgment and hence of the 
Sitra Aḥra, is attributed to the fact that he originated in this first, still unpurified "drop."  
This image, like that of the birth of Cain prior to Seth,
132
 rests on the recurrent Zoharic 
notion of the necessity for an initial prior emission of refuse before the good form can be 
produced.  In the graphic image of this passage, the Esau "drop" was not "perfected" 
[םילש], unlike the Jacob "drop."  I note also that, while such an emission might be 
expected in the case of parents like Eve or Isaac, since the feminine (Eve) and Gevurah 
(Isaac) are associated with the left side, other Zoharic passages also portray such an 
emission with respect to Abraham.
133
    
 
A genealogical corollary of this phenomenon is the intimate sibling relationship between 
the divine and demonic, associated respectively with good and bad offspring.  One 
passage declares that the relationship between Isaac and Ishmael should be viewed as that 
between "gold" and its "dregs"
134
 – with the familial and mineral images working 
together to reinforce the deep intimacy between the divine and demonic.  The relationship 
between Jacob and Esau, however, receives much greater attention – indeed, their names 
often respectively signify Ze’er Anpin or Kudsha Berikh Hu, on the one hand, and 
Sama’el, the chief of the diabolical realm, on the other.  Moreover, the twinning 
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relationship between Jacob and Esau suggests an even more intertwined relationship than 
that between refuse and essence, although the latter image is also used.   
 
The Zohar's tracking of the biblical narratives of the relationship between Jacob and Esau 
takes us well beyond the initial stage of subject-formation-through-abjection to the 
subsequent stage of grappling with a fully crystallized demonic Other.  As the biblical 
account itself tells us, this struggle occurred even within the womb, presumably once the 
initial "drops" stage passed.  One extended passage portrays the twinning relationship 
between the two as emerging not so much as a genetic matter but as an effect of the 
ongoing struggle between them:  Jacob proceeds in the manner of a "crooked snake" with 
Esau, because the latter "drew upon that snake," i.e., Sama’el.135  It is thus the struggle 
with the demonic sibling that produces the similarity between the two, making it possible 
to refer to the two antagonists by the same word, "taninim" (a word whose translation, 
and relation to “splitting,” I discussed in Chapter One):  "And Elohim created the great 
taninim” [Genesis 1, 21] – this is Jacob and Esau"  [ בקעי אד ,םילודגה םינינתה תא ם"יהלא ארביו
ושעו ].136   
 
Moreover, even in the "drops" passage itself, after insisting on the difference between the 
two seminal emissions, the Zohar proceeds to two other homonymous relationships 
between the holy and unholy.  Curiously, these relationships are not between Jacob and 
Esau, but between two other, much more unexpected, pairs.  The first is Esau and David 
– both of whom the Bible calls "ruddy" [ינומדא],137 a pair whose closeness and opposition 
are evoked a few pages earlier through a pun on the phrases zohama di-dehava, "refuse 
[zohama] of gold" [אבהדד אמהוז] and zohara di-dehava, "luster [zohara] of gold" [ ארהוז
אבהדד].138  The second, even bolder parallel, is between Esau and Kudsha Berikh Hu, a 
comparison based on the fact that both are called "first" in the bible – "Esau is called first 
… and Kudsha Berikh Hu is called first" [ ןושאר ארקנ ושע... ןושאר ירקא אוה ךירב אשדוקו ].139 
This homonymy appears to contribute to the ability of Kudsha Berikh Hu to destroy Esau, 
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here clearly a name for the chief of the diabolical realm.
140
  The passage thus attributes an 
explicitly rhetorical, and implicitly ontological, twinning to the relationship between the 
divine and the demonic, indeed between God and the Devil, a twinning that is closely 
linked to the struggle between them – in a manner very similar to that of the "taninim” 
passage in its description of the relationship between Jacob and Esau.
141
   
 
The movement in the "drops" passage – from the formless seminal emissions to 
homonymy between the divine and the demonic – is a paradigmatic, if foreshortened, 
example of the process upon which I am focusing in this chapter.  It also highlights some 
of the dangers implicit in this process, another leitmotif in my argument.   A passage in 
the Ra’ya Mehemena draws out these dangers, focusing on the female version of the 
sibling relationship between the divine and the demonic.
142
  This passage describes the 
Shekhinah and Lilith, the "woman of valor" and the "woman of harlotry," as "two 
sisters."   
 
If we attend to the midrashic source for this passage,
143
 this image becomes even more 
startling.  The midrash describes an adulteress who faces the sotah ordeal and sends her 
pure sister, "who resembles her," to the priest so that she may undergo the test in the 
sinner’s place.  Read in light of that background, the Ra’ya Mehemena passage would be 
suggesting not only that the holy and demonic females are sisters, but that they may be 
readily mistaken for each other, even by the "high priest" – a common Zoharic term for 
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the sefirah of Ḥesed, the first of the six sefirot of Kudsha Berikh Hu, the Shekhinah's 
consort.  The midrashic source even implies that the holy female engages in a form of 
cooperation with her demonic sister.  Ultimately, according to the Ra’ya Mehemna, it is 
only through a theurgic ritual, the barely-offering, which functions in the spiritual realm 
like the sotah ordeal in the human realm, that the two twins/opposites may be separated 
from each other.    
 
This resemblance between divine and demonic personages due to their sibling 
relationship poses both cognitive and religious dangers – for if the two resemble each 
other, an ordinary human being, even more so than the human or divine "high priest," 
may mistake one for the other and may even thus come to mistake a demonic figure for 
the true object of religious devotion.  It is only through the ritual that separates the two 
that a person may be saved from this danger – and it is only thus that "Israel remains 
meritorious, without mixture, in relation to the mystery of faith."
144
  The threatening 
“mixture,” that between the divine and the demonic, is the ultimate religious danger, 
ever-latent within a conception of subject-formation that begins with abjection of refuse, 
proceeds to the crystallization of an autonomous Other Side as well as a holy side, 
continues with the movement towards resemblance between the two sides in the course of 
their struggle, and now culminates in the danger of perverse misprision made possible by 
this resemblance.  Or, to use rhetorical terms:  from the irony of inchoate emissions, to 
the prosopopeia of the formation of demonic figures, to the antithetical homonymy of the 
divine/demonic doubles, to the dangerous ambiguity of the reference of any particular 
term.  In my discussion in Chapter Three of the “impersonation” of the holy by the 
demonic, I will return at length to this theme of the cognitive and religious dangers 
caused by ontological and rhetorical "mixtures" of the holy and the demonic. 
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C. Ambivalences of Intimacy  
 
1. Dangerous Liaisons 
  
I use the phrase “ambivalences of intimacy” primarily to refer to sexual liaisons between 
the divine and the demonic; however, I also intend the phrase to evoke a broader range of 
meanings, since intimate liaisons between divine and demonic personages are often 
portrayed with putatively non-sexual verbs – verbs which often seem to be used as 
something more than mere euphemisms for sexuality, but also evoke other associations 
suggested by their “literal” meaning.  In all their variations, intimate relationships 
between the divine and demonic are key sites of the dangerous proximity of the two 
realms.  Such relationships may involve both desire and coercion, as well as 
indeterminate oscillations between the two.  They may also appear variously as episodic 
horrors, as the consequence of tragedy and sin, or as more integral and routinized aspects 
of the cosmic process.  Finally, I note that the portrayal of such intimacies with the 
demonic can focus on a female or male divine protagonist. 
 
The intimate relationships I discuss here transpire between already-crystallized 
personages.  The abjection involved in such relationships primarily appears in the 
debasement undergone by the divine through the very fact of engaging in such intimacies, 
a debasement at times explicitly portrayed as involving a loss of identity – as one would 
anticipate in accordance with the theory of abjection.  Nonetheless, abject emissions also 
play an important role in the portrayal of divine/demonic intimacies in the Zohar, 
particularly when the Shekhinah is the protagonist; they also appear with prominence in 
the writings of the 13
th
 century Joseph of Hamadan, a writer close to the Zohar, in the 
portrayal of the divine male’s relationship to demonic female consorts.  In rhetorical 
terms, such portrayals may be described as a compound form of catechresis:  to the 
prosopopeia of the emergence of mighty personages from inchoate emissions, they add 
the monstrous hybridity of intimacy between incompatible cosmic realms -- "the coupling 
of two realities that seem incapable of coupling [inaccouplables] on a plane that seems 
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unsuited for them."
145
  These couplings are preceded, and made possible, by the irony of 
repulsive emissions issuing forth from divine power – to take the most striking example, 
in the form of refuse from the divine phallus.   
 
I begin with the portrayals of female divine intimacies with the demonic.  The ease with 
which the Shekhinah seems to be forced into consorting with the demonic suggests the 
Zohar's deep mistrust of, as well as desire for, this female figure.  The variety of verbs the 
Zohar uses for this relationship – the demonic "rules" the divine, the divine “tastes” or 
"suckles" the demonic,
146
 and so on – suggests the powerful hold of such relationships on 
the Zoharic imagination.  Indeed, the prevalence of such relationships is such that the 
Shekhinah will only be fully separated from the Sitra Aḥra upon the coming of the 
Messiah; until then, separation only happens at certain privileged moments, such as the 
recitation of the Shema.
147
  The power of the Sitra Aḥra's hold on the Shekhinah is even 
offered as the explanation for the requirement that the verse after the Shema (" םש ךורב
....") be whispered.  This requirement, according to the Zohar, was enacted so that the 
prayer may effect the unification of the Shekhinah with Kudsha Berikh Hu without 
alerting the Sitra Aḥra, as a way of minimizing the danger of the latter’s participation in 
the union.
148
  
 
The medium of the relationship between the Sitra Aḥra and the Shekhinah is the zohama 
that the diabolical male “casts” [ליטא] into her.149  The Zohar’s usage of this term in this 
context undoubtedly derives from its Talmudic usage in portraying the sexual act in the 
Garden between the snake and Eve.
150
  Transposing this relationship to the divine sphere, 
the Zohar explains that the “casting of zohama” into the Shekhinah by the cosmic 
“snake” rendered it impossible for the divine male to have sexual relations with his 
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consort – for the “evil snake” thereby effected a “separation” so that the “sun could not 
have intercourse with the moon” [ ד אשיב איוח אשמש שמשי אלד אדוריפ דבעד אמהוז ליטא
ארהיסב].151     
 
 It is important to note that this term, zohama, is used throughout the Zohar to denote the 
abject, even in putatively non-sexual contexts.  It is probable that all such usages 
ultimately derive from this Talmudic passage.  One example that I have discussed above, 
which seems, at least on first reading, non-sexual, but which is generative of the Sitra 
Aḥra, is the zohama  emitted from the “snow in the water” – the filth which first becomes 
“refuse” [pesolet], then “Tohu,” and then crystallizes as a fully formed demonic force, 
“the mighty wind.”   
 
Another passage succinctly proclaims this process in relation to the generation of 
diabolical personages:  “the Sitra Aḥra is male and female, the strong form of the zohama 
of hard judgment” [אישק אנידד אמהוזד אפקות ,אבקונו רכד והיא ארחא ארטס].152  The personified 
Sitra Aḥra is here explicitly said to be the crystallization, the “strong form,” of the abject.  
If we read this passage in conjunction with that portraying the sexual intimacy of the 
demonic as the “casting of zohama,” we get the following result:  the personified Sitra 
Aḥra, a crystallization of the abject zohama, engages in sexual contact through the 
medium of zohama, which would thus be a partial regression of the crystallized demonic 
back into the zohama‘s abject formlessness – precisely as a means to degrade the 
subjectivity of the divine, to render it abject.  
 
As I noted above, the fallen condition of the Shekhinah, its susceptibility to perverse 
intimacy with the demonic, is so central to the Zohar that it can only be redeemed 
episodically and precariously.  Unifications of Kudsha Berikh Hu and the Shekhinah 
demand a preliminary affirmative act to separate the Shekhinah from the Sitra Aḥra.  One 
passage portraying such a separation on the eve of the Sabbath, the “ke-gavna” 
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passage,
153
 became one of the most well-known Zoharic texts through its incorporation in 
the Friday night Lurianic/Ḥasidic liturgy – an incorporation no doubt intended to have a 
theurgical effect.  As this passage declares, it is only through such a separation that the 
Shekhinah achieves her own unity, rendering her capable of unity with her consort
154
 – 
or, in Kristevan terms, separation from the abject as a prerequisite for subjective 
coherence.  Achievement of true intimacy between the holy male and female, and thus 
the completion of the construction of divine subjectivity,
155
 must traverse abjection and 
its always only provisional overcoming.         
 
This kind of perverse intimacy also troubles the divine male.  Above all, one finds such a 
portrayal in the following passage, in which the divine King, particularly his phallus, the 
Tsadik, the sefirah of Yesod, consorts with the demonic female, the “bondwoman,” 
elsewhere identified with Lilith. 
   
 ןימע ןילא אנימח ,ןועמש  יבר רמא ,ןועמש יברד הימע איירבח ילזא ווה דח אמוי ,יאלע והלכ
 המכ ,אהרתאב והמא ליעאו ,הינמ אתינורטמ רדשא אכלמד ןיגב ,אמעט יאמ ,והלכמ יאתת לארשיו
 שרית יכ החפשו ,'וגו ךולמי יכ דבע תחת ,'וגו ץרא הזגר שלש תחת )אכ ל ילשמ( ,רמא תאד
 החפשב קבדתאד אכלמ ,אכלמ ירקא אל אתינורטמ אלב אכלמ ,רמאו ןועמש יבר הכב... .התריבג
 ט הירכז( אמילו ,אתינורטמל ארשבל אלק אנימזו  .היליד ארקי אוה ןא ,אתינורטמד )הליד( והמאב
 ,עשונ אוה קידצ רמולכ ,אוה עשונו קידצ ךל אבי ךכלמ הנה ,םלשורי תב יעירה ןויצ תב דאמ יליג )ט
ינע ,ביתכ אד לעו :היל קיניו הארכונ רתאב ,היליד ואלד רתאב אתשה דע ביכר הוהד ןיגב  לע בכורו
 ליטקד ןימעד ןיאתת ןירתכ ןוניא אנמיקואד המכ ,רומח לע בכורו ,אתימדקב הוה )אלד( ינע ,רומח
המהב רוכב לכו )ה אי תומש( ,ביתכד אוה אדה ,םירצמב ןוהלד ארכוב אוה ךירב אשדוק:   אתשהו ...
בא ,דבא יאמו ,...ארחא ארטסב ביתי אל אהד ,אוה עשונו קידצ ,אדחכ ןוגוודזיד ,אתינורטמל ד
החפש ירקאד ארחא רתאב קבדתאו156 
 
 
                                                 
153
 Zohar II, 135a-b.    
154
 Zohar II, 135b: 
חיב תראתשא יהיאו ,הנימ ןירבעתמ ןיניד לכו ,ארחא ארטסמ תשרפתאו תדחיתא יהיא ,אתבש לייע דכאשידק וריהנד אדו 
When Sabbath enters, She unifies herself and separates herself from the Other Side, and all 
judgments pass away from her.  And she remains in the unity of the holy light. 
155
 “A king without a queen is not called a king” [  אתינורטמ אלב אכלמאכלמ ירקא אל ].  Zohar III, 69a. 
156
 Zohar III, 69a. 
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One day, as the companions were walking with R. Shim’on, he said: ‘I see 
all other peoples elevated and Israel degraded below them. What is the 
reason? Because the King has sent the Matronita away from him and put 
the bondwoman in her place. As it is written:  “For three things the earth is 
disquieted ...  For a slave when he becomes king ...  and a bondwoman 
who supplants her mistress” [Proverbs 30:21-23].  ... 
R. Shim’on wept, and continued: ‘A king without a Matronita is not called 
a king. A king who cleaves to the bondwoman of the queen, where is his 
honor? And a voice is destined to bear good tidings to the Matronita, 
“Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion, shout, O daughter of Jerusalem, for 
thy king cometh unto thee; he is righteous [tsadik] and has been saved”, 
etc. (Zechariah 9:9).
157
  In other words: The Righteous One [the Tsadik] 
will himself be saved – for he was riding until now in a place that was not 
his, an alien place, and was suckling  it.  And for this reason it is written, 
“lowly, and riding upon an ass” (Ibid.).  He was initially lowly and “riding 
upon an ass”:  as we have established, these are the lower crowns of the 
nations, whose firstborn Kudsha Berikh Hu killed in Egypt, as it is written, 
“and all the firstborn of beasts” (Exodus 11:5)… But now that they will 
couple as one, “a Tsadik who has been saved”:  for he is no longer sitting 
on the Other Side.  .... And what had he lost? He had lost the Matronita 
and had cleaved to that Other Place that is called the bondwoman.  
 
The divine King actively sends away his true consort and replaces her with the 
“bondwoman.”  The latter figure is portrayed in abject terms as an “ass,” identified with 
the demonic “lower crowns,” and, through the evocation of the Tenth Plague, as destined 
for destruction.  The King’s relationship to this “ass” is that of a repulsive, and obviously 
sexual, “riding.”  The abject dimension of this relationship, both degrading the subject 
and threatening its coherence, is explicitly stated:  a king who engages in such behavior, 
about whom one can only ask, “where is his honor?”, is not “called a king.”  The very 
identity of the king thus collapses as a result of this relationship – and it is this kind of 
                                                 
157
 I have altered the KJV to conform to the Zoharic reading. 
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identity-collapse that is precisely the key experience of abjection.  Despite the attempt to 
explain away the import of this passage by an ostensibly shocked Cordovero,
158
 the text 
seems quite clear and has at least one parallel elsewhere in the Zohar.
159
  Lurianic 
writings restate this notion, though, in at least one place, add reservations that remove 
some of its sting.
160
 
 
Closely related images may also be found in at least two other 13
th
 century writers, 
Moshe of Burgos and Joseph of Hamadan – both of whom, as Liebes has shown, were 
associated with the circle of the Zohar.
161
  In the next two sections, I discuss each of these 
writers in turn. 
 
2. Seduction of Yesod and the Generation of the Shedim 
 
In the “turban” passage I briefly mentioned in Chapter One, Moshe of Burgos declares:   
 
  יותיפ חור הרבע לוכיבכ  שודקה ימינפה חכה הסכתנ וזב...םלוע דוסי תדמ לע גרטקמה תיליל דצמ
תוערו תורז תותכ ודלונ האלהו זאמו הב שבלתנ תינחורה תפנצמה חכש ,לעופה לא חכה ןמ תאצל  
הטמו הלעמ םלוע יבירחמ162 
 
A  spirit of seduction, as it were,  passed from Lilith the accuser over the attribute 
of Foundation of the World [Yesod Olam] … By this means, the inner holy power 
was covered over [and prevented] from going from potentiality to actuality,  for 
the power of the spiritual
163
 turban [or mitre] became enclothed in it.  And from 
                                                 
158
 See Or Yakar XIII, 57-58. 
159
 Zohar II, 60b-61a:   
 החפשב קבדתאד קידצל םירגד ,התריבג שרית יכ החפשו )גכ ל ילשמ( ביתכד 
As it is written, (Prov. 30:23), “And a bondwoman who supplants her mistress,” for it causes the 
Righteous One to cleave to the bondwoman. 
160
 Compare Ets Ḥayim, 66a, where the idea is stated without more reservation than an “as it were” [לוכיבכ], 
with Sha'ar Ma'amere Rashbi, 191b, where substantial reservations are stated. 
161
 On Moshe of Burgos, see Liebes, ‘Ha-Mashiaḥ shel ha-Zohar’, 35-38; on Joseph of Hamdan, see 
Liebes, ‘Ketsad Nitḥaber’, 32-67.  See also Mopsik, ‘Introduction’ in Joseph de Hamadan, Fragment d'un 
commentaire sur la Genèse, 8-11. 
162
 Moshe of Burgos, ‘Ma’amar al Sod “Hasir Mitsnefet, Harim ha-Atarah”’, 50. 
163
 On the use of the term "spiritual" to designate Sama’el and Lilith, see also Moshe of Burgos, 'Hosafot 
me-Ibud Ma'amaro shel R. Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen al Ha-Atsilut’, 194. 
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that time on, strange and evil bands were born, destroyers of the world above and 
below. 
 
This passage could not be any more explicit on the sexual level:  the phallic “attribute” of 
Yesod is seduced by Lilith and “enclothed with a turban,” thus preventing it from 
bestowing vitality on the cosmos, which would apparently have been through a proper 
and holy ejaculation.  Instead, the blockage produced by the demonic “turban” diverts the 
Yesod’s bestowal of vitality, causing it to give birth to demonic, destructive “bands.”    
 
I note that this passage, and related contemporaneous texts, embody a kabbalistic 
reappropriation of at least three rabbinic sources about the generation of demonic spirits, 
shedim.  Two of these sources concern the birth of shedim from Adam and Eve.  The first 
is a Talmudic passage asserting that Adam separated himself conjugally from Eve after 
the sin in the Garden and bound himself with fig leaves so as to ensure this separation.  
As a result, Adam had nocturnal emissions which led to the birth of a variety of demonic 
spirits [ ןילילו ןידש ןיחור].164  The second source is a midrash that asserts that shedim were 
born during this period of conjugal separation as byproducts of the sexual relations of 
both Adam and Eve with demons.
 165
  A third rabbinic source is a midrash that portrays 
the seemingly accidental creation of  shedim by God himself on the first Friday.  This 
midrash portrays God as having created their spirits and then having run out of time to 
create their bodies due to the entry of the Sabbath.
166
  Each of these is an image of a 
creative act going awry – in the first two accounts through sexual deviation, and, in the 
last case, through a hasty, incomplete act, which, though not sexualized in the rabbinic 
source, will be so in its kabbalistic reinterpretation. 
 
The Moshe of Burgos passage is manifestly structured by the kinds of ontological and 
rhetorical patterns I have identified in the section on “origin”:  the divine creative impulse 
                                                 
164
 bEruvin, 18b. 
165
 Bereshit Rabah I, 24b-c (20:11); bPesahim 54a; mAvot 5:6. 
166
 Bereshit Rabah, I, 8c (7:5); Yalkut Shim'oni 1:12.  This midrash has a somewhat ironic tone.  The irony 
is expressed, in the first place, in the very image of God running out of time.  In addition, the midrash tells 
us that we can learn "manners” [ץרא ךרד] from the shedim  – though, to be sure, it means that we should 
learn from God's conduct in relation to their creation.  It then goes on to compare the half-finished shedim 
to a "gem" [תילגרמ] that a person finds in his pocket on the eve of the Sabbath, and which he should throw 
away rather than violate the prohibition on carrying on the Sabbath.    
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becomes diverted from its goal and, rather than a perfect creation, gives rise to its 
opposite.  The passage evokes the abject emission of a diverted ejaculation that goes 
astray due to the “turban” that covers the Yesod as a result of its seduction by Lilith.  
Again we are presented with an irony:  the majestic divine Yesod, the very organ of 
divine potency, proves to be beset by an inability to pass from potentiality into actuality, 
but rather is capable only of perverse emissions.   From irony and abjection, the passage 
then goes on to a trope of representation:  the crystallization of the demonic in the form 
of the “strange and evil bands.”  As I suggested in Chapter One, one might advance the 
notion that the “turban” that covers the Yesod in this passage is related to, or modeled on, 
the image of the foreskin – another “covering” that blocks proper conjugal relations and 
hence proper (pro)creation.   
 
The passage is also strongly reminiscent of the Zoharic passages I have discussed above 
in relation to Binah, where the cessation of the mother’s proper “suckling” of her “sons” 
leads to the emission of “judgments” from her “sides.” The differences between these 
texts must also be noted.  First and most obviously, there is no hint of any kind of 
“seduction” in the Zoharic Binah context.  Second, in the heuristic terms I am using in 
this chapter, the Binah texts are “origin” texts rather than “intimacy” texts.  Finally, the 
cessation of proper “suckling” by Binah is a necessary aspect of the annual process of the 
holy renewal of the cosmos that takes place on Rosh Hashanah.  Here, by contrast, we are 
faced with a scandalous seduction of the divine by the demonic, leading to abject 
emissions and to a horrifying creation of monstrous beings.  
 
The Moshe of Burgos text is even closer to the Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen narrative I discussed 
above that portrays Binah’s emanation of evil worlds, interrupting its preparations to 
bring forth holy worlds.  It seems quite likely that Moshe of Burgos was here adapting 
the teaching of his mentor, Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen, modeling the troubles that beset Yesod on 
those afflicting Binah.  Conversely, and rather more speculatively, one might wonder 
whether Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen modeled his narrative of Binah’s perverse, premature 
emanation of destructive worlds on a teaching about the perversion of sexualized 
creativity at the level of Yesod – a teaching only later made explicit by his student.    
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I now turn to the Zoharic version of the kabbalistic reinterpretation of the midrashim 
about the generation of the shedim.  I begin with the general statement about the Sitra 
Aḥra from the Idra Raba quoted above:    
 
    ןיבאסמו ןיקיחר והלכ ,אפוגב וללכתא אלד ןירתכ ןוניא לכ167  
 
All of these crowns that were not included in the Body are all distant and 
contaminated. 
 
Though this phrase is used as a preface to an extended discussion of various kinds of 
shedim, "crowns" is a general Zoharic term for sefirot, and here refers to the demonic 
sefirot.  The notion of the Sitra Aḥra as that which is not "included" in the "Body," highly 
significant for the theory of abjection, recurs in many passages in the Zohar, and refers to 
both divine and human bodies.
168
  It also evokes two of the key midrashim about the 
creation of the shedim:  although it primarily evokes the midrash about the divine 
creation of shedim without bodies on the eve of the Sabbath, it also evokes their 
generation through Adam’s accidental sexual emissions that escape his body despite his 
fig-leaf encasement.  Indeed, the latter midrash is particularly significant, since, for the 
Zohar, a body is only truly a “whole body” when consisting of a proper union between 
male and female.
169
  The "inclusion in the body" theme is also evoked by the Zoharic 
notion that evil people become shedim after their death
170
 -- a fate some passages 
attribute specifically to those who have sinned by not marrying and having children.
171
  
Such people have refused to become "Adam," i.e., male and female, and therefore, after 
death, they are excluded from the "holy body" and join the ranks of the shedim, those 
who are not "included in the body" and thus not "included in Adam."
172
  The shedim are 
thus the abject of this body, those not assimilable to its "clean and proper" unity"
173
  -- 
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 Zohar III, 143b.  See also Zohar II, 214b; III, 43a. 
168
 On the Sitra Aḥra as that which is not "included in the body," see Liebes, Perakim, 262. 
169
 See, e.g., Zohar III, 81b; III, 143b; III, 296a;  
170
 See, e.g., Zohar II, 118a. 
171
 See Zohar III, 143b; Zohar Ḥadash, 33a. 
172
 Zohar III, 143b. 
173
 Kristeva, Pouvoirs, 127. 
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those born, in the words of another Zoharic text, when Adam is not in the “tikun of his 
body, the tikun of his soul, in the direct way” [רשימ חראב אשפנד אנוקיתב אפוגד אנוקיתב].174 
 
A text in the Idra Raba, part of the same passage as the “not included in the Body” quote, 
contains an even fuller synthesis of midrashic material about the creation of the shedim 
and their relocation to the divine level.
175
  Indeed, the text is part of a passage which 
contains an elaborate transposition of the entire Genesis narrative of the creation of Adam 
and Eve to the emergence of the divine male and female, here called Ze’er Anpin and the 
Matronita.  The passage portrays the newly emergent Ze’er Anpin in the process of 
creating shedim on the Sabbath eve.  He engages in this activity until properly united with 
the Matronita – the prevention of which was due to the "heart of stone" that covers his 
"flesh," the divine phallus.
176
  The “heart of stone” appears to be the Matronita in a 
deficient, pre-tikun form – for the perverse creation of the shedim is interrupted when the 
"heart of stone" is replaced by the “heart of flesh” with the arrival of the Matronita “in 
her tikunin” [אהנוקתב].  This proper Matronita appears before the King and is united with 
him – a union which excludes all diabolical interlopers.  And it is only then, when the 
male and female “have joined face to face” [ןיפאב ןיפא ורבחתא] that they begin to achieve 
their complete form:  “and they were sweetened this one with this one” [אדב אד ומסבתאו].   
  
                                                 
174
 Zohar I, 55a. 
175
 The Idra Raba passage relevant here is at Zohar III, 142b-144a. The specific text I am interpreting is at 
III, 142b-143a:  
 ביתכד אוה אדה(אכ ב תישארב )הנתחת רשב רוגסיו , ביתכו(וכ ול לאקזחי ) םכל יתתנו םכרשבמ ןבאה בל תא יתוריסהו
רשב בל  לעימל אעבד אתעשבואתבש ,ןילועלעו ןידשו ןיחור ירב הוה ,ןול םייס אל דעו , אהנוקתב אתינורטמ תתא
הימק תביתיו ,הימק תביתיד אתעשב ,ומילתשא אלו ןאיירב ןוניאל ןול חנא ,בתי אתינורטמד ןויכ ןיפנאב ןיפנא ורבחתאו ,
והייניב לועיי ןאמ ,והיידהב ברקיד אוה ןאמ: 
This is as it is written:  'And he closed the flesh underneath it' (Genesis 2:21) and it is written, 
"And I will remove the heart of stone from your flesh and give you a heart of flesh" (Ezekiel 
36:26).  And at the hour when the Sabbath was going to enter, he was creating spirits, demons 
[shedim], and storm-spirits [il'ulin].  Before finishing them, the Matronita came in her tikunin and 
sat before him.  At the moment she sat before him, he laid aside those creatures and they were not 
completed.  Once the Matronita sat and they were united face to face, who could come between 
them, who could approach them? 
176
 The passage is based on a reading of the end of the verse portraying the creation of Eve, Genesis 2:21, 
"הנתחת רשב רגסיו".  The usual understanding of these words may be paraphrased as “And he closed up the 
flesh that was in its place” [i.e., God closed up the flesh that was in the place from which he had taken 
Adam’s “rib” or “side” to create Eve]. The Zohar understands the word הנתחת, “in its place,” as “in its 
stead” and the prounoun “its” as referring to the “heart of stone” in the Ezekiel passage, and, more 
significantly for the Zoharic narrative, and in keeping with the gender of the Biblical pronoun, as “in her 
stead,” i.e., instead of the deficient Matronita, he placed the proper Matronita, the Matronita of “flesh.”   
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The Zohar’s narrative of the creation of the shedim due to the blockage of the divine 
phallus closely parallels Moshe of Burgos' account of their creation by the Yesod when it 
is covered by the "turban" whose presence is due to its seduction by Lilith – and both are 
undoubtedly modeled on the generation of shedim by the Talmudic Adam's fig-leaf 
encased body.   The key difference between the passages is that, in the Moshe of Burgos 
passage, the blockage is due to Lilith, whereas, in the Idra Raba passage, the improper 
female partner appears to be a deficient version of the future Matronita, a stage when she 
has not yet received her proper “tikunin.”  Yet, the image of the divine female (and in the 
case of the “Bald God,” the divine male) providing an ontological base for the Sitra Aḥra 
is one I have identified in the Zohar itself in a number of forms, as in the “zohama of the 
fingernail” passage.  Indeed, one Zohar passage portrays the divine female being 
transformed, as a result of human sin, into a clearly Lilith-like figure, arousing demonic 
forces in the world.
177
  Moreover, the interpretation of the Genesis verse (2:21) about the 
creation of Eve as actually portraying the replacement of Lilith by Eve – the same verse 
used as a proof-text in the Idra Raba passage I have been discussing – appears in the 
Midrash Ha-Ne’elam, is alluded to in another passage in the Guf Ha-Zohar, and closely 
resembles a passage in the Tikune Ha-Zohar.
178
  That the deficient Matronita and Lilith 
could play a similar role in closely related texts should not, by this point in this 
dissertation, be altogether surprising, even if always shocking, and I shall return to this 
kind of notion in the Conclusion.   
 
The generation of shedim through the earthly or divine primordial man's improper 
emissions vividly expresses the production of menacing entities through "abjection" of 
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 Zohar III, 79b describes the effect on the divine female of the casting of “zohama” into her by the 
“snake”: 
 ביתכד אוה אדה ,אלכ ןובאתסיו ,אמלעב ארעתאל ןיירש ןיניד ןידכו ,ואיגס אהרפוטו ,אבר אהרעשו ,תבאתסא אבקונו
דמב(אשנ ינבד והייבוחב באתסא ה"והי שדקמ ,אמט ה"והי שדקמ תא יכ )כ טי רב...  ןיניז שמחו האמ עבראו ףלא ןנינתד
ןירפוטד אמהוז אוההב ןירעתמ והלכו ,אפיקת איוח ליטאד אמהוז אוההב ןדחאתמ ,ןישיב 
And the female is contaminated, and her hair is long and her nails are large, and then judgments 
begin to arouse in the world, and contaminate everything.  This is as it is written:  “because he 
hath defiled the sanctuary of YHVH” (Ex. 19:20).  The sanctuary of YHVH is contaminated due 
to the sins of human beings...As we have learned, one thousand four hundred and five evil species 
unite in that zohama that the fierce ḥivya cast and all are aroused in that zohama of the nails.   
178
 Thus, like the passage I have been discussing, Midrash Ha-Ne'elam, in Zohar Ḥadash, 16:c, interprets 
"הנתחת" in Genesis 2:21 as "in place of her" – but the “her” in question is Lilith, rather than the deficient 
Matronita.  Tikune Ha-Zohar 96a refers to Adam's "two wives," Eve and Lilith, as emerging, respectively, 
"from the side of the flesh" and "from the side of the bone."  Zohar I, 34b also alludes to the same notion.     
  
 
202 
 
that which precedes, exceeds, or is inassimilable to the subject, byproducts of the 
inevitably pyrrhic effort to create a seamlessly bounded self, a “clean and proper body.”  
Throughout the Zohar, such a body requires a proper union between proper male and 
female consorts.  When the primordial male is blocked from such a union due to the 
“turban” or the “heart of stone,” whether associated with Lilith or the deficient Matronita, 
it prevents him from properly constituting his “body.”  The shedim, the crystallizations of 
the abject, are entities which Adam/Ze’er Anpin both cannot and must acknowledge as 
his offspring – beings that he "begat" but which were not in "his image."179  In 
transferring the midrashic story on the earthly level to the emergence of the divine male 
subject and its relation to the demonic, kabbalistic texts like those of Moshe of Burgos 
and the Idra Raba forcefully, if implicitly, acknowledge the unavoidability of abjection 
as a prerequisite to the construction of any subject and as an ever-present danger to the 
maintenance of the subject’s proper boundaries.  In this context, this danger is posed by 
unseemly liaisons, the union of the divine male with an improper mate – most starkly, 
that of the divine phallus with Lilith:  liaisions at least as catastrophic for the cosmos, and 
scandalous theologically, as the union of the divine female with the demonic male.    
 
3. Routinization of Abjection 
I now turn to Joseph of Hamadan.  The sexual nature of the liaisons between divine and  
demonic figures is very explicit in the work of this kabbalist – specifically, between the 
“Holy One blessed be He” (which appears in both its Hebrew and Aramaic forms) and 
Lilith (under various appellations).   This relationship occurs as part of the regular cosmic 
process, rather than as a result of contingent, tragic and scandalous misfortunes as in both 
the Moshe of Burgos and Zohar passages discussed above.  In Joseph of Hamadan, the 
sexual relationship to the demonic female becomes routinized – though no less abject.     
 
In his commentary on Genesis, Joseph of Hamadan seems to take for granted the 
routinized nature of these relationships by simply declaring that the Kadosh Barukh Hu, 
like Adam in the Lilith myth, took two wives, the Shekhinah and one "from the sect not 
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 bEruvin, 18b. 
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that of purity."
180
  The abject nature of the latter appears in her designation as the mere 
“shadow” of the Shekhinah, a byproduct of her divine counterpart, who has nonetheless 
also crystallized as a “whore” and a “concubine”181 – and whose union with the divine 
leads to the emergence of evil and murderousness.   
 
In another text, he recounts the difference between the two relationships:  the relationship 
with the Shekhinah is conducted openly, “for all know that she is his wife and mate,” 
whereas the relationship with the “concubine” is conducted “in secret, at night, because 
of the honor of his wife.”182  The shameful quality of the latter relationship is also 
reflected in the medium of the sexual liaison:  the Kadosh Barukh Hu mates with the 
Shekhinah through "pure channels" and with the concubine through “covered channels,” 
those of "impurity."
183
  Yet, this shameful quality only serves to emphasize the 
overpowering nature of the divine desire for his demonic consort.  The latter agrees to the 
liaison only at a price, the Kadosh Barukh Hu’s agreement that the sons that result from 
their union will “rule in your kingdom”184 – a price to which He agrees in the form of 
assuring the Moabite lineage of the House of David.     
 
Joseph of Hamadan makes explicit the nature of the two “channels” in another work, the 
Sefer Tashak.   
 
 םלוע דוסי קידצ ירקתאד אוה ךירב אשדוקד אשידק תירבד אזר יהיא אשידק אכלמד אכיתר תוחת
 אריבל ביאשד אעובמ והיאו ןיבקנ 'ב ינהד אזר והניא 'עד ןישאר ירת והנהו .אתינורטמ יהיאד אשידק
 יאיבנ יקני ןמתמו אתינורטמד וקיני אשידק אנימיד אעובמ ןיעובמ ןירת ןוניאו .המאד הימופב אכיאד
 ןיכאלמו אתובאסמ תותכד וקיני אניינת אעובמו .ןדעד אתנגב אקנפתמד יקידצו ימימתו ידיסחו
ו .אמלעב ןיגרטקמדאעישר םעלבד וקיני ןמתמ185 
                                                 
180
 Joseph de Hamadan, Fragment d'un commentaire, 22 (pagination from the Hebrew section):   וניאש תכו
הרהט לש.    
181
 Ibid.:  'הלצ' 'רקנ 'יפלו הניכש לצב םיבשוי – “they [the ‘impure sects’] sit in the shadow of the Shekhinah and 
therefore she [Lilith] is called ‘Tsilah’ [read hyper-literally as “her shadow”]. 
182
 Idel, 'Seridim Nosafim Mi-Kitve R. Yosef ha-ba mi-Shushan ha-Birah,' 47-48:  יכ  תבו ותשא איהש לכל יולג
ותשא דובכ םושמ הלילב אענצב אב ושגליפל אבשכו וגוז. 
183
 Ibid.:  האמוט... םיסוכמ תורונצ...םירוהטה תורונצ.  The theme of the two channels is also contained in the work 
of Moshe of Burgos.  See 'Sefer Amud Ha-Semali', 217 & n. 10.   
184
 Idel, ‘Seridim Nosafim’, 48:  ךתוכלמב וטל]שי[. 
185
 Sefer Tashak, 267-268.  This passage is quoted by Cordovero, with incorrect attribution, in Pardes, I, 
34b. 
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Under the chariot of the Holy King is the mystery of the holy covenant of Kudsha 
Berikh Hu, which is called Tsadik Yesod Olam.  And it is the spring that draws to 
the holy well which is the Matronita.  And the two heads of [the letter] Ayin are 
the mystery of the two orifices that there are in the mouth of the phallus.  And 
they are two springs.  The spring of the right is the suckling of the Matronita – 
and from there suckle prophets, and pious ones, and pure ones, and righteous ones 
who enjoy themselves in the Garden of Eden.  And the second spring is the 
suckling of the bands of contamination and the angels who accuse the world.  And 
from there is the suckling of Balaam the wicked. 
   
This passage makes it clear that the medium of the relationship with the impure side is 
refuse, the waste fluids that come from the second “orifice,” the “second spring,” in the 
divine phallus, just as the relationship with the Shekhinah is through the “orifice” that 
contains sperm.  This positing of two channels within the “holy King,” specifically within 
the sefirah of Yesod, is yet another instance of the doubling phenomenon, the splitting of 
an entity into its good and bad forms – now installed in the very interior of a divine 
organ. 
  
A second passage from the same work makes it even clearer that the “two orifices” are 
the site of sexual liaison with the two conjugal partners of the divine male described in 
the author’s Genesis commentary:    
 
תאד  ביאשו ךיפש דח ןישידק ןיעובמ ןירת והנהו קידצ תדמ זימרד ןישאר ןירת היל תיא 'צ
 ,ןיאתתו ןיאלע ןיכרבתמ ןמתמו אתינורטמל ןמתמ… ןיכאלמ וירבתא ןמתמד אד אעובמו .
 ה"בקד יולאמש רטסל ךיפש והיא אניינת אעובמו .ןישידק ןיתמשנ 'מכ וירבתאו 'ישידק
נמ השאו הרז השאד וקיני ןמתמו אעובמ חיתפו םיתס אעובמ אוהה לארשי ןייכז יאו .תפא
 ץוח םיבשויה האמוטה תוחכ הרז השא ביאשד אעובמ אוהה חתפא ,ואל יאו .אנימיד אשידק
 ןיקיזמו ןילילו ןיחורו ןידש ]ןיקנוי[ ןיאצוי םשמו   ... םירחא וארקנש הנוילע הבישיל
 לאמשה דצמ םיעשרו 186 
                                                 
186
 Sefer Tashak, 278-279.  The textual variant “ןיקנוי” for “ןיאצוי” is given by Cordovero. Pardes I, 34b. 
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For the letter Tsadi has two heads which allude to the attribute of Tsadik.  And 
these two holy springs:  one pours forth and draws forth from there to the 
Matronita, and from there upper and lower beings are blessed.  And from this 
spring, holy angels were created and many holy souls were created.  And the 
second spring pours forth to the left side of Kudsha Berikh Hu, and from there is 
the suckling of the Alien Woman and the Adulterous Woman.  And if Israel is 
meritorious, this spring closes, and the holy spring of the Right opens.  And if not, 
that spring opens from which draw the Alien Woman and the contaminated forces 
who sit outside the supernal settlement/academy [yeshivah], who are called 
“Others.”  And it is from the second spring that go forth [or suckle] demons, 
flying spirits, lilin, destroyers, and wicked ones from the left side. 
 
These passages from the Sefer Tashak affirm that each of these channels in the divine 
phallus routinely mates with divine and demonic female consorts, respectively, vivify and 
nourish the divine and demonic domains, respectively, and give birth to angels and 
shedim, again respectively.
187
   
 
In the four passages I have discussed here, three reasons are advanced for these liaisons 
with the demonic.  In the two “concubines” passages, they are a product of divine desire 
for the “Other” woman, a desire stated very explicitly in the portrayal of the deity’s 
bargain with his secret lover.  In the first of the Sefer Tashak passages, they appear to 
result from an organic need of the divine male for an outlet for the abject emissions of the 
“second orifice” – though this, too, may be seen as a kind of desire.  It is only in the 
second of the Tashak passages that these liaisons are attributed to human sin.       
 
Joseph of Hamadan’s routinization of the relationship of the divine male to the demonic 
female does not appear as such in the Zohar.  Nonetheless, I have discussed it here not 
only for comparative purposes but also because it provides an entry into a theme that 
                                                 
187
 A very similar passage about the “two springs” in the Sefer Tashak, 267-268, that I quoted above in the 
text, leaves no doubt about the parallelism between the relationships to the two females.   I note that the 
"hosts of contamination” in that passage are later identified in this same work with "the alien woman, the 
adulterous woman."  Ibid., 279. 
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does appear with some frequency in the Zohar, that of the ongoing sustenance of the 
demonic by the divine through “suckling.”   Rather than a contingent misfortune, 
“suckling” evokes routinized and ongoing relationships, as does, even more explicitly, 
Joseph of Hamadan’s portrayal of Lilith as God’s “concubine” or “whore.”  As a result of 
this importance of this theme, I will discuss it separately in the next section, though it is 
closely related to the intimate relationships that are the main topic of this section. 
 
Before going to that discussion, however, I note that Cordovero, rather surprisingly, 
seems to have felt more comfortable with the portrayal of the liaison between the male 
divine and the female demonic in Joseph of Hamadan than in the Zohar.  In the Or Yakar, 
Cordovero rejects the seemingly clear meaning of the Zohar passage cited above 
concerning the consorting of the divine male with Lilith, seeking to distance the divine 
from any direct relationship of this kind.
188
  By contrast, in Pardes Rimonim, he quotes 
extensively from Joseph of Hamadan
189
 on the "two channels" within the divine phallus 
and makes even more graphic their abject implications – for example, explicitly 
informing us that the emission from the “second orifice” of the Yesod, as from its human 
counterpart, is repulsive refuse.
190
  This seems strange:  at least upon a first consideration, 
this parallelism between Yesod's relationship to the "Matronita" and the "Adulterous 
Woman" in the Joseph of Hamadan passages seems at least as scandalous theologically as 
the notion of the replacement of the Matronita by the “ass” or “bondwoman” in the Zohar 
passage whose plain meaning Cordovero so vociferously disavows.   
 
One can only speculate about Cordovero's seemingly incompatible stances in relation to 
the two formulations – about the fact that the routinization of the divine male’s 
relationship to the demonic female alongside his relationship to the Shekhinah seems 
more acceptable to Cordovero than the replacement of the latter by the former.  It seems 
to be acceptable to Cordovero to declare that the divine male has an ongoing liaison with 
Lilith as well as with the Shekhinah, that the sefirah of Yesod pours its refuse into Lilith 
in a manner parallel to its pouring of holy seed into the Shekhinah, and that the divine 
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 Or Yakar XIII, 57-58. 
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 Though he misattributes the quotations. 
190
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male sustains and impregnates both – indeed, coming perilously close to Joseph of 
Hamadan’s notion that the Kadosh Barukh Hu has “two wives” or a “wife” and a 
“concubine.”  In line with the theory of abjection, Cordovero may be embracing the 
notion that just as the emission of the abject precedes the constitution of the divine 
subject, so the abject coupling with Lilith may be a necessary prerequisite, or 
accompaniment, to the true and complete coupling with the Shekhinah.  By contrast, the 
replacement of the Shekhinah by Lilith, however episodic, would serve no such purpose.  
 
Nonetheless, the tension between Cordovero's rejection of the Zohar's notion of the 
substitution of Lilith for the Shekhinah, on the one hand, and his endorsement of the 
imagery of the "two channels," on the other, remains quite striking – especially in light of 
the focus on ambivalence that I am developing in this study.  It is as though the 
relationship to the demonic female were both indispensable and yet unacceptable.  It is 
also striking that, in Lurianic writings, in which a very similar tension appears,
 191
 we are 
told that the distance between the two channels is as thin as a garlic skin, making it easy 
to confuse the holy and the profane
192
 – a kind of danger we have already seen above. 
 
Be that as it may, elsewhere in the Pardes, Cordovero discusses the “two channels” in a 
manner that sheds light on his affinity for this image as well as on the relationship 
between ambivalences of origin, ambivalences of intimacy, and the ongoing sustenance 
of the demonic by the divine.
 193
   In that passage, he declares that the theory of the two 
channels helps explain the puzzling mechanics of the nourishment of the demonic side 
from the holy side.  He implicitly rejects what one might call a conventional Neoplatonic 
account, in which evil would simply be the lowest rung in the ladder of being, even a 
mere privation of being.  For Cordovero, referring to the cosmology of the “four worlds,” 
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 Compare Sha’ar Ma’amere Rashbi, 46b, on the two channels with the same work, 193a, on the 
bondwoman.  Of course, in the Lurianic schema, one can with agility limit the tension by placing the 
processes at different levels – e.g., in the first passage on the two channels, we are told that it is limited to 
the world of Asiyah.   
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Sha'ar Ma'amere Rashbi, 46b: 
  הזו שדק הז ... םושה תפילקכ אלא םהיניב ןיא יכ הזל הז ןיכומס םה ולאה 'ורונצה יתשו רשפא טעומ רבדבו ... לוח
ו"ח לוחב שדק ברעתהל 
And these two channels are contiguous to each other, for between them is barely a garlic skin … 
this holy, this profane … and in a thing so slight, it is possible to mix the holy in with the profane, 
God forbid… 
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such a stance is impossible, due to the fact that the genesis of evil is in the level of 
“Gevurah of Atsilut” and that there are many holy levels below that.  The theory of the 
two channels puts the demonic side directly in touch with this quite high level of the holy 
side, circumventing the need for impure nourishment to traverse holy levels on its way to 
the unholy side.  It thus serves to shore up the kabbalistic affirmation of the reality of 
evil, its parallelism with the holy side, and its source in the holy side – even while paying 
the price of apparently positing direct and intimate contact of the holy with the unholy, a 
notion firmly rejected by Cordovero as theologically unacceptable in the context of the 
Zohar passage about the substitution of Lilith for the Shekinah.
194
  Perhaps most 
importantly, it provides a narrative that allows him to reconcile two key imperatives in 
his worldview:  on the one hand, the antithesis between the divine and the demonic, on 
the other hand, the subordination of the latter to the purposes of the former, in accordance 
with the verse, “and his kingdom ruleth over all” [הלשמ לכב ותוכלמו ] (Psalms 103:19).195  
These conflicting imperatives, that the demonic must both be sustained by, and yet, 
antithetical to, the divine, are most fully explored in the narratives of “suckling,” to 
which I now turn. 
 
 
D. Ambivalences of Sustenance:  "Suckling" 
 
A key manner in which Zoharic passages portray active relationships between the divine 
and the demonic is through images of sustenance, frequently expressed by the term 
"suckling," portrayed through various conjugations of the infinitive “אקניל”.196  As 
demonstrated by Ellen Haskell, the imagery of suckling is deeply implanted in thirteenth 
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 Indeed, in another passage in the Pardes, I, 56a-b, he uses the notion of the two channels to interpret the 
passages in the Zohar that refer to the coupling of the kelipah, specifically, the ḥivya, with the Shekhinah.  
According to Cordovero, rather than literally referring to the snake coupling with the Shekhinah, the 
passages actually refer to the nourishment of the Shekhinah from the impure channel of Yesod.  This 
interpretation clearly runs contrary to the plain meaning of the Zohar passages. 
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 See, e.g., Pardes, I, 80c. 
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 I note at the outset the following linguistic curiosity.  In English, the verb “to suckle” can refer both to 
the maternal giving of milk to the infant and to the infantile taking of milk from the mother.  In Hebrew, 
this ambiguity generally disappears through distinguishing between הקנה for the former and הקיני for the 
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English verb.   For example, the verb קנילא  and the third person singular קיני may be used for both senses – 
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century kabbalah, taking its most vivid form in the Zohar.
197
  Haskell shows that suckling 
is one of the main ways 13
th
 century texts portrayed the bestowal of vitality from higher 
levels to lower levels, both within the divine sphere and between the divine and 
humanity.  However, though Haskell does not discuss this feature, it is also one of the 
main verbs used by the Zohar and some related texts to portray the relationship of the 
divine and the demonic – considerably complicating the import of the various meanings 
of the term. In the Zohar, the term may be read in a number of different ways:  “literally,” 
evoking maternal and nutritive imagery; figuratively, evoking sexual imagery; 
polysemically, evoking both at once; or catachrestically, evoking a unique meaning, an 
“unspeakable” relationship, as it were, for which no other term exists.  I note also that the 
Zohar’s portrayal of such relationships feature both male and female divine protagonists.   
  
The abject nature of suckling between the divine and demonic does not generally 
manifest itself in the Zohar in the form of inchoate emissions, though there is at least one 
exception; by contrast, Joseph of Hamadan foregrounds that kind of abjection, as 
suggested in the passages cited in the preceding section.  In the Zohar, the abject nature 
of such relationships lies in the scandalous and repulsive mixtures that are intrinsic to 
relationships of suckling between the two realms.   Like repulsive and inchoate 
substances, such improper mixtures evoke the horror of the collapse of the proper 
boundaries of the subject.  Such mixtures form a series with those social experiences of 
abjection whose key features, in Kristeva’s words, are that they do “not respect proper 
limits, places, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite. The traitor, the liar, 
the criminal with a good conscience, the shameless rapist, the killer who claims he is a 
savior."
198
  This aspect of the abject as an improper “composite” often appears in the 
Zohar – most explicitly, perhaps, in the use of the word irbuvia [איבוברע, confusion, 
tumult, motley crowd]  to describe the Sitra Aḥra.199  In the context of suckling, this 
disrespect of “proper limits, places, rules” takes the form of the horrifying transformation 
of that which should be the most life-giving and tender deed, that of suckling, into an 
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 Haskell, Metaphor and Symbolic Representation:  The Image of God as a Suckling Mother in Thirteenth 
Century Kabbalah, passim.   
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 Kristeva, Pouvoirs, 12. 
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 See, e.g., Zohar I, 28b-29a, III, 87a. 
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action that empowers malevolence and destruction.   Rhetorically, such “unspeakable,” 
monstrous perversions can only be evoked through various forms of catachresis.  
   
Before discussing suckling in the context of divine-demonic relationships, however, it is 
necessary to take a brief detour through the debate about the meaning of the term in the 
context of relationships among two or more holy entities.  Zoharic and other texts use the 
term in such contexts in ways that evoke sustenance (both maternal and masculine) as 
well as sexual liaison.  Recent scholars have debated which of these meanings should be 
taken as primary.   
 
For Ellen Haskell, suckling in 13
th
 century texts evokes the beneficent bestowal of 
vitality from higher to lower levels in the cosmos, with the term’s literal, maternal 
meaning coming to the fore in the Zohar.  In Haskell's summary: 
 
In these Zoharic texts, we see the fullest kabbalistic expression of the image of 
God as a suckling mother.  As in the writings of Isaac the Blind and Ezra of 
Gerona, the suckling image serves as a metaphor for spiritual transmission of 
overflowing divine energy, both among the sefirot and between divinity and 
humanity.  However, in Sefer ha-Zohar the image takes on an immediate and 
experiential quality absent from earlier literature, because it is thoroughly 
embedded in an explicit network of metaphoric connotations that provide 
anthropomorphic and anthropopathic references for the reader.
200
 
 
The spirit of Haskell’s interpretation, emphasizing the dimension of maternal love in the 
suckling imagery, runs directly counter to some of the central theses of the early work of 
Elliot Wolfson.   Wolfson asserts that, in the Zohar, and kabbalah more generally, the 
divine “breast that gives milk is functionally equivalent to the penis that ejaculates. 
…[T]he righteous described as suckling from the splendor of the breasts of the Shekhinah 
are, in fact, cleaving to and drawing from the corona of the divine phallus."
201
  Wolfson 
thus displaces the literal meaning of suckling as maternal nurturance in favour of reading 
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it figuratively as masculine sexuality – or more precisely, argues that such a tropic 
displacement is effected by the kabbalistic texts.   Indeed, one of Wolfson’s central 
arguments is that the displacement of the maternal by the phallic is both a central feature 
of kabbalistic rhetoric and the ontological goal of kabbalistic tikun.  For Wolfson, 
kabbalistic texts should be interpreted, at their deepest level, as implicitly attributing 
masculine gender to the ostensibly female sefirah of Binah (the “supernal Mother,”  אמא
האליע) and as animated by a theurgic aspiration to reintegrate the sefirah of Malkhut (the 
Daughter or “lower Mother”) into the masculine identity of the divine, specifically, into 
the corona of the divine phallus.
202
   
 
Haskell concedes that Wolfson's reading may at times be appropriate, but rejects it as the 
dominant meaning of suckling in the Zohar.  She emphasizes the considerable presence in 
thirteenth century kabbalah of the "image of God as a breasted, suckling mother who 
nurtures children with life-giving spiritual overflow."
203
  For Haskell, the "nurture, 
dependence and tenderness" associated with such images are "often better suited to 
expressing the relationships between the sefirot and humanity than the connotations 
structuring the image of cleaving to the divine phallus."
204
  Wolfson's assertions about 
interpreting the emission of milk by the divine breast as the emission of semen by the 
divine phallus seem categorical.  Nevertheless, perhaps he might agree that his distinctive 
interpretation is not necessarily appropriate for all instances of the suckling imagery – or 
at all levels of interpretation.  Perhaps the difference between Wolfson and Haskell is less 
an absolute matter and more a question of a passage-by-passage discussion.   
 
In any case, both the maternal and phallic readings of suckling must be rethought when 
one shifts from beneficent occurrences of suckling, the bestowal of divine overflow on 
holy sefirot, divine personages, or righteous human beings, to maleficent occurrences, the 
sustenance provided by a divine entity to unholy sefirot, demonic personages, or evil 
human beings.  The sinister nature of suckling in such passages puts the alternative 
interpretations to which the term lends itself in a rather different frame.  The relationships 
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on this “other side” of suckling may be roughly divided into three modes:  the parasitical 
suckling by the demonic from the life force of the divine, the monstrous suckling by the 
divine from the demonic, and perverse suckling intimacies between the two realms.  
 
I contend that, in such relationships, one cannot ignore either the nutritive or sexual 
senses of suckling.  Rather, the power of the passages portraying these relationships often 
depends precisely on the polysemy of the term.  At a rhetorical level, the use of suckling 
is often limited neither to its literal sense nor to its figurative sense of copulation, but 
rather uses the double meaning in a number of ways, including:  1) shifting between one 
meaning and the other in the course of a passage; 2) evocation of an ambivalent 
relationship that may either be sexual or nutritive or both at once; or 3) evocation of an 
intimacy between the divine and the demonic so shocking, improper, indeed impossible, 
that it defies any existing term.  The third use may be viewed as a prime example of 
catachresis, the use of a term which seems to function figuratively but for which no 
“proper” term exists.   
 
The perversity ascribed to the liaisons between the divine and demonic make them 
particularly suited for portrayal by catachresis.  As I noted in the Introduction, citing Paul 
de Man, there is often something monstrous in catachresis, the evocation of something 
that cannot be named “properly” – often through the yoking together of incompatible 
phenomenal or organic elements.  Similarly, Jacques Derrida attributes the “monstrous” 
quality of his own writing, which he also describes as marked by catachresis, to its 
“hybridisation,” for a “composition that puts heterogeneous bodies together may be 
called a monster.”205   Finally, a doubled meaning of suckling, simultaneously sexual and 
maternal, may, of course, be understood in classical psychoanalytical terms.  Indeed, it is 
precisely such instances of double entendre, of shifting between the sexual and maternal, 
which the term “Freudian” in its popular sense often evokes.  However, I will also show a 
more precise way in which psychoanalysis can shed light on the ontological dimension of 
the sexual/maternal term suckling.    
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A complex Zoharic passage, which I have already introduced above, illustrates a number 
of different uses of the term in the context of divine/demonic relations.  This passage 
concerns a verse symptomatically relevant to this topic:  "Thou shalt not seethe a kid in 
his mother's milk" (Ex. 34:26).   Since the Zohar generally associates goat imagery with 
the Sitra Aḥra and maternal imagery with the Shekhinah, it is hardly surprising that one 
sage offers the interpretation that the verse should be taken as a prohibition on the 
intermixture of the divine and the demonic.  Another sage, however, offers a seemingly 
theological objection to this interpretation, based on the verse's use of the possessive “his 
mother":  can the holy Shekhinah really be viewed as the mother of the Sitra Aḥra?  In 
his quintessentially Zoharic response to this question, Rabbi Shim’on offers a narrative 
embrace of the theological scandal, portraying the conditions that could give rise to 
precisely such an intimate link between a divine parent and a demonic offspring:   
 
 אתעשב ,הב ןדחאתא יתמיאארחא ארטסמ אקני םא יאהד , יראש אפיקת איוחו ,באתסא אשדקמו
 .ןירעתמ ןינידו ,הימאד אבלחמ אקני אידג ןידכ ,האלגתאל...  לכ אבלחב ארשב לוכיי אל ךכ יניגב
 אילת אדבועב אהד ,ךירטצא אלד ןאמל אתכוד ביהי אלד ,אד ארטסמ יתאד ןאמ לכו ,אשידק אערז
יעל ארעתאל אתתלד אדבועב ,אתלמאל 206 
 
When are they [i.e., the forces of the Sitra Aḥra] joined with Her?  When this 
Mother suckles from the Other Side and the sanctuary is defiled and the mighty 
serpent [ḥivya] begins to reveal himself.  Then the kid sucks of his mother’s milk 
and judgments arouse.  ... Therefore all holy seed and anyone who derives from 
this side should not eat meat with milk, so as not to provide a place for those for 
whom it would be improper.  For the matter depends on action, an action below 
arousing above.
207
 
 
Two relationships of suckling occur in this narrative, portrayed with the same verb, yanka 
[אקני].   Under certain conditions – for example, under the impact of the “black 
theurgical” effect of human consumption of milk with meat – the Shekhinah will "suckle" 
from the Sitra Aḥra, specifically the ḥivya, implicitly Sama’el.  As a result, the “kid,” 
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here a lower demonic force, will, in turn, "suckle" from the Shekhinah.  Under such 
conditions, the Shekhinah can, indeed, be accurately described as the “mother of” the 
demonic “kid.”    
 
The reading that makes the simplest sense of this text would take the first occurrence of 
suckling, portraying the relationship of the divine “Mother” to the ḥivya as sexual, and 
the second, portraying the relationship of the “kid” to the “Mother,” as maternal and 
nutritive.  In this reading, the passage would be asserting that, as a result of specific 
human transgressions, the Shekhinah copulates with Sama’el, here figured as the “mighty 
ḥivya” – evoking the snake of Eden, already sexualized in the Talmud, as noted above.208  
The consequence of this act is that the Shekhinah becomes the mother of the demonic 
"kid" either by implicitly giving birth to it, or, as the text states explicitly, by establishing 
a maternal relationship with it through sustaining it with nourishing milk.   The 
Shekhinah would thus be fittingly called "his mother" in relation to the demonic, either as 
its progenitor (or perhaps step-parent), since she copulated with a diabolical mate, or as 
the giver of lactic nourishment.   
 
This passage would thus depart both from Haskell's notion that the suckling image 
evokes a beneficent maternal God and from Wolfson's notion that it reinforces the 
dominance of a phallic divinity.   Rather, the passage works best if we read it as shifting 
among the various meanings of suckling.  It evokes a maleficent mother, even if one 
whose maleficence may be the product of coercion, who strengthens the forces of evil 
through nutritively suckling them, resulting in the perverse and parasitical diversion of 
what should be the holy milk of the “holy Mother” [אשידק אמיא]; by contrast, the male 
figure in this passage is the diabolical “mighty ḥivya,” who sexually “suckles” the 
Shekhinah, thus diminishing the power of the divine male figure, Kudsha Berikh Hu.  
This interpretation is supported by other Zoharic passages in which the separation of the 
holy male and female leads to the latter sexually “suckling” from the Sitra Aḥra.209   
 
                                                 
208
 E.g., bShabbat, 146a. 
209
 E.g., Zohar III, 58a, III, 291b. 
  
 
215 
 
For the theory of abjection, it is highly significant that such monstrous, parasitical, and 
perverse relationships are brought about by a forbidden "mixture."  Indeed, the entire 
discussion of the “kid/mother’s milk” verse begins with the pronouncement:  "for one 
should not mix a lower thing with an upper, so that the external dimension should not 
suckle from the internal dimension" [ אתת הלמ אברעל אלד ארטסמ רבלד ארטס אקני אלד ,האלעב ה
האמינפ].210  The “upper” and “lower” are thus identified with the “inside” and “outside” 
[וגלד and רבלד], as well as with the “holy side” and “contaminated side” [השודקד ארטס and 
אבאסמד ארטס].  The constitution of subjectivity through abjection is threatened by any 
illicit mixture which puts into question the subject's proper boundaries.  And here, 
indeed, this illicit mixture transmogrifies the very identity of the Shekhinah:  from the 
"holy Mother” of Israel to "his Mother," i.e., the mother of the demonic.  Moreover, in an 
evocation of a theme from passages concerned with the constitution, as well as the 
sustenance, of the demonic, the passage closely associates the emission of milk from the 
holy side to the unholy side with creating a geographical site for the demonic:  mixing 
meat and milk is forbidden lest it "give a place for those for whom it would be improper" 
[ךירטצא אלד ןאמל אתכוד ביהי].211   Though the emphasis here is on the monstrous effect of 
the mixture rather than on the fluid nature of the milk, the establishment of a solid 
foothold for the demonic in the cosmos, the “giving of place” to them, is implicitly 
identified with the vivifying effect of the suckling of milk by the “kid.”  
 
It is even more significant that both perverse mixtures, both sinister “sucklings,” evoked 
in this passage concern the maternal body, that primary locus of abjection for Kristeva.  
Indeed, the "kid/milk" verse serves as a key proof-text for Kristeva in her argument about 
the relationship of abjection to biblical dietary laws.
212
   Kristeva views the prohibition as 
a "metaphor of incest,"
213
 because it is directed at forbidding an improper relationship 
between mother and child.  Of course, any psychoanalytically informed reading would 
notice this dimension and would not be distracted by the rabbinic extension of the 
prohibition to cover meat and milk generally.  For Kristeva, however, this verse provides 
the key to the whole edifice of biblical purity laws:  "Far from being one of the semantic 
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values of this vast project of separation which is the biblical text, the taboo on the mother 
seems to be its originary mytheme.”214  The entire biblical "logic of differences dictated 
by a divine Ego is based on the prohibition of incest."
215
   In this reading, the slippage 
between the two meanings of “suckling” is both an evocation, and a repression, of the 
danger of incest.   
 
The Zoharic interpretation of the verse dovetails with the psychoanalytic in three ways.  
First, it restores the specificity of the terms of the biblical verse (the relationship of the 
“kid” to “his mother”) from its rabbinic effacement, stressing the unnatural maternal 
relationship against which the verse warns.  Second, it highlights the threat to bounded 
identity this relationship constitutes.  Third, it reinforces the double meaning of the 
suckling relationship evoked in this verse, both sexual and nutritive (even though the 
Zoharic and psychoanalytic readings might distribute those two meanings differently).  
Most importantly, the psychoanalytic frame, with its attention to verbal and affective 
displacements between various levels, allows us to perceive the way the text produces its 
force at a rhetorical level precisely through such shifts.  Although the simplest reading of 
the Zohar passage might allocate the improper sexual suckling to a different entity than 
the improper maternal suckling, the textual force of the passage clearly derives from its 
repetition of the term while shifting from one semantic valence to the other.
216
   
 
Indeed, the foregrounding of the maleficent character of suckling precisely through the 
use of the term to portray different kinds of relationships seems to render of subsidiary 
importance an interpretive choice between its lactic or seminal character.  One could even 
make sense of the “kid/milk” passage by reading both instances of suckling in the 
passage – that of the Shekhinah from the Sitra Aḥra and that of the demonic "kid" from 
the Shekhinah – as relating either to suckling or to copulation.  This passage, like the 
many other passages in the Zohar in which the Shekhinah is said to "suckle" from the 
Sitra Aḥra, could be read in either of these two ways, or as both at once.217  Even the 
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reference to “his mother” does not necessarily obviate the possibility of a sexual meaning 
of the “kid’s” suckling, as any psychoanalytically informed reader would point out.  
Alternatively, the suckling could be read as neither maternal nor sexual, but as some 
novel, monstrous intimacy.  This doubled, indeterminate, and/or novel meaning of 
suckling may be explained in psychoanalytic terms as displacements between sexuality 
and maternity; it may be articulated in rhetorical terms either as displacements between 
literal and figurative meanings, or as a catachresis, in which no “literal” meaning exists – 
i.e., as an image of a relationship which is so “improper” that no word exists to describe 
it.  As I suggest throughout this thesis, the portrayal of divine-demonic relationships 
seems particularly well-suited for such catachreses. 
  
Finally, I note that, although the emphasis in the suckling passages is on the portrayal of 
the perverse relationships between already-constituted personages rather than on their 
generation via the emission of repulsive substances, or, to put it in rhetorical terms, on 
prosopopeia rather than on irony, the latter dimension is far from wholly absent.  First, 
implicit throughout the “suckling” imagery is the perversion of maternal milk from its 
proper role in the nourishing of life to its improper role in the empowering of evil and 
destruction – an imagery close to that of a child’s sudden and shocking experience of 
milk as repellent that is for Kristeva a paradigmatic experience of abjection.
218
   
 
Moreover, a passage in Zohar Ḥukat provides a much more graphic portrayal of the link 
between improper intimacies and abject emissions.  This passage is an extended 
commentary on the ritual of the “red heifer.”  The excerpt relevant here concerns the 
verse fragment, איה תאטח הדנ ימל (Num. 19:9), translated by the KJV as “for a water of 
separation:  it is a purification of sin.”   The Zohar, however, reads it hyper-literally, 
construing it as something like:  “for waters of a menstrual woman, for she is sin.”   The 
“menstrual woman” of the verse becomes the Shekhinah and her condition the direct 
result of her “suckling” from the Sitra Aḥra: 
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 יהיא דכ ,אבאסמד ארטסמ ותאד ןוניא לכו ,ןיאתת ןיניד לכד ןיגב ,איה תאטח הדנ ימל ביתכד יאה
כ ,אנידב תביתיו ,ארחא ארטסמ אקני ןידכ ,בלחמ הנשדוה ,םד האלמ )ו דל היעשי( רמא תאד המ
אמלעב ןארשו ,יקלתסמו ירעתמ והלכ 219 
 
That which is written, “for waters of a menstrual woman, for she is sin”:  for all 
the lower judgments [i.e., demonic forces] and all those who come from the side 
of impurity, when she suckles from the Sitra Aḥra, and sits in judgment, as it is 
written, “filled with blood, it is made fat with fatness” (Is. 34:6), then they arouse 
and rise, and prevail in the world. 
 
The Shekhinah, that “mother” who bestows nourishing milk either, in proper times, on 
the holy side of the cosmos, or, in improper times, on the demonic side, here becomes 
“filled with blood,” bringing destructive forces upon the world.220  Menstrual blood, a 
distinctively female secretion, is here emitted as a result of her “suckling” from the Sitra 
Aḥra, which generally in the Zohar entails intimacy with a male partner, the “mighty 
ḥivya.”221  The abject substance, the contaminating menstrual blood, is emitted as a result 
of this intimacy – the converse of the process I have shown in the context of the origin of 
the demonic, whereby the abject substance crystallizes into the demonic.  It is as though 
this perverse coupling causes a reversal of the process of crystallization, a regression to a 
more primal state (a phenomenon I have noted above in my discussion of demonic male 
zohama).  To be sure, this blood, in turn, leads to the further crystallization of mighty 
demonic forces who are thereby “aroused” and “prevail in the world.”    
 
I now turn to the suckling relationship of the divine male to the demonic.  In the Zohar, 
by contrast with Joseph of Hamadan, there are substantially fewer usages of suckling to 
portray this relationship than in the context of the Shekhinah.  Nonetheless, I have 
already cited a crucial instance above, concerning the perverse substitution of Lilith for 
the Shekhinah as the consort of the "King," and specifically, of the "Tsadik," the divine 
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phallus:  “for he was riding until now in a place not his own, in an alien place, and was 
suckling it”  [  היל קיניו הארכונ רתאב ,היליד ואלד רתאב אתשה דע ביכר הוהד ןיגב ].222  As in 
several instances I have discussed in the female context, the phrase "suckles it," [היל קיני, 
yanik le], here operates at the junction of its sexual and nutritive meanings.  It may be a 
simple reiteration of "riding in a place not his own, in an alien place" – i.e., an additional 
figurative evocation of copulation between the holy Yesod and Lilith.  Alternatively, it 
may signify that, a result of "riding in that place," it then sustains, nutritively “suckles,” 
it.  A third possibility is that it serves to carry both sexual and nutritive meanings.   
Finally, it may be read as a catachresis, an evocation of the monstrous, “unspeakable” 
intimacy between the divine and demonic for which language has no “proper” term.  In 
any event, the crucial force of the passage is the evocation of the scandalous link between 
the holy Yesod and Lilith.  Finally, as I noted above, the passage emphasizes the abject 
nature of this relationship, the way it puts into doubt the identity of the king, cast down, 
without “honor,” to intimacy with an “ass,” losing even the name of “king.”   
 
Joseph of Hamadan, who makes suckling a central and routine feature of divine-demonic 
relations, also moves more seamlessly between its various meanings.   The two passages 
from the Sefer Tashak quoted above, especially when read together, show the same kind 
of playing on the multiple meanings of suckling that appear in the Zohar’s “kid/milk” 
passage.  On the one hand, they use the verb to refer to the Yesod’s relationship to both 
the “Matronita” and to the “Alien Woman,” both involving “suckling” in a primarily 
sexual sense.  On the other hand, they use it to describe the vivification of the minions of 
these two females in a primarily nutritive sense – the “holy angels” and “prophets and 
pious ones” nourished by the Matronita, the “demons and spirits” and “Balaam the evil 
one” nourished by the “Alien Woman.”  Although suckling seems primarily used in one 
sense or another depending on the relationship, the evocative force of the passages clearly 
depends on this shifting between senses.   
 
The usage of suckling to describe the relationship between the divine and the demonic by 
the Zohar and by Joseph of Hamdan requires a different approach than that of either 
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Haskell or Wolfson.  It is neither an act of maternal beneficence and tenderness, as 
Haskell would have it, nor an instrument of the establishment of exclusive phallic 
dominance, as Wolfson would have it.  The sexual/nutritive suckling of the demonic by 
the divine through abject emissions – of menstrual blood and, implicitly, semen in the 
Zohar, and of urine in Joseph of Hamadan – leads to an abject relationship that debases 
divine subjectivity.  The emissions vivify the Sitra Aḥra, and links the holy phallus not 
only with the “Alien Woman” but with her minions, the “impure hosts,” both 
metaphysical and earthly.   
 
In Joseph of Hamadan, suckling becomes a routinized feature of the cosmos whereby the 
divine enters into relationship with an autonomous Sitra Aḥra.  He most often portrays 
this sustaining link with the demonic neither as a catastrophic “black theurgical” result of 
human sin nor as a perverse outcome of demonic seduction, but as an inevitable organic 
process and thus a regular feature of cosmic process.  By contrast, the “ambivalences of 
origin” explored in this chapter concerned the generation of the demonic either at the 
very incipience of the constitution of the cosmos or its reconstitution at moments of 
crisis; the “ambivalences of intimacy,” for their part, primarily concerned links between 
already constituted personages or structures, links that were for the most part episodic 
and tragic contingencies.  In suckling, at least as portrayed by Joseph of Hamadan, the 
divine routinely undermines its own distinctive qualities, be they maternal or phallic, by 
providing regular sustenance to its chief antagonist, object of temptation, and wayward 
offspring.     
 
E. Conclusion:  A Theurgical Parallel 
 
A passage in the Hakdamah of the Zohar
223
 gives a fresh look at the themes in this 
chapter through a discussion of abjection on the human level and its “black theurgical” 
effects.  This passage begins as a homily on Isaiah 51:16: “that I may plant the heavens, 
and lay the foundations of the earth, and say unto Zion, Thou art my people,” [  םימש עטנל
התא ימע ןויצל רמאלו ץרא דסילו ].  Re-vowelizing the word "ימע" to read "with me" instead of 
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"my people," the Zohar declares that this verse describes the partnership between the 
kabbalist and God in the creation of heaven and earth.   
 
This partnership with God, however, only applies to a proper kabbalist, not to one for 
whom engagement with the “secrets of the Torah” is not properly "his way," one who 
"innovates matters that he does not know in their clear form, as would be appropriate,” a 
sage who has not yet reached the stage of "instruction and teaching” [ היחרוא ואלד אוהה
... תואי אקדכ ןוהיירוב לע עדי אלד ןילמ שדחו ,אתיירואד ןיזרבהארוהל יטמ אלד םכח דימלת ].224   On the 
contrary, such a person enters into a creative partnership with Sama’el, here called the 
"perverse man" [תוכפהת שיא], a word whose root [ךפה] highlights its relationship of 
reversal in relation to the divine.  Rather than creating a proper heaven, the words emitted 
by the improper kabbalist enable Sama’el to leave his place in the "crevice of the great 
abyss" [אבר אמוהתד אבקונ ] and empower him to create a "vain firmament" [  אושד אעיקר ].  
Immediately following the creation of this vain firmament, Lilith, the "woman of 
whoredom," emerges, becomes "strengthened though it … participates in it" and 
"acquires the license and power to fly" throughout the world  [  דימ תקפנ תפיקתאו ,םינונז תשא
אוההב  לכ סט יוהמל אתלוכיו ושר הל תיא ,אעיקר אוההב תמייק דכד ןיגב ...היב תפתתשאו ... אושד אעיקר
אמלע].225  She then proceeds to engage in murderous rampages, in accordance with a 
verse from Proverbs (7:26), "For many are those she has struck dead [םיללח םיבר יכ 
הליפה].”   
 
This elaborate narrative of “black theurgy” closely tracks the themes I have been 
discussing in this chapter.  The proclamation of esoteric words by an improper person is 
described in a manner which evokes perversity, implicitly of a sexual nature – for such a 
person is described as one who "does not know” in an “appropriate” way, a description 
whose sexual resonance is brought out by the phrase that esoteric study is not "his way" 
[היחרוא ואל].  This phrase, in both its Aramaic and Hebrew variants, is widely used in 
rabbinic writing to describe sexual perversity.
226
  The notion of the destructive effect of a 
sage's premature instruction also has the resonance of inappropriate or failed sexuality.  
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Moreover, the chapter from Proverbs in which the cited verse appears is devoted to an 
elaborate description of the sexual seduction of an innocent by a "prostitute," an "alien 
woman," both frequent Zoharic terms for Lilith.  In the Talmudic source of this Zoharic 
passage, the premature sage is not merely viewed as a collaborator with this destructive 
woman, but is actually identified with her.
227
  Finally, the verb used for the act of killing 
by this woman, "הליפה," is also probably intended to evoke prematurity, in the sense of 
abortion or miscarriage, due to the play on the word "לפנ," as Rashi explains – thus 
linking the prematurity of the instruction by the sage with the kind of destruction that he 
thereby causes.   And, of course, the destruction of infants and the provocation of 
nocturnal emissions are two of Lilith's key characteristics in both midrashic and 
kabbalistic literature. 
 
In light of these associations, we can see that the passage from the Hakdamah presents 
the central themes of this chapter set in the context of “black theurgy.”  It begins with the 
nourishment and partial creation of the Sitra Aḥra by the emission of refuse before the 
proper formation of the creative individual, in short, by the process of abjection – though 
here it is a not yet fully formed human being, rather than a divine subject as in most of 
the passages discussed above.  The unripe sage emits perverse, unnatural creative forces 
in the cosmos, leading to the creation of the space of the Sitra Aḥra, the "vain 
firmament."  He also brings the two key diabolical figures into this stable, if "vain," 
space:  Sama’el from his lair in the "great abyss" and Lilith from an unnamed, perhaps 
even more inchoate whereabouts.   Having acquired this stable platform within the 
cosmos, the murderous and perverse activities of Lilith are now given free rein.   
 
We can even identify fairly precisely the moment in the cosmic process in which this 
black theurgy occurs.  It is a moment in which Sama’el and Lilith have already been 
constituted, and thus it is somewhat subsequent to the stage portrayed in the "smoke" 
narrative in Zohar Pekude or the "anger" narrative in Zohar Va-Yetse.  Yet, it is also a 
moment in which Sama’el and Lilith have not fully acquired their place in the cosmos, or 
rather in which they are, at best, resident in the "great abyss."   The construction of their 
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domain of the "vain firmament," and their taking up of residence in it, is a result of the 
premature and perverse emission by the improper kabbalist.  Finally, we should note that 
the movement from the "great abyss" to the "vain firmament" is a movement from the 
remote Sitra Aḥra to the proximate and concentric Sitra Aḥra – for, as I have shown in 
Chapter One, the term "firmament" [אעיקר] is used in the Zohar as an image of the 
concentric Sitra Aḥra, associated with the "curtains" of which the impure form surrounds 
the pure form.  This entire perverse creation and cosmic restructuring is brought about by 
the premature emission of refuse by the not-yet-fully-formed individual, the improper 
kabbalist – in short, by abjection.  
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Chapter Three.   
Dangerous Consequences:   
Impersonation and the Abyss 
 
  
 אוהש ,וילעמ תופילקה תא טשפ ומכ אוה ,ףלשו .המחלמ שיא ארקנש ,ה"בקה הז ,ולענ שיא ףלש
םיהלאה השע הז תמועל הז םג יכ ,ל"אמס הז ,והערל ןתונו .לענל זמור. 
 
“A man plucked off his shoe” [Ruth 4:7]:  this is the Holy One blessed be He, who is 
called “A man of war” [Exodus 15:3].  “And he plucked”: this is as though he 
disrobed himself of the kelipot, which alludes to the shoe.  “And he gives it to his 
neighbor”: this is Sama’el.  “For also this confronted with this hath made the Elohim” 
[Ecclesiastes 7:14] 
 
- Ḥayim Vital1 
 
 תעדה תואיצמ םהינש ןיב לצאתמו ,עיפשמ הזו לבקמ הז ,םיעקבנ הלא תומוהת יתש תעדה ידי לעו
םלענה 
  
And by means of the Knowledge, these two abysses are split – this receives and 
this bestows – and, between the two, the existence of the hidden Knowledge is 
emanated. 
 
- Moshe Cordovero2 
 
A. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I discuss two polar consequences of the processes discussed in the 
preceding chapters.   First, in a world in which the Sitra Aḥra has crystallized into fully 
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formed structures and personages (Chapter Two) and in which these forms come to 
double those of the holy side (Chapter One),  impersonation of the divine by the demonic 
increasingly moves to the foreground as a central danger.  As the process of 
crystallization of the demonic becomes further and further extended, it yields a world of 
entities almost impossible to distinguish from their divine counterparts – a reified world 
of simulacra.  In its most dangerous form, impersonation results from an ontological 
amalgamation between divine and demonic entities produced through coercion.  While I 
have already broached the problem of impersonation a number of times, I focus in this 
chapter on a specific variant of it, which I call “aggressive enclothing,” a kind of forced 
metaphysical cross-dressing.  This phenomenon is latent in the Zohar, explicitly emerges 
in the Tikune Ha-Zohar and Ra’ya Mehemena, and then becomes a major theme in later 
kabbalah.  
 
I then turn to a challenge which is the diametrical opposite of impersonation, that posed 
by the utterly formless tehom, the abyss.  The abyss, which ever threatens to dissolve all 
form and meaning, and which thus shares much, indeed at times may even be identified, 
with the abject, is that from which both the holy and demonic sides emerge and to which 
they return (Chapter Two).  Nonetheless, in a world in which reified demonic simulacra 
have become cognitively and ontologically powerful, it may seem that it is only through a 
plunge back into the dissolving abyss that creativity can be resumed – in Kristeva’s 
words, “rebirth with and against abjection.” 3    
 
B. Impersonation through Aggressive Enclothing 
    
I first turn to one of the most troubling variants of divine/demonic relations:  the 
possibility that the divine can come to be aggressively enclothed  [אשבלתאל] by the 
demonic.  The portrayals of this phenomenon in kabbalistic texts span a wide range, from 
those that view it as posing the ultimate cosmic and religious dangers to those that view it 
as secretly holding the key to redemption.   Aggressive enclothing shares some features 
with other antagonistic, yet intimate, relationships between the divine and the demonic, 
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such as “suckling” and “cleaving”; it is also, in some ways, modeled on them.   
Enclothing resembles those other relationships in that it produces the parasitical 
empowerment of the demonic by the divine, while also posing the distinctive hazard of 
impersonation. 
 
The valence of such enclothing is not only portrayed in different ways in different texts, 
but may even vary within a single text.  When portrayed as dangerous, aggressive 
enclothing is the capture of the divine by the demonic and the reversal of the proper 
hierarchy between clothing and the enclothed.   When portrayed as redemptive, it is a 
tactic, even a ruse, by means of which the divine dominates the demonic from within.  
That the aggression involved in enclothing has been portrayed as working in both 
directions may perhaps be partly attributed to the ease with which one can imagine the 
donning and doffing of garments.  Indeed, in Lurianic texts, as I shall show, the struggle 
over enclothing becomes a central way of describing the oscillations between the fortunes 
of the divine and demonic realms throughout cosmic and human history.  I note that, 
although the image of enclothing is usually reserved for the encasing of the divine in a 
demonic garment, this is not exclusively the case;
4
 in any event, the successes of the two 
sides in such struggles come to be portrayed in increasingly parallel terms.    
 
Aside from its ever-increasing importance for the portrayal of divine/demonic relations as 
kabbalistic history progresses, a key aspect of aggressive enclothing for my study is that 
it brings together the dominant themes of the first two chapters:  splitting and abjection-
and-crystallization.  Upon first consideration, the notion of the enclothing of the divine 
by the demonic may be seen as primarily a form of splitting – here, between a divine core 
and a demonic exterior.  As with other kinds of splitting, enclothing would thus be a 
technique for the construction and management of ambivalence.  Psychologically, of 
course, if one views an entity as bearing contradictory traits, or if one experiences 
                                                 
4
 See Tikune Ha-Zohar, 109a:    
 ,בוט רבלמ קיקד אחומו ,ער ואגלמ ןוניא ןיניערג ןוניאד ,ןיפילקד ערו בוטד אנליא תיאו בט רבלמ אקיקד אחומד תיאו
 היבלו בט הימופ ,ארקשד אטינומ אד ,ואגלמ םיגיס תרפועו ,רבלמ הפוצמ ריעז אפסכו אבהד ןוגכ ,ואגלמ שיב יגס אחומו
שיב 
And there is a Tree of Good and Evil of the kelipot, for these seeds are evil within, and the thin 
moḥa without is good.  And there are those whose thin moḥa without is good, and a large moḥa 
within is bad – like a small amount of gold and silver coating without, and lead dross within.  This 
is the stamp of the liar – his mouth is good and his heart is bad. 
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contradictory affects towards it, then the notion that the entity is split between a good 
core and a bad exterior validates that ambivalence – revealing that the conflicted 
perception of the entity is a result of an incompatibility in the object itself.  Subjective 
ambivalence is transformed into objective contradiction, human anxiety into an 
ontological struggle between antagonistic cosmic forces.   
 
Aggressive enclothing, from this perspective, might thus be viewed as providing an 
etiological explanation, an ontological back-story, as it were, for the confusions and 
indeterminacies of worldly experience.  The “homology” aspect of “splitting,” described 
in Chapter One, yields the demonic as a realm of fully structured and organized entities, 
homologous to the divine and therefore difficult to distinguish from it.  Aggressive 
enclothing takes this one step further:  the difficulty of distinguishing between the two 
realms is here not simply a cognitive problem but rather a perversion of the real itself, an 
impersonation made possible by the actual capture of the divine by the demonic.  Thus, 
while this back-story takes some of the onus off the ambivalent subject, it is hardly 
reassuring, for at least two further reasons.  First, aggressive enclothing combines 
extreme forms of the key dangerous feature of the “concentric” Sitra Aḥra, its proximity 
to the divine, with the key dangerous feature of the “homologous” Sitra Aḥra, its 
indistinguishability from the divine.  Second, in a world in which impersonation is 
pervasive and rooted in reality itself, avoiding the gravest religious pitfall, the confusion 
of the divine and demonic, seems almost impossible.    
 
I have thus far discussed the relationship of aggressive enclothing to splitting; I now turn 
to its relationship to the theme of abjection, a relationship that increasingly comes to the 
fore as kabbalistic history progresses.  At the simplest level, enclothing is a form of 
splitting that is also intrinsically abject in the conventional sense of degradation, the 
debasement of the divine through its subordination to a demonic exterior.   Such abject 
subordination reaches its ultimate form in  narratives of talking idols, intrinsically lifeless 
creatures granted perverse vitality by divine names inserted into them.  Such narratives, 
kabbalistically adapted from rabbinic sources, are particularly blatant examples of 
monstrous prosopopeia – in which language itself becomes an expression of abjection.  
At a deeper ontological level, however, particularly in Lurianic texts, abjection also 
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comes to be the very means of the combat between the divine and demonic.  In such 
texts, each side seeks to enclothe a vital core (specifically, the “nine upper sefirot of 
Malkhut”) by inducing its violent expulsion from one realm to another.  By enclothing 
this core, the provisionally victorious side re-crystallizes itself, reconstructs its 
wholeness, “completes its partsuf.” As I shall describe in detail, the vital core itself thus 
comes to be paradoxically portrayed as the refuse that is fought over and violently 
exchanged between one realm and the other.  In these struggles, the paradoxes of 
abjection become particularly acute as refuse becomes identified with substance.   
 
The origins of the idea of aggressive enclothing, in my view, lie in an innovative 
composite, created by the Ra’ya Mehemena and Tikune Ha-Zohar, of two processes that 
are quite distinct in the Zohar:  enclothing and capture.   Enclothing is a common way the 
Zohar portrays benign and necessary cosmic and divine processes.
5
   Although such 
portrayals take many heterogeneous and complex forms, the “garments” [ןישובל] are 
generally appropriate to the entity being clothed.  A garment may be necessary for a 
lower entity to ascend to a higher level or for a higher entity to descend to a lower level.
6
  
On the cognitive level, a garment might be necessary to conceal secrets for which the 
world is not worthy or to make secrets accessible to those worthy of them.  Moreover, the 
Zohar reserves holy garments for the holy and unholy garments for the unholy.  For 
example, in one passage, the Zohar refers to bodies as garments for the spirit – with pure 
bodies enclothing holy spirits and contaminated bodies enclothing contaminated spirits.
7
    
 
A consideration of their relation to the kelipot reinforces the benign nature of garments in 
the Zohar.  Athough the images of “garment” and kelipah may be viewed as quite closely 
related on a phenomenal level, the Zohar generally keeps the two notions quite distinct – 
and certainly does so when kelipah is used in a clearly demonic sense.  The “benign 
kelipah” passage, discussed in Chapter One, may, on a first reading, be viewed as an 
exception.  I note, first, that, even in the "benign kelipah" passage, we do not find a 
complete overlap between the terms "garment" and "kelipah."  At the upper levels, as I 
                                                 
5
 See generally, Cohen-Alloro, Sod ha-Malbush u-Marʼeh ha-Malʼakh be-Sefer ha-Zohar, passim. 
6
 See, e.g., Zohar III, 184a on the need for a proper garment for a proper yenikah to take place 
7
 Zohar I, 20b. 
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have shown, the term "garment," and not "kelipah," is used to describe the relationship 
between successive sefirot.  From Gevurah downward, however, the term "kelipah" is 
used, as well as, indeed seemingly interchangeably with, the term "garment." We find 
this usage in the passage’s key lines:  "so that this is a garment for this, and this for this.  
This, the kernel [moḥa]; this, the shell [kelipah].   Although a garment, it becomes the 
kernel [moḥa] of another layer" [   ג"עאו ,הפילק אדו אחומ אד ,אדל אדו ,אדל אשובל אד חכתשאד דע
ומ והיא דיבעתא ,אשובל אדדארחא אגרדל אח  ].  Still, one could say that it is precisely the 
unusual, benign conception of the kelipah in that passage which makes it the exception 
that proves the rule.   
 
More importantly for my discussion here, however, is that the fact that a higher level 
entity takes on either a "garment" or (from Gevurah downward) a "kelipah" poses no 
problem of capture or misprision.  Indeed, even in the "Lilith/kelipah" passage, no danger 
is posed by enclothing as such; rather, the danger is that of a metastasis of the kelipah 
dimension, the generation of an entity which is a kelipah by essence rather than 
relationally.  To be sure, one finds in this passage a suggestion of the theme of 
impersonation in the specific manner by which Lilith attempts to capture the “small 
faces” [ירטוז יפנא]:  she sought to “cleave to them and to portray herself through them” 
[והייוגב ארייטצאלו והב אקבדתאל]8.  This comes very close to the monstrous prosopopeia I 
discuss below – but, significantly, it does not use the imagery of enclothing to portray it. 
 
By contrast with its benign portrayal of enclothing, the Zohar describes  aggression 
against, and capture of, the holy by the demonic with words like "domination,"
9
 
"cleaving,"
10
 and "suckling."
11
   The description of capture as an aggressive "cleaving" or 
"suckling" portrays it as a perverse erotic intimacy.  When the Shekhinah succeeds in 
bringing a halt to this intimacy, as on the Sabbath or in a future messianic time, she is 
                                                 
8
 Ibid.  I note that this desire of Lilith seems ultimately to derive from the midrashic notion of the shedim as 
spirits without bodies.  This notion is also alluded to in the assertion, at Zohar III, 143b, that shedim desire 
Torah sages in order to be “included in the Body.”     
9
 E.g., Zohar I, 210b. 
10
 E.g., Zohar II, 134a. 
11
 E.g., Zohar II, 125a. 
  
 
230 
 
described as “separating” herself from intimacy with the Sitra Aḥra [ תשירפתא יהיא ןידכו
ארטס אוההמ ].12    
 
I argue that the Ra’ya Mehemena and Tikune Ha-Zohar create a composite of these two 
Zoharic processes:  on the one hand, the "enclothing" of one level by another, a process 
always portrayed in the Zohar as benign, and, on the other hand, the "cleaving" of the 
Sitra Aḥra to the divine, a process always portrayed as malign.  This composite yields a 
novel use of "enclothing" to portray hostile capture, a composite that seems intended to 
identify a specific set of cognitive and religious dangers.  If the enclothing of the divine 
by the demonic is also the capture of the former by the latter, a world in which this 
phenomenon was pervasive would be truly terrifying.  The cognitive and spiritual 
dangers would be akin to those involved in the "sisters" allegory or the seductive powers 
of nogah – above all, the possibility that a person might be lead to perceive the demonic 
as divine, and thus to worship the former, or draw on its metaphysical powers, instead of 
the latter.  In the case of enclothing, however, the danger is more acute than in those two 
other examples – for this religious perversion has an ontological basis, rather than merely 
indicating a perceptual illusion.  We are confronting not a covert alliance between 
opposites/twins, nor an already-constituted phenomenal resemblance between 
antagonists, but rather, impersonation brought about through aggression, capture, and 
ontological hybridization.
13
    
 
In the Ra’ya Mehemena and Tikune Ha-Zohar, the enclothing of the Shekhinah by the 
kelipot, and the Shekhinah's effort to "disrobe" herself from them, is often found 
precisely at the kind of textual moments whose equivalents in the Zohar use the notion of 
                                                 
12
 Zohar II, 134a. 
13
 The impersonation of the divine by the demonic exists in some other sources, sometimes in order to test 
whether a person can see through the disguise.  Thus, Moshe of Burgos declares that the angel who fought 
Jacob was a holy angel, “enclothed in the image of Sama’el” [ לאמס לש ותומדב שבלתנ ].   Scholem, ‘Hosafot 
me-Ibud Ma’amaro shel R. Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen al Ha-Atzilut’, 191.   See also 'Ma'amar 'al Ha-Atsilut Ha-
Semalit,' 91, where Yitsḥak Ha-Kohen states that because this impersonation was done to test Jacob, the 
angel was forbidden to tell Jacob whether his name was "Israel" or "Sama’el."  In a classic Ḥasidic 
transformation of these themes, Ya'akov Yosef Ha-Kohen of Polnoye tells us that the "essence of 
redemption" is to see that the “enemy” is really the “lover” [ביוא, בהוא – words that in eastern Europe would 
have been pronounced nearly identically].  Toledot Ya'akov Yosef, 250.  The Zoharic parable of the 
prostitute sent by the king to test his son may also be added to this series of texts.  Zohar II, 163a. 
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the "cleaving" of the Sitra Aḥra to the Shekhinah and of her efforts to "separate" herself 
from it:     
 
והיינמ תטשפתא תבשבו ,אנידד התימד ןיפילק ןילאב תשבלתא האתת אתניכש לוחד ןימויבד ןיגב 
 
For during the week, the lower Shekhinah is enclothed in these kelipot of death, of 
judgment, and on Shabbat, she disrobes herself from them.
14
  
 
 תנג לא ,אכלמ המלש רמאד המכ ,היל ןנירק זוגא ,וגלמ אחומ יהיאו ,אתולגב סדרפ יהיא אתניכש
 המינפ ךלמ תב הדובכ לכ )ה"מ םילהת( ביתכד אוה אדה ,ואגלמ אביא אתניכש יהיאו ,יתדרי זוגא
בהז תוצבשממ ןה ןיפילקו ,השובל   תשבלתאו ,תטפשתא אלכמ תבשבו ,ןיארכונ תויושר המכ
ןאריפש ןישובלב….    
 
The Shekhinah is an orchard in exile.  And she is the moḥa within.  She is called a 
“nut,” as King Solomon said, "I went down into the garden of nuts," [Song of 
Songs, 6:11].  And she, the Shekhinah, is the fruit within, as it is written, (Psalms 
45:13), “The king's daughter is all glorious within: her clothing is of wrought 
gold.” And the kelipot are the several alien domains.  And on Shabbat, she 
disrobes from all, and dresses in beautiful clothes.
15
 
 
 יאהו ,ןיריפש ןישובלב אשדחתמו ,ןיכושח ןיפילק ןילאמ ארהיס אטשפתמ אנמז אוההבו
הילעמ התונמלא ידגב רסתו ביתכד אוה אדה ,ארהיסד אשודח והיא. 
 
And in that time, the moon will disrobe herself from those dark kelipot, 
and will be renewed in beautiful clothes.  And this is the renewal of the 
moon.  And this is as it is written, " And she put her widow's garments off 
from her."  [Genesis 38:14].
16
 
 
                                                 
14
 Ra’ya Mehemena, in Zohar III, 243b. 
15
 Tikune Ha-Zohar, 69a-b. 
16
 Tikune Ha-Zohar, 36b. 
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Such passages use enclothing as the key trope to portray perverse intimacy between the 
Shekhinah and the Sitra Aḥra.  ”To enclothe” [אשבלתאל] has come to take the place of “to 
cleave” [אקבדתאל] as the central verb portraying this intimacy; “to disrobe” [ אלאטשפת ], 
rather than “to separate” [אשרפתאל], as its undoing.     
 
Nevertheless, as I have hinted above, the directionality of the aggression involved in this 
new notion of enclothing is not always univocal.  Thus, despite the clear description of 
enclothing in some texts as the capture of the divine, we also find explicit declarations of 
the diametrically opposed view, as in the following passage from the Tikune Ha-Zohar.    
  
אתולגב ןוותא רשע ןוהב ןישבלתמד ,ןיאלע ןירתכ יבגל ןיפילק ןוניא ןיאתת ןירתכ17יוהמל , 
ןיאתת ןירתכ יותוחת ןייופכ 
 
The lower crowns are kelipot in relation to the upper crowns.  In them [the lower 
crowns – n.b.], the ten letters are enclothed in exile – in order that the lower 
crowns be subjugated beneath them.
18
 
 
Rather than defeat of the divine by the demonic, this passage thus declares that such 
enclothing is an intentional act by the divine to subjugate the demonic.    
  
In another, lengthy, passage, the Tikune Ha-Zohar propounds a full range of  
heterogeneous interpretations of aggressive enclothing – including the establishment of 
divine omnipresence and omnipotence, the sympathetic accompaniment of Israel into 
exile, the “black theurgical” effect of human sin, and the utilization of the demonic as an 
instrument of punishment for the wicked.  The establishment of divine omnipresence and 
omnipotence, the first interpretation in this passage, is closely related to the subjugation 
theme:  
 
                                                 
17
 Some textual variants read “in prayer” [אתולצב] rather than “in exile” [אתולגב].  The former does not suit 
the context at all.  Cordovero (Pardes, I, 80c) also uses the latter variant. 
18
 Tikune Ha-Zohar, 26a. Cordovero emphasizes this function of the enclothing of the divine by the 
demonic.  See Pardes, I, 80c-d. 
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 הציחמ ןוניא ןיפילק ןילאו ,והייוגב אחומ ןריפס רשעו ,ןריפס רשעל ןיפילק ןוניא ןיאתת ןירתכ ןוניאו
 לארשי ןיב היתניכשב אמייקל ,היתניכשו אוה ךירב אשדוק שבלתמ ןיפילק ןילאב ,םימשבש םהיבאל
הלשמ לכב ותוכלמו 
 
And these lower crowns are kelipot for the ten sefirot, and the ten sefirot are the 
moḥa within them.  And these kelipot are a barrier between Israel and their Father 
in heaven.  In these kelipot, Kudsha Berikh Hu and his Shekhinah are enclothed, 
in order to fulfil, through the Shekhinah, "and his kingdom ruleth over all." 
[Psalms 103:19]
19
 
 
The triumphalism of the end of this excerpt is, to be sure, somewhat undermined by the 
immediately preceding notion that this method of establishing divine supremacy 
constitutes a barrier between Israel and God.   
 
The passage then declares that enclothing stems from divine solicitude for Israel in exile, 
in a passage in which the complex relationship between “kelipot” and “garments” 
receives some attention: 
  
 אוה ךירב אשדוק טשפתא ןוהנמד ,ארוהנד ןיריפש ןינווג המכמ ןישובל ןוניא אליעל היליד ןיפילק
 ארטנל ןיגב ,ןינרחא ןילאב שבלתאו ,אתולגב לכב והיא אדו ,ןיפילק ןילאב ןישבלתמ ןוניאד ,לארשיל
רצ ול םתרצ20 
 
His kelipot above are garments of several beautiful colors of light, from which 
Kudsha Berikh Hu disrobes in exile – and puts on these others, in order to protect 
Israel who are enclothed in these kelipot.  And this is “In all their affliction he was 
afflicted” [Isaiah 63:9]. 
 
Here we are told that there are two kinds of kelipot, or, perhaps, that the upper “kelipot” 
are really benign, indeed beautiful, garments.  In any case, Kudsha Berikh Hu disrobes 
from these beautiful garments and dons the unholy kelipot in order to follow Israel into 
                                                 
19
 Tikune Ha-Zohar, 108b. 
20
 Ibid. 
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exile with the goal of protecting them.  Far from omnipresent and omnipotent as in the 
first interpretation, the God who follows his people into exile is explicitly portrayed as a 
suffering deity, precisely by virtue of his donning the demonic garments.    
 
Finally, and still within the same passage, we learn that enclothing of the divine in the 
demonic is designed to mete out punishment to the wicked – but in a manner that, 
paradoxically, seems to diminish divine omnipotence, perhaps even more so than in the 
"self-exiling deity" interpretation. 
 
רב םירגד הפילק איהה   ך"יקלא 'ה םש תא אשת אל אד ןיגבו ,אמקונ ליטנ היב 'ה םש אשבלתאל שנ
אושל21 
 
This kelipah, in which the person has caused the name of God to be enclothed, 
takes revenge.  And therefore, "Thou shalt not take the name of YHVH your 
Elohim in vain" [Exodus 20:7]. 
 
With this third interpretation of enclothing, we have come almost full circle.  Rather than 
an act of divine omnipotence, as in the first interpretation, or divine sorrowful empathy, 
as in the "self-exiling deity" view, the enclothing here happens as a coercive act of black 
theurgy.  The human sinner causes the divine to be enclothed in a kelipah.  More 
precisely, the sinner causes a linguistic deportation from divine to demonic – reading the 
Third Commandment hyper-literally as “Thou shalt not transport the name of YHVH to 
the [realm of the] vain,” i.e., the demonic realm. This linguistic deportation also has 
immediate ontological consequences.  The sinner is punished by the black theurgical 
consequences of his own act, delivered into the hands of a demonic entity that he himself 
has empowered.  I note that just as ambivalence is expressed in the first, triumphalist, 
interpretation by the notion that enclothing constitutes a “barrier” between Israel and 
God, so it is expressed in this third interpretation by the notion that the sinner’s coercive 
                                                 
21
 Tikune Ha-Zohar, 109a.  I note that a bit earlier in the same passage, the punishment of sinners is also 
described as rendered possible by an intentional divine entrusting of the ten sefirot of the Sitra Aḥra to 
Sama’el.  Ibid. 
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perversion of the divine name brings about his punishment at the hand of the monstrous 
product of that very perversion.   
 
Moreover, we can only grasp the full horror of the situation created by the sinner when 
we consider that this monstrous avenger is indistinguishable from its divine counterpart.  
Just before the transition to this third interpretation, the passage stresses the rhetorical 
homonymy and structural homology between the divine and the demonic realms.  The 
two share the name badad, “solitary” [דדב], which has the numerical value of ten, the 
number of sefirot possessed by each realm.  Bringing together this kind of antithetical 
homonymy, familiar from the Zohar, with the notion of aggressive enclothing of the 
divine by the demonic, means that such enclothing is a strictly imperceptible process – 
since it consists in the covering over of the divine by its identical demonic adversary.  
Again, the danger is not merely one of subjective perception because aggressive 
enclothing is a simultaneously rhetorical and ontological event – the actual deportation of 
the divine into the demonic through the black theurgy of human sin.  The passage tightly 
links the rhetorical and ontological processes through its hyper-literal reading of the 
Third Commandment in which it is precisely the divine “name” that is actually deported 
into the realm of the “vain,” the realm of demonic language and being.22  
 
One final speculation on this passage.  One may interpret the deportation of the divine 
into the demonic in at least three ways:  the bestowal of new powers on a pre-existing 
demonic entity by inserting the divine name within it, the creation of a new demonic 
entity through enclothing the divine name with lifeless matter, or, finally, most 
provocatively, the transmogrification of a divine into a demonic entity through deporting 
it into the demonic realm.  I would argue that the denomination of the sinner’s 
punishment as "revenge" by the kelipah favors this last interpretation, that the sinner is 
submitted to the retributive wrath of a monstrously transmogrified divine entity whose 
language and being he has forcibly expatriated from the divine to the demonic realm.   
The “revenge” would, in this view, emanate from a god furious at being transformed into 
                                                 
22
 For the antecedents of this usage in the Zohar, see I, 5a. 
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a monster.  The shared name, badad, would, in this reading, not be merely a case of 
homonymy, but a sign of the horrifying identity of ostensible opposites.  
  
The dangers of impersonation are made even more explicit in another passage in the 
Tikune Ha-Zohar which also uses as a proof-text the prohibition of "taking" God's name 
"in vain" – again interpreted as deporting it to the demonic realm.23  The text describes a 
black theurgical act whose consequence is the intermixture of "the name of Kudsha 
Berikh Hu and idolatry," producing the hybrid "tree of good and evil."   This act, drawn 
from a midrashic source, is the insertion of the name of God into Nebuchadnezzar's idol – 
a very literal instantiation of the deportation of the divine name into the demonic – 
enabling the idol to utter the words, "I am YHVH your Elohim."
24
  The Tikune Ha-Zohar 
interprets the speaking idol as an ontological intermixture of the divine and demonic, 
brought about by black theurgy – rather than merely, as in the midrashic source, as an 
illusory effect of black magic.   On the rhetorical level, this monstrous ontological 
perversion is a strikingly clear, as well as openly sacrilegious, case of prosopopeia.   
 
Such monstrous ontological and rhetorical hybrids lead inevitably both to religious 
disorders and distortions of subjectivity: 
 
 ,ןיאמדק והומקוא אד ןיגבו ,ערו בוטד אנליאב ןיברועמ ווה ולאכ ,אתולגב ןוניא לארשיד אנמזבו
םה הרהטב הרז הדובע ןידבוע אתולגב לארשי25 
 
And when Israel is in exile, it is as though they are intermixed with the tree of 
good and evil.  And it is because of this that the ancient ones taught, “Israel in 
exile are idol worshippers in purity.” 
 
In its original Talmudic context,
26
 the notion of the "idol worshippers in purity" is a 
byproduct of contingent social constraints and does not actually affect interior religious 
experience; here, by contrast, it is viewed as a metaphysical inevitability and 
                                                 
23
 Tikune Ha-Zohar 97a-b. 
24
 Tikune Ha-Zohar, 97b.  The source I have found for this story is Shir Ha-Shirim Rabah, III, 61a (7:15).    
25
 Tikune Ha-Zohar, 97b.  The internal quote is from bAvodah Zarah, 8a. 
26
 bAvodah Zarah, 8a. 
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ontologically enmeshes the person with demonic forces.
27
  In a fallen world, in which the 
demonic and divine are intermixed, many good faith attempts at religious engagement – 
specifically, in this passage, to theurgically “use any angel” or “any [holy] name” – 
inevitably involve one with this lethal “mixture” or “confusion.”28  The dangerously 
indeterminate meaning of such religious acts – expressed in the paradoxical phrase, "idol 
worshippers in purity" – is the ultimate menace posed by aggressive enclothing.    
 
I have thus far traced the development of the notion of enclothing from its Zoharic role as 
an inevitable and salutary vehicle of protection and revelation to its emergence as an 
ontological basis of heresy and a terrain of struggle between the divine and demonic in 
the Tikune Ha-Zohar.   These developments are crucial for understanding the unfolding 
of the Sitra Aḥra in kabbalistic history.  Aggressive enclothing occupies an important 
place in the teachings of both Cordovero and Luria.  And as kabbalistic history proceeds, 
aggressive enclothing becomes ever-more prominent as a portrayal of the dangerous 
intimacy of the divine and demonic, undoubtedly accelerated by its distinctive 
appearance in Sabbateanism. 
 
To be sure, post-Zoharic texts also preserve and further elaborate the Zoharic notion of 
enclothing as a benign and necessary aspect of divine unfolding.  In some passages, the 
Tikune Ha-Zohar portrays the lower divine figures, Kudsha Berikh Hu and the 
Shekhinah, as garments for the upper ones, Aba and Ima,
29
 and the lower world of 
Beri’ah as a garment for the upper world of Atsilut.30  Such usages became widespread in 
Lurianic kabbalah, for which "everything that is higher than its fellow enclothes itself in 
it to illuminate it and give it life" [ וב ריאהל וריבחב שבלתמ וריבחמ הובג אוהש רבד לכו
ותויחהלו].31  This notion of the garment in its beneficial and inevitable senses coexists side 
by side with its usage in its antagonistic, episodic, and often catastrophic senses.  In the 
latter contexts, and in direct opposition to the Zohar’s “benign kelipah” passage, it is the 
                                                 
27
 Cordovero elaborates on this phenomenon in several places.  See, e.g., Pardes, I, 44c-d and Or Yakar, 
XVI, 122b. 
28
   איבוברע תיאד ... אמלעב אמשב ... ךאלמ םושב אשמתשאל .  Tikune Ha-Zohar, 97b.  To be sure, the Tikune Ha-
Zohar declares that those who truly “know” are able to avoid this consequence.    
29
 Ibid., 63b. 
30
 Ibid., 116a. 
31
 See, e.g., Ets Ḥayim, 63d. 
  
 
238 
 
very geographical proximity and structural concentricity of the garments that facilitates 
antagonistic confrontations between the divine and the demonic, with reciprocal attempts 
at capture and subjugation.  It is also that which makes possible the danger that the 
demonic may impersonate the divine and be worshipped in its place.  Indeed, the 
coexistence of the benign and malign portrayals of enclothing may partly explain the 
dangerousness of the latter:  the ability of the demonic to deceive when it aggressively 
enclothes the divine may stem from the fact that such enclothing is a perverse form of a 
holy and necessary process.   
 
The fact that aggressive enclothing acquires such prominence in post-Zoharic kabbalah 
calls out for further reflection on the relationship between this kind of intimate 
relationship between the divine and the demonic and some of the others I have discussed.  
The connotations of “garments” may seem, at first, far more neutral than those of the 
“husks” surrounding the mo’aḥ, the "red hair" of the Ish, the foreskin of the divine 
phallus, let alone the rapacious “suckling” by the demonic – though perhaps it is 
precisely this seemingly non-threatening quality that makes them so dangerously 
deceptive.  They also seem less integrally related to the holy entity which they cover, in 
contrast with the other images which all relate to organic processes.  This more 
contingent relationship to the covered entity could have a variety of divergent 
consequences.  On the one hand, garments are more easily discarded than husks, hair, or 
foreskins – and, therefore, it may be easier to purify an enclothed holy entity than one 
that is, for example, uncircumcised.  From this perspective, theurgy would seem more 
effective if one is merely dealing with garments rather than an organic covering.
32
  On the 
other hand, garments are also more easily donned, making black theurgy seem more 
possible and dangerous.
33
  In short, the greater contingency of garments in contrast with 
                                                 
32
 Thus, a late attempt to mitigate the consequences of enclothing is articulated by Shlomo Elyashiv who 
declares that a donned garment never becomes a part of the enclothed person.  Sefer Sha'are Leshem, 482.  
To be sure, the same text also highlights the danger of impersonation, declaring that the kelipot attempt to 
use the fact of enclothing to "call themselves divinity" [תוהלא םשב כ"ג םמצע תא םינכמ ז"יע הנה].  Ibid., 483.  In 
any case, the danger of contamination is clearly expressed in other texts, both in the Tikune Ha-Zohar and 
in Lurianic kabbalah.  
33
 The contingency and reversibility of the "enclothing" image is highlighted by the early 19
th
 century 
Yitsḥak Isaac Ḥaver.  Ḥaver contrasts two images of the development of the universe: unfolding 
[תולשלתשה], which he see as linear development, associated with the Lurianic model of igulim, and 
enclothing [תושבלתה], which he sees as subject to reversibility, to the theurgical effects of human action, 
associated with the Lurianic model of yosher.  See Sefer Pitḥe She'arim, II, 14a-b 
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organic coverings makes them more susceptible to all kinds of human action, whose 
effects on them appear far more easily reversible:  by contrast with re-donning garments, 
the notion of re-growing husks and foreskins runs contrary to the physical sense of the 
image (even though, to be sure, such counter-factual uses of images are commonplace in 
the kabbalistic imagination), and even hair requires a good deal longer to grow back than 
garments require to be put back on.  
 
Finally, I note that one might imagine that the non-organic connection between garments 
and that which they cover would mean that they pose a lesser degree of contamination, 
that their effect on holy entities would be more superficial than that of the organic 
contaminants.  Nonetheless,  the portrayal of aggressive enclothing in the Tikune Ha-
Zohar and Ra’ya Mehemena, with its distinctive blending of the Zoharic notions of 
enclothing and erotically charged “cleaving,” entails the notion that enclothing can cause 
the deepest kind of contamination.  Repudiating any impression that enclothing is merely 
external, the Tikune Ha-Zohar uses the verse, “he hath defiled the sanctuary of YHVH“ 
(Numbers 19:20) [אמט הוהי שדקמ תא] to describe the effects of demonic garments on the 
divine.
34
  The passage associates that contamination with transgression of the prohibition 
of “kil’ayim” [םיאלכ], the mixing of seeds from different species, and, even more 
pertinently, “sha’atnez” [זנטעש], the mixing of linen and woolen materials in a garment.35  
By associating the seemingly external notion of enclothing with the “defilement of the 
sanctuary,” and then with a garment marked by an illicit mixture, the passage implies that 
aggressive enclothing brings about a monstrous ontological hybrid between divine and 
demonic.  This implication is reinforced when we consider that the “defilement of the 
sanctuary” verse is often cited in the Zohar to portray the illicit sexual union of the 
Shekhinah with the Sitra Aḥra, the “casting of zohama” into her.  And it is this 
association of enclothing with both sexual contamination and monstrous ontological 
                                                 
34
 Tikune Ha-Zohar, 109a.  The Tikune Ha-Zohar also attempts to mitigate such consequences.  Shortly 
after describing the enclothing of the divine name in the demonic, the Tikune Ha-Zohar declares that, at the 
level of Atsilut, contamination by the demonic garments only affects the divine garments and not the 
“moḥa".  These garments, however, are the divine sefirot themselves.  From the level of Beri'ah downward, 
moreover, the contamination can affect the "moḥa" as well.  Tikune Ha-Zohar, 109a.   This kind of 
reasoning is restated in some passages in Lurianic kabbalah with its notion that the kelipot of Atsilut are to 
be found in Beri’ah.  See, e.g., Ets Ḥayim, I, 17b.  In any event, the very attempts at such mitigation 
suggest the seriousness of the perceived threat of contamination from enclothing. 
35
 Leviticus 19:19. 
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hybridity that demands further reflection on the relationship between aggressive 
enclothing and the two processes described in Chapter Two, abjection and crystallization.    
 
In Chapter Two, I described the emergence of the demonic realm in relation to the two 
processes of abjection and crystallization.  In the  fullest elaborations of this emergence, 
the Zohar narrates these two processes as successive stages.  The construction of the holy 
realm only becomes possible after the abjection of inassimilable "refuse," "dregs," 
"smoke,” and so on, from the divine.  The demonic realm, in turn, emerges from these 
inchoate elements as they crystallize in their “place.”  Nevertheless, the phenomenal link 
between the two stages, as I noted in Chapter Two, is shrouded in mystery.  No 
explanation is given for this facility of abjected miasma to crystallize into a mighty 
structured realm of evil.  By contrast, in the Tikune Ha-Zohar’s use of the “contamination 
of the sanctuary,” tightly associating the Zoharic “casting of zohama” with aggressive 
enclothing, we find, not merely a link, but an implicit identification of the two seemingly 
incongruous, yet successive, processes of abjection and crystallization.  In aggressive 
enclothing, crystallized demonic “garments” paradoxically converge, or even become 
identified, with miasmic “zohama.”  Far from constituting a superficial contiguity, the 
enclothing of the divine sefirot by the demonic sefirot simultaneously casts implicitly 
sexual “zohama” in the interior of the divine, forcing it to undergo the experience of 
abjection.  As a result of this “enclothing/contamination,” a monstrous hybrid then forms, 
the agricultural “kil’ayim” or sartorial “sha’atnez.”  This monstrous hybrid is the product 
of the deep blending of the divine and demonic sefirot,  which is simultaneously their 
ostensibly superficial enclothing relationship.  To be sure, the Tikune Ha-Zohar’s 
identification of sexual contamination with enclothing, the convergence of the 
Zoharically distinct encounters with the abject and with the crystallized demonic, yields 
formulations that are just as catachrestic as the Zohar’s portrayals of them as distinct 
processes.  Indeed, I note that the term “sha’atnez,” which stands here catachrestically for 
the monstrous hybrid of the divine and demonic is also linguistically marked as 
monstrous in the biblical text itself, standing out as seemingly non-Hebraic and 
semantically obscure.     
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In Lurianic texts, the convergence of the themes of abjection and crystallization comes to 
play a key role in the cosmic drama, though in a very different way than in the Tikune 
Ha-Zohar.  In such texts, it is the vital core of divine identity itself that is violently 
abjected from the divine to the demonic and back again.  I refer here to the Lurianic 
portrayal of a combat in which one set of elements, the nine upper sefirot of Malkhut, 
shift violently between the two realms – specifically between the Shekhinah and Lilith.  
Thus, in the Ets Ḥayim, Vital describes the black theurgical consequences of Adam's sin 
as the enclothing of the nine upper sefirot of the Shekhinah by her demonic counterpart, 
Lilith.  Although Lilith was originally composed of "one point," these “nine sefirot have 
now become enclothed in her and have become in her ten complete sefirot"  [ הליחת התיהו
 הדוקנ 'יחבב... א התעותומילש ס"י הב ןישענו הב ושבלתנ ס"טה ול ] .36 Tishby explains this process 
as the "transformation of the holy sefirot themselves into the sefirot of the female of the 
kelipah"
37
 – enclothing as destroying the existing identity of the enclothed and bestowing 
upon it a new identity.    
 
Moreover, Vital cites the rabbinic dictum, "Tyre was only filled from the ruins of 
Jerusalem" [  אלםילשורי לש הנברחמ אלא רוצ האלמתנ ],38 to describe the construction of Lilith 
through her enclothing the nine upper sefirot of the Shekhinah.  The ruins of “Jerusalem,” 
a common kabbalistic name for the Shekhinah, would thus be identified with her nine 
sefirot, “destroyed” by being taken from her and deported to the demonic.  The “filling” 
of Lilith, in turn, would consist of the ruins of the Shekhinah as they become the core of 
her rival.  This deportation, this abjection of the sefirot from the one to the other, is 
understood as their violent wresting away from one garment, the “one point” of the 
Shekhinah, and their enclothing by the demonic “one point” of Lilith.  Lilith’s identity 
would thus be constructed on a foundation of ruins, the “destroyed” nine sefirot, which 
paradoxically become the core of her subjectivity, as they formerly were of that of the 
Shekhinah.  Destruction and construction, abjection and crystallization, become identical 
processes in the deportation of the sefirot from one realm to the other. 
                                                 
36
 Ets Ḥayim, II, 110b.  See Tishby, Torat Ha-Ra, 89. 
37
 Tishby, Torat Ha-Ra, 89. 
38
 E.g., Ets Ḥayim, II, 110b.  The earliest source I have found for the dictum in this form is in Rashi, 
Genesis 25:23, commenting on Ezekiel 26:2.  It appears to be a modification of two Talmudic dicta, one 
from bMegilah, 6a and one from bPesaḥim, 42b. 
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While the “Tyre/Jerusalem” dictum may suggest only the construction of the demonic 
from the refuse/core of the divine, the logic of the "enclothing" struggle is that it should 
be reversible.  And, indeed, a  reversal of the dictum is formulated in a late text written 
within the Lurianic framework, Shlomo Elyashiv's Sha'are Haleshem:  "for the 
construction of Jerusalem is from the destruction of Tyre"  [ לש הנברוחמ אוה םילשורי ןינב יכ
רוצ].39   Elyashiv associates these terms, respectively, with the Garden of Eden (like 
Jerusalem, a common kabbalistic name for the Shekhinah) and Hell, with the former built 
from the ruins of the latter.  Thus, not only is the demonic built from the ruins of the holy 
side, the holy side is constructed from the ruins of the demonic.   
 
The uses of the Tyre/Jerusalem dictum by Vital and Elyashiv can, moreover, be viewed 
as an elaboration of an allusion to it in a passage in the Ra’ya Mehemena.  This passage 
portrays the conditions of the Shekhinah and Lilith as inversely related, "for if this is 
replete, this is desolate" [וז הבירח וז האילמ יאד]40 – an implicit reference to the 
Tyre/Jerusalem dictum.  Indeed, the Ra’ya Mehemena makes this statement in the context 
of comparing the clothing of the two females, and their inversely related dignified and 
abject states.
41
 
 
In sum:  in post-Zoharic texts, aggressive enclothing gradually becomes the crucial 
weapon of violent combat between the divine and the demonic.  In Lurianic texts, it 
becomes the means by which each rival seeks to take possession of the vital core of 
identity.   The construction, the “filling,” of one figure is the depletion of other, as the 
sefirot are cast from one realm to the other.   The Lurianic “nine sefirot” are thus both 
inchoate, abject ruins and the vital core, the crystallization of identity.  These 
                                                 
39
  Sha'are Leshem, 184b-185a.   For Elyashiv, the construction of Hell precedes that of the Garden, just as 
the Zoharic “Kings of Edom” preceded the stable sefirot. Although this is a somewhat different context 
from the shifting back-and-forth of the nine sefirot between the divine and demonic females, it reflects a 
closely related kabbalistic theme. 
40
 Ra’ya Mehemena, in Zohar III, 272b. 
41
 To be sure, the use of the clothing imagery in the Ra’ya Mehemena is very different than in the Lurianic 
texts I am discussing here.  The Ra’ya Mehemena passage compares the states of the two females on Friday 
night.  The Shekhinah is adorned with crowns and fully constituted with her ten sefirot, with her devotees 
dressed in beautiful garments, while Lilith is dressed in the black clothes of the widow, weeping alone in 
darkness.  The banishment of Lilith to the darkness comports with her abject state, manifested by her 
degraded garments.     
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ruins/foundations are repeatedly, and simultaneously, destroyed and rebuilt through 
human and cosmic history as they are cast from one realm to another.  This convergence 
between the themes of abjection and crystallization in later kabbalah, like the notion of 
aggressive enclothing itself, is a considerable development beyond its Zoharic sources, 
though latent in them. 
 
In retrospect, the theme of aggressive enclothing gradually developed in post-Zoharic 
texts seems tailor-made, as it were, for its later use in Sabbateanism.  Shabetai Tsevi's 
conversion to Islam was described as putting on a "garment," that of Ishmael, a 
description often focused on a specific garment, the Turkish turban.
42
  Nathan of Gaza 
cites a passage in the Tikune Ha-Zohar about a person who is "good on the inside, but his 
garment is evil" [ שיב הישובלו וגלמ בט ]43 to refer to Shabetai’s donning of the turban.44  
Significantly for my argument, Nathan connects this "bad garment" in the Tikune Ha-
Zohar to a passage in the Ra’ya Mehemena which portrays the Shekhinah “imprisoned” 
by Lilith, who is the "grave" as well as the "evil handmaiden."
45
 The Ra’ya Mehemena 
passage stresses that the two females are structurally homologous, each composed of 
seven levels.  Nathan's association of Lilith with the "bad garment" may suggest that he 
interprets the passage as portraying the aggressive enclothing of the Shekhinah (and the 
messiah which he associates with her) by Lilith, associated with the turban – the latter 
association already made, as we have seen, three centuries earlier by Moshe of Burgos.   
 
Moreover, in accordance with the convergence in aggressive enclothing between 
crystallization and abjection, the Ra’ya Mehemena portrays Lilith not only as a 
substantial, imprisoning “grave” but also as mere refuse, as "filthy dung" [תפנוטמ הפשא], 
composed of every manner of repulsive matter, including putrefying carcasses.  This 
rotting mass serves as a kind of fertilizer for the "garden," the Shekhinah, and facilitates 
its fruitfulness, though only from the side of the "Tree of Good and Evil."  This image of 
                                                 
42
 On the "garment of Ishmael," see Nathan of Gaza, ‘Igeret Natan Ha-Azati al Shabetai Tsevi ve-al 
hamarato’, 244.  On the turban, see, e.g., Nathan of Gaza, ‘Letter to Shemu’el Primo’, 270-271.  See also 
the numerous documents cited in Wolfson, ‘The Engenderment of Messianic Politics: Symbolic 
Significance of Sabbatai Sevi's Coronation’,   203-258.   
43
 Tikune Ha-Zohar, 93b.  
44
 ‘Igeret Natan Ha-Azati', 244; ‘Letter to Shemu’el Primo’, 270-271. 
45
 Ra’ya Mehemena, at Zohar III, 282a. 
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the abject-as-fertilizer provides an organic explanation for the link between abjection and 
crystallization, absent from the Zohar itself.   It also prefigures Elyashiv’s portrayal of the 
construction of the Garden from the ruins of Hell.   Most strikingly, the passage’s images 
of the demonic starkly juxtapose abjection and crystallization:  impregnable grave and 
miasmic filth, constraining prison and productive fertilizer.    
 
The ambivalence toward the demonic expressed in this Ra’ya Mehemena passage is 
highlighted in Nathan of Gaza; indeed, the passage itself refers to Lilith by none other 
than the name "Shabetai."
46
  This ambivalence becomes elaborated in Sabbatean writing 
about garments, in the form of the shifting valorizations of the "turban," already 
described in Nathan's early post-apostasy writings as both a "bad garment" and the "holy 
turban."
47
  Another Sabbatean writer quotes Shabetai Tsevi himself as declaring that the 
meaning of the turban is indeterminate, that both the turban and the traditional Jewish 
headcovering can signify either good or evil.
48
  The vicissitudes of enclothing in 
Sabbatean writings thus highlight the dangerous indeterminacy intrinsic to aggressive 
enclothing, the possibilities of impersonation that can work in both directions of the 
divine-demonic divide.  
 
Indeed, according to the 18
th
 century Moshe Ḥayim Luzzatto, it was precisely the 
cognitive and spiritual dangers implicit in enclothing that led directly to Sabbatean error.  
In the following passage from his anti-Sabbatean tract, Kin’at Hashem Tseva’ot, Luzzatto 
concisely portrays the danger of impersonation that can result from enclothing:    
 
 תושבלתההו ,םרובעב תופילקב תשבלתמ תויהל הניכשל ומרג ,לארשי ואטח רשאכ יכ ,יחא ךל עד
 תבבוס תויהל א"סל םוקמ חינת רשא תיטרפ הניחבב היהיש ךירצ יכ ...תיטרפ הניחבב השענ הזה
 אוה הנכס םוקמ הזה םוקמה הנהו .תכלוהו וחקפנ אל רשא םיניעה זוחאל א"סה הלוכי וב יכ ,דאמ
 ,רמל קותמהו ,קותמל רמה םהל הארתו ,שדוקל לוח ןיבו ,לוחל שדק ןיב םהל ףילחהל ,בטיה
 הטממ ךפהתמה ,הטמה ןינע אוה יכ ,"וינפמ השמ סניו" רמאנ םוקמה הז לעו .םירבדה תובירקמ
הטמל שחנמו ,שחנל,תינ םשמש השודקב תומוקמה יכ... תופילקל םוקמ ן-  דאמ םינכוסמ םה
                                                 
46
 In context, of course, this name refers to Saturn.  Cf. Idel, Saturn's Jews: On the Witches' Sabbat and 
Sabbateanism, passim. 
47
 ‘Igeret Natan Ha-Azati', 244; ‘Letter to Shemu’el Primo’, 270-271.    
48
 Scholem,  Meḥkerei Shabta'ut, 111. 
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,םהב לכתסהל …. רקש םהל הארמ א"סה יכ .הלאה םינוזה ועטו ואצי םשמש םוקמה והז ,תמאבו
.בטיה הנחבהה תוארל רשפא יא םש הברקתה בורמ רשא ,תמאכ 49 
 
Know my brother, that when Israel sinned, they caused the Shekhinah to be 
enclothed in the kelipot because of them, and this enclothing was done in a 
particularized fashion.  … It was necessary to do this in a particularized fashion in 
order to leave room for the Sitra Aḥra to move about.  And this place is a place of 
great danger, because it is there that the Sitra Aḥra can delude eyes that have not 
been thoroughly opened, by swapping between the holy and the profane, and 
between the profane and the holy, and it will show them the bitter as sweet and 
the sweet as bitter, due to the proximity of these things.  About this place it is 
written, "And Moses fled from before it" [Exodus 4:3], for this is the matter of the 
staff, which changes from a staff to a snake, and from a snake to a staff. …For the 
places in the holy [dimension] from which room is given for the kelipot are very 
dangerous to contemplate.  …  And this is really the place from which these 
strayers [i.e., the Sabbateans] went forth and erred.  For the Sitra Aḥra shows 
them falsehood as truth, and due to its close proximity in that place, it is 
impossible to see clearly the distinction [between them]. 
 
As an illustration of this danger, Luzzatto depicts an instance of impersonation and 
prosopopeia very similar to that cited by the Tikune Ha-Zohar, though this time the 
speaking idol is not that of Nebuchadnezzar but of Jeroboam: 
 
 כ"חא םרג הזו ,ותדובעב א"סב השודקה תא שיבלה םעברי יכ .דאמ דאמ לודג דוס הזב ךעידוא התעו
'ה יכנא" רמוא היה לגעהש "ךיהלא 
 
And now I will let you know a very, very great secret.  For Jeroboam enclothed 
the holy [realm] in the Sitra Aḥra through his [idol-]worship and, thereupon, this 
caused the calf[-idol] to say, “I am YHVH your Elohim.”50 
 
                                                 
49
 Luzzatto, Kin'at Hashem Tzeva'ot, 91-93. 
50
 Ibid., 104.  The Talmudic sources for this incident are bSotah, 47a and bSanhedrin, 107b. 
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It is from this sort of dynamic that other arch-villains were able to derive their power, like 
Jesus and the "evil Armilus," in both of whom the Messiah-son-of-Joseph was 
enclothed.
51
   
 
Moreover, citing the Lurianic description of the construction of Lilith by means of 
enclothing the fallen nine sefirot of the Shekhinah, Luzzatto constructs a brief, but vivid, 
fable that brings together many of our themes.
52
  The fable begins with a Lilith who has 
achieved completion through this enclothing, as a result of human sin.  Demonic 
creatures crowd around her, baying for her capture, because they are able to perceive that 
the Shehkinah is enclothed within her. The Shekhinah succeeds in escaping from total 
capture by these demonic forces only at the last moment.   
 
Luzzatto further explains his fable by identifying it with the midrashic-style gloss found 
in the Ra’ya Mehemena and Tikune Ha-Zohar about Esther, a figure he identifies with the 
Shekhinah.
53
  These works declare that it was a demonic twin, and not Esther, who had 
sex with Ahasuerus.  (It is, of course, significant for my argument here that this gloss 
about impersonation is found specifically in these post-Zoharic works.)  Moreover, 
Luzzatto further links this gloss to the themes of this section by declaring that the 
demoness was constructed from the “zohama of Esther herself,” from a “defect” in her 
that “required purification.”54  By declaring that the demoness was constructed from the 
“zohama” of Esther, and affirming the identity of this story with the construction of Lilith 
from the nine sefirot of the Shekhinah, this passage in Luzzatto explicitly pronounces the 
                                                 
51
 Kin’at Hashem, 104. 
52
 Ibid., 96: 
 הטשפתנ ,דבל תחא הדוקנ התיהש ,תאזה הערה החפשהו .הער החפש תילילב השבלתנו הניכשה הדרי ,תונועה ומרגשכ
 ו"חש םיבשוח םה הנה ,תשבולמ םש הניכשה םיאורש ןויכ ,תופילקה תוגרדמ לכ הנהו .ףוצרפ תארקנו ,תודוקנ רשעל
 תמאבו .הילע טולשל ולכוי הניכשה דחא עגרב זאו .םש רשא הניכשה רובעב הנוז תיליל לע לודג ןואשב םיצבקתמ םה
ללכ םיטלוש םניאו ,םתאמוטב םיראשנ םהו ,םשמ תחרובו תקלתסמ. 
As a result of sin, the Shekhinah descended and was enclothed in Lilith, the evil bondwoman.  
And this evil bondwoman, who had been only one point, expanded to ten points, and was called a 
partsuf.  And all the ranks of the kelipot, when they see that the Shekhinah is enclothed there, 
think, heaven forbid!, that they can dominate her.  Indeed, they gather in a great tumult around 
Lilith the whore for the sake of the Shekhinah who is there.  And then, in one moment, the 
Shekhinah gets out of there and escapes and they remain in their impurity and do not dominate at 
all.    
53
 Ra’ya Mehemena, at Zohar III, 276a; Tikune Ha-Zohar 58a. 
54
 Kin’at Hashem, 96: 
המצע רתסא לש המהוזה תניחבמ התיה תאזה הדישה הנהו...הרהט ךירצש םגפ הזיא 
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identity of the abject (the “refuse” of Esther) with the core of the subject (the nine 
sefirot).   
 
These passages from Luzzatto bring together a variety of themes I have discussed in this 
section, above all the deep intertwining of abjection and crystallization implicated in 
aggressive enclothing as it developed from the Zohar to the Tikune Ha-Zohar / Ra’ya 
Mehemena to Lurianic kabbalah and beyond.  On the one hand, the relationship between 
garments and that which they enclothe resembles splitting, with the garments both 
surrounding and doubling that which they enclothe; on the other hand, and ever-
increasingly in the later texts, aggressive enclothing involves the casting of elements 
from one realm to another, with all the subjectivity-disintegrating effects that are the 
hallmarks of experiences of abjection, as well as the subjectivity-constituting effects that 
are the hallmarks of crystallization.     
 
The full unfolding of this dynamic required two steps beyond the Zohar.  First, the Ra’ya 
Mehemena and the Tikune Ha-Zohar developed the notion of enclothing as capture of the 
divine by the demonic (to be sure, mitigated by those passages which portray it as the 
domination of the demonic by the divine!).  The freeing of the divine consists in the 
divine divesting itself of the demonic garments and replacing them with "beautiful 
garments."  The second stage is in Lurianic kabbalah, in which one set of already-
constituted elements, the nine upper sefirot of Malkhut, are cast back and forth between 
the two realms – specifically between the Shekhinah and Lilith – through violent acts of 
mutual expropriation.     
 
In the later texts, we thus see the Sitra Aḥra constructed not through the two stage 
process of abjection followed by crystallization, but rather through a convergence of the 
two processes:  the simultaneous destruction/construction of filth/foundations as they are 
cast from the divine to the demonic.   The imagery of enclothing also facilitates  
reversibility, yielding a permanent potential for oscillation between rival constructions of 
the two realms.  The donning and doffing of garments, those seemingly inconsequential 
and easiest of actions, become transformed into a violent history of expropriations and re-
expropriations – and the stakes are the very existence of divine and demonic subjectivity.   
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The notion of aggressive enclothing emerges, by definition, after portrayal of the initial 
abjection and construction of the two realms, for it is only after the construction of each 
that one can become enclothed in the other – even if that enclothing then becomes a 
renewed medium of abjection and crystallization. Although nothing, as far as I can tell, 
necessarily prevented the authors of the Zohar from imagining these dynamics, it makes 
(mythological) sense that they emerge only in the later texts.  Aggressive enclothing is 
thus a belated development both in the human history of kabbalah and in the 
metaphysical history of the cosmos.   
  
C. The Abyss 
 
 םידמוע הזה םוהתה לעו.... ןירוריב הזה וריהטה דוסמ ררוב ,לודג סנ השוע ה"בקהש םעפ לכבש
וגוז תבו לאמס 
 
For each time that the Holy One blessed be He works a great miracle, he sifts 
siftings [or, clarifies clarifications/purifies purifications] from the mystery of this 
tehiru … And on this tehom stand Sama’el and his female consort. 
 
- Nathan of Gaza55 
 
A world whose fate depends on the vicissitudes of the battles of aggressive enclothing is 
a thoroughly reified world, in which creativity has ceased and triumph is only achieved 
by the shifting back and forth of long-standing elements.  As Luzzatto warns, a world in 
which the divine is doubled by the divine, and in which the construction of each takes 
place through the capture of already constituted elements from the other, is a world in 
which familiar measures to defeat the demonic may no longer suffice.  It is a world in 
which the production of dualism, to use the terms I elaborated at the beginning of Chapter 
Two in questioning Tishby’s notion of Lurianic “catharsis,” can no longer achieve its 
goal.  Lurianic kabbalah portrayed divine emanation as a mechanism to separate out evil 
                                                 
55
 Nathan of Gaza, ‘Derush Ha-Taninim’, 19. 
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into an autonomous realm, as a preliminary step for its ultimate destruction.
56
  The 
phenomenon of aggressive enclothing thoroughly undermines this process.  The strategy 
of purification-through-separation becomes meaningless if the Sitra Aḥra builds itself 
precisely through capturing fully constituted structures of the divine, and if, conversely, 
the divine builds itself through re-capturing those structures.  Above all, it cannot work if 
the demonic structures produced through the purification of the divine themselves 
become the means by which the divine is re-contaminated with the demonic.  Ultimately, 
aggressive enclothing is the ultimate proof that the paradox of abjection – the need to 
separate oneself from that which it is impossible to separate oneself – defeats all 
strategies that depend on a segregation, as well as unification, of the two realms. 
 
This dilemma compels us to look for another way out of reification:  rather than seeking 
to build the divine through the back-and-forth movement of already constituted elements, 
this alternative would aspire to re-build it by means of new crystallizations, which 
requires a return to the formless abject.  This path to renewal depends on the 
identification of the locus of formlessness in such a world, either through identifying any 
remaining, primordial, pre-crystallized regions or through the de-construction of the 
crystallized demonic back into the abject, as a precondition to the re-creation of the 
divine.   This alternative to the oscillating capture and re-capture of old, reified elements, 
the alternative of new crystallizations, indeed of unlocking new paths to creativity, is the 
theme of this section.    
 
In the Derush Ha-Taninim, Nathan of Gaza asks, “why has the tehom [the abyss, םוהת] 
remained in this world [  הזה םלועב םוהתה ראשנ עודמ ]?”57  Nathan’s defines the term tehom 
by associating it with a number of other terms – above all, with the bottom part of the 
tehiru [וריהט], which, in one version of the Lurianic expropriation of Zoharic terms, is the 
empty space left behind after the tsimtsum.  For Nathan, this is the part of the tehiru that 
has not yet received form from the direct light of emanation, the kav ha-yashar [ רשיה וק].  
He also associates this region with the term “golem,”58 used in medieval philosophical 
                                                 
56
 See Tishby, Torah Ha-Ra, 53. 
57
  'Derush Ha-Taninim,' 19. 
58
 Ibid. 
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writings to refer to unformed matter,
59
 as well as Zoharically associated with the tehiru.
60
    
These associations are consistent with Nathan’s notion that “all the worlds were 
emanated” from the tehiru.61 Together, they produce a portrayal of the tehom, the abyss, 
as indispensable to creativity, indeed, as its privileged site.      
 
The golem, however, is not only in need of form, but of berur [רוריב[, the separation of its 
good from its bad elements.  Nathan associates the kelipot with the series of terms 
tehiru/tehom/golem, defining them in almost identical terms: “for all the kelipot are called 
golem, something which is not mevorar [ררובמ וניאש רבד םלוג תוארקנ תופילקה לכ יכ]."62  The 
tehom seems to be both the locus of the kelipot and also at least partly identified with 
them. This identification of the tehom and the golem with kelipot in need of berur seems 
like a distant progeny of the distinction made by the Neoplatonist Avraham bar Ḥiya 
between the two “parts” of hylic matter, the “pure and clean” part and the part containing 
“filth and dross.”63   
 
Nathan's question – “why has the tehom remained in this world?" – thus concerns the 
existence of the kelipot as well as the persistence of a formless region of the cosmos.  
Nathan's response to this question is quite different from the more theologically safe 
answers (the necessity of evil forces to punish the wicked) and goes beyond the 
mythologically bold answers (the expulsion from the divine of primordial evil or proto-
evil elements).  Rather, he focuses on the intrinsic connection between creativity and 
formlessness: 
 
בקהש םעפ לכבש אוה םעטה"ג סנ השוע הלוד , הוהתנ הז םלוגו ןירוריב הזה וריהטה דוסמ ררוב
תי לאה רצויש תוריצי ונממ 'ע"םי בלב תומוהת ואפק בותכה דוס הזו ויתואלפנ י  . חישמה ךלמ םג
ונממ םימעפ המכ רריב רבכ.  64 
 
                                                 
59
 Nathan’s identification of the tehom with the golem is also undoubtedly a distant progeny of 
Naḥmanides’ identification of Tohu with “hylic matter” in his commentary to Bereshit 1:1. 
60
 Zohar I, 15a.  I note that these terms, particularly tehiru, have a very different sense in the Zoharic 
context.   
61
 ‘Derush Ha-Taninim’, 18. 
62
 Ibid. 17. 
63
 Avraham bar Ḥiya, Hegyon Ha-Nefesh, 2a:  םירמשו תפוניט הנממ שיו יקנו ךז הנממ שי ילויהה יקלח ינש. 
64
 ‘Derush Ha-Taninim’, 19. 
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The reason is that each time the Kadosh Barukh Hu works a great miracle, he sifts 
siftings [clarifies clarifications/purifies purifications] from the mystery of this 
tehiru.  And from this golem come into being creations that the blessed El creates 
through his wonders.  And this is the mystery of “the depths were congealed in 
the heart of the sea” [Exodus 15:8].  Also the King Messiah has already sifted 
[clarified/purified] several times from it. 
 
The tehom/tehiru/golem/kelipot function as a reservoir upon which the most creative and 
innovative subjects can draw to produce wondrous, even miraculous novelties.  The two 
creative subjects Nathan mentions here are the Kadosh Barukh Hu and Shabetai Tsevi, an 
association that, of course, grew increasingly important as Sabbateanism developed. 
 
The notion of a deep link between the highest divine creativity and the lowest, demon-
ridden depths is strikingly prefigured in a well-known passage from Pirke Rabbi Eliezer, 
though I have not yet found explicit reference to it in the relevant kabbalistic texts.   
Foreshadowing Nathan's interpretation of the tehom as the part of the tehiru where the 
divine light has not yet reached, this text reads: 
 
 תנפ חורה ןופצ ורמג אלו ארברמא שלכ ש ימרמאי  תאזה הנפה תא רומגיו אבי הולא אוהש יתחנהש
ועדיו לכה  הולא אוהש תועווזלו ןיקיזמל רודמ אוה םשולו תוחורל םידשלו םיקרבלשמו םימער ם
אצוי הערת נש םלועל)א והימרי( רמא הערה חתפת ןופצמ65 
 
The wind of the northern corner:  He created but did not finish it – for he said, 
“anyone who will say he is a deity, let him come and finish this corner which I 
have left over – and all will know he is a deity!”  And there is the dwelling place 
for the destroyers, and the horrors, the spirits, the shedim, the lightnings, and the 
thunders.  And from there evil goes forth to the world, as it is said, “Out of the 
north an evil shall break forth” (Jeremiah 1:14). 
 
                                                 
65
 Pirke Rabbi Eliezer, 8b. 
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In bold mythological fashion, the Pirke Rabbi Eliezer passage does not explain from 
where the demonic spirits come to take up residence in the unfinished “North.” Rather, it 
implies that their existence is due precisely to the unfinished quality of this corner of the 
cosmos.  In the Pirke Rabbi Eliezer, as much later in Nathan, associations between the 
unfinished quality of the cosmos and the demonic are undoubtedly distant echoes of the 
older midrash which portrays the demons as not fully finished creations, which I 
discussed in Chapter Two.  In Kristevan terms, the unfinished “North” with its not-fully-
constituted demonic denizens is the realm of the abject, that which has not been able to 
be assimilated into bounded identities.   
 
Moreover, as in the Nathan passage, the distinguishing feature of the divine, the ultimate 
fully constituted subjectivity, is the ability to engage the abject in order to produce new 
creations.  The challenge issued by God – that only another deity could complete the 
unfinished North – is issued in this text in a sarcastic tone, with the presumed inability of 
anyone to meet that challenge serving as proof that there is no other god.   Nonetheless, if 
we suppress the sarcastic tone, there is another possible reading of this challenge, which 
may make this passage a source of both the glories and terrors of kabbalistic experience.   
 
Engaging with the demonic realm to perform creative tikunim is precisely the kind of 
bold theurgy that kabbalistic texts claim makes the adept a partner with the divine – 
indeed, able to participate in the very construction of the divine partsufim.  The Pirke 
Rabbi Eliezer passage, perhaps against its intentions, can be read as a precursor of these 
boldest claims of kabbalistic theurgy.  Yet, the passage also contains the potential for the 
darker side of kabbalistic experience.  It only takes a slight Zoharic gloss on the passage 
to infer that the one who is successfully able to create out of this unfinished corner 
without divine cooperation must be the diabolical deity, the El Aḥer, the “Other God.”  I 
would maintain that this possibility is made explicit in the words of Nathan of Gaza, “and 
on this tehom stand Sama’el and his female consort.”66    
 
                                                 
66
 This image, as well as that of the tanin who covers the tehom in the Zohar, may have as its rabbinic 
source the divine killing of the “ruler of the sea” as a prerequisite to the creation of the world.  bBava 
Batra, 74b. 
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In between the Pirke Rabbi Eliezer and Nathan of Gaza lies classical kabbalah, above all 
the Zohar.  The portrayal of creation as requiring engagement with the tehom after battle 
with a diabolical being is the subject of the lengthy Zoharic passage I broached in the 
Introduction, the so-called Ma’amar Ha-Taninim, whose exegesis forms the basis of 
Nathan’s Derush Ha-Taninim.  The key text is the following:     
 
 בישנ הוה לודגה ןינתה יאהד ןיגב ,ריהנ הוה אל אמעט יאמ ,ריהנ הוה אל אתתל אמוהת אהד ןיגב
 אפרפרמ אלו ,היל ךישחאו אמוהת לע אחור בשנו ,אליעלד ארחא אחור )ד"כעו א"נ( רבעו ,אתתל
 ,םימה ינפ לע תפחרמ ם"יהלא חורו ביתכד אוה אדה ,היל ךיכשו אחור אוההב שטבו )בשנד א"נ(
 ,רוא יהיו רוא יהי ם"יהלא רמאיו .אמלע ארבו אחורב אחור שטב אוה ךירב אשדוקד ןנינתד ונייהו
שטבו ,אליעלד וריהנ ריהנ ישנד אחור יבג לע אמוהתד ןויכ ,היל אפח אלו ,אמוהת לעמ קלתסאו ,ב
וריהנ הוה ןידכ ,קלתסא והיאו ריהנתא67 
 
For the tehom below did not shine.  Why did it not shine?  Because this Great 
Dragon blew upon the tehom, darkening it, not undulating below.  Another wind - 
from above – blew, striking that wind, taming it, as is written:  and the spirit of 
Elohim moved upon the face of the tehom (Genesis 1:2).  This corresponds to 
what we have learned, that Kudsha Berikh Hu struck wind against wind and 
created the world.  Elohim said, Let there be light!  And there was light (Genesis 
1:3) Radiance from above shone, striking the blowing wind, and he [the Dragon] 
withdrew from the tehom, covering it no more.  Once the tehom was illumined 
and he withdrew, then there was illumination.
68
 
 
As I noted in Chapter Two, the necessary prerequisite to the achievement of the third 
verse of Genesis (“let there be light”) is the defeat of the dragon who blocks access to the 
tehom, identified by Nathan with Sama’el and his consort.  Moreover, this text stresses 
that the illumination of which that verse speaks is precisely the illumination of the tehom, 
an illumination which would thus be the key to the creation of the cosmos, indeed to 
creativity itself. 
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 Zohar II, 34b-35a. 
68
 Matt IV, 154 (translation of the text and the biblical quotations modified). 
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Another Zohar passage that shows that the full construction of the divine must engage 
with the abyss takes its imagery from the re-construction of Jerusalem, implicitly 
identified with the Shekhinah, in the time of the final redemption. 
 
ו ,אלכ לע ןוטלשיד ןינרחא ןידוסימ ,םלשורי ידוסי ינבמל אוה ךירב אשדוק ןימז ,ןיריפס ,ןוניא ןאמ
 ןוהל תילד ,ןיאלעו ןיפיקת ןיכמסו ןידוסי ןוניא ןילאד ,םיריפסב ךיתדסיו )אי דנ היעשי( ביתכד
ןינבאד ןיגב ,אמעט יאמ ,יאמדקכ ושילח  יאמ ,והיילע טלשמל ןימע ראש וליכי ,ידוסי ןוניאמ ןיאמדק
יהנ ןוהי ןילא לבא ,תואי אקדכ האלע וריהנ והב תילד ןיגב ,אמעט וג ןעקשמו ,האלע וריהנ וגמ ןיר
אתתו אליעל ןורהניד ןיריפס ןוניא ןילאו ,והיילע האטלשל ןילכי אלד ,ימוהת.69 
 
Kudsha Berikh Hu will one day build the foundations of Jerusalem out of other 
foundations that will prevail against all.  What are those?  Sapphires, as is written:  
I will …lay thy foundations with sapphires (Isaiah 54:11), for these are supernal 
mighty foundations and supports, without any weakness like the first ones.  How 
so?  Over the former stones of the foundations, other nations could prevail.  Why? 
Because they lacked suitable supernal radiance.  But these will shine with 
supernal radiance and be embedded in the abysses [tehome], so that no one can 
overpower them.  These are sapphires that will shine above and below.
70
 
 
The strength of the renewed cosmic structure will lie in the fact that the new “supernal 
foundations and pillars” will “plunge into the tehome.”   It is only such a structure that is 
immune from domination by the forces of the Sitra Aḥra, here figured as the “other 
nations.”  By contrast, the passage implies, the initial “pillars” did not engage with the 
abyss and therefore were subject to destruction. 
 
The role of the tehom in these passages is not altogether unambiguous.  The passages 
portray creation (in the first passage), or the re-construction of the cosmic structure (in 
the second passage) as predicated on the illumination of the tehom.  Both require the 
defeat of the forces of evil (the dragon in the first passage, the “other nations” in the 
second) in order to accomplish this illumination.  However, whether the tehom is itself a 
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 Matt VI, 391 (translation modified). 
  
 
255 
 
neutral, potentially good entity that needs to be linked to the divine light, or, alternatively, 
is an ally of the forces of evil which must be subordinated by that light, is not altogether 
clear.  It is possible to read the first passage as more in line with the former interpretation 
and the second with the latter, but these associations are far from obvious.   
 
Indeed, the tehom appears in the Zohar in a number of divergent roles – divergences 
which may make it one of the Zohar’s mythological images par excellence, resistant to 
univocal interpretation.  Perhaps most often, particularly when it appears in the phrase 
“the crevice of the great tehom” [אבר אמוהתד אבקונ], it is clearly the domain of the 
demonic, the place from which evil forces emerge and to which they retreat when 
defeated.
71
  Indeed, when the demonic forces retreat to the tehom, they may even be 
viewed as undergoing de-crystallization to abject formlessness.  In this role, the tehom is 
clearly the locus of the abject – or perhaps more precisely, the abject itself, the condition 
wherein entities dwell at their most disintegrated and degraded.   
 
On the other hand, in at least one passage, the tehom is clearly associated with the 
Shekhinah.  In this passage, the “six supernal days” [ןיאלע ןימוי אתיש] (evoking the six 
sefirot of Kudsha Berikh Hu) bring the “waters of the streams” [ילחנד אימ] (evoking the 
divine vitality from the upper levels of the sefirot, particularly Binah) into the “great 
tehom” [אבר אמוהת] (which, following these evocations, must be the Shekhinah).72  In a 
play on words, the passage associates this conveyance of vitality by the “six [אתיש, shita] 
days” to the tehom with the rabbinic image of the conveyance of fluids by the “pits” or 
“drains” [ןיתיש, shitin] below the altar in the Temple to the tehom.73 The association of 
the tehom that lies below the shitin with creation is also a theme familiar from midrashic 
sources.
74
  
 
In pre-kabbalistic midrashim, the connection between the entrance to the tehom, which 
lies beneath the altar, and creation, either the initial act of creation or the preservation of 
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 E.g., Zohar I, 48a. 
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 Zohar I, 30a. 
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 See, e.g., bSukah 49a. 
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the world’s existence, always involves the restraint of the tehom. 75  Such motifs do 
appear several times in the Zohar, at times with a very similar sense as in the earlier 
sources.
76
  However, it is telling that the emphasis is just as often on transforming the 
tehom as with restraining it – often by penetrating it with light as in the excerpt from the 
Ma’amar Ha-Taninim.  Some passages explicitly weave the midrashic motif of the 
destructively rising tehom into this newer portrayal, as in the following brief excerpt: 
 
אכושחב קילס הוה אבר אמוהת רתבל ,אלכ יפח אכושחו , קפנד דעאכושחב עקבו ארוהנ , קפנו
ריהנתאו , ביתכד(גכ בי בויא )תומלצ רואל אצויו ךשח ינמ תוקומע הלגמ. 77 
 
Afterwards the great abyss [tehoma] arose in darkness, and darkness covered all, 
until light emerged and cleft the darkness and came forth and shone, as it is 
written, “He uncovereth deep things out of darkness, and bringeth out to light the 
shadow of death” (Job 12:22).78 
 
The transformations evoked by the verse from Job are, in the terms I have been using 
throughout, the emergence of new crystallizations from the abject; or, in Nathan of 
Gaza’s language, the miraculous creation of wonders through the “congealing” of the 
tehomot [ מוהת ואפקתו ].   
  
The most elaborate portrayal of such processes is provided in a lengthy passage in (not 
coincidentally) Zohar Noaḥ. 79  In this passage, the operation of light on the tehom leads 
not only to the latter’s illumination but to its becoming pervaded by complex structures 
facilitating the transmission of light and water, sources of divine vitality.  The passage 
proliferates the lights as well as the “tehomin” [ןימוהת] involved in this process – 
beginning with the action of seven lights on seven tehomin, as “each knocked on its own 
tehom” [ אמוהתב שטב דח לכ היליד ].80  The influence of the lights on the tehomin leads to the 
construction of an elaborate system of “channels” [ןירוניצ], “veins” [ןידיג], and “nets” 
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 bSukah 51a-b; bSanhedrin 52b; Midrash Shemu’el, 41a. 
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[ןיתשר], overseen by two “thrones” [ןווסרוכ], to conduct the various flows and interactions 
among light, darkness, and water.  The passage appears to state the goal of this structured 
interaction at the outset: “and they blend as one, lights, darknesses, and waters, and they 
become lights whose darkness is not visible” [   ודיבעתאו ןיימו ןיכושחו ןירוהנ אדחכ וברעתאו
ןאכושח ןאזחתא אלד ןירוהנ והיינמ ].81  Formlessness becomes so completely permeated by 
structure until it is no longer perceptible as such.    
 
While this passage is a highly elaborate example of the structuring, rather than the 
restraint, of the tehom, it still accords it a rather unequal, passive role compared with the 
light.  Another passage, however, gives it a more equal role, in which the tehom, more 
precisely a “drop” from the tehom, becomes one of two indispensable poles in the process 
of creation.  The other pole is a flame from the botsina de-kardinuta, which emerges, as 
we learn at the beginning of the Zohar Bereshit, from the tehiru – which, for the Zohar, is 
the highest level of the divine or proto-divine, perhaps identified with the sefirah of Keter 
or its proto-form.  This passage is remarkable for its lyrical evocation of a veritable dance 
between the two poles, marked by ascents and descents, crossings and unifications:   
 
ח את ,אתונידרקד אניצובד אבוהלש דח קיפא אמלע ירבמל אוה ךירב אשדוקד אתוערב קילס דכ יז
וגמ קיפאו תדיקואו תאכשח אקיזב אקיז ףשנו  ,אמלע והב ארבו דחכ ןול רבחו ףיט דח אמוהת ירטס
 ופלחא דחב דח וקלס אנימיב רטעתאו קילס ףיט אוההו אלאמשב ארטעתאו קילס אבוהלש אוהה
 אד יתכוד חור והייניבמ קיפנ אדב אד ורטקתא תיחנ קילסדו קילס תיחנד אד ארטסל אדו אד ארטסל
 םלש חכתשא ןידכ דחב דח ורטעתאו והייניב ביהייתאו דח ודיבעתא ןירטס ןירת ןוניא ןידכ םילש
אתתל םלשו אליעל82     
 
When it arose in the will of Kudsha Berikh Hu to create the world, He generated a 
single flame from the lamp of impenetrable darkness [botsina de-kardinuta], and 
blew spark against spark.  It darkened and ignited.  From the recesses of the abyss 
[tehoma], He brought forth a single drop and joined them as one, thereby creating 
the world.  The flame ascended, crowned on the left; the drop ascended, crowned 
on the right.  They arose, one in one; they exchanged places, this to this side, this 
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to this side. The one that descended ascended, that which ascended descended.  
They were bound each to the other, this to this.  Amidst them issued perfect spirit, 
so those two sides turned into one; it was placed between them – they were 
crowned one with one.  Then peace prevailed above, peace below…83 
  
The very emergence of light in this passage is contingent on the dance between the 
“flame” and the “drop,” the tehiru and the tehom, the highest and lowest levels of the 
cosmos.  The indispensable exchanges of places and reversals of roles between these 
poles sheds light on the otherwise puzzling phenomenon that the Zohar’s tehiru, the 
highest level of the cosmos, could come eventually to signify, in the version of Lurianic 
kabbalah adapted by Nathan of Gaza, the lowest level of the cosmos and, indeed, to be 
identified with the tehom.
84
 It can also make sense of the fact that the tehom, in some 
post-Zoharic kabbalistic texts, can signify the highest reaches of the divine, the sefirot of 
Ḥokhmah and Binah.85   
 
Indeed, in the Zohar itself, the two seemingly opposite cosmic poles, the tehom and the 
tehiru, have much in common.  Both are limitless regions about which little can be said 
beyond their limitlessness; both need to be limited in order to create a structured, 
articulated cosmos.   It is significant in this context that, in the passage just quoted 
portraying the creation of the world out of the interaction between the tehiru and the 
tehoma, it is the “flame of the botsina de-kardinuta” that engages the tehom.  It is, of 
course, the botsina de-kardinuta that, in the beginning of Zohar Bereshit, sets a limit on 
the infinite tehiru to yield particularity, there in the form of determinate colors.    
 
Moreover, just as one can find in the Zohar and post-Zoharic kabbalah a set of 
ambivalences about the tehom – ally and enemy of form-giving light, highest and lowest 
region of the cosmos – so one finds a set of ambivalences about the threshold between the 
tehom and the cosmos, specifically about a hard slab, either stone or pottery, that controls 
access between them.  The Zohar’s accounts of this threshold are constructed through 
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merging and adapting a number of distinct rabbinic narratives.  One narrative, of which 
several versions are extant and which is important here for the way it combines linguistic 
and ontological power, portrays King David’s excavation of the Temple Mount, 
preparing the channels to serve as drainage for the altar.  At 1500 cubits, he finds a slab 
of pottery – which then speaks, informing him that it descended to that point, blocking up 
the tehom,  as a result of an act of divine power, either the Sinai epiphany or the “splitting 
of the earth,” perhaps alluding to the Koraḥ cataclysm.  Undeterred, driven on by an 
erotically charged hubris, David removes the pottery and the tehom rises up and threatens 
to destroy the world.  David inscribes the divine name on another slab of pottery and 
casts it into the tehom, thereby taming it and saving the world.
86
  A second narrative 
concerns the even ha-shtiyah [היתשה ןבא], a stone which God casts, or kicks, into the 
tehom to serve as the foundation of the world, also called the “navel [רובט] of the 
world.”87  A third source is the Talmudic definition of Bohu: “smooth (or slimy) stones, 
submerged in the tehom, from which water issues forth” [ םוהתב תועקושמה תומלופמה םינבא
 םימ ןיאצוי ונממש ].88  Note that the tehom may be viewed as differently valorized in the 
three sources – in the first as a mortal threat that needs to be coercively blocked, in the 
second as more neutral and amenable to discipline, in the third, rather obscure, source, 
perhaps as subject to the influence of the flow from the “stones.”   
 
These three narratives reappear, variously intermingled and reappropriated, in the Zohar.  
One short passage in the Midrash Ha-Ne’elam on Bereshit restates all three in barely 
altered form without much attempt to synthesize them.
89
  The more elaborate Zoharic 
passages, however, transform these midrashim, though with different emphases and in 
divergent, sometimes incompatible ways.   Most significantly for my purposes, they 
generally refuse to take for granted the dichotomy between the formed and the formless, 
slab and abyss, but rather, explore the opposition narratively in a number of ways.   First, 
they provide a genealogy for the slab, often implying that it is a congealment of the 
tehom itself.  Second, as in the portrayals of abjection-and-crystallization that I have 
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analyzed at length in Chapter Two, they portray congealment, de-congealment, and re-
congealement as recurrent processes, their vicissitudes depending on the state of the 
cosmos.  Third, they suggest the necessity of engagement with the tehom for the creative 
process.  Finally, they all emphasize the overlap of linguistic and ontological processes, a 
theme already contained in the rabbinic sources and central to my study. 
 
I begin with an account of which variants appear in the Midrash Ha-Ne’elam to Ruth 
(mostly in Hebrew) and in Zohar Yitro (in Aramaic).  The Midrash Ha-Ne’elam begins 
by portraying the stone that disciplines the tehom as originating in the divine casting of 
snow into the waters – an image whose source, as I discussed in Chapter Two, is the 
Pirke Rabbi Eliezer.  This act freezes one region of the tehom, yielding a stone 
“submerged in the center of the tehom” [םוהתה אצמאב תעקושמ תחא ןבא] that rises up to 
become the “point of the world” [םלועה תדוקנ ].90  Another sage picks up the narrative, 
declaring that when the earth began to congeal from the freezing of the waters, the waters 
rose up and covered it, and were only pacified when God took a “tseror” [רורצ]91 of 
pottery, inscribed his “name of 72 names” [תומש ב"ע לש ומש] upon it, and cast it into the 
waters.
92
  The Zohar Yitro’s version picks up the story at this point.  In the spirit of earlier 
midrashic sources, but more explicitly, it personifies the tseror; like the Midrash Ha-
Ne’elam, it also portrays it as particularly susceptible to the theurgical impact of human 
action. In keeping with the simultaneously linguistic/ontological dimensions of the tseror, 
this susceptibility particularly concerns oaths – performative linguistic acts.  When a 
human being makes an oath, the tseror “ascends to receive that oath” [ אקלס ארורצ אוהה
האמוא אוהה אלבקל].  If it is a true oath, the power of the tseror to “prevail on the tehoma” 
is reinforced and the world’s existence is preserved [םייקתא אמלעו ,אמוהת לע םייקתאו ].  If, 
however, the tseror greets a false oath, it undergoes a simultaneously linguistic and 
ontological process of disintegration: 
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 Zohar Ḥadash, 76a. 
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זחד ןויכ ,האמוא איההל הל אלבקל אקלס ארורצ אוהה ,ארקשל האמוא אשנ ינב ומואד אתעשבו י
 ארורצ אוההד ןוותאו ,ןיטשו ןילזא ןיימו ,ארוחאל בת קילס הוהד ארורצ אוהה ןידכ ,ארקשד והיאד
ןימדקלמכ היל ארדהאלו ,אמלע אייפחל אקלסל אימ ןאעבו ,ןרדבתאו ימוהת וג ןחרפ  93 
 
At the moment when human beings swear a false oath, that tseror rises to receive 
that oath.  As soon as it sees that it is false, then that tseror falls backwards, and 
the waters start surging, and the letters of that tseror fly into the tehome and 
scatter.  And the waters seek to rise up and cover the world and to return the 
world to its primordial state. 
 
Upon seeing the false oath, the tseror falls backward, apparently horrified, and is swept 
away by the steadily rising waters.  Moreover, it does not merely retreat, but its very 
identity dissolves, as it loses linguistic capacity and thus ontological power:  its “letters,” 
the center of its identity, “fly into the tehome and scatter, and the waters seek to rise up 
and cover the world and to return it to its primordial state.”   This dissolution of identity, 
produced by an encounter with a perversion such as a false oath in the name of God, is an 
experience of abjection by now familiar in this study.  The tseror’s experience of 
abjection is both linguistic and ontological: with the dissolution of its language, it de-
crystallizes to become part of the tehom itself.   
 
Salvation from this danger can only proceed from a new crystallization of the tseror, 
again portrayed in simultaneously linguistic and material terms: 
 
 ,אשידק אמשד אזרב ןחתפמ ןיעבש לע אנממ יד ,ל"אירזעי אנממ דחל אוה ךירב אשדוק ןימזד דע...
צ אוההד היבגל לעאו ןיימ ורדהאו ,אמלע םייקתא ןידכו ,ןימדקלמכ ןוותא היב קיקחו ,ארור
והייתכודל94 
 
… until Kudsha Berikh Hu summons one officer, Ya’azri’el, who is appointed 
over seventy keys of the mystery of the holy name.  And he enters in to that 
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tseror, and engraves on it the letters as before.  And then the world endures.  And 
the waters return to their place. 
 
The remedy for the dissolution of the tseror is the reconsolidation of its interiority 
through the reconstitution of its language.  God calls upon a linguistic official, he who 
holds the keys to the divine name, to “enter” into the tseror, and to re-engrave “letters” 
within it.  This linguistic reconstruction of identity has ontological consequences: “and 
then the world endures.”  The reconstruction of the tseror after its disintegration in the 
tehom is reminiscent of, if not strictly identical to, the reconstruction of the “pillars” 
through their “plunging” into the tehom in the passage discussed above.  It also suggests 
that the tseror, like the “stone” it succeeds in the Midrash Ha-Ne’elam, is a congealment 
of the tehom – for since its material and linguistic substance dissolves into the tehom, its 
reconstruction would seem to require a re-assemblage and re-congelament from there.    
 
The notion of the slab as a congealment also appears in a very different, indeed inverse, 
configuration, which appears in two closely related versions in the Guf Ha-Zohar and the 
Sitre Torah in Zohar Va-Yetse.
95
   In this configuration, the limitless flow of waters is a 
beneficent outpouring of vitality from the uppermost reaches of the divine, perhaps 
originating from something like the tehiru, the holy twin of the tehom; the slab here thus 
threatens, rather than facilitates, the life of the cosmos.  This configuration is presented as 
the meaning of the story of Jacob’s arrival in Ḥaran.  Jacob finds the shepherds awaiting 
the arrival of their fellows to “roll the stone from the well’s mouth” in order to “water the 
sheep” (Genesis 29:8).  The “stone” had interrupted the flow of the divine vitality (the 
“waters”), to those heavenly and earthly creatures (the “sheep”) sustained by the cosmic 
well.  The Guf Ha-Zohar version tells us that the stone is a product of the cosmic “North” 
[ןופצ] that causes the waters to “congeal” [שרקמל].96 The stone is also described as “the 
strong form of hard judgment, that which freezes and congeals” [  פיקת אוהה ,אישק אנידד ו
דילגד שירקו ].97  The “North” that is identified with “hard judgment” is here either a 
hypertrophied aspect of Gevurah which is very close to the demonic or is actually 
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demonic.  The stone that is a crystallization of this dimension can only be dissolved when 
the “South,” the locus of Ḥesed, “strengthens” and the cosmic flow resumes – “like a 
river when its waters are great” [ןיאיגס יומימ דכ ארהנ יאהכ], which “do not freeze and 
congeal” [ישרקו ןידילג אלו], unlike “a river whose waters are lesser” [ןיריעז יומימד ארהנכ].   
 
The Sitre Torah version brings out the demonic dimension more clearly.  It refers to the 
stone as that “upon which the inhabitants of the world fail, ‘a stone of stumbling and a 
rock of offence’ [Isaiah 8:14]” [לושכמ רוצו ףגנ ןבא אמלע ינב ילשכ הנימד ןבא].98 It also equates 
Jacob’s removal of the stone from the well with the “confusion of Satan” [ טשד איבוברען ].99  
The stone, like the tseror but with an inverse valence, is both a material object, in this 
case, a material impediment to the flow of vitality, and also a linguistic agency, a 
prosecutorial figure seeking to “demand judgment on the whole world, in order that 
nourishment and good not descend upon the world” [ אנוזמ תוחי אלד ,אמלע לכד אניד עבתמל
אמלעל בטו].100  
 
The Zohar thus gives us two diametrically opposed slabs, each set up as barriers to 
unlimited flows of metaphysical water.  Both are congealments of flows that are 
themselves doubled, posing, respectively, the supreme cosmic danger and the supreme 
blessing.  This doubling is expressed concisely in another passage marked by rhetorical 
parallelism and alluding to the Ecclesiastes phrase “this confronted with this”:  “this 
stone is called ‘stone of stumbling, rock of offense, and this stone is called ‘a tried stone, 
a precious corner stone’ (Isaiah 29:16), rock of Israel, and all exists this corresponding to 
this” [  יאהו ,לושכמ רוצ ףגנ ןבא ירקא יאה אמייק אלכו ,לארשי רוצ ,תרקי תנפ ןחב ןבא )זט חכ םש( ירקא
.אד לבקל אד ].101   I note also that the positioning of Satan on the well recalls the 
positioning of the dragon on the tehom in the Zohar’s “Ma’amar Ha-Taninim,” as well as 
the positioning of Sama’el on the tehiru in Nathan of Gaza. 
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Significantly for the perspective adopted in this study, each of these stones is portrayed as 
the congealment of fluid forces, with the valence of the congealment in each case the 
opposite of the other.  In the context of the baleful stone, one passage makes explicit the 
notion I broached above that the waters of divine vitality themselves freeze, becoming 
their own blockage:  “When the north wind blows, the waters freeze and do not flow out, 
and do not irrigate, because judgment is hovering, and the cold of the north freezes the 
water” [ גב ,ןייקתשא אלו ,רבל ןידגנ אלו ןידילג ןיימ ,בישנ ןופצ חורד אתעשב ןופצד ורירקו ,אילת אנידד ןי
אימ דילג  ].102  For its part, the beneficent stone may be a congealment of the tehom, as in 
the Midrash Ha-Ne’elam, or may congeal from a variety of formless sources:  “this stone 
is created from fire and from wind and from water, and congeals from all of them and is 
made into one stone and stands upon the tehome” [ ,איממו אחורמו אשאמ ירבתא ןבא יאה
יבעתאו והלכמ דילגתאוימוהת לע אמייקו ,אדח אנבא ד ].103    
 
In light of these features of the two “stones” – viz., their doubling of each other and their 
formation as a congealment of fluid forces – I return to the proposition I stated at the 
beginning of this section:  that the secret to renewed creativity lies in de-reification 
followed by a new crystallization from the formless.  This process is easiest to see in the 
passage cited above about the “freezing” of the divine waters by the “north wind.”  The 
reversal of the process is their de-crystallization through unfreezing:   
 
דכו  ומימחד ןיגב ,אלכ ןייקשתא ןידכ ,ןידגנו ןוהלד ודילג רבעתאו אימ יממחתמ ,םורד חור רעתא
  אימ ןארש םורדד104 
 
And when the southern wind is aroused, the waters warm up and their ice passes 
away, and they flow.  Then all is watered.  The waters are released due to the 
warmth of the South.   
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This de-crystallization is accomplished by the “south wind,” the forces of Ḥesed, which 
releases the waters and bestows vitality on the cosmos.  The Zohar explicitly gives this 
“warming” a sexual sense, a “heat” that leads to procreation.105 Thus, the very substance 
that becomes a barrier to life, the waters in their frozen state, becomes the source of the 
renewed creation of life upon its de-crystallization.   
 
I conclude with a very obscure passage in Zohar Bereshit which brings together many of 
these themes – though its thorough decipherment must be left for another day. This 
passage, I contend, is yet another reading of the first three verses of Genesis.  It portrays 
the initial creation of the world as effected by letters in a seal, perhaps impressing 
themselves on something like hylic matter.  After this initial creation (presumably an 
allusion to the first verse), they penetrate deep into the earth, causing the tehom to rise up 
and darken the world (presumably an allusion to the second verse).  
  
 יחיכש ינהב אטליקד ארספוט... אתתל ןיתחנו אליעל ןוותא ןיקלסב וקפנו ולאע ,אקנפשוגד אמתוח
 ולאעו וחמ אברבר איוחד יופלוקב אמלע םייקתאו ופרטצאו אמתוח וג ולאע ,אמלע ירבתאו תאו תא
 אבר אמוהת רתבל ןימא האמ שמחו ףלא ארפעד יבקונ תוחת אלכ יפח אכושחו אכושחב קילס הוה 
 
Letters ascend and descend … Scribal patterns of impress appear here by the seal 
of the signet.  They entered and emerged, letter by letter, and the world was 
created. They entered the seal, permutated, and the world endured by the cudgels 
of the mighty serpent [ḥivya].  They struck and penetrated chasms of dust 1500 
cubits. [Alternative translations of the previous two sentences:  1) “They entered 
the seal, permutated, and the world endured.  They struck against the cudgels of 
the mighty serpent, and penetrated chasms of dust 1500 cubits”; 2)“They entered 
the seal, permutated, and the world endured.  With the cudgels of the mighty 
serpent, they struck and penetrated chasms of dust 1500 cubits.”] Then the 
immense abyss [tehoma] ascended in darkness, and darkness covered all.
106
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We then arrive at the passage’s version of the third verse, with the disciplining of the 
abyss by light.   
 
 ...הלגמ )ב"י בויא( ביתכד ריהנתאו קפנו אכושחב עקבו ארוהנ קפנד דע  רואל אצויו ךשח ינמ תוקומע
תומלצ107 
 
…until the light emanated, split the darkness, and radiated, as is written:  He 
discovereth deep things out of darkness, and bringeth out to light the shadow of 
death.  (Job 12:22).
108
 
 
In this passage, the signet inscribed with letters is the instrument of the creation of the 
world, which is capable of “enduring.”  Yet, like the midrashic David, the letters are 
driven on to “penetrate the chasms,” an act that leads to “darkness covering all,” 
endangering that cosmos.  This penetration is not explained, although it is associated in 
some way with the demonic.  In the Matt translation I have transcribed above, the world 
as initially created endures “by the cudgels of the mighty ḥivya.”  In this reading, the 
penetration of the “chasms” appears to have been necessitated, despite the severe dangers 
it involves, because the vitality of the primordial cosmos was blocked by its premature 
reification in the form of the “mighty ḥivya.” The narrative would thus resemble the 
blockage of the tehom by the dragon in the “Ma’amar Ha-Taninim” and its blockage by 
Sama’el and his consort in Nathan of Gaza, as well as the blockage of the “well” by 
“Satan” in the Va-Yetse passages.  The first “alternative translation” I have given above – 
in which the letters strike against the ḥivya in order to gain access to the tehom – directly 
aligns this breaking of the demonic blockage with those other passages.  In either case, 
the seal must burrow down to the abyss, incurring the danger of the darkening/flooding of 
the world.  Only then can the light split the darkness, illuminate it, and prepare the way 
for a world of multiplicity.  The need to break this blockage of the tehom is thus 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the translation, from Soncino I, 116.  The second alternative translation reads יופלוקב as “with the 
cudgels,” and links it to the verb וחמ, “they struck.”  I base this reading on Talmudic usages that link this 
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something of a composite of the two options concerning the flow of water discussed 
above:  the block must be done away with, but the waters that this releases are far from 
unequivocally beneficent.  Rather, they are quintessentially ambivalent:  both mortally 
dangerous and indispensable for the further unfolding of the creative process.  
 
A second interpretation of this passage presents an even more radical possibility.  This 
second interpretation, which is suggested by the second “alternative translation” above, 
allocates the “cudgels of the serpent” not to the place where the “world endured” but 
rather as the means by which the letters penetrate the chasms.   This interpretation 
provides an intriguing link with the David narrative cited above.  David’s insistence on 
digging below the divinely implanted pottery, an act of hubris which some of the sources 
leave unexplained but to which the Midrash Tehilim implicitly attributes a desire for 
sexual conquest, seems to partake of a demonic character.  The noun kulfa, אפלוק, the 
instrument of the penetration of the “chasms,” has elsewhere in the Zohar an explicitly 
phallic meaning, indeed in a context of sexual impropriety;
109
 the term “chasms,” 
moreover, is here denoted by the possessive of the term אבקונ, which can also simply 
mean a female being.  In this reading, the penetration of the chasms is a demonically and 
erotically charged act, which threatens to destroy the cosmos.  Yet, it is a demonic act 
which is, at the same time, indispensable for the unfolding of the creative process.   
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Conclusion: 
 The Divine/Dunghill, or, 
The Self is the Other 
 
The confrontation with the demonic in the Zoharic tradition is an encounter with 
“Otherness,” with all its attendant fears, desires, violence, and hopes.  This 
characterization is by no means the imposition of a term familiar from recent academic 
jargon, but rather, is drawn from the key Zoharic name for the demonic, the Sitra Aḥra.  
Indeed, I would argue that the vicissitudes of the relationship to an Other who is both an 
intimate, and yet an absolute opponent, of the Self is one of the key guiding threads that 
runs through the Zoharic labyrinth as a whole.  The vast set of discourses and rituals 
concerned with evoking, naming, repressing, domesticating, annihilating, and embracing 
the demonic Other are central to the Zohar’s ontology, poetics, and, indeed, its 
reinterpretation of Judaism as a whole.   It is also my conviction that the Zohar’s 13th 
century discussions of the demonic have rich and complex consequences for current 
concerns about Otherness, whether of the interpersonal, ethnic, racial, national, gendered, 
or sexual varieties – though an elaboration of these consequences would take me far 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
    
I have sought here to explicate the diversity, ambivalence, and often contradictory quality 
of the Zohar’s portrayals of Otherness.  In particular, I have argued that the Zohar 
portrays the demonic Other as inextricably related to divine and human subjectivity, and 
have explored that relationship in terms of two main paradoxes.  In relation to the initial 
construction of subjectivity, the Other is both its precondition and the threat of its 
dissolution; in relation to the already-constituted subject, it is both a terrifying and 
fascinating double. These paradoxes inevitably required attention to the complex 
relations in Zoharic textuality between poetics and doctrine, form and substance, rhetoric 
and ontology. 
 
On one level, these concerns about the relationship of language and being are simply in 
keeping, not merely with kabbalistic discourse and ritual, but with a timeless tendency in 
the Jewish tradition, going back at least to Genesis.  However, when the very constitution 
of subjectivity, including divine subjectivity, is in question, these dynamics take on a 
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particularly fraught quality.  From the Zoharic perspective, the quintessential 
convergence of language and being in the Jewish tradition – Genesis 1:3’s “Let there be 
light” – cannot even be uttered until the epic battle with the demonic Other, in the person 
of the Great Dragon, has been engaged.  Divine speech itself, one might say, is thus only 
rendered possible through dangerous and never definitively decided struggles with 
Otherness.   
 
If speech depends on the outcome of such struggles, any attempt to portray them in 
language necessarily puts one in a paradoxical, if not impossible, position.  The stylistic 
distinctiveness of the Zohar – the heterogeneous imagery that defies phenomenal 
coherence, the trance-like schemes that shatter hermeneutic consistency – can be traced 
to this paradoxical condition.  The ever-present possibility of non-correspondence 
between signifier and signified is not simply due to some general ineffability of the 
deepest secrets, but rather, is a consequence of the perennial threats posed by the demonic 
Other to the articulation of a stable meaning by a coherent subject.  The Zohar portrays 
these threats, as I have shown, in terms of specific hazards, all of which have their 
rhetorical and ontological dimensions, including deception, seduction, and dissolution.  
But it also insists that engagement with the demonic is indispensable for linguistic and 
ontological creativity. 
 
In Chapter Two, I showed how the Zohar portrays the emergence of an elaborately 
structured demonic realm as inextricably bound up with the emergence of the holy realm, 
as an inevitable byproduct of the constitution of divine subjectivity through processes of 
abjection.  The links between theogony, cosmogony, abjection, and language are also 
evoked intriguingly in a non-Zoharic, kabbalistic appropriation of a Talmudic allegory, to 
which I made brief reference in that chapter. The allegory appears in the Talmud’s 
discussion of the opening Mishnah of the second chapter of the tractate Ḥagigah, a 
chapter known by its significant initial words, “One may not expound” [ןישרוד ןיא].  The 
Mishnah’s most well-known rules concern the severe restriction on the number of people 
to whom one may teach the most esoteric secrets, the Work of Creation [תישארב השעמ] 
and the Work of the Chariot [הבכרמ השעמ].  The allegory to which I refer, though, 
explains a later part of the Mishnah:    
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 אל וליאכ ול יותר םירבד העבראב לכתסמה לכ ... :]הנשמ[ המ הטמל המ הלעמל המ םלועל אב
 הוהד המ םינפל אלא ייחל רוחאל המ הטמל המ הלעמל המ אמלשב...]ארמג[... רוחאל המו םינפל
 ןיריטלפ יל ונב וידבעל רמאש םדו רשב ךלמל לשמ והייורת ירמאד רזעלא יברו ןנחוי יבר הוה
הפשא םש ריכזהל ךלמ לש ונוצר ןיא ול ונבו וכלה הפשאה לע ןילודג1 
 
[Mishnah]:  Anyone who contemplates four matters, it would have been better if 
he had not come into the world:  that which is above, that which is below, that 
which came before, that which will come after … [Gemara]… Granted: in 
relation to that which is above, that which is beneath, that which will come after, 
fine.  But as regards that which came before: what happened, happened! — Rabbi 
Yoḥanan and Resh Lakish both said: It may be compared to a king of flesh and 
blood who said to his servants: “Build for me a great palace upon the dunghill.”  
They went and built it for him. It is against the king's will to have the name of the 
dunghill mentioned [thenceforth]. 
 
The Talmud offers its “dunghill” allegory as an explanation of the Mishnah’s prohibition 
against inquiring “what was before” the world, in addition to prohibiting “what is above, 
what is below, and what will be after.”  It points out that, in contrast to the other three 
prohibitions, which are intended to restrict human knowledge, it is useless to prohibit 
knowledge of the past, because “what happened, happened.”  The allegory’s answer 
appears to be that the prohibition is not a restriction on knowledge, but a restriction on 
speech, indeed a definition of the proper boundaries of human speech.  On the temporal 
plane, those boundaries begin subsequent to the “dunghill” stage; on the structural, even 
architectural, plane, they begin above it.    
    
To be sure, in a performative contradiction, enacting the violation of the very prohibition 
it establishes, it is the allegory itself that tells us that God desired to build the cosmos on 
a dunghill.  Moreover, if, as seems probable, the “dunghill” of the allegory is a reference 
to the Tohu of the second verse in Genesis, then the allegory is also implicitly suggesting 
                                                 
1
 bḤagigah 11b, 16a . 
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that the Bible itself is engaged in such a violation.
2
  Like many restrictions on speech, it 
seems impossible to establish the prohibition without transgressing it.   
 
The allegory’s interpretation by the 14th century Sefer Ma’arekhet Ha-Elohut radically 
transforms its meaning – a transformation particularly striking when one recalls the 
general desire of this work to reconcile kabbalah and philosophy.  
 
 ולבק ךא ל"זר ירבדב אלו םיבותכב אלו םיאיבנב אלו הרותב אל זומר ונניא ונרכז רשא ףוס 'יאה יכ עדו
זמר תצק הדובעה ילעב וב. הפשאל ןינעה ולישמה .הפשאב אירטלפ הנבש םדאל לשמ ךרד דוע ורמאו..
גוסיו םמותשי וב לכתשהל םדא אב םאש ינפמ  תרדוג הבשחמה ןיאש ןינע לכ יכ הפשאה ומכ רוחא ונממ
.הפשאכ סואמ תויהל רזוח ללכ תלבוסו3 
 
And know that the En-Sof that we have mentioned is not hinted at in the Torah, the 
Prophets, the Writings, or in the words of our rabbis.  Nonetheless, the masters of the 
service have received a small allusion concerning it.  … [Here the Mishnaic passage 
above is cited].  And, moreover, they spoke in the manner of an allegory, comparing 
it to a man who built a palace on a dunghill.  They compared the matter to a dunghill 
because if a person comes to contemplate it, he will be overwhelmed and will retreat 
backwards from it as [from] a dunghill.  For every matter that thought cannot at all 
circumscribe and withstand becomes as repulsive as a dunghill. 
 
In a startling revision of the Talmudic passage, the “dunghill” of the allegory here 
becomes identified with the most primordial level of divinity, the En-Sof.  The creator-
king of the allegory no longer precedes the “dunghill” but is either identified with it as 
the En-Sof or, perhaps, is identified with a lower level of divinity than the dunghill/En-
Sof.  This reading thus requires a reinterpretation of the Talmudic phrase “that which is 
before”:  for the Ma’arekhet Ha-Elohut, the “before,” refers to the most primordial stage, 
the stage of the divine-as-dunghill, prior to the crystallization of the divine in forms 
amenable to human experience.  This ontological association, even identification, of the 
                                                 
2
 The implicit association of the dunghill with the biblical Tohu in this Talmudic passage is made explicit 
in a closely related text in Bereshit Rabah, I, 1d (1:5).  
3
 Sefer Ma'arekhet ha-Elohut, 131a.      
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abject with the primordial divine may be placed alongside the series of such portrayals in 
the Zohar.    
 
The consequences for the relationship between language and being are no less significant 
than for ontology itself.  In the Ma’arekhet Ha-Elohut, the prohibition on speaking of the 
“dunghill” becomes virtually irrelevant.  No prohibition is necessary, for the turning 
away from the highest level of the divine is a natural human reflex.  That which human 
thought cannot “circumscribe and withstand” is, by its very nature, as “repulsive as a 
dunghill.”  If a person attempted to contemplate it, he would become “overwhelmed and 
retreat backwards.”  This interpretation transforms the meaning of the allegory from a 
restriction on a human desire to speak about the primordial actions of the divine into a 
portrayal of the human revulsion from speaking about the primordial essence of the 
divine.  The assertion that the highest level of the divine can only appear to human beings 
as a “dunghill” converts rabbinic normativity into kabbalistic psychology, a portrayal of 
the threat posed to the subject when confronted with the genealogy of all subjectivity, 
even divine subjectivity, in abjection.  Taking the human and divine implications of the 
allegory together, one arrives at the following:  the primordial divine, the abject, must 
crystallize in a proper form in order to become the God of religion, the divine that can be 
an object of worship rather than of revulsion.  To be sure, there is still room in the 
Ma’arekhet Ha-Elohut to argue that the “dunghill” quality of the divine is a result of a 
human incapacity to perceive the divine rather than something in the essence of the 
divine.  The latter step, however, is overtly made in both the Lurianic and Zoharic 
readings of the allegory. 
 
There are several explicit interpretations of the allegory by writers in late Lurianic texts.
4
 
These interpretations read the “dunghill” as referring to the dregs and refuse that are 
present in the seven lower sefirot, the vessels that “break” during the first series of 
emanations.  The cosmos is “built on the dunghill” in the sense that it can only be firmly 
established after the dregs and refuse contained in the seven broken vessels have been 
                                                 
Sefer Afike section); Ḥaver,  Ḥadash ZoharTikune (32b , Commentary Zohar-Tikune Ha, Gaon of Vilna 4
Yam, 205;  Yosef Ḥayim ben Eliyau, Sefer Ben Yehoyada, III, 49b. 
  
 
273 
 
purified.
5
  These readings thus combine aspects of the uses of the “dunghill” image in 
both the Talmud and the Ma’arekhet Ha-Elohut.  They preserve the notion that it is an 
affront to the dignity of God to speak about the impurities that precede the divinely 
created world (as in the Talmudic allegory) as well as the notion that the “dunghill” may 
be identified with an aspect of the divine itself (as in the Ma’arekhet Ha-Elohut, but even 
more boldly).  To my mind, the persuasive strength of these readings is such that they 
might even suggest that the entire Lurianic notion of cosmic history as a tikun of broken 
vessels can be traced to an ancient tradition hinted at by the Talmud’s “dunghill” 
allegory.
6
    
    
How should the Zohar be situated among these options?  The Zohar contains no explicit 
mention of the dunghill allegory or any identification of the word “dunghill” with the 
divine.  Nonetheless, one may read Zoharic texts like those portraying the “the Kings of 
Edom,” the precursors of the broken Lurianic “vessels” whose “repair” is identical to the 
construction of our cosmos, as implicitly referring to it.   Indeed, the opening section of 
the Idra Raba may be read as closely related, in the very details of its order of exposition, 
to the Talmudic passage cited above. The Idra Raba, one of the boldest mystical and 
mythological sections of the Zohar, is prefaced by a long discussion of the prohibition on 
revealing the deepest secrets as well as of the simultaneous necessity of doing so. 
Following this preface, we are told that the “place shook and the Companions shuddered” 
[ולחלחתא ןירבחו ,ארתא עזעדזא]7 – a destabilization indicating that the secrets about to be 
expounded concern the most primordial levels of the cosmos, prior to its firm foundation.  
Rabbi Shim’on then commences the Idra’s first substantive exposition by quoting the 
verse about the Kings of Edom and proclaiming that it contains the deepest secrets.  In a 
seemingly ironic reversal, however, he then exclaims that, on first reading, the verse 
seems pointless:  “this verse is difficult and it should not have been thus written, since we 
see how many kings there were, prior to the arrival of the Children of Israel and prior to 
                                                 
5
 I am using this verb here as convenient shorthand for differently conceived processes in different texts. 
6
 The midrash about the divine creation and destruction of worlds before the creation of the present world 
would also form a link in this tradition.  It does not, however, explicitly state the notion that the present 
world is constructed out of, or on, the refuse of the destroyed worlds. 
7
 Zohar III, 128a 
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there being a king for the Children of Israel!” [  םיכלמ המכ ןניזח אהד ,יכה בתכמל היל הוה אלד
לארשי ינבל אכלמ אהי אלד דעו ,לארשי ינב ןותיי אלד דע ,ווה]. 8   
 
The order of exposition here tracks very closely that in the Talmudic passage.  The Idra 
begins with a discussion of the dangers of revealing secrets – just as the restrictive 
Mishnah “One May not Expound” is the preface to the boldest mystical and mythological 
pages in the Talmud. The specific matter which induces this overwhelming effect 
concerns the archaic past, the primordial Kings of Edom – evoking the Talmudic “what 
came before.” Although the Zoharic challenge to the import of speaking about the past is 
the converse in form to that posed by the Talmud, it is very close in substance:  i.e., since 
the past is known to all, the premise explicitly stated by both texts, there seems no point 
in either restricting speech about it (the Talmud’s question) or even speaking about it at 
all (the Zohar’s question).  In the Idra, there then follows a narrative explanation of how 
the past, here the death of the Kings, concerns the most primordial divine processes – 
evoking the Talmud’s proceeding to its dunghill allegory.   
 
And here the Zohar’s story diverges from that of the Talmud in a direction similar to the 
Ma’rekhet Ha-Elohut, but making the ontological dimension more explicit – though in a 
way that brings out the darker side of the Talmudic allegory itself.  The Talmudic 
allegory tells us that the “dunghill” is linguistically concealed by the divine prohibition to 
speak of it, out of respect for the honor of the king.  By contrast, the Zohar tells us that 
the Kings who perished were ontologically hidden away by Atika Kadisha, as a necessary 
step before he could proceed to a proper construction of the cosmos.
9
  Most strikingly and 
theologically scandalously, the Zohar declares that the reason for the perishing of the 
Kings lay in the defective state of Atika Kadisha himself, in the fact that he had was not 
properly prepared in his tikunin and therefore produced defective creations.
10
   
 
                                                 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 “Until He put them aside and hid them” [והל ענצאו והל חנאד דע].  Ibid. 
10
 See, e.g., Zohar III, 128a: 
 אוה אדה ,וברחתא ןימלע והלכו ,אנקתתאל ועבד ןוניא לכ ונקתתא אל ,יונוקתב אוה ןקתתא אל דעד ,ןימוי קיתעמ ,ןלנמ
דרועב ןב עלב םודאב ךולמיו )םש( ביתכ: 
Whence [do we know this]?  From the Ancient of Days, for until he was rectified in his tikunin, all 
those who needed to be rectified were not rectified, and all the worlds were destroyed.  This is as 
is written, “And there reigned in Edom Bela son of Be’or” [Genesis 36:32].    
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This last explanation clarifies a mystery I have so far left unexplored in the Talmudic 
allegory itself:  its silence as to the reason that the King desired to build his palace on a 
dunghill, a desire of which he seems to feel ashamed.  This desire, key to the Talmudic 
allegory, itself hints at a primordially abject divine subjectivity, its intimate, archaic 
connection with “dung.” This primordially flawed nature of divine subjectivity is finally 
made explicit centuries later in the Idra Raba.  Reading these texts together, we find that 
the most unspeakable and deepest secret of the Jewish esoteric tradition, first broached in 
the Talmud, is that the primordial divine is inextricably related to, indeed 
indistinguishable from, the abject – and that the simultaneous desire for the abject and 
revulsion from it, experienced by the divine subject itself, is an effect of their common 
origin.    
    
As I have shown throughout this thesis, the abject is “unspeakable,” both because of its 
miasmic state and because of the revulsion and horror it evokes.  Encounters with it 
provoke linguistic and ontological dissolution.   The effort to segregate it, however 
pyrrhic, is indispensable for the construction of the divine subject and thus of the cosmos.  
The Talmudic King forbids us to speak of it; the Ma’arekhet Ha-Elohut describes the 
dissolution of any subject who would approach it; the Idra Raba tells us that Atika 
Kadisha thoroughly concealed its byproducts [והל ענצאו].11 Yet, the Zohar teaches us, 
such efforts also yield a crystallized form of the abject, the structured realm of the 
demonic with its own sefirot and partsufim.  The two realms then come to double each 
other, and to engage in fraught relations of enmity, nurturance, seduction, and 
impersonation.   
 
I thus now turn from the most radical articulation of abjection, the primordial divine-as-
dunghill, to the most radical consequence of its crystallization.  And here, drawing 
together a number of hints scattered throughout the thesis, I would suggest that this 
consequence is the notion that the demonic, even in its crystallized, separately nameable 
state, is another dimension of the divine – or, to put it as starkly as possible, that the 
Devil is another face of God.  I have already given several examples of this possibility:  
                                                 
11
 Zohar III, 128a. 
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Lilith as the Shekhinah in her initial, defective state; the diabolical, Esau-like Red-Haired 
Ze’er as the initial, defective state of the holy, shaven Ze’er, the divine “Ish,” itself a 
lesser form of the divine “Adam”;12 and the Tikune Ha-Zohar’s image of the vengeful 
kelipah as the transmogrified God.  One could add images from Lurianic kabbalah, such 
as the notion that the nine sefirot of Malkhut shift back and forth from divine to demonic 
forms, discussed in Chapter Three. 
 
I would also add one more image, suggested by Yehudah Liebes, and related to my brief 
discussion in this Conclusion of the opening passage of the Idra Raba.  Liebes speculates 
that the passage comes very close to identifying Edom, the realm of the Kings destined to 
perish, with the unrectified Atika Kadisha himself.
13
   I recall that the passage explicitly 
lays the blame for the production of a defective cosmos, the realm of the Kings who 
“ruled in the land of Edom,” on Atika himself, the Atika who is not “prepared in his 
tikunin.”  In accordance with Liebes’ reading, we should read the “of” here as possessive, 
the land belonging to a figure called “Edom” – who must be none other than the 
(defective) creator of the “Kings,” the flawed Atika.  Like the proposal made by Wolfson 
that the “red-haired Ze’er” may be associated with Esau, this is a shocking suggestion, 
given the close associations in the Zohar between Sama’el and both Esau and Edom.  
Indeed, Liebes can only footnote a Sabbatean text for explicit support for this reading.
14
  
Nonetheless, given the Idra’s insistence that the defective state of the Kings of Edom 
reflects the defective state of their creator, the suggestion seems “only one step” beyond 
the explicit text, as Liebes declares.  Taking the suggestions by Wolfson and Liebes 
together, the metaphysical Edom who is the quintessential adversary to the divine is the 
divine itself in its primordial state, a state it both desires and seeks to repress.  Transposed 
to the human domain, an analogous set of notions applied to the earthly Edom, who 
always symbolizes in Jewish tradition the quintessential adversary of Israel, would have 
complicated political and ethical consequences beyond the scope of this work. 
 
                                                 
12
 I take this notion from Wolfson, ‘Light through Darkness: The Ideal of Human Perfection in the Zohar’,  
81 n. 29. 
13
 Liebes, ‘Ha-Mythos Ha-Kabbali be-fi Orpheus’, 30. 
14
 Ibid., n. 89.  The text is Va-Avo Ha-Yom el Ha-Ayin, often attributed to Yonatan Eybeschutz. 
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The ultimate teaching about the Sitra Aḥra would thus be that the demonic Other is the 
primordial condition of the holy Subject (human, national, or divine).  As the name Sitra 
Aḥra suggests, the Other haunts the subject as its secret, never definitively locked away 
in a sealed-off temporal or geographical elsewhere, rendering its annihilation or 
incorporation forever impossible.  It is thus far from gratuitous that both the Talmud and 
the Zohar attribute the deepest secrets to “that which came before”:  for in that primordial 
past lie secrets that can make the “earth shake and the companions shudder.”  It is the 
secret, to use a favorite Zoharic rhetorical scheme, that “there is a Self, and there is a 
Self,” that “there is an Other, and there is an Other,” and that splitting both makes the 
cosmos possible and forever shakes it to its core.  
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